Herrera v. Ahlin et al

Filing 20

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS recommending that this Action Proceed on the July 20, 2015, Second Amended Complaint Against the Doe DSP Officers and Defendants Ahlin, King, Maynard and Randhawa be Dismissed From this Action for Plaintiff's Failure to State a Claim Against Them re 16 Amended Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 5/6/2016. Referred to Judge O'Neill. Objections to F&R due within fourteen (14) days. (Jessen, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RUBEN HERRERA,

Case No. 1:14-cv-00164-LJO-BAM-PC

Plaintiff,

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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
THAT DEFENDANTS AHLIN, KING,
MAYNARD AND RANDHAWA BE
DISMISSED FROM THIS ACTION FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE
CLAIM AND THAT THIS ACTION
PROCEED ON PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM OF
EXCESSIVE FORCE AGAINST DOE
DEFENDANTS

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(ECF NO. 16)

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OBJECTIONS DUE IN FOURTEEN DAYS

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v.

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PAM AHLIN, et al.,
Defendants.

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Plaintiff is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s July 20, 2015, second
amended complaint.
I.

Procedural History
Plaintiff, a civil detainee in the custody of the Department of State Hospitals at Coalinga

State Hospital (CSH), filed this action on February 6, 2014. Plaintiff’s claim stems from a use of
force incident at CSH on September 18, 2011. Plaintiff alleges that on that date, he was housed
on the Secured Services Unit (SSU) at CSH. Plaintiff, while in the SSU courtyard, climbed a
basketball pole and refused orders to climb down. Plaintiff refused to come on the ground that

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1 he was not given an opportunity to talk to the then Director, Defendant Pam Ahlin. Four inch
2 thick mattresses were placed around the base of the pole in order to protect Plaintiff if he fell.
3 Plaintiff refused commands to come down from the pole. Plaintiff alleges that unidentified
4 officers fired several shots from a baton launcher in order to get Plaintiff climb down. Plaintiff
5 used his hands to cover his eyes and fell over backwards, falling head first and injuring his neck
6 and head.
On April 16, 2015, an order was entered, dismissing the complaint and granting Plaintiff

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8 leave to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 9.)

On May 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed a first

9 amended complaint. (ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time to further
10 amend the complaint to identify Doe defendants. On May 20, 2015, an order was entered,
11 granting Plaintiff’s Plaintiff motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), and
12 granting Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint that identified the Doe Defendants.
13 (ECF No. 13.)

On July 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed the second amended complaint that is now

14 before the Court. (ECF No. 16.)
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II.

Allegations

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In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff re-states the allegations of the original

17 complaint. Plaintiff names as Defendants former CSH Executive Director Pam Ahlin, current
18 CSH Executive Director A. King; former CSH Medical Director G. Maynard; CSH Psychologist
19 R. Randhawa, Ph.D.; Department of Police Services (DPS) Officers John Does.1 Plaintiff re20 states the allegations of the original complaint that he climbed a basketball pole in protest on
21 September 18, 2011, and Defendant John Doe DPS officers used excessive force to get him to
22 climb down, resulting in his fall and injury.
II.

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Analysis

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A. Excessive Force

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The Eighth Amendment protects prisoner from inhuman methods of punishment and from

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Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants in their individual and official capacities. However, ‘[t]he Eleventh

27 Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, its agencies, and state officials in their
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official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dept. of Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007)(citations omitted).

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1 inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.
2 2006). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must provide
3 prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Farmer v.
4 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994)(quotations omitted).

Prison officials are liable under the

5 Eighth Amendment only if they demonstrate deliberate indifference to conditions posing a
6 substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate; and it is well settled that deliberate indifference
7 occurs when an official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of
8 serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 841; Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177 1181 (9th Cir.
9 2009); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005).
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As a civil detainee, Plaintiff is entitled to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather

11 than the Eighth Amendment. Fisher v. Bryant, 2:10-cv-02311-KJM-DAD, 2012 WL 327698
12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012)(Applying the Fourteenth Amendment due process standard to a claim
13 of excessive force brought by a civil detainee, rather than the standard set forth under the Eighth
14 Amendment). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the aforementioned Eighth Amendment
15 rights guaranteed for prisoners “set a floor for those that must be afforded to” civil detainees.
16 Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2007)(summarily reversed on other grounds by
17 Hunter v. Hydrick, 556 U.S. 1256 (2009). The objectively reasonable standard set forth by the
18 Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the “malicious and sadistic” standard of the Eighth
19 Amendment, applies to Plaintiff’s claim. Id.
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Here, a state employee firing non-lethal rounds to remove Plaintiff from a basketball pole

21 without any provocation, plausibly identifies an objectively unreasonable use of force. As such,
22 Plaintiff states an excessive force claim against the Doe DPS officer or officers that fired the
23 non-lethal rounds.
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As Plaintiff was advised in the April 16, 2015, screening order, the Court cannot order

25 service upon unidentified individuals. Although the use of Doe defendants is acceptable to
26 withstand dismissal of the complaint at the screening stage, those person or persons cannot be
27 served with process in this action until they are identified by their names. The burden is on
28 Plaintiff to discover the identity of the defendant(s).

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B. Supervisory Liability
As to Defendants Ahlin, King and Maynard, Plaintiff is advised that government officials

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3 may not be held liable for the actions of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.
4 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 673 (2009). Since a government official cannot be held liable
5 under a theory of vicarious liability for section 1983 actions, Plaintiff must plead that the official
6 has violated the Constitution through his own individual actions. Id. at 673. In other words, to
7 state claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named defendant with some
8 affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff’s federal rights.

Plaintiff

9 has not alleged any facts suggesting personal participation by these Defendants in the use of
10 excessive force. They should therefore be dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim against
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C.

Dr. Randhawa

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Plaintiff does not charge Defendant Randhawa with any conduct that indicates a deprivation

14 of a protected interest of Plaintiff’s. Plaintiff’s sole allegation against Dr. Randhawa is that he is
15 responsible for Plaintiff’s placement in the SSU.
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Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or

17 other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d
18 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.
19 2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). “Section 1983 is not itself a source
20 of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere
21 conferred.” Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada Sec’y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir.
22 2012)(citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989))(internal quotation marks
23 omitted). To state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating the existence of a link, or
24 causal connection, between each defendant’s actions or omissions and a violation of his federal
25 rights. Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013);
26 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011).
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As a civil detainee, Plaintiff is entitled to treatment more considerate than that afforded

28 pretrial detainees or convicted criminals. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931-32 (9th Cir. 2004).

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1 Plaintiff’s right to constitutionally adequate conditions of confinement is protected by the
2 substantive component of the Due Process Clause. Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 315
3 (1982). A determination whether Plaintiff’s rights were violated requires “balancing of his
4 liberty interests against the relevant state interests.”

Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321.

The

5 Constitution requires only that courts ensure that professional judgment was exercised.
6 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22. A “decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid;
7 liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial
8 departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the
9 person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Id. at 322-23. The
10 professional judgment standard is an objective standard and it equates “to that required in
11 ordinary tort cases for a finding of conscious indifference amounting to gross negligence.”
12 Ammons v. Washington Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 648 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2011),
13 cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2379 (2012)(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Here, Plaintiff’s only allegation as to Dr. Randhawa is that he is responsible for

15 Plaintiff’s placement in the SSU.

There are no allegations that Dr. Randhawa made any

16 decisions or engaged in any conduct that was a departure from the professional judgment
17 standard. Dr. Randhawa should therefore be dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim
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III.

Conclusion.

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Plaintiff was previously notified of the applicable legal standards and the deficiencies in

21 his pleading, and despite guidance from the Court, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is
22 largely identical to the original complaint. Based upon the allegations in Plaintiff’s original
23 complaint, first amended complaint, and second amended complaint, the Court is persuaded that
24 Plaintiff is unable to allege any additional facts that would support a claim for relief against
25 Defendants Ahlin, King, Maynard, and Randhawa, and further amendment would be futile. See
26 Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may deny leave to
27 amend when amendment would be futile.”)

Based on the nature of the deficiencies at issue, the

28 Court finds that further leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130

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1 (9th. Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446-1449 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

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1. This action proceed on the July 20, 2015, second amended complaint against the Doe
DSP officers; and

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2. Defendants Ahlin, King, Maynard and Randhawa be dismissed from this action for
Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim against them.

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These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

8 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provision of Title 28 U.S.C. §636 (b)(1)(B). Within
9 fourteen (14) days after being served with these Finding and Recommendations, the parties may
10 file written objections with the Court.

The document should be captioned “Objections to

11 Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within
12 the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.2d
13 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014)(citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

/s/ Barbara

May 6, 2016

A. McAuliffe

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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