Palacios v. Benov
Filing
23
FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS recommending that 19 Respondent's Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 6/6/2014. Referred to Judge O'Neill. Objections to F&R due within thirty (30) days. (Jessen, A)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 JAIME PALACIOS,
Case No. 1:13-cv-01531-LJO-BAM-HC
12
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
GRANT RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS THE PETITION (DOC. 19)
13
14
15
16
Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL L. BENOV,
Respondent.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
DISMISS THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AS MOOT (DOC. 1)
AND TO DIRECT THE CLERK TO CLOSE
THE ACTION
OBJECTIONS DEADLINE: 30 DAYS
17
18
19
Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma
20 pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
21 U.S.C. § 2241.
The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge
22 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 through 304.
23 Pending before the Court is the Respondent’s motion to dismiss the
24 petition as moot, which was filed on March 3, 2014, and supported
25 with documentation submitted on March 26, 2014.
26 opposition to the motion on March 17, 2014.
Petitioner filed
Although the time for
27 filing a reply has passed, no reply has been filed.
Further,
28 Petitioner did not take the opportunity to file supplemental
1
1 opposition after the Respondent’s supporting documentation was
2 filed.
3
I.
Background
4
Petitioner, an inmate of the Taft Correctional Institution
5 (TCI), challenges the disallowance of forty-one days of good conduct
6 time credit that Petitioner suffered as a result of prison
7 disciplinary findings, initially made at TCI on or about December
8 29, 2011, that he engaged in prohibited conduct by possessing a
9 hazardous tool (a cell phone) on or about November 19, 2011.
10 doc. 1 at 9, 13-14.)
(Pet.,
Petitioner challenges the loss of credit and
11 seeks invalidation of the sanction.
12 claims in the petition:
Petitioner raises the following
1) because the disciplinary hearing officer
13 (DHO) was not an employee of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and
14 thus lacked the authority to conduct the disciplinary hearing and
15 make findings resulting in punishment, including disallowance of
16 good time credit, Petitioner suffered a violation of his right to
17 due process of law; and 2) because the hearing officer was not an
18 employee of the BOP but rather was an employee of a private entity
19 with a financial interest in the disallowance of good time credits,
20 Petitioner’s due process right to an independent and impartial
21 decision maker at the disciplinary hearing was violated.
(Id. at 3-
22 9.)
23
Respondent moves for dismissal of the petition as moot because
24 the disciplinary charges were reheard via teleconference on February
25 27, 2014, by a certified disciplinary hearing officer of the BOP.
26 At the rehearing, Petitioner admitted the violation.
The BOP DHO
27 found that Petitioner had committed the prohibited misconduct, and
28 she assessed the same disallowance of good conduct time credit
2
1 (forty-one days), but she reduced the time of administrative
2 segregation and loss of telephone privileges.
(Decl., doc. 22, 2-4;
3 attchmt. 4, doc. 22, 19-21.)
4
II.
Mootness
5
Federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide cases that are moot
6 because the courts= constitutional authority extends to only actual
7 cases or controversies.
8 U.S. 67, 70-71 (1983).
Iron Arrow Honor Society v. Heckler, 464
Article III requires a case or controversy
9 in which a litigant has a personal stake in the outcome of the suit
10 throughout all stages of federal judicial proceedings and has
11 suffered some actual injury that can be redressed by a favorable
12 judicial decision.
Id.
A petition for writ of habeas corpus
13 becomes moot when it no longer presents a case or controversy under
14 Article III, ' 2 of the Constitution.
15 477, 479 (9th Cir. 2003).
Wilson v. Terhune, 319 F.3d
A petition for writ of habeas corpus is
16 moot where a petitioner=s claim for relief cannot be redressed by a
17 favorable decision of the court issuing a writ of habeas corpus.
18 Burnett v. Lampert, 432 F.3d 996, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting
19 Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)).
20 jurisdictional.
Mootness is
See, Cole v. Oroville Union High School District,
21 228 F.3d 1092, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2000).
Thus, a moot petition must
22 be dismissed because nothing remains before the Court to be
23 remedied.
24
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18.
Here, documentation submitted by Respondent in support of the
25 motion to dismiss demonstrates that the claims initially alleged by
26 Petitioner are no longer in controversy.
The charges were reheard
27 by an officer who had the very qualifications that Petitioner had
28 alleged were required by principles of due process of law and the
3
1 pertinent regulations.
It is undisputed that the findings and
2 sanctions that constituted the object of Petitioner’s challenges in
3 the petition have now been superseded by the findings and sanctions
4 of the certified BOP DHO.
5
When, because of intervening events, a court cannot give any
6 effectual relief in favor of the petitioner, the proceeding should
7 be dismissed as moot.
Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996).
8 In the present case, it appears that the only relief that Petitioner
9 sought was invalidation of the findings and associated sanctions.
10 It appears that the rehearing of the incident report by an
11 indisputably qualified DHO has effectuated the relief sought by
12 Petitioner.
Thus, it is no longer possible for this Court to issue
13 a decision redressing the injury.
14
Petitioner argues that the controversy is not moot because the
15 rehearing was part of disciplinary proceedings that were wholly
16 invalid or unconstitutional.
The asserted invalidity is based on
17 the fact that in the earlier stages of the disciplinary process,
18 employees of the private prison management company, who did not
19 constitute BOP staff, participated in violation of various
20 regulations, including 28 C.F.R. § 541.5, which requires “staff” to
21 witness or suspect a violation and issue an incident report, 28
22 C.F.R. § 541.5(a); requires a “Bureau staff member” to investigate
23 the incident report, 28 C.F.R. § 541.5(b); and directs that it is
24 “staff” who ordinarily serve on a unit disciplinary committee, a
25 body which considers disciplinary charges before the charges are
26 heard by a DHO, § 541.7(b).
Petitioner argues that the hearing and
27 rehearing process evinced deliberate indifference to his liberties
28 and violated his Fifth Amendment right to equal protection of the
4
1 laws and his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
2 unusual punishment.
3
However, the documentation attached to the petition shows that
4 the BOP DHO considered not only the incident report and
5 investigation, but also photographic evidence and Petitioner’s
6 repeated admissions of the truth of the incident report made during
7 the investigation, at a unit disciplinary hearing, and at the
8 rehearing before the BOP DHO.
(Doc. 22, 19-20.)
The photographs
9 and Petitioner’s repeated admissions provide strong and independent
10 support for the finding of misconduct and also undercut Petitioner’s
11 general allegation that he suffered a taint from the earlier stages
12 of the disciplinary process.
13
Further, the documentation establishes that Petitioner received
14 all procedural due process due under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
15 539 (1974).
Procedural due process of law requires that where the
16 state has made good time subject to forfeiture only for serious
17 misbehavior, then prisoners subject to a loss of good-time credits
18 must be given advance written notice of the claimed violation, a
19 right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence where it
20 would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or
21 correctional goals, and a written statement of the finder of fact as
22 to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for disciplinary action
23 taken.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 563-64.
Further, if the
24 inmate is illiterate, or the issue so complex that it is unlikely
25 that the inmate will be able to collect and present the evidence
26 necessary for an adequate comprehension of the case, the inmate
27 should have access to help from staff or a sufficiently competent
28 inmate designated by the staff.
However, confrontation, cross5
1 examination, and counsel are not required.
2 70.
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 568-
Where good-time credits are a protected liberty interest, the
3 decision to revoke credits must also be supported by some evidence
4 in the record.
5
Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).
Here, Petitioner’s admission of responsibility precludes any
6 claim of a lack of evidence to support the disciplinary finding.
7 Likewise, the documentation shows that Petitioner received adequate
8 notice; waived witnesses, staff representation, and presentation of
9 evidence; and received a written statement of the decision.
10 22, 12-21.)
(Doc.
In light of these circumstances, it does not appear
11 that Petitioner suffered any prejudice from either participation of
12 non-BOP staffers in the earlier stages of the disciplinary process
13 or any delay experienced in the course of the rehearing process.
14
It is recognized that generally a failure to meet a prison
15 guideline regarding a disciplinary hearing would not alone
16 constitute a denial of due process.
17 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1989).
See Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d
In the absence of controlling
18 authority, the Court notes that several courts have concluded that
19 to establish a denial of due process of law, prejudice is generally
20 required.
See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)
21 (proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254); see also Tien v. Sisto,
22 Civ. No. 2:07 cv-02436-VAP (HC), 2010 WL 1236308, at *4 (E.D.Cal.
23 Mar. 26, 2010) (recognizing that while neither the United States
24 Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has spoken on
25 the issue, numerous federal Courts of Appeals, as well as courts in
26 this district, have held that a prisoner must show prejudice to
27 state a habeas claim based on an alleged due process violation in a
28 disciplinary proceeding, and citing Pilgrim v. Luther, 571 F.3d 201,
6
1 206 (2d Cir. 2009); Howard v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 487
2 F.3d 808, 813 (10th Cir. 2007); Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666
3 (7th Cir. 2003); Elkin v. Fauver, 969 F.2d 48, 53 (3d Cir. 1992);
4 Poon v. Carey, no. Civ. S 05 0801 JAM EFB P, 2008 WL 5381964, *5
5 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 22, 2008); and Gonzalez v. Clark, no. 1:07 CV 0220
6 AWI JMD HC, 2008 WL 4601495, at *4 (E.D.Cal. Oct. 15, 2008)); see
7 also Smith v. United States Parole Commission, 875 F.2d 1361, 13688 69 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding in a § 2241 proceeding that a prisoner
9 challenging the government’s delayed compliance with a procedural
10 regulation that required counsel to be appointed before a record
11 review in parole revocation proceedings was required to demonstrate
12 prejudice to be entitled to habeas relief); Standlee v. Rhay, 557
13 F.2d 1303, 1307-08 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that burden is on a
14 parolee to demonstrate that failure to permit a witness’s live
15 testimony at a revocation hearing was so prejudicial as to violate
16 due process).
17
In summary, the claims in the petition before the Court are no
18 longer subject to redress by the Court.
Further, the factual
19 accuracy of the findings on rehearing are undisputed, the record
20 establishes that Petitioner received procedural due process of law,
21 and there is no indication that Petitioner suffered any legally
22 cognizable prejudice.
23
Although Petitioner now alleges that other details of the early
24 stages of the prison’s disciplinary program are contrary to
25 regulation, the Court concludes that in light of the foregoing
26 analysis, it does not appear that these aspects of Petitioner’s
27 confinement bear any relationship to the legality or duration of
28
7
1 Petitioner’s confinement and thus do not fall within the core of
2 habeas corpus jurisdiction.
A federal court may not entertain an action over which it has
3
4 no jurisdiction.
5
6
7
8
2000).
Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir.
Relief by way of a writ of habeas corpus extends to a person
in custody under the authority of the United States if the
petitioner can show that he is “in custody in violation of the
9 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
10 § 2241(c)(1) & (3).
28 U.S.C.
A habeas corpus action is the proper mechanism
11 for a prisoner to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement.
12
13
14
15
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973); Tucker v. Carlson,
925 F.2d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding in a Bivens1 action that a
claim that time spent serving a state sentence should have been
16 credited against a federal sentence concerned the fact or duration
17 of confinement and thus should have been construed as a petition for
18 writ of habeas corpus pursuant to ' 28 U.S.C. ' 2241, but that to the
19
extent that the complaint sought damages for civil rights
20
violations, it should be construed as a Bivens action); Crawford v.
21
22 Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 891B892 (9th Cir. 1979) (upholding dismissal of
23 a petition challenging conditions of confinement and noting that the
24 writ of habeas corpus has traditionally been limited to attacks upon
25
26
27
28
the legality or duration of confinement); see, Greenhill v. Lappin,
376 Fed. Appx. 757, 757-58 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (holding
1
The reference is to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
8
1 that the appropriate remedy for a federal prisoner's claim that
2 relates to the conditions of his confinement is a civil rights
3
4
5
6
action under Bivens); but see Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269
(9th Cir. 1989) (holding that habeas corpus is available pursuant to
§ 2241 for claims concerning denial of good time credits and
7 subjection to greater restrictions of liberty, such as disciplinary
8 segregation, without due process of law); Cardenas v. Adler, no.
9 1:09-cv-00831-AWI-JLT-HC, 2010 WL 2180378 (E.D.Cal., May 28, 2010)
10
11
12
13
(holding that a petitioner's challenge to the constitutionality of
the sanction of disciplinary segregation and his claim that the
disciplinary proceedings were the product of retaliation by prison
14 staff were cognizable in a habeas proceeding pursuant to ' 2241).
15
Claims concerning various prison conditions that have been
16 brought pursuant to ' 2241 have been dismissed in this district for
17 lack of subject matter jurisdiction with indications that an action
18 pursuant to Bivens is appropriate.
See, e.g., Dyson v. Rios, no.
19 1:10–cv–00382–DLB(HC), 2010 WL 3516358, *3 (E.D.Cal. Sept. 2, 2010)
20 (a claim challenging placement in a special management housing unit
21 in connection with a disciplinary violation); Burnette v. Smith, no.
22 CIV S–08–2178 DAD P, 2009 WL 667199 at *1 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 13, 2009)
23 (a petition seeking a transfer and prevention of retaliation by
24 prison staff); Evans v. U.S. Penitentiary, no. 1:07-CV-01611 OWW GSA
25 HC, 2007 WL 4212339 at *1 (E.D.Cal. Nov. 27, 2007) (claims brought
26 pursuant to ' 2241 regarding a transfer and inadequate medical
27 care).
28
Here, to the extent that any claims remain before the Court,
9
1 the claims concern conditions of confinement that do not bear a
2 relationship to, or have any effect on, the legality or duration of
3 Petitioner’s confinement.
It has long been established that habeas
4 corpus should be used as a vehicle to determine the lawfulness of
5 custody and not as a writ of error.
See Eagles v. U.S. ex rel.
6 Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 311-12 (1946).
Habeas corpus proceedings are
7 not an appropriate forum for claims regarding disciplinary
8 procedures if the effect of the procedures on the length of the
9 inmate’s sentence is only speculative or incidental.
10 Branch, 974 F.2d 116, 117-118 (9th Cir. 1992).
Sisk v.
The Court concludes
11 that if any claims remain before the Court, the claims are not
12 within the core of habeas corpus jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
13 § 2241.
14
In summary, Petitioner has not asserted any factual or legal
15 basis that would preclude a finding of mootness.
The Court thus
16 concludes that the matter is moot because the Court may no longer
17 grant any effective relief.
See, Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574
18 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a habeas claim was moot where a former
19 inmate sought placement in a community treatment center but was
20 subsequently released on parole and no longer sought such a
21 transfer); Kittel v. Thomas, 620 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2010)
22 (dismissing as moot a petition seeking early release where the
23 petitioner was released and where there was no live, justiciable
24 question on which the parties disagreed).
25
Accordingly, it will be recommended that the Court grant the
26 motion to dismiss the petition as moot.
27
III.
Recommendations
28
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
10
1
1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED as moot;
2 and
2) The Clerk be DIRECTED to close the action.
3
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United
4 States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the
5 provisions of 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local
6 Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern
7 District of California.
Within thirty (30) days after being served
8 with a copy, any party may file written objections with the Court
9 and serve a copy on all parties.
Such a document should be
10 captioned AObjections to Magistrate Judge=s Findings and
11 Recommendations.@
Replies to the objections shall be served and
12 filed within fourteen (14) days (plus three (3) days if served by
13 mail) after service of the objections.
The Court will then review
14 the Magistrate Judge=s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(C).
15 The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the
16 specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court=s
17 order.
Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
18
19 IT IS SO ORDERED.
20
21
Dated:
/s/ Barbara
June 6, 2014
A. McAuliffe
_
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?