Glaze v. Stane et al

Filing 15

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT for Failure to State a Cognizable Claim for Relief, and GRANTING Plaintiff one final opportunity to Amend Complaint, signed by Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone on 02/23/2015. ( Third Amended Complaint : 30-Day Deadline) (Attachments: # 1 Amended Complaint Form)(Martin-Gill, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RODNEY GLAZE,

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Plaintiff,
v.
STANE, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-01153-SAB (PC)
ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
COGNIZABLE CLAM FOR RELIEF, AND
GRANTING PLAINTIFF ONE FINAL
OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND COMPLAINT
[ECF No. 14]

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Plaintiff Rodney Glaze is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed January 5, 2015.

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I.

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SCREENING REQUIREMENT

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

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Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

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“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks

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monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

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entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but

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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

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do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

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550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally

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participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-677; Simmons v. Navajo County,

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Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-1021 (9th Cir. 2010).

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Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings

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liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, but the pleading standard is now

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higher, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), and to survive

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screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow

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the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal,

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556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer

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possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely

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consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556

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U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

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II.

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COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

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Correctional officer Stane subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unusual circumstances by making

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Plaintiff pull down his pants and boxers so a dog could sniff a towel which was placed on the chair

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that Plaintiff was sitting in. Officer Stane also placed Plaintiff in a contraband outfit which consisted

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of two jumpsuits, one placed on the correct way and the other placed backwards. Plaintiff’s legs were

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chained together with tap wrapped around the ankles. Plaintiff’s wrists were in handufffs and also

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tapped. Plaintiff was forced to drink out of a cup he had to share with another unknown inmate.

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Correctional officer Robles violated Plaintiff’s civil rights by writing a fabricated rules

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violation report in which Plaintiff was found not guilty. Officer Robles also tried to have Plaintiff

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subject to a psychological evaluation.

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Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages as a result of the Defendants’ actions.
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III.

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DISCUSSION

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A.

Strip Search

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The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,

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558 (1979); Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011);

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Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1988). The reasonableness of the search is

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determined by the context, which requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the

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invasion of personal rights the search entails. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558-59 (quotations omitted); Byrd, 629

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F.3d at 1141; Bull v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2010); Nunez v.

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Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1227 (9th Cir. 2010); Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 332-34. Factors that must be

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evaluated are the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the

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justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 (quotations

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omitted); Byrd, 629 F.3d at 1141; Bull, 595 F.3d at 972; Nunez, 591 F.3d at 1227; Michenfelder, 860

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F.2d at 332.

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Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for the search conducted by officer Stane. Plaintiff

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alleges nothing more than he was subject to a strip search, which alone, does not give rise to a

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constitutional violation. Plaintiff allegations regarding the strip search do not state a claim as there is

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no allegation of use of exaggerated or excessive means. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a

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cognizable claim under the Fourth Amendment.

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B.

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The requirements of due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the

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Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,

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569 (1972). A protected liberty interest may be created either by the Due Process Clause of its own

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force or by states through statutes and regulations. Sandin v. Coonor, 515 U.S. 472, 483-484 (1995).

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A deprivation authorized by state law may amount to deprivation of a protected liberty interest if the

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deprivation

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Fabrication of Rules Violation Report

To the extent Plaintiff complains that his right to due process was violated because he was
charged with a rules violation report for which he was found not guilty, his claim fails on the merits.
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A prisoner has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of

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conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest. See Sprouse v. Babcock,

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870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986).

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Consequently, the fact that Plaintiff may have been innocent of the disciplinary charges brought

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against him does not give rise to a due process issue. The Constitution demands due process for which

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Plaintiff received. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable due process violation.

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C.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

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The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners

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not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of confinement.

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Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

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847 (1994) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)) (quotation marks omitted). While

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conditions of confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they must not involve the

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wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347)

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(quotation marks omitted). Thus, conditions which are devoid of legitimate penological purpose or

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contrary to evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society violate the

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Eighth Amendment. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks and citations omitted); Hope v.

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Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346.

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Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food,

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clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir.

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2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted), but not every injury that a prisoner sustains while in

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prison represents a constitutional violation, Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks omitted). To

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maintain an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that prison officials were deliberately

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indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Thomas v.

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Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2010); Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812-14 (9th Cir.

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2009); Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045; Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th

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Cir. 1998). Of particular pertinence here, subjection of a prisoner to lack of sanitation that is severe or

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prolonged can constitute an infliction of pain within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Johnson

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v. Lewis, 217 F.3d at 732-733 (prisoners’ allegations that they did not receive adequate access to
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toilets, and then were not allowed to clean themselves after, if believed, is sufficiently serious to

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satisfy objective component); Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1995).

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In the second amended complaint, Plaintiff contends in claim one that he was subjected to

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cruel and unusual punishment, Plaintiff fails to set forth facts to support such a claim. First, to the

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extent Plaintiff contends that strip search constituted cruel and unusual punishment, his claim fails.

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Plaintiff has not alleged more than a minimal or momentary discomfort in being subjected to the strip

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search. Plaintiff alleges no harm or injury suffered as a result of the strip search, or that the search

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involved physical contact. As such, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to support a finding that

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Plaintiff was in substantial risk of serious harm as a result of the strip search.

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Second, to the extent Plaintiff contends, as he did in the first amended complaint that he was

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subjected to conditions to conditions which constituted cruel and unusual punishment, Plaintiff’s

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instant complaint is devoid of such factual allegations to support such a claim. As stated in December

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12, 2014 order, “an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. [citations] The amended

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complaint must be ‘complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleadings.”

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[citation] Plaintiff is warned that ‘[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not

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alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” (ECF No. 13, Order at 7.) Thus, if Plaintiff wishes to

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proceed on the cruel and unusual punishment claim found cognizable in the Court’s December 12,

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2014, he must re-allege sufficient factual allegations against an appropriate defendant or such claim is

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waived.

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IV.

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER

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For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

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may be granted. Plaintiff is granted one final opportunity to file an amended complaint within thirty

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(30) days. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the

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nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507

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F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints).

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Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each

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named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights.
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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678. “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties

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and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a

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constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). Although accepted

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as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative

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level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

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Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.,

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114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must be

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“complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” Local Rule 220. “All

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causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are

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waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir.

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1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

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Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff an amended civil rights complaint form;

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2.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed January 5, 2015, is dismissed for failure to state a
claim;

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3.

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Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an
amended complaint; and

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4.

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If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this action
will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:

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February 23, 2015
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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