Shapour v. State of California

Filing 77

ORDER re Plaintiff's Motions in Limine (Doc. 67). signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 2/23/2016. (Herman, H)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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YOUSSEF SHAPOUR,
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Plaintiff,

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vs.

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Department of
Transportation,

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Defendant.

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Case No. 1:13-cv-01682-BAM
ORDER RE PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS IN
LIMINE
(Doc. 67)

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This action proceeds on Plaintiff Youssef Shapour’s claim against the State of California

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Department of Transportation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for employment

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discrimination based on retaliation for engaging in a protected activity. Docs. 1, 30. A jury trial

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is scheduled for March 8, 2016.

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Plaintiff filed his motions in limine on February 2, 2016. (Doc. 67). Defendant opposed

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the motion on February 12, 2016. (Doc. 68). Plaintiff’s motions in limine were heard before the

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Honorable Barbara A. McAuliffe on February 22, 2016. Kevin Little appeared on behalf of

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Plaintiff Youssef Shapour. Matthew George appeared telephonically on behalf of Defendant

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State of California, Department of Transportation.

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I.

Motions in Limine
A. Standard

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A party may use a motion in limine to exclude inadmissible or prejudicial evidence

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before it is actually introduced at trial. See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n. 2 (1984).

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“[A] motion in limine is an important tool available to the trial judge to ensure the expeditious

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and evenhanded management of the trial proceedings.” Jonasson v. Lutheran Child and Family

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Services, 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1997). A motion in limine allows the parties to resolve

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evidentiary disputes before trial and avoids potentially prejudicial evidence being presented in

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front of the jury. Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d 985, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Motions in limine that exclude broad categories of evidence are disfavored, and such

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issues are better dealt with during trial as the admissibility of evidence arises. Sperberg v.

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Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975).

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evidentiary issues are not accurately and efficiently evaluated by the trial judge in a motion in

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limine and it is necessary to defer ruling until trial when the judge can better estimate the impact

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of the evidence on the jury. Jonasson, 115 F.3d at 440.

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Additionally, some

B. Plaintiff’s Motions In Limine (“MIL”)

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MIL 1: Plaintiff moves for an extended period of voir dire (30 minutes) to follow-up on

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potential anti-Muslim bias. Plaintiff also requests “more than the typical number of alternates”

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because he believes there is a greater chance jurors may be recused or disqualified. Defendant

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does not object to extended voir dire, but requests the same leeway to ascertain sectarian malice.

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Defendant does not object to the request for more alternates.

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As Defendant does not object, Plaintiff’s motion shall be granted.

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MIL 2: Plaintiff seeks to introduce evidence of the discrimination and retaliation that he

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felt his supervisor, Ron Sekhon, who is of Indian descent, suffered. Plaintiff asserts that his

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claim of retaliation is based, in part, on Caltrans’ handling of complaints made by Christian

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employees against his supervisor. Plaintiff reportedly circulated a petition objecting to his

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supervisor’s treatment and shortly thereafter he was pressured to transfer.

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In response, Defendant contends that the motion should be denied because it fails to

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identify the evidence Plaintiff seeks to introduce. Defendant notes that there were 2 formal EEO

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complaints against the former supervisor, along with other complaints for retaliation, denying

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medical leave to a suicidal employee and confronting a safety officer in the parking lot.

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Defendant argues that evidence of complaints against the supervisor may result in jury confusion

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and waste of judicial time. Defendant indicates that the petition referred to does not include any

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language objecting to his supervisor’s treatment.

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The Court defers ruling on this motion in its entirety until trial. However, as discussed at

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the hearing, Plaintiff is not precluded from testifying about his participation in the investigation

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of the complaints against his supervisor, Mr. Sekhon, but the ultimate findings involving

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Plaintiff’s supervisor are not relevant and shall be excluded. Moreover, the handling of the

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complaints made by Christian employees against his supervisor is irrelevant to whether Plaintiff

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was retaliated against for Plaintiff’s participation in the proceeding. Additionally, the Court will

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not permit a trial of the supervisor’s adverse employment action.

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MIL 3: Plaintiff objects to any matters over which the defendant claimed a privilege in
discovery being used at trial.

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During the course of the hearing, Plaintiff clarified that the crux of his motion is to

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preclude witness testimony related to any statements relied upon by Mr. Tim Bullivant during

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the course of his investigation of the religious discrimination complaint against Plaintiff.

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According to Plaintiff, there were tapes made of the witness statements, which were not

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produced during the course of discovery.

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investigation report.

The witness statements were included in the

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Defendant indicated that it did not intend to proffer testimony from witnesses regarding

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the investigation with the exception of Mr. Bullivant and witness Brian Ash. Mr. Ash made a

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related complaint involving religious discrimination against Plaintiff and provided statements to

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Mr. Bullivant.

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Having considered the parties’ arguments, Plaintiff’s motion in limine shall be granted in

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part and denied in part. The relevant report shall be admitted subject to objection at trial.

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Further, Mr. Bullivant’s testimony shall be limited to the process he engaged in during the course

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of the investigation and the statements in the report.
MIL 4: Plaintiff seeks to preclude the introduction of insulting remarks he made during

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his deposition regarding his former supervisor, Margaret Schaeffer.

Plaintiff believes his

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“unfortunate choice of words” would be far more prejudicial than probative. Fed. R. Evid. 403.

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Plaintiff also believes the evidence is impermissible “bad character evidence.” Fed. R. Evid.

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404.

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Defendant asserts that the statements are relevant to Plaintiff’s then-attitude toward his

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supervisors and the retired interviewer, and are also relevant to Plaintiff’s bias and the

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reasonableness, or lack thereof, of his belief that he was retaliated against or made protected

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disclosures. Defendant also asserts that the statements bear on Plaintiff’s credibility and state of

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mind. Defendant contends that one of the issues is whether Plaintiff’s acting supervisor revised

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his duty statement and, if she did, whether she did for legitimate business reasons or as an

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amanuensis for the Chief of Construction because she was incapable of doing so on her own.

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The Court finds that Plaintiff’s statements are relevant to his state of mind and are not

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more prejudicial than probative. Fed. R. Evid. 403. Additionally, these statements are not

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impermissible character evidence and will not be introduced for the truth of Plaintiff’s

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statements. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to exclude evidence of his statements regarding Ms.

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Schaeffer shall be denied.

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MIL 5: Plaintiff seeks to introduce evidence of how the investigations into complaints

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against him and Mr. Sekhon were performed in comparison to investigations of complaints filed

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by him. Plaintiff believes this is potential evidence of disparate treatment and retaliatory intent.

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Defendant argues that investigation into complaints against non-parties is irrelevant.

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Defendant contends that any such evidence of complaints against Plaintiff’s supervisor could

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only serve to confuse the jury. Plaintiff does not identify the complaints he references in his

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motion, either against his supervisor or those made by Plaintiff. Defendant also points out that

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Plaintiff made different complaints to different agencies, so differences in the investigative

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process are inevitable. Defendant argues that a comparison of how the investigations were

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performed would be meaningless and confusing because of the differing agencies.

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The Court finds that the method of investigation of various claims is irrelevant to

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Plaintiff’s retaliation claim and further would consume time for a “trial within a trial.” Fed. R.

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Evid. 401, 403. Plaintiff’s assertion of disparate treatment is not a surviving claim in this action.

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II.

Conclusion and Order

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For the reasons stated, it is HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

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1. Plaintiff’s motion in limine #1 is GRANTED;

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2. Plaintiff’s motion in limine #2 is DEFERRED.

Plaintiff is not precluded from

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testifying about his participation in the investigation of the complaints against his

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supervisor, Mr. Sekhon, but the handling of the investigation and the ultimate

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findings involving Plaintiff’s supervisor are not relevant and shall be excluded;

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3. Plaintiff’s motion in limine #3 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The

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relevant report shall be admitted subject to objection at trial. Further, Mr. Bullivant’s

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testimony shall be limited to the process he engaged in during the course of the

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investigation and the statements in the report;

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4. Plaintiff’s motion in limine #4 is DENIED; and

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5. Plaintiff’s motion in limine #5 is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

/s/ Barbara

February 23, 2016

A. McAuliffe

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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