Sutton v. Management & Training Corporation (MTC)

Filing 118

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE CASES FOR TRIAL, Jury Trial currently set for 9/26/2017 is moved to 9/19/2017 at 08:30 AM in Courtroom 2 (AWI) before District Judge Anthony W. Ishii, signed by District Judge Anthony W. Ishii on 8/7/2017. (Kusamura, W)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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JOSEPH USUNUBU ALUYA,
Plaintiff,

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vs.
MANAGEMENT & TRAINING
CORPORATION, and DOES 1-9,

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CASE NO. 1:13-CV-1345-AWI-JLT
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
CONSOLIDATE CASES FOR TRIAL
(Doc. No. 92)

Defendants.

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DEMOND HAMMOND,

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Plaintiff,

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vs.
MANAGEMENT & TRAINING
CORPORATION, and DOES 1-9,

CASE NO. 1:13-CV-1209-AWI-JLT
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
CONSOLIDATE CASES FOR TRIAL
(Doc. Nos. 99)

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Defendants.

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BRUCE DWIGHT SUTTON,

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Plaintiff,

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vs.
MANAGEMENT & TRAINING
CORPORATION, and DOES 1-9,

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Defendants.

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CASE NO. 1:13-CV-1344-AWI-JLT
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
CONSOLIDATE CASES FOR TRIAL
(Doc. No. 100)

In three separate but similar cases, Joseph Usunubu Aluya (“Aluya”), Demond

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Hammond (“Hammond”), and Bruce Dwight Sutton (“Sutton), (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) make

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claims against Defendant Management & Training Corporation (“MTC”) after allegedly

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contracting Valley Fever while inmates at Taft Correctional Institution (“TCI”), which is

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operated by MTC. Plaintiffs allege three negligence causes of action against MTC. On June 28,

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2017, the parties appeared at a pretrial conference before the Court. Doc. No. 95. At the pretrial

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conference, counsel for Plaintiffs raised the issue of consolidation of the cases for trial. On July

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14, 2017, the parties appeared by phone at a status conference before the Court regarding

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consolidation, and the parties agreed to a briefing schedule for Plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate.

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Doc. No. 98. Having now reviewed the briefing from both parties, the Court will grant

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Plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate for the reasons that follow.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

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All Plaintiffs allege they contracted Valley Fever while incarcerated at TCI due to the

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negligence of MTC. All Plaintiffs were incarcerated at TCI during relatively close time periods.

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All Plaintiffs allege that MTC was negligent in failing to implement preventative measures to

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reduce the risk of infection in light of the danger of contracting Valley Fever in the area where

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TCI is located.

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PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION

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A. Plaintiffs’ Arguments

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Plaintiffs argue, inter alia, that their cases are materially identical in all aspects, save

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damages. All three cases involve the same Defendant, MTC, the same lawyers, almost all of the

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same witness, the same theories of liability, and the same experts. Plaintiffs argue that three

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separate trials would involve unnecessary cost and delay in calling the same witnesses and

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experts three separate times to provide repetitive testimony.

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B. MTC’s Arguments

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MTC argues, inter alia, that a consolidated trial would be prejudicial and confusing to the

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jury. MTC argues that causation and damages will be different for each Plaintiff. MTC argues

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that each Plaintiff was at TCI for a different amount of time, spent different amounts of time

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outside, had differences in their use of dust masks and understandings of warnings, and claim

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widely different damages. MTC does not deny that there are some overlapping issues in this case

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that were raised at summary judgment.
C. Discussion

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LEGAL STANDARD

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Pursuant to Rule 42(a) addressing consolidation: “If actions before the court involve a

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common question of law or fact, the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at

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issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orders to avoid

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unnecessary cost or delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). Under Rule 42, the Court has “broad

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discretion” to consolidate cases pending in the same district either upon motion by a party or sua

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sponte. In re Adams Apple., Inc., 829 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1987). In exercising this

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discretion, the Court “weighs the saving of time and effort consolidation would produce against

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any inconvenience, delay, or expense that it would cause.” Huene v. United States, 743 F.2d

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703, 704 (9th Cir. 1984).

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A. Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate Over Individual Questions

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The case of Young v. City of Augusta, 59 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 1995), is instructive.

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Young involved a Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against prison officials for improper

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treatment of her mental health condition. Plaintiff Young alleged that the City of Augusta failed

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to adequately select or train jail personnel to deal with inmates suffering from mental illness. Id.

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at 1165. Plaintiff sought to consolidate her case with the case of another of her attorney's clients

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who also brought an Eighth Amendment claim against the City. Id. at 1165. The court found

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that there were differences between the two actions in that each plaintiff alleged a different set of

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facts concerning his or her particular medical needs and the responses made by jail employees.
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Id. at 1168. However the court expressly rejected the magistrate judge's finding that there were

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no common issues of law or fact in the cases and reasoned that consolidation would have been

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appropriate. Id. at 1168-1169. According to the court, consolidation of both cases would have

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made sense. Id. at 1170. Both actions contained the same allegations of deliberate indifference

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to Plaintiffs' medical needs by jail officials. Id. Both actions claimed a city custom, practice, or

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policy of deliberate indifference in providing mental health treatment. Id. The core issue of

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liability was whether the city could be held accountable for Plaintiffs' alleged constitutional

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deprivations. Id. Both cases were assigned to the same district judge and followed a similar

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course of development. Id. at 1169. In both actions the parties would have to prove the same

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elements to establish their claims. Id.
In this case, all the Plaintiffs bring identical claims for negligence causes of action

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against the same Defendant, MTC, who managed the same prison facility, TCI, after Plaintiffs

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allegedly contracting Valley Fever at TCI. All three cases are before the same district judge and

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have followed a similar course of development, with uniform decisions on summary judgment.

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Some small factual differences exist in Plaintiffs’ cases, such as who asked for a dust mask or

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who saw a poster on Valley Fever. However, Plaintiffs share the same core issues of whether

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MTC breached the duty of care it owed to Plaintiffs and whether this breach caused Plaintiffs to

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contract Valley Fever and the related suffering and costs associated with this condition. The

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main thrust of Plaintiffs’ cases goes to the practices and procedures that MTC had in place to

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protect inmates from the dangers of contracting Valley Fever and whether such practices were

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reasonable. These are universal questions to all three Plaintiffs, making consolidation

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appropriate here. The question is whether the benefits of consolidating the cases for trial

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outweigh the potential prejudice to the parties.
B. The Value of Consolidation Outweighs Any Argument of Prejudice Here

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In Finder v. Leprino Foods Co., 2016 WL 6875259 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2016) this Court

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granted plaintiff’s motion for consolidation, finding that “Litigating the two actions together is

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likely to conserve judicial resources and decrease the likelihood of inconsistent factual or legal

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determinations.” Id. at *5; see also Morgan v. Napolitano, 2012 WL 4755034, at *2 (E.D. Cal.
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Oct. 4, 2012) (granting consolidation where two trials would “present a significant risk of

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inconsistent verdicts”).
The Plaintiffs are currently scheduled for three consecutive trials. The parties’ exhibit

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lists for each trial are nearly identical, with the exception of each Plaintiffs’ medical records.

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The parties’ witness lists are also nearly identical, with the exception of each Plaintiff and a few

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witnesses who may be called on behalf of an individual Plaintiff. For example, if three separate

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trials are held, the following witnesses will apparently be called three separate times:

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1. Dr. Royce Johnson (Plaintiff’s expert);

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2. Peter Jaramillo (Plaintiff’s expert);

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3. Dr. George Thompson (Defendant’s expert);

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4. Burnett Rucker, M.D. (Defendant Party Affiliate witness);

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5. Lori Watts (Defendant Party Affiliate witness);

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6. Michael Benov (Defendant Party Affiliate witness);

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7. Dan Jones (Defendant Party Affiliate witness);

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8. Diana Cormier (third party witness & government employee);

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9. Kirt Emery (third party witness & County of Kern government official);

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10. Dr. James Pelton (out-of-state third party witness & government employee);

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11. Dr. Newton Kendig (out-of-state third party witness & former top government official);

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12. Dr. Lauren Burwell (third party witness & government employee);

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13. Custodian of records, MTC (Defendant Party Affiliate witness);

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14. Custodian of records, Kern County Dept. of Public Health (third party witness &
government employee); and

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15. Custodian of records, Bureau of Prisons (third party witness & government employee).

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See Pretrial Order in each of the three cases: Doc. No. 89 (Aluya); Doc. No. 96 (Hammond);

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Doc. No. 97 (Sutton). Calling 15 identical witnesses three times in a row and examining almost

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identical exhibits three times in a row is not a conservation of judicial resources.1 Further, since

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The Court notes that MTC’s filings in this case specific to each Plaintiff have been substantially similar.

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key questions of law of fact are common to all three cases, there is a high risk here of

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inconsistent verdicts.
The Court finds that any risk of prejudice is minimal and outweighed by the benefits of

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consolidation. First, there is almost no risk of delay here since the separate trials were scheduled

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for three consecutive weeks. Therefore consolidating the trials is an insignificant delay of at

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most one to two weeks. The Court can also provide cautionary instructions to the jury to reduce

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the risk of confusion or prejudice. See, e.g., Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281, 1284 (2d

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Cir. 1990) (“When considering consolidation, a court should also note that the risks of prejudice

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and confusion may be reduced by the use of cautionary instructions to the jury and verdict sheets

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outlining the claims of each plaintiff.”); Lewis v. City of Fresno, 2009 WL 1948918, at *1 (E.D.

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Cal. July 6, 2009) (same). Therefore, the Court will order Plaintiffs’ cases consolidated for trial.

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ORDER

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1. Plaintiff’s Motions to Consolidate the Aluya, Hammond and Sutton cases for trial is
GRANTED;

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2. The Court will issue an amended Pretrial Order with the hearing date for the

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consolidated trial beginning on September 19, 2017; and

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3. The Clerk of the Court shall file this decision in each separate case:

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Aluya v. Management & Training Corp. 13cv1345;

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Hammond v. Management & Training Corp. 13cv1209; and

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Sutton v. Management & Training Corp. 13cv1344.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 7, 2017
SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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