Taylor v. Chase Bank

Filing 4

ORDER SCREENING Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint; ORDER DIRECTING Clerk to Issue Summons and New Case Documents signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 6/18/2015. (Sant Agata, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JEFFREY WAYNE TAYLOR,

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Plaintiff,

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v.
CHASE BANK,

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Defendant.

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1:13-cv-00982-AWI-BAM
ORDER SCREENING PLAINTIFF’S
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO ISSUE
SUMMONS AND NEW CASE
DOCUMENTS

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Plaintiff Jeffrey Taylor (“Plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se in this action for monetary

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damages against Defendant Chase Bank. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged Chase Bank committed

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violations of the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act, Pub.L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)

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(“Dodd-Frank Act”), the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2605 (“RESPA”),

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and the Truth in Lending Act, 12 C.F.R. Part 226 (“TILA”) (Doc. 3). After filing his complaint,

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Plaintiff paid the filing fee.1 The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s initial complaint with leave to

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amend. (Doc. 3). Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is now before the Court for screening.

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Although Plaintiff paid the filing fee, the Court may raise issues such as jurisdiction and whether a
complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted sua sponte. See Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc.,
631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (subject matter jurisdiction); Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361-62 (9th Cir. 1981)
(failure to state a claim).

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SCREENING REQUIREMENT

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The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the plaintiff has raised claims

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that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

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granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. If

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the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to

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the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith,

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203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court looks to the pleading

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standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain

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“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the

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elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations

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are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart

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Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires

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sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable

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for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted);

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Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility

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that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short

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of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks

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omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

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DISCUSSION

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In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on three separate occasions, Defendant

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violated the Truth in Lending Act section 1642(f)(2) and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures

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Act (“RESPA”) when Defendant failed to respond to his Qualified Written Request’s (“QWR”)

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seeking information about his mortgage. Plaintiff alleges that on August 7, 2012, October 19,
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2012, and January 8, 2013, he requested information about title assignments and the name of the

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entity that currently owns the note.

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Plaintiff seeks damages of $2,000 for each of the RESPA time violations and $4,000 for
each of the TILA time violations for a total of $18,000 in monetary damages.

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A servicer’s failure to respond to a QWR as required entitles a borrower to recover actual

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damages, as well as statutory damages in cases showing a “pattern or practice of

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noncompliance.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f). The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, supra, changed the

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maximum award of statutory damages for a “pattern or practice” of violation from $1,000 to

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$2,000. See Pub. L. 111-203, § 1463(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2184.

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In order to state a claim for a violation of RESPA QWR provisions, the borrower must

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demonstrate (1) a written request that meets RESPA’s definition of a QWR, (2) the servicer

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failed to perform its duties, and (3) actual damages. See Medrano v. Flagstar Bank, 704 F.3d

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661, 666 (9th Cir. 2012).

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Similarly, §1641(f)(2) of TILA provides, in part, that “[u]pon written request by the

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obligor, the servicer shall provide the obligor, to the best knowledge of the servicer, with the

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name, address, and telephone number of the owner of the obligation or the master servicer of the

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obligation.” 15 U.S.C. § 1641(f)(2). TILA establishes a private right of action against creditors

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and assignees for violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1641(f)(2). See Consumer Solutions REO, LLC v.

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Hillery, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1437, 2010 WL 14988, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding “TILA

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allows for a suit against a creditor or an assignee but not a servicer except under narrow

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circumstances”); Fullmer v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3551, 2010 WL

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95206, at *9 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that TILA “establishes a private of action and provides

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for statutory damages for violations of TILA only against the creditor (the owner of the

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obligation) and assignees”).

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Chase Bank is liable under RESPA and TILA for failing

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to respond to his requests for information.

Liberally construed, this Court finds that, for

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purposes of pro se screening, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a cause of action for violations of

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the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2605 (“RESPA”), and the Truth in
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Lending Act, 12 C.F.R. Part 226 (“TILA”). More specifically, Plaintiff contends he submitted

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written requests following the guidelines set forth under section 6 of RESPA and 1641(f)(2) of

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TILA and Defendant failed to perform its duties, which caused Plaintiff actual damages.

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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint states a cognizable claim for violations of

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RESPA and TILA.
CONCLUSION

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Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

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Bank;

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The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to issue and serve Plaintiff with New Case
Documents, including setting an Initial Scheduling Conference;

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The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to issue summons as to the defendant, Chase

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Plaintiff is cautioned that he must achieve service of process within the time
period set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 or the matter may be dismissed.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

/s/ Barbara

June 18, 2015

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A. McAuliffe

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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