Payne v. Gipson et al

Filing 12

DISMISSAL ORDER, signed by Chief Judge Ralph R. Beistline on 1/26/15. 30-Day Deadline. (Verduzco, M)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MYRON A. PAYNE,
Case No. 1:13-cv-01557-RRB
Plaintiff,
vs.
DISMISSAL ORDER
C. GIPSON, et al.,
Defendants.

Plaintiff Myron A. Payne, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several officials of the
California State Prison–Corcoran (“CSP–COR”).1 Payne is currently housed at the Kern
Valley State Prison, Delano, California.
I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT
This Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.2 This Court

1

In addition to Warden C. Gipson, Payne names as Defendants: Matthew Cate,
Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”); Jeffrey
Beard, Secretary, CDCR; D. G. Adams, former Warden, CSP-COR; Aqueel El-Amin,
Islamic/Muslim Imam, CSP-COR; E. Eburuche, Catholic Chaplain, CSP-COR; Yosi Carron,
Jewish Rabbi, CSP-COR; T. Norton, Associate Warden, CSP-COR; F. P. Field, Associate
Warden, CSP-COR; Capt. M. Hodges Wilkins, Appeals Examiner, CSP-COR; and Capt.
R. Davis, Appeals Examiner, CSP-COR.
2

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

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must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that
“seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”3 Likewise, a
prisoner must exhaust all administrative remedies as may be available,4 irrespective of
whether those administrative remedies provide for monetary relief.5
In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court looks to the pleading
standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”6 “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.”7 Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard
applied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), including the rule that complaints filed
by pro se prisoners are to be liberally construed, affording the prisoner the benefit of any

3

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
1122, 1126 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
4

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93–95 (2006) (“proper
exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires proper adherence to
administrative procedural rules); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (exhaustion
of administrative remedies must be completed before filing suit).
5

See Booth, 532 U.S. at 734.

6

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

7

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)).
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doubt, and dismissal should be granted only where it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can plead no facts in support of his claim that would entitle him or her to relief.8
This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief.9 “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a
defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.’”10 Further, although a court must accept as true all factual allegations
contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true.11
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”12
II.

GRAVAMEN OF COMPLAINT
At the time he filed his Complaint, Payne, an adherent to the Muslim/Islamic religion,

was housed in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) at CSP–COR. Payne contends that he
was denied Payne asserts two causes of action. In his first cause of action, Payne
contends he was denied his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).13 In his second cause of action Payne contends that he was
denied his rights to procedural due process.

8

Wilhelm v. Rotham, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012).

9

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–69; see Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969
(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting and applying Iqbal and Twombly).
10

Iqbal 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

11

Id.

12

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

13

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.

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Payne seeks an order compelling Defendants to provide him with meals consistent
with his religious beliefs, permit him to attend appropriate religious services, allow him to
receive and purchase appropriate Islamic religious items, visitation by an Islamic Imam,
participation in Islamic holy days, and provide a means for financing Islamic religious
materials and artifacts for indigent Muslim prisoners. Payne also seeks the award of
monetary damages.
III.

DISCUSSION
Initially this Court notes that to the extent that Payne requests equitable relief,

because he is no longer housed at CSP-COR, this Court cannot grant him effective relief.
Consequently, those claims are rendered moot and must be dismissed.14 To the extent that
Payne seeks damages for the denial of a Halal meal, however, Payne’s claim remains a
live controversy.
Prisoners “do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction
and confinement in prison.”15 Prison inmates retain the rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment, “including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.”16
“when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid
if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”17 Four factors must be

14

See Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A claim is moot when
the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in
the outcome.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
15

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 5435 (1979).

16

O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).

17

Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).

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balanced in determining whether a prison regulation is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests: (1) Whether there is a valid, rational connection’ between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2) Whether
there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates;
(3) Whether accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will impact guards and
other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally; and (4) Whether there
is an absence of ready alternatives versus the existence of obvious, easy alternatives.18
Section 3 of RLUIPA provides that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . .
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless the government
demonstrates that the burden is “in furtherance of a compelling government interest” and
is “the least restrictive means of furthering that . . . interest.”19 In this case, accepting as
true Payne’s allegations as it must, Defendants bear the burden of establishing that the
failure to provide Halal meals satisfies this test.20
These are questions that cannot be answered at this juncture of the proceedings.
Accordingly, Payne must be granted leave to file an amended complaint as to his First
Claim for Relief with respect to the failure or refusal to provide him with Halal meals. That
claim is, however, limited to those individuals with the authority and responsibility for
providing adequate and proper nutrition to prison inmates. Clearly, Defendants Aqueel El18

Id. at 89–90.

19

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).

20

See Shakur v. Schiro, 514 F.3d 878, 889–90 (9th Cir. 2008).

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Amin (Islamic/Muslim Imam), E. Eburuche (Catholic Chaplain), Yosi Carron (Jewish Rabbi),
Capt. M. Hodges Wilkins (Appeals Examiner), and Capt. R. Davis (Appeals Examiner), do
not fall within that category. Accordingly, the Complaint as against them must be dismissed
without leave to amend.
Payne’s Second Claim for Relief, which asserts a denial of procedural due process,
is fatally flawed. Taken as a whole, however, it is evident from the Complaint that he was
not denied procedural due process. In the context of grievances, prisoners have no right
to a particular procedure.21 At most, this claim is predicated upon Payne’s contention that
he did not agree with the responses he received. While an erroneous response is a
legitimate basis for attacking the decision itself, it does not amount to a violation of
procedural due process. Because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
by this Court, Payne’s Second Claim for Relief must be dismissed.
To the extent that Payne alleges that the actions of the Defendants violated State
law, § 1983 does not provide a cause of action for those claims.22 A federal court does,
however, have supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims.23 In addition, with respect
to a pendente state-law claim, a prisoner must show compliance with the presentment

21

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); see Hewitt v. Helms, 459
U.S. 460, 472 (1983) (discussing the flexible approach to due process requirements in the
prison context) (receded from in other part by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 481–84
(1995)).
22

Loftis v. Almagar, 704 F.3d 645, 647 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502
U.S. 62, 67 (1991).
23

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Frequently referred to as pendente jurisdiction.

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requirements of the applicable provisions of the State tort claims act.24 Here it does not
appear that Payne has complied with the requirements of the California tort claims act. In
amending his complaint, should Payne allege violations of California law, he should
affirmatively plead that he has complied with the requirements of California law, provided
he may truthfully so do.
IV.

ORDER
1.

The First Claim for Relief is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

2.

The Second Claim for Relief and all claims as against Defendants Aqueel El-

Amin, Islamic/Muslim Imam, CSP-COR; E. Eburuche, Catholic Chaplain, CSP-COR; Yosi
Carron, Jewish Rabbi, Capt. M. Hodges Wilkins, Appeals Examiner, CSP-COR; and Capt.
R. Davis, Appeals Examiner, CSP-COR are DISMISSED, in their entirety without leave to
amend.
3.

Plaintiff is granted through and including Monday, March 2, 2015, within

which to file an Amended Complaint consistent with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 26th day of January, 2015
S/ RALPH R. BEISTLINE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

24

See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t., 839 F.2d 621, 627 n.4 (9th Cir.

1988).
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