White v. Gibson et al

Filing 11

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis L. Beck on 12/2/14. Amended Complaint Due Within Thirty Days. (Attachments: # 1 Amended Complaint Form) (Marrujo, C)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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BERNARD ANDREW WHITE,

Case No. 1:13-cv-02048 DLB PC

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Plaintiff,
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ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

v.
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THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE
E. MOLINA, et al.,

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Defendants.
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Plaintiff Bernard Andrew White (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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On October 8, 2013, Plaintiff filed a civil rights complaint in the Kings County Superior
Court. Plaintiff names Correctional Sergeant E. Molina and Warden G. Gibson as Defendants. On
December 13, 2013, Defendants filed a notice of removal from the Kings County Superior Court.
Plaintiff is not proceeding in forma pauperis as Defendants have paid the filing fee.1
A.

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SCREENING REQUIREMENT
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

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The Court notes that Plaintiff is a three-striker under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See White v. United States Eastern District,
Case No. 1:12-cv-01623-LJO-SKO-PC. Nevertheless, Defendants have paid the filing fee.

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dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual
allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

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Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other
federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092
(9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v.
Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s allegations must link the actions or
omissions of each named defendant to a violation of his rights; there is no respondeat superior
liability under section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d
1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009);
Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim
for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
B.

SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff is currently housed at Corcoran State Prison. It is unclear where the events giving

rise to this action took place.
The complaint is mostly vague and incomprehensible. Plaintiff appears to be complaining
about his housing assignment and/or custody status. From the little the Court can discern, it appears
that Plaintiff may have been placed in segregated SHU confinement on November 24, 2008. It also
appears that Plaintiff may have been housed with protective custody prisoners or prisoners who had
been housed on the Sensitive Needs Yard (“SNY”). As a result, Plaintiff appears to be complaining
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that he became associated with other protective custody inmates and/or enemies, and this in turn
caused “bad disputes.”

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Plaintiff seeks relief in the amount of $100.00 or $200.00 per day that he was in “false
imprisonment.” He further requests injunctive relief so as to be given single-cell status and housed
at either the reception center facility, another level IV facility, or federal prison.
C.

DISCUSSION
1.

Linkage

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must link the named defendants to the participation in the
violation at issue. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1948-49 (2009);
Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of
Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.
2002). Liability may not be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior, and there must exist
some causal connection between the conduct of each named defendant and the violation at issue.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75
(9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Starr v.
Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012).
In this case, Plaintiff fails to link any of the named Defendants to any improper conduct. “A
supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation,
or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the
constitutional violation.”

Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any named
Defendant. Plaintiff will be provided with an opportunity to file an amended complaint.
2.

Due Process – Classification

The Due Process Clause protects Plaintiff against the deprivation of liberty without the
procedural protections to which he is entitled under the law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,
221, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (2005). To state a claim, Plaintiff must first identify the interest at stake.
Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause or from state
law. Id. The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding
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more adverse conditions of confinement, id. at 221-22 (citations and quotation marks omitted), and
under state law, the existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by
focusing on the nature of the condition of confinement at issue, id. at 222-23 (citing Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995)) (quotation marks omitted). Liberty interests
created by prison regulations are generally limited to freedom from restraint which imposes atypical
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Wilkinson,
545 U.S. at 221(citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484) (quotation marks omitted); Myron v. Terhune, 476
F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007).
Nevertheless, prisoners do not have a constitutional right to a particular classification status,
Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9, 97 S.Ct. 274 (1976), or to be incarcerated at a particular
correctional facility, Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25, 96 S.Ct. 2532 (1976). Plaintiff has
alleged no facts that implicate constitutional concerns regarding his classification status.
3.

Due Process – Administrative Segregation

With respect to placement in administrative segregation, due process requires only that
prison officials hold an informal nonadversary hearing within a reasonable time after the prisoner is
segregated, inform the prisoner of the charges against him or the reasons for considering segregation,
and allow the prisoner to present his views. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01 (9th
Cir. 1986) (quotation marks omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds, Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995); accord Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003).
Prisoners are not entitled to detailed written notice of charges, representation by counsel or counsel
substitute, an opportunity to present witnesses, or a written decision describing the reasons for
placing the prisoner in administrative segregation. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100-01 (quotation marks
omitted). Further, due process does not require disclosure of the identity of any person providing
information leading to the placement of a prisoner in administrative segregation. Id. (quotation
marks omitted).
With respect to retention in administrative segregation, prison officials must engage in some
sort of periodic review of the confinement of such inmates. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Annual
reviews do not sufficiently protect the prisoner’s liberty interest. Id. Here, Plaintiff fails to allege
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any violation of his constitutional rights due to placement in administrative segregation.
D.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under section

1983. The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Akhtar v.
Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what
each named Defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s federal rights and liability may
not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of mere respondeat superior, Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 676-77; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-07 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101
(2012). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).
Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa
County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be “complete in itself without
reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 220.
Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim

under section 1983;
2.

The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3.

Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint; and
4.

If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this

action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

/s/ Dennis

December 2, 2014

L. Beck

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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