Cranford v. Okpala
Filing
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FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone on 11/2/2015 regarding 16 MOTION to DISMISS. Referred to Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill; Objections to F&R due by 12/7/2015. (Lundstrom, T)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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ARCHIE CRANFORD,
Plaintiff,
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v.
ANTONIA OKPALA,
Defendant.
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Case No.: 1:14-cv-00921-LJO-SAB (PC)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
REGARDING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS
[ECF No. 16]
Plaintiff Archie Cranford is a civil detainee proceeding pro se in this civil rights action
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pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Individuals detained pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions
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Code § 6600 et seq. are civil detainees and are not prisoners within the meaning of the Prison
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Litigation Reform Act. Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000).
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I.
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
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Plaintiff filed the instant action on June 13, 2014, under the prison mailbox rule. On January 9,
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2015, the Court screened and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend. (ECF No. 7.)
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Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on January 23, 2015, which was dismissed with leave to
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amend on January 29, 2015. (ECF Nos. 9, 10.)
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Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on February 9, 2015. (ECF No. 11.) On March 11,
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2015, the Court found that Plaintiff’s second amended complaint stated a cognizable claim against
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Defendant Okpala for denial of medical attention. (ECF No. 12.)
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On May 14, 2015, Defendant Okpala filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the second
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amended complaint sets forth a single claim for relief different in nature from his previous complaint,
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and the claim is barred by applicable two year statute of limitations.
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Pursuant to this Court’s order, Plaintiff filed an opposition on October 15, 2015, and Defendant
filed a reply on October 21, 2015. (ECF Nos. 22, 23.)
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II.
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DISCUSSION
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A.
Allegations Of Second Amended Complaint
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Plaintiff contends that in 2012, Defendant locked the housing unit door after receiving a phone
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call from the hospital’s dining hall informing Defendant that Plaintiff had just had scolding hot split
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pea soup poured in his lap and was suffering from severe burns. Defendant locked the unit door in an
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effort to prevent Plaintiff treatment for his injuries. Plaintiff approached the Defendant on several
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occasions regarding his injuries from the burn and each time he was refused.
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B.
Motion to Dismiss Standard Under Rule 12(b)(6)
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A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim,
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and dismissal is proper if there is a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts
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alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th
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Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1762 (2012). In resolving a
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12(b)(6) motion, a court’s review is generally limited to the operative pleading. Daniels-Hall v.
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National Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010); Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th
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Cir. 2007); Schneider v. California Dept. of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998).
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To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
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true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (quotation marks omitted); Conservation
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Force, 646 F.3d at 1242; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court
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must accept the factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
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moving party, Daniels-Hall, 629 F.3d at 998; Sanders, 504 F.3d at 910; Morales v. City of Los
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Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000), and in this Circuit, pro se litigants are entitled to have
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their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, Wilhelm v. Rotman,
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680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); Silva v.
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Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).
Second Amended Complaint Contrary to Court’s Prior Order
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C.
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Defendant argues that the previous complaint “was one for race discrimination for the manner
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in which Defendant prioritized medical appointments.” (ECF No. 16, Mot. at 3:22-23.) Defendant
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submits that “[t]his Court, in allowing Plaintiff to amend, instructed him to not change the nature of
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his suit by adding new, unrelated claims.” (Id. at 3:23-24.) Defendant argues that contrary to the
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Court’s order, Plaintiff completely changed the nature of his complaint, by alleging that Defendant
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acted with deliberate indifference for failing to treat his burns in 2012. Defendant requests that the
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Court dismiss the complaint for violation of the Court’s prior order.
The Court rejects Defendant’s argument that the claim presented in the second amended
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complaint is in violation of the Court’s January 29, 2015, screening order directing that Plaintiff not
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add any new or unrelated claims. The claim presented in the second amended complaint is against the
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same Defendant and presents, as with the other complaints, a claim of inadequate medical attention.
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Although the claim presented in the second amended complaint does not contain a racial competent as
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his prior complaints, such fact does not make it unrelated to the prior claims so as to violate the
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Court’s directive. In any event, given the Ninth Circuit’s liberal policy toward amendments and
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Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court finds that the interest of justice warrants review of Plaintiff’s claim
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of deliberate indifference against Defendant Antonia Okpala, even if it may arguably (which the Court
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does not find) not be in conformity with the Court’s prior order. This same analysis applies to the
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alleged timing of the events giving rise to the claim against Defendant Okpala in the second amended
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complaint. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss due to improper amendment, should be
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denied.
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///
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D.
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Defendant also argues that the second amended complaint is barred by the applicable two year
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Statute of Limitations
statute of limitations.
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Federal law determines when a claim accrues, and “[u]nder federal law, a claim accrues when
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the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury that is the basis of the cause of action.” Douglas v.
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Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945,
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955 (9th Cir. 2004); Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999). Because section 1983
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contains no specific statute of limitations, federal courts should apply the forum state’s statute of
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limitations for personal injury actions. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004).
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California’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions was extended to two years effective
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January 1, 2003. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1; Jones, 393 F.3d at 927; Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 954-
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955.
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In actions where the federal court borrows the state statute of limitations, courts should also
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borrow all applicable provisions for tolling the limitations period found in state law. Jones, 393 F.3d
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at 927. Under California law, prisoners who at the time of the cause of action accrued were either
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imprisoned on a criminal charge or serving a sentence of less than life for a criminal conviction benefit
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from a two-year tolling provision for damages actions. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1.
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In addition, California’s equitable tolling doctrine operates to toll a statute of limitations for a
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claim asserted by a continuous confined civil detainee who has pursued his claim in good faith. Jones,
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393 F.3d at 928.
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The equitable tolling of statutes of limitations is a judicially created, nonstatutory doctrine
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designed to prevent unjust and technical forfeitures of the right to a trial on the merits when the
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purpose of the statute of limitations-timely notice to the defendant of the plaintiff’s claims-has been
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satisfied, McDonald, 45 Cal.4th at 99 (quotation marks and citations omitted), and pursuit of
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administrative remedies equitably tolls the statute of limitations so long as there was timely notice,
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lack of prejudice to the defendant, and reasonable, good faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff. Id.
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at 101-103.
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If running of the statute of limitations is apparent on the face of a complaint, a claim may be
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dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of
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Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010).
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ordinarily limited to the face of the complaint. Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d
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977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). “Because the applicability of the equitable tolling doctrine oftend depends
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on matters outside the pleadings, it is not generally amenable to resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”
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Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. U.S., 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation
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marks omitted); see also Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th Cir.
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2001) (stating that, “only in the rare case” could the analysis of California’s equitable tolling doctrine
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proceed at the pleading stage). “A motion to dismiss based on the running of the statute of limitations
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period may be granted only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would
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not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” Supermail Cargo, Inc., 68 F.3d at 1206
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(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is
Based on the fact that under the mailbox rule, Plaintiff initiated the instant action in June 2014,
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and the second amended complaint was filed on February 2, 2015, the Court cannot determine from
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the face of the second complaint that it is barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Defendant did
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not address the issue of equitable tolling or the relation-back doctrine, and the Court cannot find that
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the running of the statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s medical claim against Defendant Okpala to be
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apparent on the face of the second amended complaint. While Defendant contends that the claim in
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the second amended complaint is different in nature (which the Court does not agree), given Plaintiff
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is a civil detainee and is proceeding pro se, without proper briefing on any potential issue of equitable
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tolling and/or proper analysis as to any potential application of the relation-back doctrine, the Court
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cannot find it apparent from the face of the complaint to be barred by the applicable statute of
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limitations. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss should be denied.
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III.
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RECOMMENDATION
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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss
the second amended complaint be DENIED.
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This Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge
assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30) days after
being served with this Findings and Recommendation, the parties may file written objections with the
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Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and
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Recommendation.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may
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result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014)
(citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
November 2, 2015
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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