A. A. et al v. Clovis Unified School District et al

Filing 31

ORDER Denying Defendants' 27 Motion for Attorney Fees, signed by District Judge Anthony W. Ishii on 1/27/2015. (Gaumnitz, R)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CASE NO. 1:13-CV-01777 AWI SMS
A.A. and L.A. on behalf of A.A.,
Jr.,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

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Plaintiffs

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v.
CLOVIS UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT, MARY BASS in her personal
and official capacities as SELPA
ADMINISTRATOR and DIRECTOR of
SPECIAL EDUCATION for CLOVIS
USD,

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Defendants
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I. Background
Plaintiffs A.A. and L.A., on behalf of A.A. Jr. (collectively “Plaintiffs”) brought this action

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against Clovis Unified School District (“CUSD”) and Mary Bass, individually and in her official

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capacities as SELPA Administrator and Director of Special Education for CUSD (collectively

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“Defendants”). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief related to A.A. Jr.’s placement in

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school under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The Court addresses

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Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees.

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Plaintiffs’ Complaint involved the same parties and identified some of the same factual

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allegations as Case No. 1:13-CV-01043 filed in this Court, which brings eight causes of action

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also related to A.A. Jr.’s education. That case appeals an ALJ’s decision in CUSD’s favor dated

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April 5, 2013 regarding A.A. Jr.’s Individual Education Program (“IEP”) for the 2012-2013 school

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year. According to IDEA, during the pendency of proceedings in district court “the child shall

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remain in the then-current educational placement of the child.” 20 U.S.C.S. 1415(j).

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This case arose out of A.A. Jr.’s IEP for the 2013-2014 school year. Doc. 1, 1:20-23. The

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2013-2014 IEP was substantially similar to the 2012-2013 IEP, which A.A. and L.A. had rejected.

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Doc. 1, 2:8-10. A.A. and L.A. also refused to consent to the 2013-2014 IEP. Doc. 1, 5:14-22.

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CUSD filed a request for a due process hearing with the Office of Administrative Hearings, to

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which Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss and were denied. Doc. 1, 1:18-25, 2:17-18. Plaintiffs

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requested two continuances of the hearing. Doc. 19-2, pp. 2-3.

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This Complaint was filed on November 2, 2013. Doc. 1. It requested that the Court make

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certain declarations of law, and that Defendants be required to keep A.A. Jr. in his present

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placement according to the IDEA’s “stay-put” provision. Doc. 1, 9:26-10:18. Plaintiffs filed a

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motion for temporary restraining order on November 8, 2013 to enjoin the hearing from occurring

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(Doc. 9), which was denied for failure to demonstrate irreparable harm (Doc. 12). Plaintiffs did

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not file a motion for injunction. The hearing took place on November 12 and 13, 2013, and the

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ALJ found in favor of CUSD. Doc. 19-2, Exh. A, pp. 1, 28.

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Defendants brought a motion to dismiss the Complaint on November 25, 2013. Doc. 13.

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On July 11, 2014, this Court issued an order granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant

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to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

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granted. Doc. 25. The Court found that the Plaintiff’s Complaint was inappropriately brought as an

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IDEA action, which seeks judicial review of an unsatisfactory or inappropriate decision. Doc. 25,

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4:9-10. The Complaint did not seek a judicial review of the IEP, but rather sought to enjoin the

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Defendant’s from violating the stay-put provision. Doc. 25, 4:10-12. The Complaint also failed to

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allege any facts that the stay-put provision had been violated, nor that it was likely to be violated.

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Doc. 25, 4:20-22. Further, a violation of the IDEA’s “stay-put” provision is not itself an

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independent cause of action and thus should have been brought as a motion in the underlying

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matter (referring to Case No. 1:13-CV-01043). Doc 25, 4:25-26. For the above reasons, the

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Plaintiff’s Complaint was dismissed without leave to amend. Doc 25.
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On October 6, 2014, Defendants brought this motion for attorney’s fees under 20 U.S.C. §

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1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II) and (III). Doc. 27. Defendants seek an award in the amount of $17,918.50 for

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fees incurred by the Defendant’s in defending the Plaintiff’s Complaint for injunctive relief.

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Defendants seek this award against the Plaintiff’s attorneys of record, Yvette C. Sterling, Esq., and

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Barbara E. Ransom, Esq. of Sterling Law Firm, and Marianne Malveaux, Esq. Doc. 27, 2:4-5.

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II. Legal Standard
“In any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may

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award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs-- to a prevailing party who is a State

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educational agency or local educational agency against the attorney of a parent who files a

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complaint . . . that is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation or to a prevailing State

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educational agency or local educational agency against the attorney of a parent, or against the

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parent, if the parent's complaint . . . was presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to

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cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” 20 U.S.C.

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§1415(i)(3)(B).

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III. Discussion
Although Defendants prevailed in their motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s Complaint, it

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cannot be said that the circumstances were exceptional so as to compel an award of attorney’s fees

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since the litigation between the two parties is still unresolved. The Ninth Circuit has stated

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regarding the granting of attorney’s fees under Handicapped Children's Protection Act (the

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predecessor to the IDEA) that the attorney’s fee provision is to be interpreted consistent with fee

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provisions under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Barlow-Gresham

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Union High Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Mitchell, 940 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1991); Abu-Sahyun By &

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Through Abu-Sahyun v. Palo Alto Unified Sch. Dist., 843 F.2d 1250, 1252 (9th Cir. 1988). It is

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evident that this is because the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 parallels that of the IDEA, “In any

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action or proceeding to enforce a provision . . . of this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow

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the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In

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accordance with this objective, courts are permitted to award attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs

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as a matter of course, but are permitted to award attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants under 42
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U.S.C. §§ 1988 . . . only “in exceptional circumstances.” Harris v. Maricopa Cnty. Superior

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Court, 631 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2011); Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 1990).

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Defendants prevailed only in a small procedural sense unworthy of an award reserved only for

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exceptional circumstances.

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The burden of establishing entitlement to attorney’s fees lies solely with the claimant

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seeking the fees. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983).

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“In a civil rights action with multiple claims a defendant is entitled only to those fees attributable

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exclusively to defending against plaintiff's frivolous claims” Harris v. Maricopa Cnty. Superior

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Court, 631 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, Defendants have not shown that the work asserted

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in dismissing the Plaintiff’s Complaint would not have been performed but for the Plaintiff’s

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Complaint. In the present case, had Plaintiffs properly filed the Complaint as a motion in the

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substantive case that is ongoing between the parties, the Defendant’s would have been fighting the

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same general complaint but as a motion rather than as a separate action. It cannot therefore be said

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that the work asserted by the Defendants would not have been performed but for Plaintiff’s

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complaint where the work would inevitably have been done if the Complaint was filed correctly as

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a motion.

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In addition, the Defendants have not shown that their victory was substantial enough to

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award fees in light of the ongoing case between the parties. The Supreme Court has stated that the

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degree of success of the litigant is a relevant consideration in determining an award of attorney’s

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fees. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1941, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983).

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Some “technical victories” may be so insignificant that it is insufficient to confer “prevailing party

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status” upon the litigant. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113, 113 S. Ct. 566, 574, 121 L. Ed. 2d

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494 (1992) (despite winning a declaratory judgment, the plaintiffs could not alter the defendant

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school board's behavior toward them for their benefit); Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4, 109 S.

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Ct. 202, 203, 102 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1988) (declaratory judgment will constitute relief, for purposes of §

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1988, if, and only if, it affects the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff). Thus, there is a

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threshold of victory which at minimum must be surpassed in order to be entitled to attorney’s fees.

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Here, achieving a dismissal of a small collateral matter is insufficient for an award of attorney’s
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fees since the Defendant’s litigation with the Plaintiffs is ongoing. Therefore, this amounts to a

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mere technical victory and does not affect the behavior of the parties towards one another.

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IV. Conclusion
Defendants achieved a mere procedural victory in the instant case while the bulk of the

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substantive litigation between the parties is ongoing. Without deciding whether Plaintiff’s

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Complaint would otherwise be “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation”, this Court

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chooses to exercise its discretion under 20 U.S.C. § 1415 in declining to award Defendants the

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prayed for attorney’s fees. The Plaintiffs took a procedural misstep in filing their complaint as a

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new action rather than as a motion in the ongoing litigation between these two parties. With

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another action pending between the parties with substantially similar factual allegations, the Court

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will not award attorney’s fees at this time.

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V. Order
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for attorney’s fees is hereby DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 27, 2015
SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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