Hanna v. County of Fresno et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER Re Defendant's 29 Motion to Dismiss, signed by District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill on 7/8/2014. (The Court GRANTS Defendants motion to dismiss the SAC in its entirety WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff shall file any amended complaint within 20 days of electronic service of this order, but will be given only one chance to do so if he wishes.)(Gaumnitz, R)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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DOMINIC HANNA, by and through his
guardian ad litem, KATHY HENDERSON,
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
TO DISMISS (DOC. 29)
Plaintiff,
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1:14-cv-142-LJO-SKO
v.
COUNTY OF FRESNO, et al.,
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Defendants.
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I. INTRODUCTION
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Dominic Hanna, by and through his guardian ad litem, Kathy Henderson (“Plaintiff”), brings this
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case due to Defendants’ alleged violation of his constitutional rights. Doc. 21, Second Amended
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Complaint (“SAC”), at 1. Currently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the SAC in its
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entirety under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the ground it fails to state a claim for relief against
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Defendants. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion.
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II. BACKGROUND1
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Plaintiff was at all relevant times a pre-trial detainee at the Fresno County Adult Detention
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These background facts are drawn exclusively from the SAC, the truth of which must be assumed for purposes of a Rule
26 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
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Facility (“the jail”) in Fresno, California. SAC ¶ 4. Plaintiff brings this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§
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1983”) on the ground the County of Fresno (“the County”) and various county employees involved in
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his detention violated his constitutional rights. Id. ¶ 2. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’
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violation of his constitutional rights “were a direct and legal cause of the permanent mental and physical
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injuries which result in Plaintiff’s physical and mental incapacity.” Id. ¶ 4.
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Plaintiff was booked into the jail around 9:30P.M. on February 6, 2012. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff was
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noted to suffer from a bipolar disorder. Id. A release of information was signed and faxed to the
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pharmacy at Target in Hanford, regarding the medications, Lamictal, [P]laintiff . . . had been prescribed,
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and had brought with him to the Jail.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that “[a] suicide and mental health assessment
10 was completed by intake staff without qualifications or licensure to do so.” Id.
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The next day, Plaintiff was observed “pounding the back of his head against his cell bars,” which
12 allegedly caused “a hematoma the size of a tennis ball on the back of his head.” Later that day,
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Plaintiff Hanna had been heard to say that he did not want to go to trial because he wanted to
“end it.” Custody staff also saw plaintiff Hanna remove something that looked like socks from
his mouth or throat as if he had been trying to gag or choke himself. Custody staff had also seen
plaintiff write a letter he chewed up leaving a portion of the letter with the word “final” on it.
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Id.¶ 31. Plaintiff’s mental health status was assessed; he was determined to be a danger to himself and
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was placed into a suicide cell for his safety. Id. ¶ 32.
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At approximately 3:30A.M. on February 8, 2012, Defendant Tricia Nekola “determined that
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[P]laintiff . . . no longer met suicide cell criteria and recommended that he be removed.” Id. ¶ 33. At
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approximately 10:42P.M., Plaintiff was seen by a jail staff member to obtain a medical records release
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and the staff member assessed plaintiff’s mental health status as ‘not a danger to self at this time.’” Id.
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Around 2:30 P.M. on February 9, 2012, Plaintiff attempted to commit suicide by stuffing two
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socks down his throat and ramming his head into the cell wall. Id. ¶ 34. Medical personnel did not arrive
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for two to three minutes. Id. CPR was administered on Plaintiff and he was transported to the emergency
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room. Id.
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As a result of his suicide attempt, Plaintiff suffered severe, life-long injuries. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff
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alleges he never received his Lamictal “or any other similar medication” from the time he was booked
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until his attempted suicide. Id. ¶ 26. P
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Plaintiff names the County, seven individuals, and Does 1-through 50, inclusive, as Defendants.
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Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sheriff Margaret Mims (“Mims”) “is ultimately responsible for the
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health care and safety of prisoners in the jail.” Id. ¶ 7. Defendant “Edward Moreno, Director of the
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Department of Public Health, is responsible for the provision of health care services including mental
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health care to all prisoners in the jail.” Id. ¶ 9. Defendant “Pratap Narayen, the Medical Director of the
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Division of Correctional Health in the Fresno County Department of Public Health, was at all times
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responsible for the delivery of health care services to all prisoners in the Jail, including mental
10 health care.” Id. 10. Defendant “Karen Nunez, Nursing Services Manager of the Division of
11 Correctional Health in the Fresno County Department of Public Health, is and . . . was responsible for
12 supervising the operation and administration of health care services in the Jail, including mental health
13 care.” Id. ¶ 11. Defendant “Rick Hill, the Captain of Detention in the Jail, is and . . . herein was
14 responsible for custody operations, prisoner classification, correctional officer training, security
15 emergency response, and prisoner grievances.” Id. ¶ 12. Defendant “Marilynn Weldon, Captain of
16 Inmate Programs and Contracts, is and . . . was responsible for oversight of the contract with the
17 Department of Public Health for the delivery of health care in the Jail.” Id. ¶ 13. Defendant “Tricia
18 Nekola, was . . . a Licensed Vocational Nurse II, at the Jail.” Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff sues all individually
19 named Defendants in their official and individual capacity.
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The Doe Defendants “include Jail Psychiatric Services staff, from February 6, 2012 through
21 February 9, 2012, Fresno County employees, employees of Fresno County Department of Public Health,
22 administrators and other personnel.” Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiffs allege Doe Defendant 21, the main jail
23 Lieutenant, is the individual “who approved the removal of [P]laintiff . . . from the Main Jail Suicide
24 Cell, February 8, 2012 at 3:30 a.m.” Id. ¶¶ 14, 48.
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Plaintiff alleges three causes of action against Defendants under § 1983. The first claim is for the
26 alleged denial of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment due to Defendants’ alleged
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deliberate indifference to his mental health needs. Id. at 12-16. The second is for Defendants’ failure to
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train, supervise, and discipline employees. The third is for Monell liability.
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III. STANDARD OF DECISION
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a challenge to the sufficiency of the
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allegations set forth in the complaint. A 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is either a “lack of a
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cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”
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Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering a motion to dismiss
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for failure to state a claim, the court generally accepts as true the allegations in the complaint, construes
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the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolves all doubts in the
10 pleader’s favor. Lazy Y. Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008).
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To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim
12 to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim
13 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
14 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
15 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for
16 more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
17 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops
18 short of the line between possibility and plausibility for entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,
19 550 U.S. at 557).
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“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
21 allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more
22 than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
23 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Thus, “bare assertions . . . amount[ing]
24 to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ . . . are not entitled to be assumed true.”
25 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. In practice, “a complaint . . . must contain either direct or inferential allegations
26 respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.”
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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562. To the extent that the pleadings can be cured by the allegation of additional
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facts, the plaintiff should be afforded leave to amend. Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern
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California Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
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IV. DISCUSSION
A.
Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action.
Plaintiff’s first cause of action is brought under § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied
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his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that
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Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to his mental health needs during his detention and but for
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their conduct he would not have sustained the injuries that he did.
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A pretrial detainee’s claim of failure to provide care for serious medical needs is analyzed under
11 the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Simmons v. Navajo County, Az., 609
12 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010); Lolli v. Cnty of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2003); Gibson
13 v. Cnty of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1106 (2003). “With
14 regard to medical needs, the due process clause imposes, at a minimum, the same duty the Eighth
15 Amendment imposes: ‘persons in custody ha[ve] the established right to not have officials remain
16 deliberately indifferent to their serious medical needs.’ ” Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1187 (quoting Carnell v.
17 Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996)). “Under the Eighth Amendment’s standard of deliberate
18 indifference, a person is liable for denying a prisoner needed medical care only if the person ‘knows of
19 and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.’ ” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511
20 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
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Deliberate indifference is shown by “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a [detainee's] pain
22 or possible medical need, and harm caused by the indifference.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096
23 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other
24 grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)). Deliberate
25 indifference may be manifested when officials “deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical
26 treatment.” Id. (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (internal quotations omitted)).
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“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th
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Cir. 2004). Indifference to “medical needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or
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‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d
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458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980). Under the deliberate indifference standard, “the official must both be aware of
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facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must
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also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “But if a person is aware of a substantial risk of
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serious harm, a person may be liable for neglecting a [detainee’s] serious medical needs on the basis of
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either his action or his inaction.” Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188 (alteration in original). “A defendant must
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purposefully ignore or fail to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need in order for
10 deliberate indifference to be established.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (emphasis added).
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Plaintiff’s allegations are entirely devoid of any facts indicating that Defendants purposefully
12 ignored or failed to respond to Plaintiff’s alleged mental health needs. Rather, Plaintiff’s allegations
13 against Defendants are entirely premised on their alleged negligence. In fact, Plaintiff alleges numerous
14 facts to demonstrate that Defendants took many affirmative steps in an effort to provide Plaintiff with
15 medical care. When Plaintiff was booked, he underwent a medical intake screening and “[a] release of
16 information was signed and faxed to the pharmacy at Target in Hanford, regarding the medications,
17 Lamictal, Plaintiff . . . had been prescribed, and had brought with him to the Jail.” SAC ¶ 25. Then “[a]
18 suicide and mental health assessment was completed by intake staff.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that he was
19 never provided his medication, but he does not allege that Defendants purposefully ignored his medical
20 needs or purposefully failed to give him his medication.
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The next day, February 8, 2012, Plaintiff’s mental health status was assessed. Because he was
22 determined to be a danger to himself, “he was placed into a suicide cell for his own safety.” SAC ¶ 32.
23 On the following day, he was assessed and determined to no longer meet suicide cell criteria by two jail
24 staff. “Psychiatric Services was to follow up ‘if scheduled’ and as needed for crisis.” Id. Later that day, a
25 different jail staff member “assessed [P]laintiff’s mental health status as ‘not a danger to self at this
26 time.’” Id. ¶ 33. Plaintiff attempted suicide on February 9, 2012. Emergency medical services arrived
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“two to three minutes” after. Id. ¶ 34. He was then transported to the emergency room. Id.
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Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is simply no indication that
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Defendants’ conduct amounted to purposeful ignorance of Plaintiff’s medical needs or failure to address
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them. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. Plaintiff’s mental health status was assessed multiple times by
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multiple different jail staff, who made the medical decision to release Plaintiff to his cell, where he was
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able to attempt suicide. The thrust of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants is that their allegedly
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substandard care allowed Plaintiff to attempt suicide. As alleged, Defendants’ allegedly imperfect and
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ineffective health care does not amount to a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Broughton,
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622 F.2d at 460; Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990) (gross negligence does not
10 amount to a constitutional violation).
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Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action.
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Plaintiff’s second cause of action is against the “County, Mims, Moreno, Narayen, Nunez, Hill,
13 Weldon, and Does 1 through 20,” (“the Supervisor Defendants”) who Plaintiff alleges “were charged by
14 law with the selection, assignment, supervision and training of custody, psychiatric and medical staff.”
15 SAC ¶ 57. Plaintiff alleges that the Supervisor Defendants “knew or reasonably should have known, that
16 allowing unqualified, inadequately trained custodial and medical staff to make psychiatric assessments
17 was likely to cause serious injury or death to Jail inmates suffering from mental illness.” Id. ¶ 62.
18 Plaintiff alleges the Supervisor Defendants’ “lack of adequate training, monitoring, supervision and
19 staffing, was the legal and actual cause of the injuries of [P]laintiff.” Id.
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Supervisors are liable for alleged constitutional violations only if they “participated in or directed
21 the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,
22 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett,
23 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009); Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty School Board of Trustees, 479 F.3d
24 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997). Because “the
25 pleading of supervisorial liability is subject to the Iqbal standards . . . there must be facial plausibility in
26 a plaintiff’s allegations that some action/inaction on the part of the supervisor caused her alleged
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constitutional injury.” Alston v. Cnty of Sacramento, 2012 WL 2839825, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2012)
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(emphasis in original).
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As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to plead the existence of any constitutional violation.
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Plaintiff therefore cannot state a claim against the Supervisor Defendants on the ground they caused or
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failed to prevent the violation of his constitutional rights.
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C.
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Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action.
Plaintiff’s third cause of action is a Monell claim against the Supervisor Defendants. SAC at 19.
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Plaintiff alleges that the Supervisor Defendants “developed, implemented, enforced, encouraged and
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sanctioned de facto policies, practices, and/or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to [Plaintiff’s]
10 constitutional rights which caused the violation of such rights. SAC ¶ 69.
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To establish municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436
12 U.S. 658 (1978), Plaintiff must first establish that a municipal employee deprived him of a constitutional
13 right. Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). Next, Plaintiff must show that an official city
14 policy, custom, or practice was the moving force behind the constitutional injury. Monell, 436 U.S. at
15 694. A “policy” is a “deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among various
16 alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject
17 matter in question.” Fogel v. Collins, 531 F.3d 824, 834 (9th Cir. 2008). A “custom” is a “widespread
18 practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and
19 well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.
20 112, 127 (1988); Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates, 907 F.2d 879, 890 (9th Cir. 1990).
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As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to demonstrate that he suffered
22 any deprivation of his constitutional rights. Thus, his Monell claim necessarily fails. See Heller, 475
23 U.S. at 799.
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V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the SAC in its
26 entirety WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff shall file any amended complaint within 20 days of
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electronic service of this order, but will be given only one chance to do so if he wishes. This Court is
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not, and should not be, a service for writing pleadings for parties by having to rule on pleading decisions
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more than once.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
/s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill
July 8, 2014
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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