Ortiz Leon v. City of Merced et al

Filing 26

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 16 Motion to Dismiss signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr on 1/8/15. (Kaminski, H)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JOSE FELIX ORTIZ LEON,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 1:14-CV-01129-GEB-SAB

v.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT

CITY OF MERCED, a municipal
corporation, MERCED POLICE
DEPARTMENT OFFICER BRYAN
SAELEE, Individually, MERCED
POLICE DEPARTMENT CHIEF NORM
ANDRADE, in his Official
Capacity, and DOES 1 through
50, jointly and severally,
Defendants.

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Defendants City of Merced (“the City”), Merced Police

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Department

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Saelee

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12(b)(6) for dismissal of Plaintiff‟s First Amended Complaint

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(“FAC”).

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(“MPD”)

move

under

Chief

Norm

Federal

Andrade,

Rule

of

and

Civil

MPD

Officer

Procedure

Bryan

(“Rule”)

Plaintiff alleges in his FAC that as a result of each

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Defendant‟s

“tortious

and

constitutionally

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[he] was misidentified” and consequently mistakenly arrested and

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detained. (FAC ¶ 1, ECF No. 14.)
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violative

conduct,

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I.

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“To

survive

a

Legal Standard
motion

to

dismiss,

a

complaint

must

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contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

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Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir.

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2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). “A claim

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has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

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that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

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at 1949 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556

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(2007)). “For purposes of a motion to dismiss, we accept all

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well-pleaded allegations of material fact as true and construe

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them

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Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 783 (9th

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Cir. 2012). However, “we do not accept legal conclusions in the

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complaint

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allegations.” Lacano Inv., LLC v. Balash, 765 F.3d 1068, 1071

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(9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

in

the

as

light

true,

most

favorable

even

if

cast

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II.
The

following

in

the

the

nonmoving

form

of

party.”

factual

Statement of Facts

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to

Caviness v.

allegations

in

the

FAC

concern

the

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motion. “MPD maintains a database of suspects,” which can only

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store one address for each person. (FAC ¶ 17.) The information in

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the MPD database is “forwarded to [various agencies], who . . .

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use such information to either arrest individuals . . . or to

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summon such individuals to court.” (Id. ¶ 18.)

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Officer Saelee “wrote . . . Plaintiff‟s address on a

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document

he

filed

with

the

MPD

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involving the real suspect, Jose Ortiz,” and Saelee “caused the
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in

relation

to

a

2012

case

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address in the MPD database to be changed to falsely reflect

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Plaintiff‟s address.”

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“set[] into motion a chain of events that he knew or should have

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known would foreseeably lead to the address for the real suspect

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being changed and overwritten” in the MPD database to Plaintiff‟s

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address. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff was “arrested [on or about June

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18, 2013,] and thereafter falsely imprisoned in the Merced County

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Jail as a result of being wrongfully . . . identified as . . .

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the real suspect.” (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff was arrested even though

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the real suspect “is a different height [and]. . . weight” than

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Plaintiff, has a different date of birth, and the Defendants

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“ha[d]

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information concerning the real suspect. . . including . . .

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finger prints, booking photos, prior reports, and addresses.”

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(Id. ¶ 1.)

access

to

(Id. ¶¶ 19-20.) When Saelee did so, he

an

abundance

of

relevant,

identifying

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On July 1, 2013, the Merced County Superior Court found

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Plaintiff “factually innocent” because “he unequivocally was not

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the suspect in the pending criminal matters.” (Id. ¶ 26.)

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“Defendants Andrade and the City of Merced failed to

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institute

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requiring verification and corroboration [of information entered

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into the MPD database], to reduce the risk of innocent persons

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with

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entered into MPD‟s database as that of a suspect.” (Id. ¶ 17.) As

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a result, “a number of other individuals in the last several

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years. . . have been falsely arrested.” (Id. ¶ 28.)

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///

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///

the

reasonable

same

or

quality

similar

control

names

3

procedures

having

their

.

.

address

.

for

falsely

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III.

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A.

Discussion

Claims Against Saelee Concerning Plaintiff’s Arrest And

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Detention

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Saelee

seeks

dismissal

of

Plaintiff‟s

Fourth

and

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Fourteenth Amendment federal claims and Plaintiff‟s false arrest

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and false imprisonment state claims, all of which hinge on the

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allegation

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subsequent detention in the Merced County Jail.

that

Saelee

is

liable

for

Plaintiff‟s

arrest

and

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Plaintiff alleges Saelee “knew or should have known

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that other law enforcement agencies would take action to arrest

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and confine” him based on Saelee‟s conduct since Saelee caused

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Plaintiff‟s address to be associated with a criminal suspect and

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knew government agencies used the MPD database to make arrests.

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(Pl.‟s Opp‟n Defs.‟ Mot. Dismiss FAC (“Opp‟n”) 29:7-9, ECF No.

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23.) However, Plaintiff alleges that the officers who arrested

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him lacked probable cause to arrest him since he and the real

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suspect do not share other identifying information such as date

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of birth, height, or weight. (FAC ¶ 30.)

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Since

Plaintiff

alleges

that

the

arresting

officers

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lacked probable cause to arrest him, Plaintiff allegations fail

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to plausibly show that Saelee‟s entry of Plaintiff‟s address into

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the

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Plaintiff‟s Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, false arrest,

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and false imprisonment claims are dismissed with leave to amend.

MPD

database

caused

Plaintiff‟s

arrest.

Therefore,

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1. Fourteenth Amendment Claims

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Saelee argues Plaintiff‟s Fourteenth Amendment claims

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should

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federal

be

dismissed
claims

are

without

leave

governed
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to

by

amend
the

since

Plaintiff‟s

Fourth

Amendment.

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Specifically, Saelee argues “the Fourth Amendment applies to ...

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pre-arraignment seizure[s]”. (Mot. 3:28-4:1, ECF No. 16.)

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However, “[p]recedent demonstrates . . . that post-

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arrest incarceration is analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment

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alone.”

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90(9th Cir.2014).

Rivera v. County of Los Angeles,745 F.3d 384, 389-

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Saelee has not shown that the dismissal motion should

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be

granted

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denied.

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B.

without

leave

to

amend.

Therefore,

the

motion

is

Monell Claim

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The

City

claim,

and

arguing

Andrade
“to

seek

the

dismissal

extent

of

Plaintiff

Plaintiff‟s

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Monell

fails

to

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sufficiently allege. . . an underlying constitutional violation

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of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Monell claim also

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fails.” (Mot. 6:21-23.)

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Plaintiff argues his Complaint sufficiently alleges a

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Monell claim against the City and Andreade since he alleges they

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“failed to institute reasonable quality control procedures within

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the

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information in the database], to reduce the risk of innocent

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persons . . . having their address falsely entered into MPD‟s

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database”

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information systems [that] are available. . . to address [this]

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risk,”

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(Opp‟n 21:19-26.)

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MPD

for

requiring

verification

notwithstanding

and

To

this

failure

allege

a

the

amounts

claim

and

corroboration

“numerous

to

under

procedures

deliberate

the

[of

and

indifference.

municipal

liability

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doctrine promulgated by the Supreme Court in Monell v. Department

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of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), “a plaintiff must prove
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“(1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of which

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he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that

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this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's

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constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the moving

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force behind the constitutional violation.”

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Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir.2011).

Dougherty v. City of

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Plaintiff has not alleged facts plausibly evincing that

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the MPD database policies were the “moving force” behind his

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alleged constitutional injury; and he alleges that the arresting

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officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. (FAC ¶ 30.)

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Therefore, Plaintiff‟s Monell claim is dismissed.

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C.

California Constitution

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Saelee argues Plaintiff‟s claim alleged under Article

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I, Section 13 of the California Constitution should be dismissed

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since it “fail[s] as a matter of law” because “California courts

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do not recognize []a claim[] for damages for violation” of this

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provision. (Mot. 8:22, 8:24-25.)

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Plaintiff

counters

that

“[a]

damages

claim

under

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Article I, § 13 is cognizable because the California Supreme

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Court in Katzberg [v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.]. . . implicitly

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endorsed a damages action for the violation of the prohibition

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against unlawful searches and seizures” in Article I, Section 13

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of the California Constitution. (Opp‟n 26:4-6.)

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Article I, Section 13 of the California Constitution

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protects a person‟s “right. . . to be secure in their persons,

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papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches.”

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In

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appropriate to employ the following framework for determining the

Katzberg,

the

California

Supreme

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Court

stated

“it

is

1

existence

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constitutional violation”:

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a

damages

action

to

remedy

an

asserted

First, we shall inquire whether there is
evidence from which we may find or infer,
within the constitutional provision at issue,
an affirmative intent either to authorize or
to withhold a damages action to remedy a
violation. . . . If we find any such intent,
we shall give it effect. Second, if no
affirmative intent either to authorize or to
withhold a damages remedy is found, we shall
undertake the „constitutional tort‟ analysis
adopted by Bivens [v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)] and its progeny.
Among the relevant factors in this analysis
are whether an adequate remedy exists, the
extent to which a constitutional tort action
would change established tort law, and the
nature and significance of the constitutional
provision. If we find that these factors
militate
against
recognizing
the
constitutional tort, our inquiry ends. If,
however, we find that these factors favor
recognizing a constitutional tort, we also
shall consider the existence of any special
factors counseling hesitation in recognizing
a damages action, including deference to
legislative judgment, avoidance of adverse
policy
consequences,
considerations
of
government fiscal policy, practical issues of
proof, and the competence of courts to assess
particular types of damages.

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of

Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 29 Cal.4th 300, 317 (2002).
The Katzberg factors do not favor Plaintiff‟s monetary
damages

claim

alleged

under

Article

I,

Section

13

of

the

California Constitution since “[n]either the plain language of
the

[A]rticle

history

I,

[S]ection

indicate[s]

an

13,

intent

nor
on

the

available

behalf

of

the

legislative
California

Legislature to permit the recovery of monetary damages for its
violation.” Manning v. City of Rohnert Park, No. C 06-03435 SBA,
2007

WL

Plaintiff

1140434,
shown

at
that

*1

(N.D.
he

Cal.

lacks
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an

Apr.

17,

adequate

2007).

Nor

remedy

has

under

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California‟s

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damages for his alleged injury. See Brown v. Cnty. of Kern, No.

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1:06-cv-00121-OWW-TAG, 2008 WL 544565, at *17 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 26,

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2008)(considering legislative history and Plaintiff‟s other tort

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claims when deciding Plaintiff could not bring a damages claim

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under the same constitutional section).

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false

arrest

Therefore,

and

Saelee‟s

false

imprisonment

motion

to

law

dismiss

to

seek

Plaintiff‟s

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general and compensatory damages claim alleged under Article I,

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Section 13 of the California Constitution without leave to amend

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is granted.

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D.

Negligence

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1. No Duty

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Saelee seeks dismissal of Plaintiff‟s negligence claim

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against him arguing solely that Plaintiff does not “identify any

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enactment or statute that impose[d] some legal duty on . . .

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Saelee.” (Mot. 10:2-3.) However, Saelee has not demonstrated that

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this argument is a basis for dismissal.

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Therefore, the motion is denied.

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2. Immunity

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The

City

seeks

dismissal

of

Plaintiff‟s

negligence

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claim that is alleged against it under California Government Code

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section 815.2, arguing that California law immunizes it from this

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claim.

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Plaintiff contends California law authorizes this claim

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since he alleges that his injury resulted from a City employee‟s

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conduct while the employee was acting within the scope of his

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employment.

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The

City

responds

that
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holding

it

liable

for

its

1

employee‟s

2

against an individual employee,” and since Plaintiff‟s negligence

3

claim is also alleged against Saelee, “any separate claim for

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relief against the City. . . based on ... [Saelee‟s alleged

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conduct] would be . . . superfluous.” (Opp‟n 15-17.)

conduct

“would

be

redundant

to

any

claim

asserted

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“California Government Code section 815.2, subdivision

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(a) makes a public entity vicariously liable for its employee's

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negligent

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Eastburn

acts
v.

or

Reg‟l

omissions
Fire

within

Prot.

the

Auth.,

scope

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Cal.

of

employment.”

4th

1175,

1180

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(2003). “As long as [a plaintiff] is permitted to allege that the

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[City] employees were negligent, he must also be permitted to

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allege

13

California Government Code § 815.2(a).” AE ex rel. v. Cnty. of

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Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 638 (9th Cir. 2012).

that

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the

[City]

is

derivatively

liable

pursuant

to

Therefore, the City‟s motion is denied.

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IV.

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For
is

the

GRANTED

stated
in

Conclusion

reasons,

PART

and

each

motion

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granted ten (10) days from the date on which this order is filed

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to file a Second Amended Complaint addressing the deficiencies in

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any claim dismissed with leave to amend.

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Dated:

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9

in

PART.

dismissal

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January 8, 2015

DENIED

Defendant‟s

Plaintiff

is