Cranford v. Narcela

Filing 14

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS Recommending Dismissal of Action, With Prejudice, for Failure to State a Cognizable Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted 12 , signed by Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone on 2/23/15: Thirty-Day Deadline. (Hellings, J)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ARCHIE CRANFORD,

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Plaintiff,

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v.
DHORLEEN NARCELA, et al.,
Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-01037-LJO-SAB (PC)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION,
WITH PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
COGNIZABLE CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF
MAY BE GRANTED
[ECF No. 12]

Plaintiff Archie Cranford is a civil detainee proceeding pro se in this civil rights action

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pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Individuals detained pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions

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Code § 6600 et seq. are civil detainees and are not prisoners within the meaning of the Prison

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Litigation Reform Act. Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000).

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On October 31, 2014, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s first amended complaint with leave to

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amend for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief, and Plaintiff was granted thirty days to file a

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second amended complaint. (ECF No. 9.) After the thirty day time period passed and Plaintiff failed

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to file an amended complaint, the undersigned issued a Findings and Recommendation to dismiss the

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action on December 31, 2014. (ECF No. 11.) The Findings and Recommendation was served on

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Plaintiff and contained notice that objections were to be filed within thirty days. (Id.)

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On January 26, 2015, Plaintiff filed a notice to the Court, in which he elaborates on the claims
previously set forth in his complaint. The attached proof of service references the notice as an
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“amended complaint.” Accordingly, in an order issued concurrently herewith, the Court has vacated

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the Findings and Recommendation issued December 31, 2014, and construed Plaintiff’s notice filed

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January 26, 2015, as his second amended complaint, which is presently before the Court for screening

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1

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I.

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SCREENING REQUIREMENT
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must conduct an initial review of the complaint

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for sufficiency to state a claim. The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it determines

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that the action has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim upon

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which relief may be granted,” or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

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relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may

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have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that … the action or

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appeal … fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

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immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp.

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Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of

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substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.

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Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-394 (1989).

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II.

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COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS
In the caption of the second amended complaint, Plaintiff identifies Dharleen Narceda as the

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sole Defendant.
On January 13, 2015, extremely hot split pea soup was spilled in Plaintiff’s lap by another

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person causing severe burns to Plaintiff. After some difficulty locating the Defendant, she failed to

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treat Plaintiff’s “burns within the limits of her training u[sing] the skills that she obtained in her

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training.” Five days passed before Defendant looked at Plaintiff’s burns in person and when

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In both prior screening orders, the Court advised Plaintiff that “an amended complaint supersedes the original, [citations]
and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” (ECF Nos. 7 & 9.)

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Defendant did attempt to treat Plaintiff’s injuries, she allowed another patient to enter the exam room

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further denying medical care and violating medical privacy.

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III.

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DISCUSSION

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A.

Medical Treatment

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As a civil detainee, Plaintiff is entitled to treatment more considerate than that afforded pretrial

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detainees or convicted criminals. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931-32 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff’s

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right to constitutionally adequate conditions of confinement is protected by the substantive component

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of the Due Process Clause. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315, 102 S.Ct. 2452 (1982).

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A determination whether Plaintiff’s rights were violated requires “balancing of his liberty

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interests against the relevant state interests.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321. Plaintiff is “entitled to

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more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of

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confinement are designed to punish,” but the Constitution requires only that courts ensure that

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professional judgment was exercised. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22. A “decision, if made by a

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professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision by the

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professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or

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standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a

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judgment.” Id. at 322-23; compare Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1243-44 (9th

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Cir. 2010) (rejecting the Youngberg standard and applying the deliberate indifference standard to a

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pretrial detainee’s right to medical care, and noting that pretrial detainees, who are confined to ensure

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presence at trial, are not similarly situated to those civilly committed). The professional judgment

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standard is an objective standard and it equates “to that required in ordinary tort cases for a finding of

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conscious indifference amounting to gross negligence.” Ammons v. Washington Dep’t of Soc. &

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Health Servs., 648 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2379 (2012) (citations and

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internal quotation marks omitted).

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Here, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim under this standard for his medical care.

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Plaintiff merely alleges that Defendant Narceda failed to treat his burns for five days. Plaintiff’s

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allegations are so vague that it cannot support the conclusion that Defendant Narceda’s behavior was
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professional unacceptable. Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, Defendant Narceda provided Plaintiff

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treatment and nothing in the complaint indicates that the Defendant acted with conscious disregard.

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Plaintiff’s conclusory statements are not sufficient to state a claim and further leave to amend is not

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warranted.

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B.

Violation of Right to Medical Privacy

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As a civil detainee, Plaintiff is entitled to treatment more considerate than that afforded pretrial

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detainees or convicted criminals. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931-32 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff’s

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right to constitutionally adequate conditions of confinement is protected by the substantive component

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of the Due Process Clause. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315, 102 S.Ct. 2452 (1982).

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A determination whether Plaintiff’s rights were violated requires “balancing of his liberty

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interests against the relevant state interests.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321. Plaintiff is “entitled to

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more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of

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confinement are designed to punish,” but the Constitution requires only that courts ensure that

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professional judgment was exercised. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22. A “decision, if made by a

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professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision by the

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professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or

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standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a

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judgment.” Id. at 322-23; compare Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1243-44 (9th

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Cir. 2010) (rejecting the Youngberg standard and applying the deliberate indifference standard to a

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pretrial detainee’s right to medical care, and noting that pretrial detainees, who are confined to ensure

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presence at trial, are not similarly situated to those civilly committed). The professional judgment

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standard is an objective standard and it equates “to that required in ordinary tort cases for a finding of

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conscious indifference amounting to gross negligence.” Ammons v. Washington Dep’t of Soc. &

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Health Servs., 648 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2379 (2012) (citations and

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internal quotation marks omitted).

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The Ninth Circuit has recognized a constitutionally protected interest in avoiding disclosure of

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personal matters, including medical information. See, e.g., Nelson v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space

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Admin., 530 F.3d 865, 877 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds and remanded, __ U.S. __, 131
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S.Ct. 746, 178 L.Ed.2d 667 (U.S. 2011) (“Information relating to medical treatment and psychological

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counseling fall squarely within the domain protected by the constitutional right to informational

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privacy.”) (citations omitted); Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 551 (9th Cir. 2004)

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(“Individuals have a constitutionally protected interest in avoiding ‘disclosure of personal matters,’

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including medical information.”) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)); Norman-

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Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The constitutionally

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protected privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters clearly encompasses medical

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information and its confidentiality.”); Doe v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 941 F.2d 780, 795 (9th Cir.

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1991), overruled on other grounds by Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 191 (1996) (holding that “medical

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information was encompassed within the … privacy interest related to disclosure of personal

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matters.”).

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Assuming a right of privacy, Plaintiff has alleged no intentional conduct. It is well established

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that negligent conduct is ordinarily not enough to state a claim alleging a denial of liberty or property

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under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986); Davidson v.

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Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986) (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not

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implicated by the lack of due care of an official causing unintended injury to life, liberty, or property.

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In other words, where a government official is merely negligent in causing the injury, no procedure for

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compensation is constitutionally required.”).

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In this instance, Plaintiff has alleged nothing more than negligent conduct. Plaintiff’s

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allegations present nothing more than that another patient entered the medical room during treatment

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in violation of his right to privacy. Plaintiff has not alleged, must less demonstrated, deliberate

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conduct on the part of Defendant Nurse Dhorleen Narcela. Indeed, there is no factual allegation as to

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what, if any, medical information was disclosed by Nurse Narcela to the outside patient.

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C.

Leave to Amend

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Plaintiff was previously notified of the deficiencies in his claims and was given leave to amend

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on two prior occasions. Yet, even after amendment, Plaintiff has presented the same deficiencies as

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previously dismissed and based on the nature of the deficiencies at issue, the Court finds that further

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leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v.
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Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-1449 (9th Cir. 2011); see also DCD Programs, Ltd. V. Leighton, 833

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F.2d 183, 188 (9th Cir. 1987) (leave to amend may be denied where the proposed amendment “merely

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restates the same facts using different language, or reasserts a claim previously determined.”) (quoting

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Wakeen v. Hoffman House, Inc., 724 F.2d 1238, 1244 (7th Cir. 1983).

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IV.

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RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state any claims upon which relief

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may be granted under section 1983. Given the nature of Plaintiff’s deficiencies at issue in light of the

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previous screening orders, further leave to amend will not be granted. Askhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d

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1202, 1212-1213 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-1131; Noll, 809 F.2d at 1448-1449.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be DISMISSED, with

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prejudice, for failure to state a claim under section 1983.
These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

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assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30) days

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after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections

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with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

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Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

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result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014)

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(citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:

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February 23, 2015
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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