Brooks v. Macomber et al

Filing 18

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 2/4/2015 recommending to GRANT RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE PETITION re 12 ; to DISMISS THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS re 1 ; to DECLINE TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY and DIRECT THE CLERK TO CLOSE THE CASE. Referred to Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill; Objections to F&R due by 3/12/2015. (Lundstrom, T)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 RODNEY BROOKS,

Case No. 1:14-cv-00858-LJO-BAM-HC

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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
GRANT RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS THE PETITION (DOC. 12)

Petitioner,

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v.

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16 M. MACOMBER, Warden, et al.,
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Respondents.

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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
DISMISS THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS (DOC. 1),
DECLINE TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE
OF APPEALABILITY, AND DIRECT
THE CLERK TO CLOSE THE CASE
OBJECTIONS DEADLINE:
THIRTY (30) DAYS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254.

The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 through 304.
Pending before the Court is the Respondent’s motion to dismiss the
petition, which was filed on August 11, 2014.

Petitioner filed

opposition on October 9, 2014, and Respondent filed a reply on
October 17, 2014.
I.

Proceeding by a Motion to Dismiss

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the
1

1 effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
2 of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies to the petition.

Lindh v.

3 Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484,
4 1499 (9th Cir. 1997).
5

A district court must award a writ of habeas corpus or issue an

6 order to show cause why it should not be granted unless it appears
7 from the application that the applicant is not entitled thereto.
8 U.S.C. § 2243.

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Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in

9 the United States District Courts (Habeas Rules) permits the filing
10 of “an answer, motion, or other response,” and thus it authorizes
11 the filing of a motion in lieu of an answer in response to a
12 petition.
13 Amendments.

Rule 4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption and 2004
This gives the Court the flexibility and discretion

14 initially to forego an answer in the interest of screening out
15 frivolous applications and eliminating the burden that would be
16 placed on a respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer.
17 Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption.

Advisory

Rule 4 confers upon the Court broad

18 discretion to take “other action the judge may order,” including
19 authorizing a respondent to make a motion to dismiss based upon
20 information furnished by respondent, which may show that a
21 petitioner’s claims suffer a procedural or jurisdictional infirmity,
22 such as res judicata, failure to exhaust state remedies, or absence
23 of custody.
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Id.

The Supreme Court has characterized as erroneous the view that

25 a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is appropriate in a habeas corpus proceeding.
26 See, Browder v. Director, Ill. Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257,
27 269 n. 14 (1978); but see Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 325-26
28 (1996).

However, in light of the broad language of Habeas Rule 4,
2

1 it has been held in this circuit that motions to dismiss are
2 appropriate in cases that proceed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2254 and
3 present issues of failure to state a colorable claim under federal
4 law, O=Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420-21 (9th Cir. 1990);
5 procedural default in state court, White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599,
6 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989); and failure to exhaust state court remedies,
7 Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 n.12 (E.D.Cal. 1982).
8

Analogously, a motion to dismiss a petition for failure to

9 allege facts entitling a petitioner to relief in a proceeding
10 pursuant to 2254, such as Respondent’s motion in the instant case,
11 is appropriate because a federal court is a court of limited
12 jurisdiction with a continuing duty to determine its own subject
13 matter jurisdiction and to dismiss an action where it appears that
14 the Court lacks jurisdiction.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); CSIBI v.

15 Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 136 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing City of
16 Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 511-512 (1973)); Billingsley v.
17 C.I.R., 868 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1989).
18

Accordingly, the Court will consider Respondent’s motion

19 pursuant to Habeas Rule 4.
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II.

Background

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In the petition filed on June 2, 2014, Petitioner alleges that

22 he suffered a denial of due process of law resulting from the
23 failure of the California Department of Corrections and
24 Rehabilitation (CDCR) to permit Petitioner to call witnesses at a
25 prison disciplinary hearing held in 2012 at which Petitioner was
26 found guilty of willfully delaying an officer in the performance of
27 duty by depositing feces in a study cell.

Petitioner was sanctioned

28 with a loss of ninety (90) days of custody credit in addition to
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1 loss of privileges.

(Pet., doc. 1 at 6, 13-26.)

Petitioner is serving an indeterminate sentence of eighteen

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3 years to life for second degree murder imposed in 1992 in the

4 Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego.
5 (Mot., exh. 1, doc. 12-1, 1-6.)

Petitioner reached his minimum

6 eligible parole date (MEPD) on May 21, 2003.
7 12-5, 56-50.)

(Mot., exh. 5, doc.

In 2012, California’s Board of Parole Hearings (BPH)

8 found that Petitioner was not suitable for parole and denied
9 Petitioner parole consideration for seven years.

(Id. at 56.)

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III.

Likelihood of Effect on Duration of Confinement

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Respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the ground that the

12 petition does not implicate the legality or duration of Petitioner’s
13 confinement, and thus Petitioner has not stated facts that would
14 entitle him to relief in a proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
15 Respondent argues that because Petitioner is serving an
16 indeterminate life term and has passed his MEPD, any effect of the
17 credit loss on the duration of his confinement is too speculative to
18 warrant proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Petitioner is not

19 challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment
20 or seeking an immediate or speedier release; thus, his claim lies
21 without the core of this Court’s habeas jurisdiction.

See Nelson v.

22 Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643-46 (2004).
A federal court may only grant a state prisoner’s petition for

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24 writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner can show that "he is in
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Petitioner has also been sentenced to serve determinate sentences totaling six
years and eight months for weapons offenses committed in prison in 2002 and 2008.
(Mot., exh. 1, doc. 12-1, 1-4.) However, those sentences were ordered to run
consecutively to his indeterminate term, and under state law the determinate terms
will commence when Petitioner is found suitable for parole and is discharged from
the previous sentence. See In re Tate, 135 Cal.App.4th 756, 765 (2006).

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1 custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
2 United States."

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

A habeas corpus petition is

3 the correct method for a prisoner to challenge the legality or
4 duration of his confinement.

Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th

5 Cir. 1991) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973));
6 Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule 1, 1976 Adoption.

In

7 contrast, a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the
8 proper method for a prisoner to challenge the conditions of that
9 confinement.

McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 141 42 (1991);

10 Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499; Badea, 931 F.2d at 574; Advisory Committee
11 Notes to Habeas Rule 1, 1976 Adoption.
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With respect to Petitioner’s claim that he suffered a denial of

13 due process in a prison disciplinary proceeding that resulted in a
14 loss of conduct credits, it is established that a constitutional
15 claim concerning the application of rules administered by a prison
16 or penal administrator that challenges the duration of a sentence is
17 generally a cognizable claim of being in custody in violation of the
18 Constitution pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

See, e.g.,

19 Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (determining a
20 procedural due process claim concerning loss of time credits
21 resulting from disciplinary procedures and findings).

The Supreme

22 Court has held that challenges to prison disciplinary adjudications
23 that have resulted in a loss of time credits must be raised in a
24 federal habeas corpus action and not in a § 1983 action because such
25 a challenge is to the very fact or duration of physical
26 imprisonment, and the relief sought is a determination of
27 entitlement to immediate or speedier release.
28 411 U.S. at 500.

Preiser v. Rodriguez,

Thus, such claims are within the core of habeas
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1 corpus jurisdiction.
2

The Supreme Court's decisions concerning any boundaries between

3 habeas jurisdiction and jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have
4 arisen in cases involving § 1983 proceedings, where it is
5 established that, regardless of the precise relief sought, an action
6 pursuant to § 1983 concerning prison administrative processes is
7 barred if success in the action would necessarily demonstrate the
8 invalidity of the confinement or its duration, or necessarily imply
9 the invalidity of a conviction or sentence.

Wilkinson v. Dotson,

10 544 U.S. 74, 81–82, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 1247-48 (2005) (parole
11 processes).

However, the limits on habeas jurisdiction, or the

12 appropriate extent of any overlap between habeas and § 1983, have
13 not been definitively addressed by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme

14 Court has adverted to the possibility of habeas as a potential
15 alternative remedy to an action under § 1983 for unspecified
16 additional and unconstitutional restraints during lawful custody.
17 Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499–500.

Nevertheless, the Court has declined

18 to address whether a writ of habeas corpus may be used to challenge
19 conditions of confinement as distinct from the fact or length of
20 confinement itself.

See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n.6, 99

21 S.Ct. 1861, 1868 (1979).

However, it appears that the Court

22 continues to recognize a “core” of habeas corpus that refers to
23 suits where success would inevitably affect the legality or duration
24 of confinement.

For example, in Wilkinson, the Court noted that if

25 success on a claim would mean at most a new opportunity for review
26 of parole eligibility, or a new parole hearing at which authorities
27 could discretionarily decline to shorten a prison term, then success
28 would not inevitably lead to release, and the suit would not lie at
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1 the core of habeas corpus.
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Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82.

Cases in this circuit have recognized a possibility of habeas

3 jurisdiction in suits that do not fall within the core of habeas
4 corpus.

Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1989) (where the

5 petitioner sought expungement of a disciplinary finding that was
6 likely to accelerate eligibility for parole); Docken v. Chase, 393
7 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2004) (where the petitioner sought only
8 equitable relief regarding the constitutionality of the frequency of
9 parole reviews, a claim sufficiently related to the duration of
10 confinement).

However, relief pursuant to § 1983 remains an

11 appropriate remedy for claims concerning administrative decisions
12 made in prison where success would not necessarily imply the
13 invalidity of continuing confinement.

Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d at

14 1030 (characterizing Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997)
15 as holding that a § 1983 suit is an appropriate remedy for
16 challenges to conditions [there, administrative placement in a sex
17 offender program affecting eligibility for parole] which do not
18 necessarily imply the invalidity of continuing confinement); see
19 Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 852, 858 (9th Cir. 2003).
20

Here, Petitioner is serving an indeterminate life sentence.

21 There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person
22 to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid
23 sentence.

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional

24 Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979).

Under state

25 law, Petitioner will complete his indeterminate sentence when the
26 BPH determines that Petitioner is suitable for parole.
27 Code § 3041; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402.

Cal. Pen.

The decision to set

28 a parole release date is entrusted to the discretion of the BPH,
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1 which is to consider whether in light of the gravity of the current
2 convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current
3 or past convicted offenses, consideration of the public safety
4 requires a more lengthy period of incarceration before a parole date
5 is set.
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Cal. Pen. Code §§ 3041, 3041.5.

Because Petitioner had passed his MEPD when he suffered the

7 sanction of loss of custody credits, any relationship between the
8 credit loss and the ultimate duration of Petitioner’s confinement is
9 merely speculative.

Under California law, a gain or loss of custody

10 credits can affect the setting of an indeterminately sentenced
11 inmate’s MEPD.

See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2400.

However, once

12 an inmate’s MEPD passes and the inmate begins receiving parole
13 consideration hearings, assessing a credit loss does not affect the
14 inmate’s sentence; conduct credits are not awarded unless and until
15 the BPH grants parole.

Cal. Penal Code § 3041; Cal. Code. Regs.,

16 tit. 15, §§ 2400, 2403, 2410, 2411; see Wilder v. Dickinson, no. CV
17 08–1698–VBF (PLA), 2011 WL 1131491, at *6 (C.D.Cal. Feb. 10, 2011)
18 (unpublished); Garnica v. Hartley, no. 1:10–CV–01279 GSA HC, 2010 WL
19 3069309, at *2 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 4, 2010) (unpublished); Alley v.
20 Carey, no. 09–15328, 2010 WL 4386827, at **1 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2010)
21 (unpublished).

Here, because Petitioner had already begun receiving

22 parole consideration hearings before the challenged forfeiture of
23 credit, any restoration of the credit would not affect the
24 scheduling of his next parole consideration hearing or his release
25 on parole.
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The fact that the BPH may consider Petitioner’s disciplinary

27 violation at a future parole hearing does not create a sufficient
28 nexus to the length of imprisonment or a sufficient likelihood of
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1 affecting the overall length of Petitioner’s confinement.

As in

2 Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859, expungement of the
3 disciplinary finding would not necessarily shorten the overall
4 sentence.

Indeed, it is not shown that it would be likely to

5 accelerate parole eligibility; rather, success would mean only an
6 opportunity to seek parole from a board that could deny parole on a
7 multitude of other grounds already available to it.

It is entirely

8 speculative that a future parole suitability decision would hinge on
9 the single disciplinary offense presently before the Court because
10 the suitability decision is entrusted to the discretion of the BPH
11 to consider how all parole suitability factors operate together to
12 demonstrate a presence or absence of current dangerousness to the
13 public.

See In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1212 (2008); Cal. Code

14 Regs., tit. 15, § 2400 (providing that all available relevant,
15 reliable information shall be considered in determining suitability
16 for parole, including the prisoner’s social history; past and
17 present mental state; criminal history, including the base and other
18 commitment offenses, and behavior before, during, and after the
19 crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of
20 treatment or control; and any other information which bears on the
21 prisoner's suitability for release).

The parole suitability

22 decision depends on “an amalgam of elements, some of which are
23 factual but many of which are purely subjective appraisals by the
24 Board members based on their experience with the difficult task of
25 evaluating the advisability of parole release.”

Greenholtz v.

26 Inmates of Nebraska Corr. & Penal Complex, 442 U.S. at 9–10.
27

Petitioner does not show an expectation of release that could

28 form the basis of a liberty interest.
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A liberty interest arises

1 under state law when an inmate is subjected to restrictions that
2 impose “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation
3 to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”
4 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995).

Sandin v. Conner, 515

The mere possibility,

5 however, of a denial of parole at some later, yet undetermined,
6 time, where one of the considerations for parole is a potentially
7 improper disciplinary finding, does not amount to the denial of a
8 liberty interest.

In Sandin, the Supreme Court concluded that a

9 possible loss of credits due to a disciplinary conviction was
10 insufficient to give rise to a liberty interest where nothing in the
11 state’s statutes required the parole authority to deny parole
12 because of a misconduct record or to grant parole in its absence,
13 even though misconduct was by regulation a “relevant consideration.”
14 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487.

The Court noted that “[t]he decision to

15 release a prisoner rests on a myriad of considerations,” and an
16 inmate is generally “afforded procedural protection at this parole
17 hearing in order to explain the circumstances behind his misconduct
18 record.”

Id. at 487.

The Court held that “[t]he chance that a

19 finding of misconduct will alter the balance is simply too
20 attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process
21 Clause.”

Id.

After Sandin, in order to demonstrate a liberty

22 interest, an inmate must show a disciplinary conviction will
23 inevitably lengthen the duration of the inmate's incarceration.

Id.

24 Petitioner has not shown that there is a due process interest at
25 issue that would provide a basis for this Court to assert its habeas
26 jurisdiction.
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Petitioner has not alleged or documented specific facts that

28 would demonstrate or even suggest the existence of a nexus between
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1 the credit forfeiture and the length of his imprisonment such that a
2 sufficient likelihood exists of its affecting the overall length of
3 confinement.

See Docken, 393 F.3d at 1030-31.

Petitioner has not

4 shown that even if he were entitled to relief on the merits of his
5 claim concerning due process violations in the disciplinary
6 proceedings, relief would have any effect on the legality or
7 duration of his confinement.

Cf. Montue v. Stainer, no. 1:14–cv–

8 01009–LJO–JLT-HC, 2014 WL 6901853, at *9-*11 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 5, 2014)
9 (unpublished); Garcia v. Neotti, no. 11-cv-1639–WQH-KSC, 2012 WL
10 3986278, at *3 (S.D.Cal. July 27, 2012), adopted in Garcia v.
11 Neotti, 2012 WL 3986229, at *2 (S.D.Cal. Sept. 11, 2012)
12 (unpublished).

Any conceivable effect on the duration of

13 Petitioner’s confinement is speculative at best.
In his opposition, Petitioner cites state enactments2 and a

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15 settlement agreement in a state court proceeding that appear to

16 extend to Petitioner, who was a juvenile when he committed murder,
17 an opportunity to have a base term set and/or a parole suitability
18 hearing where the discretionary parole authority is to consider the
19 relatively diminished culpability of a minor offender.

However, as

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Petitioner refers to portions of Cal. Pen. Code §§ 3041, 3046, 3048, and 3051,

22 which provide that some life inmates who committed their offenses before they were
eighteen years old will receive parole consideration hearings where the BPH will

23 give “great weight to the diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to
adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased
Cal.Pen.Code §§ 3051,
4081.

24 maturity of the prisoner in accordance with state law.”
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3

Petitioner submits a copy of an order and stipulation regarding a settlement

26 agreement filed December 16, 2013, in In re Roy Butler, nos. A139411 & A 137273,
pending in the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate

27 District, Division 2, which appears to indicate that instead of waiting until an
inmate is found suitable for parole, the BPH will begin setting base terms or

28 adjusted base terms for life inmates at the initial parole consideration hearing
or the next parole hearing at which parole is denied.

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(Doc. 16, 4-12.)

1 Respondent notes, the opportunity for a suitability hearing, even
2 with a direction to consider relative culpability, does not
3 circumscribe the broad discretion otherwise entrusted to the BPH to
4 determine when a prisoner will actually be released on parole.
5

In summary, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s claim or

6 claims relate only to the conditions of confinement and do not lie
7 at the core of habeas corpus jurisdiction.

Petitioner has not

8 stated facts that would entitle him to relief in a proceeding
9 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254.

Thus, it will be recommended that the

10 petition be dismissed.
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Further, because the defects in Petitioner’s claims result not

12 from a dearth of factual allegations, but rather from state law that
13 renders any effect on the duration of confinement remote and
14 speculative, Petitioner could not state a tenable claim for relief
15 even if leave to amend were granted.
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Accordingly, it will be recommended that the petition be

17 dismissed without leave to amend.
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IV.

Certificate of Appealability

19

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of

20 appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals
21 from the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the detention
22 complained of arises out of process issued by a state court.

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23 U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336
24 (2003).

A district court must issue or deny a certificate of

25 appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.
26 Habeas Rule 11(a).
27

A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant

28 makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
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1 ' 2253(c)(2).

Under this standard, a petitioner must show that

2 reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have
3 been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented
4 were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.

Miller-

5 El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
6 473, 484 (2000)).

A certificate should issue if the Petitioner

7 shows that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether: (1)
8 the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
9 right, and (2) the district court was correct in any procedural
10 ruling.
11

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000).

In determining this issue, a court conducts an overview of the

12 claims in the habeas petition, generally assesses their merits, and
13 determines whether the resolution was debatable among jurists of
14 reason or wrong.

Id.

An applicant must show more than an absence

15 of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith; however, the
16 applicant need not show that the appeal will succeed.

Miller-El v.

17 Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338.
18

Here, it does not appear that reasonable jurists could debate

19 whether the petition should have been resolved in a different
20 manner.

Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial

21 of a constitutional right.
22

Accordingly, it will be recommended that the Court decline to

23 issue a certificate of appealability.
24

V.

Recommendations

25

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is RECOMMENDED

26 that:
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1) Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition be GRANTED; and

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2) The petition be DISMISSED without leave to amend for failure
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1 to state a cognizable claim; and
2

3) The Court DECLINE to issue a certificate of appealability;

3 and

4) The Clerk be DIRECTED to close the case.

4

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United

5 States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the
6 provisions of 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local
7 Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern
8 District of California.

Within thirty (30) days after being served

9 with a copy, any party may file written objections with the Court
10 and serve a copy on all parties.

Such a document should be

11 captioned AObjections to Magistrate Judge=s Findings and
12 Recommendations.@

Replies to the objections shall be served and

13 filed within fourteen (14) days (plus three (3) days if served by
14 mail) after service of the objections.

The Court will then review

15 the Magistrate Judge=s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(C).
16 The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the
17 specified time may “waive their right to challenge the magistrate’s
18 factual findings” on appeal.

Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834,

19 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391,
20 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
21 IT IS SO ORDERED.
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23

Dated:

/s/ Barbara

February 4, 2015

A. McAuliffe

_

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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