Ortiz Leon v. City of Merced et al

Filing 36

ORDER granting defendant's 28 Motion to Dismiss, signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr., on 5/28/15. However, plaintiff is GRANTED 14 days leave from the date on which this order is filed to file a Third Amended Complaint addressing the deficiencies in any claim dismissed. (Kastilahn, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JOSE FELIZ ORTIZ LEON,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 1:14-CV-01129-GEB-SAB

v.
CITY OF MERCED, a municipal
corporation, MERCED POLICE
DEPARTMENT OFFICER BRYAN
SAELEE, individually, MERCED
POLICE DEPARTMENT CHIEF NORM
ANDRADE, in his official
capacity, and DOES 1 through
50, jointly and severally,

ORDER GRANTING EACH DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS THE SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT

Defendants.

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16

Each

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of

the

challenging

following

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”): Defendants City of

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Merced (“the City”), Merced Police Department (“MPD”), Officer

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Bryan Saelee (“Saelee”), and MPD Chief Norm Andrade (“Andrade”).

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Plaintiff alleges the following California claims in his SAC:

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false arrest, false imprisonment, and negligence; and federal due

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process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Each claim is premised on

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allegations that each Defendant caused Plaintiff to be wrongfully

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arrested and detained as a consequence of Saelee’s placement of

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Plaintiff’s address in an MPD database, following which Plaintiff

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was

Ortiz,
1

the

claims

dismissal

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Jose

of

a

motion

as

sufficiency

filed

18

misidentified

the

Defendants

suspect

in

alleged

a

in

domestic

1

violence investigation.

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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

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The
“MPD

following

allegations

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When a new address is input into the database, “the database

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over-writes” and replaces the previously entered address. (Id.)

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Information in the database is used to “generate[] MPD documents”

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that

Merced

County

[information

the

suspects” including a suspect’s address. (SAC ¶ 17, ECF No. 27.)

the

of

concern

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to

database

SAC

motion.

“forwarded

a

the

4

are

maintains

in

District

about]

Attorney’s

10

Office, the Merced County Superior Court, and other government

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agencies,

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purpose

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summon[ing] [them] . . .

[that]

of]

rely

either

on

[such

arrest[ing]

information]
individuals

.
.

.
.

.
.

[for
or

.

the
.

.

to court or elsewhere.” (Id.)

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Saelee had “knowledge of how the [MPD database] is set

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up and functions,” and “wrote Plaintiff’s address on a document

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... filed with the MPD in relation to a 2012 case involving the

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real suspect, Jose Ortiz,” who was a suspect in several domestic

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violence-related

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Plaintiff and Jose Ortiz have different heights, weights, dates

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of birth, and live in different cities. (Id. ¶ 1.) However,

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“[d]esignating Plaintiff’s address as [Jose Ortiz’s address]...

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misidentified Plaintiff as the suspect since [Jose Ortiz’s] name

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is included in Plaintiff’s name.” (Id. ¶ 30.)

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crimes

against

his

ex-wife.

(SAC

¶¶

1,

19.)

The information in the MDP database was “forwarded to

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...

the

District

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thereby]

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Plaintiff’s address was the address of [the real suspect] Jose

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Ortiz. (SAC ¶ 30.) “As a result of being misidentified” as Jose

creat[ed]

Attorney
the

and

other

unmistakable

2

agencies[,]
.

.

.

.

.

.

[and

impression”

that

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Ortiz, Plaintiff “was summoned and, after complying [with the

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summons], . . . was seized and imprisoned” in the Merced County

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Jail “[o]n or about June 18, 2013.” (Id. ¶¶ 23, 24.) On July 1,

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2013, the Merced County Superior Court “determined [Plaintiff]

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unequivocally

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matters.” (Id. ¶ 26.)

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was

not

Plaintiff

the

suspect

alleges

consequence”

his

the

arrest

criminal

detention

address in the MDP database since “any reasonably trained officer

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would know” that when a summons is issued, “[a]rrests are made...

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and identities are sorted out later [, and that t]he default

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practice is to arrest[, and] law enforcement errs on the side of

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taking

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identity issues.” (SAC ¶ 30.)

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custody”

of

before

the

“a

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into

placement

was

foreseeable

suspects

Saelee’s

and

pending

8

perceived

of

in

wrong

“sorting

out

Plaintiff alleges the City and Andrade are responsible

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for

his

arrest

and

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sufficient

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database, and failed to adequately train employees on how to

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ensure

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database.

quality

accurate

control

address

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detention

since

policies

they
for

information

failed

to

maintain

of

the

operation

was

entered

MPD

into

the

complaint

must

II. LEGAL STANDARD
“To

survive

a

motion

to

dismiss,

a

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contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

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Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir.

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2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). “A claim

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has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

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that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
3

Caviness v.

1

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

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at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556

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(2007)). “For purposes of a motion to dismiss, we accept all

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well-pleaded allegations of material fact as true and construe

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them

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Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 783 (9th

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Cir. 2012). However, the court does “not accept legal conclusions

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in the complaint as true, even if cast in the form of factual

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allegations.” Lacano Inv., LLC v. Balash, 765 F.3d 1068, 1071

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in

the

light

most

favorable

to

the

nonmoving

party.”

(9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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III. DISCUSSION

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A.

False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Negligence, and

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Violation of Plaintiff’s Due Process Rights

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Saelee and the City each seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s

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false

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claims against the City are alleged under California Government

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Code

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entity for actions of an employee that would “give[] rise to a

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cause

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dismissal of Plaintiff’s due process claim. Saelee and the City

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argue:

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imprisonment,

section

of

815.2,

action

false

which

against

arrest,

creates

that

and

negligence

liability

employee.”

claims.

against

Saelee

also

Plaintiff appears to imply it is plausible an
incorrect address was the sole reason he was
arrested,
[not
withstanding]
the
other
allegations that Plaintiff is not Jose Ortiz,
but Jose Ortiz Leon, [and that he has a
different date of birth, height, and weight
than the Jose Ortiz.]
(Not. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss SAC 5:1-6, ECF No. 28.)

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Plaintiff responds:

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[His

arrest]

was

the proximate
4

result

a

of

The

public

seeks

1

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SAELEE’s conduct—notwithstanding . . . [that
he was physically arrested by someone other
than Saelee and] despite the differences in
identifying features between Plaintiff and
the real suspect—because [the fact that
Plaintiff
was
arrested
before
it
was
determined whether he was in fact Jose Ortiz]
. . . was not [a] highly unusual or an
extraordinary response to Plaintiff appearing
in response to the summons for the suspect,
[Jose Ortiz].

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(Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss SAC (“Opp’n”) 11:15-18, ECF No.

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32.) Plaintiff argues Saelee knew Plaintiff would be arrested

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when he responded to the summons sent to his address since a

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police officer “knows the steps that transpire in the process of

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taking suspects into custody or summoning criminal defendants”

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and that when an individual responds to a summons, he or she is

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arrested.

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(Opp’n 20:11-16.)

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To plead each claim Plaintiff must plausibly allege

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that each movant caused the injuries about which he complains.

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See Boyd v. City of Oakland, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1053 (N.D.

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Cal.

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imprisonment, Plaintiff must prove . . . that the harm [suffered]

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was substantially caused by the Defendant’s conduct.”) (emphasis

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added) (citing

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(1994)); Carlsen v. Koivumaki, 227 Cal.App.4th 879, 892

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(“The elements of any negligence cause of action are duty, breach

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of duty, proximate cause, and damages.”) (emphasis added); Harper

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v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In

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a § 1983 action, the plaintiff . . . must demonstrate that the

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defendant’s

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injury.”)

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required to plausibly establish both cause in fact and proximate

2006)

(“To

establish

a

claim

of

false

arrest

or

false

Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 701, 715-16

conduct
(quotation

was

the

actionable

omitted,

emphasis

5

cause

of

added).

the

(2014)

claimed

Plaintiff

is

1

cause. See e.g. Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Co., 31 Cal. App.

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4th 1409, 1414-15 (1995) (“Causation . . . includes both cause in

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fact

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necessity of a sufficient factual nexus between the negligent

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conduct and the injury while the latter represents the legal

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determination encompassing all the ill-defined considerations of

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policy which go to limit liability once cause in fact has been

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established.”);

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1407292, at *24-25 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2015) (“To meet [the

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federal] causation requirement, the plaintiff must establish both

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causation-in-fact

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defendant's conduct is a cause-in-fact . . . if it is a “but-for”

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cause of the injury. And a defendant's conduct is a proximate...

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cause . . . if there is ‘a sufficient causal link between the act

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or

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plaintiff to justify the imposition of liability.’”).

and

proximate-legal

omission

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Smith

of

.

a

.

.

Harrington,

and

defendant

Plaintiff
by

v.

causation:

alleges

No.

proximate

and

any

Saelee

C

reflects

12-03533,

causation

injury

caused

.

.

suffered

his

arrest

A

the

and

address in the database. However, this conclusory allegation is

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insufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

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face.”

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against Saelee are dismissed.

Therefore,

MPD

.

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679.

the

by

WL

since whoever arrested him did so based solely on Plaintiff’s

at

in

2015

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U.S.

address

.

the

detention

556

Plaintiff’s

former

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Iqbal,

placing

the

database

Plaintiff’s

claims

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Further, Plaintiff’s state claims against the City are

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also dismissed since they are alleged under California Government

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Code section 815.2, and therefore depend on Plaintiff alleging a

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plausible claim against Saelee, which he has not done.

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B.

Monell Claim
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1

The

and

alleged

Andrade

U.S.C.

4

Saelee, the Monell claim also is not actionable.
even

if

1983,

Plaintiff’s

Plaintiff has not pled a plausible due process claim against

that

§

of

3

responds

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dismissal

Monell

Plaintiff

under

seek

2

5

claim,

City

his

arguing

claim

since

against

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Saelee fails, the Monell claim is sufficiently pled since he

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alleges the City and Andrade “fail[ed] to institute reasonable

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quality control procedures . . . for requiring verification” of

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information in the database, and failed “to institute quality

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control procedures to prevent the wrongful overwriting of a[]

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[suspect’s] address,” and these failures “caused or permitted”

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the false imprisonment of innocent persons. (Opp’n 27:3-6; 26:13-

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19.)

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The “Monell claim,” refers to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

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Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), in which

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the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may use § 1983 to pursue

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a claim against a local government if plaintiff’s injuries were

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the result of a government policy, custom or practice. Liability

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against a municipality, such as City, may be established in one

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of three ways: “(1) when implementation of its official policies

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or established customs inflict[] the constitutional injury;...

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(2) when its omissions or failure to act amounts to a policy of

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“deliberate indifference” to constitutional rights; or (3) when

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an

25

subordinate’s

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Contra

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(synthesizing authority). To allege a plausible Monell claim, a

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plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipality’s “policies are

official

Costa,

with

final

policymaking

unconstitutional
591

F.3d

conduct.

1232,

7

authority

ratifies

Clouthier

v.

1249-50

(9th

Cnty

Cir.

a
of

2010)

1

the ‘moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.” City of

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Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (emphasis added,

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brackets in original). Since Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged

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Saelee violated his due process rights, neither the City nor

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Andrade can be liable under § 1983. See Quintanilla v. City of

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Downey, 84 F.3d 353, 355 (9th Cir.

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liability when plaintiff failed to show the individual officer

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inflicted

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Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Because . . .

a

no

underlying

harm);

see

also

there

11

Plaintiff

has

not

violation,

v.

Navajo

cannot maintain a claim for municipal liability.”).
Therefore,

constitutional

Simmons

10

12

was

constitutional

1996) (stating no Monell

[Plaintiff]

plausibly

pled

the

13

causation element of a Monell claim, and this claim is dismissed.

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IV. CONCLUSION

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For

the

stated

reasons,

each

Defendant’s

dismissal

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motion is GRANTED. However, Plaintiff is granted fourteen (14)

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days leave from the date on which this order is filed to file a

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Third Amended Complaint addressing the deficiencies in any claim

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dismissed.

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Dated:

May 28, 2015

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