Hazeltine v. Hicks et al
Filing
183
ORDER Denying Plaintiff's 174 Motion for a New Trial signed by District Judge Dale A. Drozd on 09/07/2018. (Flores, E)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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RICK A. HAZELTINE,
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No. 1:14-cv-00056-DAD-GSA
Plaintiff,
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL
v.
IAN YOUNG, BENJAMIN GAMEZ,
RASHAUN CASPER, JULIUS OLDAN,
PORFIRIO SANCHEZ NEGRETE,
DAVID AVILIA, CHARLES HO, and
RICKEY SMITH,
(Doc. No. 174)
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Defendants.
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Plaintiff Rick Hazeltine is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with
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this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case proceeded to jury trial on
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plaintiff’s claim for excessive use of force in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
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Fourteenth Amendment. The trial commenced on August 7, 2018. On August 10, 2018, the jury
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returned a unanimous verdict in favor of defendants and judgment was entered. On August 16,
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2018, plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. On
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August 29, 2018, defendants filed their opposition. (Doc. No. 179.)
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Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he court may, on motion,
grant a new trial . . . for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action
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at law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). Rather than specify the grounds on which a
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motion for a new trial may be granted, Rule 59 states that courts are bound by historically
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recognized grounds, which include, but are not limited to, claims “that the verdict is against the
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weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not
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fair to the party moving.” Molksi v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007); see also
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Shimko v. Guenther, 505 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The trial court may grant a new trial
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only if the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, is based upon false or perjurious
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evidence, or to prevent a miscarriage of justice.”) (citations omitted). The district court may
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correct manifest errors of law or fact, but the burden of showing that harmful error exists falls on
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the party seeking the new trial. Malhoit v. S. Cal. Retail Clerks Union, 735 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir.
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1984); see also 11 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2803
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(1995). When a party claims that a verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, the court
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should give full respect to the jury’s findings and only grant a new trial if it “is left with the
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definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” by the jury. Landes Constr. Co.
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v. Royal Bank of Can., 833 F.2d 1365, 1371–72 (9th Cir. 1987). “While the trial court may weigh
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the evidence and credibility of the witnesses, the court is not justified in granting a new trial
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merely because it might have come to a different result from that reached by the jury.” Roy v.
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Volkswagen of Am. Inc., 896 F.2d 1174, 1176 (9th Cir. 1990), opinion amended on denial of
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reh’g, 920 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot
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Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A] district court may not grant a new trial simply
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because it would have arrived at a different verdict.”). The authority to grant a new trial under
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Rule 59 is left almost entirely to the discretion of the trial court. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon,
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449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980).
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Plaintiff takes issue with two pretrial rulings which, in his view, substantially prejudiced
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his ability to prosecute his case. First, plaintiff objects to rulings by the then-assigned magistrate
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judge in this case denying plaintiff’s motion for a civil subpoena. (Doc. Nos. 48, 50.) Second,
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plaintiff objects to the assigned magistrate judge’s denial of his motion for appointment of
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counsel. (Doc. No. 103.) The court construes plaintiff’s motion as arguing for a new trial based
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on manifest errors of law.
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With respect to plaintiff’s motion for a civil subpoena, the magistrate judge laid out in
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detail the procedures by which plaintiff could obtain the information he sought. Plaintiff was
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instructed that he was entitled to the issuance of a subpoena commanding the production of
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documents, electronically stored information, and/or tangible things under Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 45, but that was required to first request those materials from defendants under Federal
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Rule of Civil Procedure 34. (Doc. No. 48 at 2–3.) If defendants objected to that request, the next
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step was for plaintiff to file a motion to compel. (Id.) Finally, if the court ruled that the items
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sought were discoverable but were not in the care, custody, or control of defendants, plaintiff
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would then be entitled to the issuance of a subpoena. (Id.) Because plaintiff had failed to follow
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these procedures, the magistrate judge denied plaintiff’s motion. (Id. at 3.)
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Rather than comply with these procedures as directed, plaintiff filed a motion for
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reconsideration of this order. (Doc. No. 49.) In it, plaintiff listed several items that he had
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unsuccessfully sought from defendants in discovery, and then asked the court to liberally construe
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his filing as a motion to compel. (Id. at 2–3.) The magistrate judge denied this request as well,
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finding that plaintiff had still not complied with the procedures laid out in the prior order and
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declining to construe plaintiff’s motion as a motion to compel. (Doc. No. 50 at 4.) In doing so,
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the magistrate judge noted that “While it is true that pro se litigant pleadings are to be construed
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liberally, there is no question that Plaintiff’s pleading was a request for [a subpoena duces tecum].
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Construing it as a motion to compel would not be a liberal construction but a complete
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mischaracterization of the pleading and would in effect be an act of litigating on behalf of
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Plaintiff by the Court.” (Id.)
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As stated above, on a motion for a new trial, the burden of showing harmful error rests on
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the party seeking the new trial. See Malhiot, 735 F.2d at 1133; Curtis v. City of Oakland, No. 10-
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CV-00358-SI, 2016 WL 1138457, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2016); Boston Sci. Corp. v. Johnson
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& Johnson, 550 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2008). However, plaintiff in his motion
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identifies no legal basis on which to question the magistrate judge’s rulings. To the contrary, in
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numerous cases courts first require parties to seek discoverable materials from a party through a
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motion to compel before resorting to the use of civil subpoenas. See, e.g., Kitchens v. Tordsen,
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No. 1:12-cv-00105-AWI-MJS, 2015 WL 1011711, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2015); Harris v. Kim,
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No. 1:05-cv-00003-AWI-SKO, 2013 WL 636729, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2013); Tafilele v.
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Harrington, No. 1:10-cv-01493-LJO-GBC, 2012 WL 1833522, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 18, 2012).
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Plaintiff has provided no persuasive authority for the proposition that the magistrate judge’s order
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was in any way erroneous.
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Plaintiff also moves for a new trial because he was denied the appointment of counsel.
(Doc. No. 174 at 3.) The assigned magistrate judge denied plaintiff’s motions for the
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appointment of counsel, explaining that plaintiff did not have a right to appointed counsel in this
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civil action. (Doc. No. 103.) It is well established in this Circuit that “[t]here is no constitutional
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right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 action.” Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir.
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1997) (citing Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981)). However, in
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“exceptional circumstances,” a district court is permitted to appoint counsel for indigent litigants
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Id. (quoting Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir.
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1980)). In determining whether exceptional circumstances exist, district courts are instructed to
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evaluate both “the likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the petitioner to articulate
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his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Id. (internal quotation
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marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir.
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1986)).
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The court finds that no error of law was committed in the denial of plaintiff’s motion for
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the appointment of counsel. The magistrate judge applied the correct legal standard from Rand,
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concluding that plaintiff did not appear likely to succeed on the merits of his claim, that the legal
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issues were not particularly complex, and that plaintiff was able to adequately articulate his
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claims. (Doc. No. 103 at 3.) Having now observed plaintiff’s conduct at trial, the undersigned
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agrees that plaintiff was a very effective advocate on his own behalf, and was clearly able to fully
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articulate his case to the jury. Plaintiff has accordingly failed to demonstrate that any manifest
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error of law was committed in this case.
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For all the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s motion for a new trial (Doc. No. 174) is
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denied.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated:
September 7, 2018
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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