Thompson v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 19

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 18 Defendant's Request for a Second Extension of Time, signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 6/22/2015. (Hall, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )
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Defendant.
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SHANNON THOMPSON,

Case No.: 1:14-cv-01100- JLT
ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S
REQUEST FOR A SECOND EXTENSION OF
TIME
(Doc. 18)

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On June 22, 2015, the parties stipulated for Defendant to have a second extension of time to file

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a response to Plaintiff’s opening brief. (Doc. 18) The Scheduling Order allows for “a single thirty (30)

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day extension” by stipulation of the parties. (Doc. 5-1 at 4.) The parties were informed that any further

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extensions of time must be requested by written motion, and would not be granted without good cause.

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(Id.) The extension by stipulation was used by Plaintiff to serve a confidential letter brief. (Doc. 17 at

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2.) Therefore, the Court construes the parties’ stipulation to be a motion by Defendant for a second

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extension of time.

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Significantly, Defendant previously requested an extension of time to respond to Plaintiff’s

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opening brief in this action, which was filed on April 20, 2015. (See Docs. 15, 16.) The Court granted

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the request, and ordered Defendant to file a response “on or before June 19, 2015.” (Doc. 17 at 2,

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emphasis in original.) In addition, the Court cautioned the parties that “no further extensions of time

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will be granted without a showing of exceptional good cause.” (Id.) Despite this warning, Defendant
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failed to file a response to the opening brief by the deadline imposed by the Court. Rather, Defendant

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filed the request now before the Court on June 22, 2015, seeking an additional thirty days to file a

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response to the opening brief. (Doc. 18.)

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Defendant reports the additional time is necessary for counsel “to properly consider the issues

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raised in Plaintiff’s MSJ and because of preplanned leave in June.” (Doc. 18 at 1.) However,

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Defendant should have been aware of the issues raised by Plaintiff which were outlined in the

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confidential letter brief provided on February 12, 2015. (See Doc. 13 at 1.) Further, presumably,

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Defendant’s counsel was aware of his “preplanned leave” when he filed a request for an extension of

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time on May 26, 2015.

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A scheduling order “is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly

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disregarded without peril.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992).

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The deadlines are considered “firm, real and are to be taken seriously by parties and their counsel.”

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Shore v. Brown, 74 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1260, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94828 at *7 (E.D. Cal.

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Oct. 9, 2009). Here, Defendant’s counsel disregarded the deadline imposed by the Court, and has not

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demonstrated good cause for the requested additional extension of thirty days. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s

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counsel indicates she does not oppose an extension.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

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Defendant’s request for an extension of time is GRANTED IN PART and

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2.

Defendant SHALL file a response to Plaintiff’s opening brief no later than July 6, 2015.

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Absolutely no additional requests for extensions of time will be considered absent a

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showing of exceptional good cause.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

June 22, 2015

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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