Wilson v. King et al

Filing 7

ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITH LEAVE TO AMEND,signed by Chief Judge Ralph R. Beistline on 03/06/2015. Amended Complaint due by 5/11/2015 (Attachments: # 1 Amended Complaint Form)(Martin-Gill, S)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WILLIAM ALBERT WILSON,
Case No. 1:14-cv-00063-RRB
Plaintiff,
DISMISSAL ORDER WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND

vs.
AUDREY KING, et al.,
Defendants.

Plaintiff William Albert Wilson, a civil detainee for treatment under the California Sex
Offender Treatment Program (“SOTP”),1 is presently in the custody of the California
Department of State Hospitals (“DSH”), housed at the Coalinga State Hospital (“CSH”).
Wilson brings this action against several state officials under the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C.
§ 1983), the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq.), the
Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) (29 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq.), and a supplemental claim under the
California Disabled Persons Act (Cal. Welfare & Institutions Code §§ 4500, et seq.).2

1

Calif. Welfare & Inst. Code §§ 6604, 6606.

2

In addition to Audrey King, Executive Director, Wilson names: Pam Ahlin, former
Executive Director; Peggy Thomas, former Program Director; Brian Bowley, Program
Director; Barbara Rodriguez, Unit Supervisor; Javier Saldivar, Psychologist; Adam Fogel,
Psychologist; Yvonne Gonzales, former Equal Employment Coordinator; Susanna Lopez,
Equal Employment Coordinator; James Perez, Equal Employment Manager; Long Mu,
ADA Coordinator; James Clark, former Supervisor Central Program Services; John Catano,
Acting Chief Central Program Services; Reimi Smith, Central Program Services
Administrator; Baltazar Villarreal, Behavior Specialist, Sex Offender Program; Efrat Mazin,
Pyschologist; Helen Sierra, HIPPAA Compliance Officer; and 25 Does.
DISMISSAL ORDER
Wilson v. King, 1:14-cv-00063-RRB – 1

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT
This Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.3 This Court
must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that
“seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”4 Prisoner pro
se pleadings are given the benefit of liberal construction.5 While this Court must liberally
construe papers filed by pro se parties, pro se parties must none-the-less follow the
applicable rules of practice and procedure. 6
In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court looks to the pleading
standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”7 “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

3

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Ninth Circuit has applied this requirement to civil
detainees. See Williams v. Coleman, 536 Fed. Appx. 694 (9th Cir. 2013).
4

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
1122, 1126 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
5

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Porter v. Ollison, 620
F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010).
6

King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Pro se litigants must follow the
same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.”) (overruled in part on other grounds
in Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)).
7

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

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accusation.”8 Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard
applied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), including the rule that complaints filed
by pro se prisoners are to be liberally construed, affording the prisoner the benefit of any
doubt, and dismissal should be granted only where it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can plead no facts in support of his claim that would entitle him or her to relief.9
This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief.10 “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a
defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.’”11 Further, although a court must accept as true all factual allegations
contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true.12
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”13
///
///
///

8

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)).
9

Wilhelm v. Rotham, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012).

10

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–69; see Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969
(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting and applying Iqbal and Twombly).
11

Iqbal 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

12

Id.

13

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

DISMISSAL ORDER
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II.

GRAVAMEN OF THE COMPLAINT
Wilson is a developmentally-disabled person suffering from a brain abnormality that

limits his learning ability and functionality to approximately the second-grade level.14 As
a result, Wilson alleges that in the absence of adequate assistance he is denied access
to information, including: posted information on bulletin boards; menus; emergency exit
information; Wellness and Recovery Progress Team Reports; assigned SOTP homework
assignments; and SOTP treatment manuals/books.
At the heart of this case is whether or not Wilson is provided sufficient assistance
for him to successfully complete the SOTP. Reduced to its essence Wilson’s complaint
is that: (1) denial of a qualified assistance to assist him in reading; (2) failure to provide
a reliable, functional tape recorder; (3) failure to provide adequate cassette tapes to retain
recorded information; (4) failure to transcribe his written class work materials onto audio
tapes/CDs; (5) failure to properly install and maintain computer software; and (6) failure to
provide a sound-proof private area within which Wilson could utilize audio equipment.
Although it is not entirely clear from the Complaint, Wilson appears to contend that, while
DSH and CSH ostensibly have adequate written policies in place, the actual customs and
practices of the Defendants effectively deny him the benefit of those services.
Wilson seeks: (1) declaratory and injunctive relief; (2) compensatory damages; and
(3) punitive damages.

14

The Court notes that Wilson’s Complaint was prepared with the assistance of two
other detainees. Wilson attests that, before signing the Complaint, it was read and
explained to him, and that the document correctly reflects the facts as known to him.
DISMISSAL ORDER
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III.

DISCUSSION
To the extent it is founded on Federal law, this case invokes the basic premise that

the Constitution “requires states to provide civilly-committed persons with access to mental
health treatment that gives them a realistic opportunity to be cured and released.”15
“Adequate and effective treatment is constitutionally required because, absent treatment,
appellants could be held indefinitely as a result of their mental illness . . ..”16 As the
Supreme Court held more than a half-century ago:
(I)nvoluntary confinement for the “status” of having a mental or physical
illness or disorder constitutes a violation of the cruel and unusual punishment
clauses of both the state and federal Constitutions . . . unless it is
accompanied by adequate treatment.17
Complicating resolution of this case in this Court is the existence of a Resolution
Agreement dated June 11, 2007 (“2007-RA”), which appears to have been accepted by
Wilson. It is unclear whether Wilson is seeking to compel Defendants to comply with the
2007-RA, a specific performance action founded in contract; or is alleging that the 2007-RA
is inadequate. If Wilson seeks to enforce that agreement, that controversy involves purely
questions of contract, a State law issue, not a violation of Federal law within the purview
of the limited jurisdiction of this Court. On the other hand, to the extent that Wilson
challenges the adequacy of that agreement under Federal law, his action may fall outside
the applicable limitation period. “For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the
15

Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Ohlinger v. Watson,
652 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1980)
16

Id. (quoting Ohlinger).

17

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 665–67 (1962).

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forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s
law regarding tolling, including equitable tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is
inconsistent with federal law.”18 California law provides a two-year statute of limitations for
personal injury claims, which may be tolled for an additional two years for prisoners.19 The
same rule applies to actions brought under the RA.20 For actions brought under the ADA,
this Court applies the California three-year limitation period.21 Thus, unless tolled under
California law, Wilson’s claims may be barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
In addition, Federal civil rights suits do not support vicarious liability, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his or her
rights.22 To impose liability, a defendant’s wrongful conduct must be sufficiently causally
connected to the constitutional violation.23 That is, the official must “implement a policy so

18
19

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004).
See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 335.1, 352.1(a).

20

See Ervine v. Desert View Regional Medical Ctr., 753 F3d 862, 869 (9th Cir.
2014) (applying Nevada’s two-year limitation period).
21

Sharkey v. O’Neal, — F.3d — (2015WL525488, 9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2015 (slip op.))
(applying Calif. Gov. Code § 11135).
22

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009); OSU Student Alliance v. Ray,
699 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 2012); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002);
see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–95 (1978) (rejecting the concept of
respondeat superior in the context of § 1983, instead requiring individual liability for the
violation); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Liability under [§] 1983
arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant. A supervisor is only
liable for the constitutional violations of . . . subordinates if the supervisor participated in
or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.”
(Citations omitted)).
23

See Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (abrogated in part on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)).
DISMISSAL ORDER
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deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force
of the constitutional violation.”24
A person deprives another “of a constitutional right, within the
meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in
another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally
required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].”
Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.1978) (Johnson) (emphasis
added). The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the
duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or
omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation. [Citations
omitted.]25
Likewise, generally subordinates cannot be held legally liable for actions taken at the
direction of, or in carrying out policy dictated by, superiors. In this case it is apparent from
the Complaint as drafted that several defendants were merely carrying out policy or
directions dictated by superiors.
As presently drafted the Complaint is legally insufficient. Although it may be
unlikely, the Court cannot say at this stage that Wilson cannot plead a viable Federal claim
in this Court.26 Accordingly, the Court will grant Wilson the opportunity to either file an
Amended Complaint in this Court, or elect to pursue his appropriate remedy(ies) under
state law in State court.

24

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

25

Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoted with approval in
Tennison v. City and County of San Francisco., 570 F.3d 1078, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009)).
26

See Hartman v. California Dept. of Corr. and Rehab., 707 F.3d 1141, 1130 (9th
Cir. 2013) (“A district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.”);
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (explaining that leave
to amend should be given unless amendment would be futile).
DISMISSAL ORDER
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Should Wilson elect to pursue his Federal law claims in this Court, in drafting his
amended complaint Wilson should:
1.

Adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding pleadings, in

particular, Rule 8(a), which provides—
(a) CLAIM FOR RELIEF. A pleading that states a claim for relief must
contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no
new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the
alternative or different types of relief.
2.

Contain sequentially numbered paragraphs; and

3.

Have attached thereto copies of all documents or papers referred to in the

complaint to the extent that he has copies in his possession, custody, or control, including
the Resolution Agreement dated June 11, 2007.
IV.

ORDER
Accordingly, the Complaint on file herein is hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice

to pursing appropriate remedies in State court or filing an Amended Complaint in this
Court.
In the event Plaintiff elects to continue to pursue his claims in this Court, he has
through and including May 11, 2015, within which to file an Amended Complaint consistent
with this decision. In the event Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within the

DISMISSAL ORDER
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time specified, or such later time as the Court may order, a judgment of dismissal
without prejudice may be entered without further notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of March, 2015.
S/ RALPH R. BEISTLINE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DISMISSAL ORDER
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