Ramirez v. Bakersfield Police Dept., et al.

Filing 49

ORDER Granting 46 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 10/22/15. CASE CLOSED. (Gonzalez, R)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ANTONIO RAMIREZ, JR.,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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BAKERSFIELD POLICE DEPT., et al.,

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Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-00978- JLT
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
TO DISMISS
(Doc. 46)

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Plaintiff asserts that Defendants, officers of the Bakersfield Police Department, used of

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excessive force in the course of his arrest in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and seeks to hold

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Defendants liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Doc. 1) Defendants seek dismissal of the action

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with prejudice, asserting Plaintiff has failed to prosecute the action and failed to comply with the

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Court’s orders regarding discovery. (Doc. 46) Plaintiff did not oppose the request for dismissal.

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On October 20, 2015, the Court found the matter was suitable for decision without oral

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arguments, and the motion was taken under submission pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons

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set forth below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

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I.

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Relevant Background
The Court held a scheduling conference on May 4, 2015, at which it set deadlines related to

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discovery. (Doc. 41) The Court ordered the parties to exchange initial disclosures no later than June 5,

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2015. (Id. at 1, 2) On July 14, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to compel discovery, asserting Plaintiff
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failed to comply with the Court’s Scheduling Order to make his initial disclosures pursuant to Rule 26

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of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants’ discovery

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requests, including interrogatories and requests for production of documents. (Doc. 42) The Court

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granted Defendants’ motion, and reminded Plaintiff that his “failure to comply with a Court order—

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including the Court’s Scheduling Order directing the parties to serve initial disclosures pursuant to Rule

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26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—may result in the imposition of sanctions, including

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dismissal of the action.” (Doc. 45 at 4, citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir.

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1992); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987))

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Defendants filed the motion now pending before the Court on August 25, 2015, reporting

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Plaintiff failed to comply with the Court’s order to serve his initial disclosures and discovery responses

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“no later than August 21, 2015.” (Doc. 46-1 at 3, quoting Doc. 45 at 4) (emphasis omitted). Therefore,

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Defendants request dismissal of the action with prejudice. (Id. at 4-5)

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III.

Failure to Comply with a Court Order

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Pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “If [a] plaintiff fails to prosecute

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or to comply with . . . a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against

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it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). The Ninth Circuit explained, “District courts have inherent power to control

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their dockets,” and in exercising that power, a court may impose sanctions including dismissal of an

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action. Thompson v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court

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may dismiss an action with prejudice for a party’s failure to prosecute an action or failure to obey a

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court order. See, e.g.; Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for

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failure to comply with a court order); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)

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(affirming the court’s decision to dismiss ab action with prejudice for failure to comply with a court

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order) Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for failure to prosecute).

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To determine whether to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute or failure to obey a court

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order, the Court must consider several factors, including: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious

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resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the

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defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability

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of less drastic sanctions.” Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423-24; see also Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260-61.
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IV.

Discussion and Analysis
Public interest and the Court’s docket

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In the case at hand, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the

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Court’s interest in managing the docket weigh in favor of dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

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191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always

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favors dismissal”); Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261 (recognizing that district courts have inherent interest in

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managing their dockets without being subject to noncompliant litigants). This Court cannot, and will

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not hold, this action in abeyance based upon Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute the action. Accordingly,

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these factors weigh in favor of dismissal of the action.

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2.

Prejudice to Defendants

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To determine whether Defendants have been prejudiced, the Court must “examine whether the

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plaintiff’s actions impair the … ability to go to trial or threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of

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the case.” Malone, 833 F.2d at 131 (citing Rubin v. Belo Broadcasting Corp., 769 F.2d 611, 618 (9th

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Cir. 1985)) In this case, Plaintiff’s failure to serve his initial disclosures and respond to Defendants’

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discovery requests significantly impair their ability to prepare for a trial. Moreover, a presumption of

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prejudiced arises when a plaintiff unreasonably delays the prosecution of an action. See Anderson v. Air

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West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

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3.

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The Court “abuses its discretion if it imposes a sanction of dismissal without first considering

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the impact of the sanction and the adequacy of less drastic sanctions.” United States v. Nat’l Medical

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Enterprises, Inc., 792 F.2d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 1986). However, the Ninth Circuit has determined that a

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court’s warning to a party that his failure to obey the court’s order will result in dismissal can satisfy

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the “consideration of alternatives” requirement. See Malone, 833 F.2d at 133; Ferdik, 963 F.2d at

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1262; see also Titus v. Mercedes Benz of North America, 695 F.2d 746, 749 n.6 (3d Cir. 1982)

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(identifying a “warning” as an alternative sanction). Moreover, the Court explained that “a plaintiff

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can hardly be surprised” by a sanction of dismissal “in response to willful violation of a pretrial

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order.” Malone, 833 F.2d at 133.

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Consideration of less drastic sanctions

In the Scheduling Order dated May 4, 2015, the Court warned the parties that failure to comply
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with the deadlines and terms of the schedule “may result in the imposition of sanctions.” (Doc. 41 at

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6) After Plaintiff failed to comply with the order to serve his initial disclosures and did not respond to

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Defendants’ discovery requests, the Court reminded Plaintiff that failure to comply with the Court’s

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orders “may result in the imposition of sanctions, including dismissal of the action.” (Doc. 45 at 4)

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Further, the Court stated: “Plaintiff is strongly admonished that his failure to comply with this

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order or any other order of the Court—including the scheduling order--may result in the Court

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imposing sanctions on him which could include dismissal of the action as authorized by Local

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Rule 110.” (Doc. 45 at 5, emphasis in original) These warnings to Plaintiff satisfy the requirement

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that the Court consider lesser sanctions, and this factor weighs in favor of dismissal. See Ferdik, 963

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F.2d at 1262; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424; Titus, 695 F.2d at 749 n.6.

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4.

Public policy

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Given Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute the action, and failure to comply with the Court’s orders

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regarding discovery, the policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits is outweighed by the

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factors in favor of dismissal. See Malone, 833 F.2d at 133, n.2 (explaining that although “the public

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policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits . . . weighs against dismissal, it is not sufficient to

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outweigh the other four factors”).

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V.

Conclusion and Order

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Plaintiff has failed to prosecute this action, and failed to comply with the Court’s orders dated

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May 4, 2015 (Doc. 41), and August 7, 2015 (Doc. 45). As set forth above, the factors set forth by the

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Ninth Circuit weigh in favor of dismissal of the matter.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

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Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 46) is GRANTED;

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2.

This action is DISMISSED; and

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3.

The Clerk of Court is directed to close this action.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

October 22, 2015

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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