Tyana Marie Sedano et al vs USA

Filing 50

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE MOTIONS IN LIMINE (Docs. 37, 38, 39, 40, 41) signed by District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill on February 10, 2016. (Munoz, I)

1
2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
3
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
4
5
6

TYANA MARIE SEDANO, a minor, by and
through her guardian ad litem, MARIA
HERNANDEZ, et al.,

7

Plaintiffs,

8

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE MOTIONS IN LIMINE (Docs.
37, 38, 39, 40, 41)

v.

9

1:14-cv-142-LJO-JLT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

10

Defendant.

11
12
13

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Maria Hernandez and Miguel Sedano, on behalf of their daughter, Tyana Marie Sedano

14 (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), and themselves, bring this suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
15 §§ 2671 et seq., against the United States (“the Government”). Plaintiffs allege that Chibuike Anucha,
16 M.D., and Doreen Tadokoro, M.D., employees of the federally funded Clinica Sierra Vista (“CSV”),
17 provided negligent medical care during Maria’s pregnancy with and delivery of Tyana, which resulted in
18 serious, life-long injuries to Tyana. See generally Doc. 1; Doc. 29 at 5. The Government denies
19 Plaintiffs’ claims and contends all of the medical care Maria and Tyana received met the applicable
20 standard of care. See Doc. 29 at 2.
21

The matter is set for a bench trial on March 22, 2016. Currently before the Court are four

22 motions in limine from Plaintiffs, and one from the Government. Docs. 37-41. The Court found the
23 matters suitable for decision on the papers and took them under submission pursuant to Local Rule
24 230(g). See Doc. 49. For the following reasons, the Court (1) GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN
25 PART Plaintiffs’ second and fourth motions in limine (Docs. 38, 40); (2) DENIES Plaintiffs’ first and
1

1

third motions in limine (Docs. 37, 39); and (3) DENIES the Government’s motion in limine (Doc. 41).

2

II. STANDARD OF DECISION
A party may use a motion in limine to exclude inadmissible or prejudicial evidence before it is

3
4

actually introduced at trial. See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n. 2 (1984). “[A] motion in limine

5

is an important tool available to the trial judge to ensure the expeditious and evenhanded management of

6

the trial proceedings.” Jonasson v. Lutheran Child and Family Services, 115 F.3d 436,440 (7th Cir.

7

1997). A motion in limine allows the parties to resolve evidentiary disputes before trial and avoids

8

potentially prejudicial evidence being presented in front of the jury, thereby relieving the trial judge

9

from the formidable task of neutralizing the taint of prejudicial evidence. Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d

10 985, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2003).
11

Motions in limine that exclude broad categories of evidence are disfavored and such issues are

12 better dealt with during trial as the admissibility of evidence arises. See, e.g., Brown v. Kavanaugh, No.
13 1:08-cv-01764-LJO, 2013 WL 1124301, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar.18, 2013) (citing Sperberg v. Goodyear
14 Tire & Rubber, Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975)); see also In re Homestore.com, Inc., No. CV 01–
15 11115 RSWL CWX, 2011 WL 291176, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan.25, 2011) (holding that motions in limine
16 should “rarely seek to exclude broad categories of evidence, as the court is almost always better situated
17 to rule on evidentiary issues in their factual context during trial”). Some evidentiary issues are not
18 accurately and efficiently evaluated by the trial judge in a motion in limine, and it is necessary to defer
19 ruling until during trial when the trial judge can better estimate the impact of the evidence on the jury.
20 Jonasson, 115 F.3d at 440.
21

III. ANALYSIS

22 A.

Plaintiffs’ Motions in Limine

23

1.

24

Plaintiffs’ first motion in limine seeks to include “evidence regarding the cost of an Annuity

First Motion in Limine

25 purchased to fund any future damage payments, or award, as the best evidence of Present Cash Value
2

1

(PCV).” Doc. 37 at 1 (emphasis added). The Government opposes, arguing that it is “premature” for the

2

Court to rule pre-trial that evidence of annuity costs is the best evidence of present value. See Doc. 45 at

3

2.
The Court is not in a position to rule that the cost of an annuity is the “best evidence” to prove

4
5

PCV. There is no current reason to believe that it will not be allowed as evidence of PCV, assuming

6

expert qualifications and foundation are met before opinions are rendered. Plaintiffs’ motion in limine is

7

DENIED.

8

2.

9

Plaintiffs’ second motion in limine seeks to exclude evidence concerning “collateral sources” of

Second Motion in Limine

10 medical benefits or payments to medical providers for Tyana. Doc. 38 at 1-2. The Government does not
11 oppose insofar as the Government does not intend to introduce this kind of evidence with the exception
12 of evidence concerning benefits from the Regional Center, which provides free benefits and, as such,
13 those benefits are not an inadmissible “collateral source.” Doc. 46 at 3-4.
Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED IN PART. The free services rendered by the Regional Center do

14

15 not appear to be related to the motion because no special damages were paid or encumbered for which
16 collateral sources would pertain.
17

3.

18

Plaintiffs’ third motion in limine seeks to exclude evidence concerning Tyana’s life expectancy.

Third Motion in Limine

19 Doc. 39 at 1. The thrust of Plaintiffs’ argument is that life expectancy is irrelevant and not necessary for
20 the Court to determine. Plaintiffs’ argue that when a judgment is paid periodically under California Code
21 of Civil Procedure § 667.7 (“§ 667.7”)1 and all payments are subject to a reversionary trust (i.e., that
22 money not used reverts back to the Government), life expectancy is irrelevant. Plaintiffs contend that to
23
24
25

1

Section 667.7 provides that, “[i]n any action for injury or damages against a provider of health services,” the Court may
“enter a judgment ordering that money damages . . . be paid in whole or in part by period payments rather than by a lumpsum payment if the award equals or exceeds fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) in future damages.”)

3

1

do otherwise runs the risk of an incorrect speculation of life expectancy, and if that estimate is too low,

2

there is a risk that the funds will run out during Tyana’s lifetime.

3

Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED. The motion is premature at best. There has been no request of

4

either party for periodic payments. There has been no award for any such request to pertain. There has

5

been no award over $50,000 that would yet trigger § 667.7. There has been no agreement, nor is there

6

any requirement for the Government to set up a reversionary trust.

7

4.

8

Plaintiffs’ fourth motion in limine seeks to exclude certain testimony from and medical articles

9

Fourth Motion in Limine

cited by Paul Sinkhorn, M.D., the Government’s liability expert. Doc. 40 at 1. Specifically, Plaintiffs

10 move to preclude Dr. Sinkhorn “from offering any opinions on life expectancy, damages, and life care
11 planning.” Id. at 2. Plaintiffs also seek to exclude any evidence concerning Plaintiffs’ comparative
12 negligence. Id. at 7.
13

The Government notes that the parties have stipulated that the Government will not assert that

14 Plaintiffs were comparatively negligent. Doc. 48 at 1-2 (citing Doc. 36, Pre-trial Order, at ¶ 14).
15 Likewise, the Government notes that Dr. Sinkhorn will not testify as to matters for which he was not
16 retained and on which he did not opine in his reports or deposition. Accordingly, the Government
17 contends—and the Court agrees—that it is not necessary to preclude evidence that the Government does
18 not intend to admit. The Court will not allow testimony from an expert that exceeds the matters for
19 which he/she was retained and on which he/she expressed opinions in reports or by deposition.
20 Plaintiffs’ motion therefore is DENIED in part.
21
22
23
24

Plaintiffs also seek to exclude the following medical articles Dr. Sinkhorn cited:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

“Obstetric Care Consensus: Safe Prevention of the Primary Cesarean Delivery”
“Rupture of the Unscarred Uterus”
“Uterine Rupture in Women Attempting a Vaginal Birth Following Cesarean Birth”
“Uterine Rupture: Risk Factors and Pregnancy Outcomes”
“Neonatal Morbidity Associated with Uterine Rupture: What Are the Risk Factors”
An excerpt from the textbook Williams Obstetrics.

25
4

1

The Government opposes excluding any of the articles. Doc. 48 at 5.

2

With regard to the first two articles, Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED. Although they were

3

published after Tyana’s birth, contrary to Plaintiffs’ suggestion, they have relevance by citing pre-birth

4

events and standards and findings.
With regard to the third, fourth, and fifth articles, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED to the extent

5
6

the discussions, opinions, and conclusion are limited to uterine rupture only after Cesarean delivery.

7

Otherwise, the Court’s ruling on the motion is deferred until the experts testify about the potential

8

broader aspects of the articles that may be relevant to the instant circumstances.
With regard to the Williams textbook, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED

9

10 IN PART. The mention of dystocia is irrelevant and is excluded. The broader text is relevant and is not
11 excluded.
12 B.

The Government’s Motion in Limine

13

The Government moves to exclude cumulative testimony from Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses Frank

14 A. Manning, M.D., and Albert J. Phillips, M.D. Doc. 41 at 1.2 The Government contends these experts
15 will both testify as to whether Drs. Anucha and Tadokoro breached the appropriate standard of care and
16 whether their alleged breach of that standard caused any injury. Id. at 1.
The Government’s motion is DENIED due to Plaintiffs’ representation in their opposition to the

17

18 motion that Dr. Manning will testify to causation, while Dr. Phillips will testify to negligence and the
19 breach of care. See Doc. 44 at 2.
20

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the Court (1) GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’

21

22 second and fourth motions in limine (Docs. 38, 40); (2) DENIES Plaintiffs’ first and third motions in
23
24
25

2

The Government also moved to exclude testimony from Richard H. Paul, M.D. Doc. 41 at 1. After the Government filed its
motion in limine, however, Plaintiff withdrew Dr. Paul as an expert witness. Doc. 43. The Government’s motion to exclude
his testimony therefore is DENIED AS MOOT.

5

1

limine (Docs. 37, 39); and (3) DENIES the Government’s motion in limine (Doc. 41).

2
3
4

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

/s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill

February 10, 2016

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
6