U.S. Bank, National Association v. Keller

Filing 4

ORDER Remanding Matter to the Merced County Superior Court, signed by District Judge Anthony W. Ishii on 1/3/14. CASE CLOSED. (Verduzco, M)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,

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CASE NO. 1:13-CV-2049 AWI GSA

Plaintiff
ORDER REMANDING MATTER TO
THE MERCED COUNTY SUPERIOR
COURT

v.
DEBRA KELLER, and DOES 1 to 10,
inclusive,
Defendant

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Defendant Debra Keller, who is proceeding pro se, removed this case from the Superior

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Court of Merced County on December 16, 2013. See Court‟s Docket Doc. No. 1. Defendant

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asserts that the basis for removal is the presence of a federal question. Specifically, Defendant

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contends Plaintiff sent a notice that expressly incorporates the “Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure

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Act of 2009,” 12 U.S.C. § 5201.

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A district court has “a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action

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sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.” United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell

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& Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004). The removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1441) is

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strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka,

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599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010); Provincial Gov‟t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582

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F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). It is presumed that a case lies outside the limited jurisdiction of

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the federal courts, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting

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jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1106-07; Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582

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F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). “The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction” means

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that “the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042;

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Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). That is, federal jurisdiction over a

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removed case “must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first

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instance.” Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1107; Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485

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(9th Cir. 1996); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. “If at any time prior to judgment it appears that the district

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court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Gibson

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v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 932 (9th Cir. 2001). Remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) “is

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mandatory, not discretionary.” Bruns v. NCUA, 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997); see

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California ex. rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). That is, the court

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“must dismiss a case when it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, whether or not a

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party has filed a motion.” Page v. City of Southfield, 45 F.3d 128, 133 (6th Cir. 1995).
“The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the „well-pleaded

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complaint rule,‟ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is

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presented on the face of the plaintiff‟s properly pleaded complaint.” California v. United States,

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215 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000); see Dynegy, 375 F.3d at 838; Duncan, 76 F.3d at 1485.

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Under the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, courts look to what “necessarily appears in the

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plaintiff‟s statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything in anticipation

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of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.” California, 215 F.3d at

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1014. Thus, “a case may not be removed on the basis of a federal defense . . . even if the defense

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is anticipated in the plaintiff‟s complaint and both parties concede that the federal defense is the

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only question truly at issue.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Wayne v.

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DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Vaden v. Discover Bank,

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129 S. Ct. 1262, 1278 (2009) (“It does not suffice to show that a federal question lurks somewhere

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inside the parties‟ controversy, or that a defense or counterclaim would arise under federal law.”).

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Here, Defendant has not shown that removal was appropriate. Plaintiff‟s Complaint is for

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an unlawful detainer action that is based entirely on state law. Defendant states that a notice by

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Plaintiff referenced § 5201. While that may be, the only cause of action that appears in the

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Complaint is a single claim for unlawful detainer. There is no federal question in Plaintiff‟s

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Complaint.
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Because there is no federal question appearing in Plaintiff‟s Complaint, Defendant has

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failed to invoke this Court‟s jurisdiction. Remand to the Merced County Superior Court is

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appropriate and mandatory. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1107;

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Bruns, 122 F.3d at 1257; Page, 45 F.3d at 133.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, per 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), due to this Court‟s

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lack of subject matter jurisdiction, this case is REMANDED forthwith to the Superior Court of

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Merced County.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 3, 2014
SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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