Knox et al v. City Of Fresno et al

Filing 184

ORDER on plaintiffs' objections to defendants' bill of costs, documents 168 , 174 , and 175 . Order signed by Magistrate Judge Erica P. Grosjean on 9/22/2016. (Rooney, M)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DORIS RAY KNOX; JERRY WAYNE
KNOX; JEREMY EDWARD MOORE,
individually and as successor-in-interest to
VERONICA LYNN CANTER, deceased,

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ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’
OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANTS’ BILL
OF COSTS

Plaintiffs,

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Case No. 1:14-cv-00799-EPG

(ECF Nos. 168, 174, 175)
v.
CITY OF FRESNO, a municipal
corporation;
EDWARD CHRISTOPHER LOUCHREN,
individually and in his capacity as a police
officer for the CITY OF FRESNO;
DOUGLAS EDWARD COX, individually
and in his capacity as a police officer for the
CITY OF FRESNO,
Defendants.

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On May 27, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants alleging causes of
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of the death of Veronica Canter, the daughter,
stepdaughter, and mother of Doris Knox, Jerry Knox, and Jeremy Moore, respectively. The
matter came before the Court for a jury trial on June 14, 2016. On June 20, 2016, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of Defendants on all causes of action. The Court entered judgment
in favor of Defendants shortly thereafter. On June 23, 2016, Defendants submitted a bill of
costs, requesting an award of $14,973.10 in costs. (ECF No. 168.) Plaintiffs filed objections to
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the bill of costs on June 30, 2016. (ECF No. 174.) Defendants filed a reply and agreed to

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reduce the amount of costs requested to $10,812.99. (ECF No. 175.) Plaintiffs’ objections to

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the bill of costs are now before the Court.

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“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that ‘[u]nless a federal statute, these

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rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney's fees—should be allowed

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to the prevailing party.’” Draper v. Rosario, No. 14-16340, 2016 WL 4651407, at *11 (9th

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Cir. Sept. 7, 2016). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted this rule as creating “a

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presumption for awarding costs to prevailing parties; the losing party must show why costs

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should not be awarded.” Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 945 n. 12 (9th Cir.

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2003). The rule also “vests in the district court discretion to refuse to award costs.” Ass’n of

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Mexican-American Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir. 2000).

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“Appropriate reasons for denying costs include: (1) the substantial public importance of

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the case, (2) the closeness and difficulty of the issues in the case, (3) the chilling effect on

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future similar actions, (4) the plaintiff's limited financial resources, and (5) the economic

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disparity between the parties. This is not ‘an exhaustive list of ‘good reasons' for declining to

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award costs,’ but rather a starting point for analysis.” Draper v. Rosario, No. 14-16340, 2016

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WL 4651407, at *11 (9th Cir. Sept. 7, 2016), quoting Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc.,

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743 F.3d 1236, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 2014). “A losing party need not demonstrate that all five

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factors weigh against imposing costs.” Id.

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Plaintiffs’ claims involved allegations that Defendants, police officers for the City of

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Fresno, violated Veronica Canter’s constitutional rights by subjecting her to excessive force

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and causing her death. Plaintiffs contended that Defendants knew or should have known that

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Canter was mentally ill or unstable at the time of their encounter and that they should have

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acted with more restraint in approaching her. The case thus involved a topic of substantial

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public importance—the situations and circumstances under which police officers can use lethal

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force against mentally ill individuals. Mahach-Watkins v. Depee, 593 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th

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Cir. 2010) (“We have difficulty imagining a more important issue than the legality of state-

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sanctioned force resulting in death. It is obviously of supreme importance to anyone who might
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be subject to such force. But it is also of great importance to a law enforcement officer who is

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placed in a situation where deadly force may be appropriate.”); Washburn v. Fagan, Case No.

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C03-00869 MJJ, 2008 WL 361048, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2008) (despite lack of Monell

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claims at trial, “action raised important issues regarding how the San Francisco Police

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Department dealt with, and supervised, excessive force incidents”).

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The issues in the case were relatively close, as well. The jury was offered conflicting

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accounts of what transpired after Defendants Louchren and Cox entered the apartment that

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Canter was in—the officers testified that Canter was brandishing knives from an elevated

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position on top of a sofa when she was shot and killed, while at least one witness testified that

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she had not reached an elevated position on the sofa before she was shot. Many witnesses also

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differed on the timing and sequence of the shots fired by the officers. Much of the jury’s

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decision thus turned on questions of credibility. While Plaintiffs did not ultimately prevail,

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their case was not meritless. Draper, 2016 WL 4651407 at *12 (award of costs an abuse of

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discretion where “case turned on which competing account of events the jurors believed”);

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Romero v. Frederick, Case No. C05-03014 MJJ, 2008 WL 142359, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14,

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2008) (“The closeness of the case also leads the Court to conclude that an award of costs would

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be inequitable in this situation. There was conflicting testimony presented at trial regarding

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Defendants’ conduct and use of force.”).

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Two of the factors considered involve Plaintiffs’ financial resources. While Plaintiffs in

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this case did not proceed in forma pauperis and are not completely indigent, Plaintiffs have

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submitted declarations attesting to their limited financial resources. (ECF Nos. 174-3, 174-4.)

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They have also been represented in this case by pro bono counsel and have not paid any of the

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expenses incurred in this litigation. Defendants note that the City of Fresno is not “some

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wealthy corporation” and argues that courts in at least one circuit have rejected the comparison

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of relative wealth between the parties, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explicitly

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used such comparisons in examining bills of costs. Draper, 2016 WL 4651407 at *13

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(“[Plaintiff] represented himself in this litigation for several years, until the district court

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appointed pro bono counsel. There is no comparison between Draper’s limited resources and
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those of the state of California, which bore the defense costs.”); Ass’n of Mexican-American

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Educators, 231 F.3d at 593 (affirming refusal to award costs based on “great economic

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disparity” between the parties). Even if the City of Fresno is not a large or wealthy business, it

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is assuredly on firmer financial footing than Plaintiffs in this case.

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Considering the totality of the circumstances and for the reasons set forth above, the

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Court finds that the requested award of costs would be inequitable. The Court thus sustains

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Plaintiffs objections to the bill of costs and declines to award costs in this matter.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

September 22, 2016

/s/
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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