Trujillo v. Munoz

Filing 44

ORDER DENYING Plaintiff's 43 Motion to Put Hold on Case; FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS to Dismiss Certain Claims and Defendants, signed by Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone on 9/25/18. 60 Day Deadline. (Marrujo, C)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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GUILLERMO TRUJILLO CRUZ,

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Plaintiff,
v.
C/O MUNOZ, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-01215-SAB (PC)
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
PUT HOLD ON CASE
(ECF No. 43)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
DISMISS CERTAIN CLAIMS AND
DEFENDANTS
(ECF No. 42)
SIXTY (60) DAY DEADLINE

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I.

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BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff Guillermo Trujillo Cruz is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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Plaintiff initiated this action on August 4, 2014, by filing the initial complaint, (ECF No. 1),

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which was found not to state any cognizable claim for relief, (ECF No. 10). Following two failed

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attempts to amend his claim to cure the deficiencies in his pleading, (ECF No. 11, 20), this action was

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dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, (ECF No. 21).

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Judgment was entered the same day. (ECF No. 22.) Plaintiff appealed. (ECF No. 23.)

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On February 27, 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the action to

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this Court. (ECF No. 30.) Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found that all the parties, including unserved

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defendants, had not consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge, and therefore the

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dismissal order was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings pursuant to Williams v.
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King, 875 F.3d 500, 503-04 (9th Cir. 2017). (Id.) The Ninth Circuit’s mandate was issued on August

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3, 2018, ordering that the February 27, 2018 judgment takes effect as of that date. (ECF No. 33.)

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On August 7, 2018, the Court re-screened Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, and issued

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findings and recommendations to a District Judge that this matter be dismissed, with prejudice, for the

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failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (ECF No. 34.) On September 4, 2018, Plaintiff

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filed objections, on extension. (ECF No. 38.)

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On September 5, 2018, the Court reviewed Plaintiff’s objections, in which he asserted that he

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could plead a cognizable claim for relief, and explained specific factual allegations he would make in

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support. Considering the foregoing and Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court found that Plaintiff should be

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afforded one final opportunity to attempt to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court

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then vacated the August 7, 2018 findings and recommendations, and allowed Plaintiff thirty (30) days

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to file a third amended complaint. (ECF No. 39.)

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On September 17, 2018, Plaintiff sought an extension of time to file his third amended complaint,

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as well as a stay of this matter. (ECF No. 40.) On September 18, 2018, the Court declined to issue the

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stay, but granted Plaintiff a sixty (60) day extension of time due to extenuating circumstances. (Doc.

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No. 41.)
Currently before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion to put a hold on the case, (ECF No. 43), and

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his third amended complaint, (ECF No. 42).

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II.

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MOTION FOR HOLD ON CASE

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The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s motion for a hold on the case. Plaintiff asserts a lack of

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access to his legal paperwork based on transfers for legal proceedings, including a trial at the end of this

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month. Therefore, Plaintiff asserts that a stay of proceedings is necessary until he further informs the

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Court.

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Plaintiff has shown good cause for a reasonable deadline extension in this matter, but the Court

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does not find it suitable to indefinitely stay the case proceedings. Plaintiff has filed a third amended

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complaint that shall be screened below, and the Court will grant Plaintiff ample time to file any

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objections to its screening. If needed, an additional extension may be requested, with good cause shown.
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III.

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THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

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A.

Screening Requirements

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court

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must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous

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or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] monetary

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relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

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entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but

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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do

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not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

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U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated

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in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally

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construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th

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Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which

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requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is

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liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962,

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969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and

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“facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility

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standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

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B.

Summary of Allegations

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Plaintiff alleges that on September 9, 2013, he was returning to his housing unit from a ducket

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pass. Defendant Control Booth Officer Munoz looked out the window and said to Plaintiff, “I’m gonna

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get you stab[bed] and off the yard.” (Third Am. Compl., ECF No. 42, at 3.) Later that day, Plaintiff

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filed a grievance complaining about this threat.

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Later that week, Plaintiff was called to program C-yard for a 602 hearing. On his way to the

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hearing, Defendant Munoz threatened Plaintiff with physical injuries for reporting Defendant Munoz’s

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threats.

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At the program office, Defendant Lieutenant Alvarez talked about the threats made by Defendant

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Munoz. Defendant Alvarez became upset, swore at Plaintiff, and told Plaintiff that he needed to stop

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making false allegations about the lieutenant’s coworkers. Plaintiff was then escorted for a strip search.

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In the holding cell where the strip search was conducted, Defendant Alvarez stated to his

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coworker, Officer John Doe, that he observed Plaintiff throw something behind the holding cell. This

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was a lie by Defendant Alvarez, and the search was done as retaliation because Plaintiff reported

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Defendant Munoz’s threats. Defendant Alvarez then ordered Officer John Doe to search behind the

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holding cell, where Officer John Doe discovered narcotics wrapped in plastic. Plaintiff was falsely

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pinned with distribution of narcotics and possession of heroin.

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Plaintiff then requested to speak with the warden or the captain of the facility before being

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charged for distribution. Defendant Alvarez and John Doe left. After thirty minutes, Defendant Alvarez

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returned with Nurse Rodriguez to do a medical evaluation before Plaintiff was released off C-yard and

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rehoused in ASU pending disciplinary charges. Later that same day, Defendant Alvarez told Plaintiff

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that the warden and captain were not available or on institution grounds, and that due to the lack of

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available bed space in ASU, Plaintiff was instead going to be re-housed in Orientation Building 3.

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Plaintiff was escorted to that temporary housing later that afternoon by Defendant Alvarez.

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The following day, at about 10:00 AM, Officer John Doe opened Plaintiff’s cell door and told

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him to get dressed because Defendant Alvarez was waiting for him in his office. Plaintiff was given his

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personal property and told that he was being moved from the lower yard Building 2, to the upper yard

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Building Five. From September 9, 2013 to November 1, 2013, Defendants Alvarez and Munoz were

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ordering an assault on Plaintiff.

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On November 1, 2013, prison officials and Defendants had Plaintiff assaulted with a deadly

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weapon in retaliation for using the prison grievance system, to try and solve the problem before it

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escalated. The assault occurred on Facility-C Upper Yard, Building Five, in cell #123. Control Booth

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Officer John Doe conspired in the assault by opening the electronic cell door for the assault.
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C.

Discussion

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1.

Eighth Amendment

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Plaintiff first alleges that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth

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Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners not only from

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inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v.

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Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994)

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and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)) (quotation marks omitted). While conditions of

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confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they must not involve the wanton and

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unnecessary infliction of pain. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) (quotation

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marks omitted). Thus, conditions which are devoid of legitimate penological purpose or contrary to

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evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society violate the Eighth

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Amendment. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks and citations omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 536

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U.S. 730, 737 (2002); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346.

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To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that prison officials were

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deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. E.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at

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847; Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2010); Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812-

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1128 (9th Cir. 1998). The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong.

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First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

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834. Second, the prison official must “know[ ] of and disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health or

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safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

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Prison officials must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and

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personal safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-33 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Prison officials

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have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical abuse. Id. at 833; Hearns v.

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Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). The failure of prison officials to protect inmates from

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attacks by other inmates may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation where prison officials

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know of and disregard a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. E.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847;

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Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040.
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Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment against Defendant

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Munoz for threatening him with a stabbing and physical violence, and for ordering an inmate assault on

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him. Plaintiff has also stated a claim against Defendant Alvarez for ordering an inmate assault on him.

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Plaintiff’s allegations against Control Booth Officer John Doe are insufficient to state a

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cognizable claim. Plaintiff makes a conclusory statement that this officer conspired in the inmate assault

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by opening the electronic cell door. Plaintiff does not allege facts from which the Court can infer that

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this officer was aware that an assault was going to take place, and acted to aid that assault.

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2.

Retaliation

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Plaintiff also asserts that certain actions were taken against him in retaliation for reporting officer

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misconduct or threats. “Prisoners [and pretrial detainees] have a First Amendment right to file

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grievances against prison officials and to be free from retaliation for doing so.” Watison v. Carter, 668

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F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009)). “Within

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the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An

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assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s

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protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights,

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and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408

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F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

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Liberally construed, Plaintiff states a claim against Defendant Munoz for threatening him with

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physical injuries for filing a grievance reporting earlier threats against Plaintiff, and for eventually

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having him assaulted by inmates for using the grievance system. Plaintiff has also stated a claim against

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Defendant Alvarez, for having him strip searched and falsely planting drugs on Plaintiff so that he would

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be charged with drug distribution and possession, and for having him assaulted by inmates, in retaliation

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for Plaintiff filing a grievance about Defendant Munoz.

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For the same reasons discussed above, the Court finds no claim stated against Control Booth

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Officer John Doe based on allegedly conspiring in the inmate assault. That is, although Plaintiff makes

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conclusory allegations, he does not state any facts from which the Court can infer that this officer knew

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about Plaintiff’s grievance or complaint, knew that Plaintiff would be assaulted by inmates, and acted

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to aid that assault for any retaliatory intent.
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Plaintiff has also not stated any claim against Officer John Doe for his involvement in the strip

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search and for locating the drugs outside of Plaintiff’s holding cell. Plaintiff does not state any facts

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from which the Court can infer that this officer knew that the search and drug-planting was done by

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Officer Alvarez in retaliation for Plaintiff’s grievance, or that the officer aided in the conduct for any

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retaliatory intent.

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3.

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In Plaintiff’s prayer for relief, he states that he seeks damages, a “polygraph examination,” and

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any other relief that the Court deems proper and just. Plaintiff does not indicate who he seeks to have

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examined by polygraph, and therefore the Court is somewhat unclear as to the nature of his request. To

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the extent that Plaintiff seeks to be tested by polygraph examination to show the truth of his assertions,

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as noted above, his factual allegations are presumed to be true at this stage. Therefore, his request is

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denied, as unnecessary. See Hammler v. Davis, No. 2:14-CV-2073 AC P, 2014 WL 6685211, at *9

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(E.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2014) (citing Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976)).

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IV.

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CONCLUSION

Polygraph Examination

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As described above, Plaintiff has stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment for cruel and

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unusual punishment, and under the First Amendment for retaliation, against Defendant Munoz and

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Defendant Alvarez.

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deficiencies in his prior pleadings, but his third amended complaint is largely identical to the allegations

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he most recently put forth in his September 4, 2018 objections. Accordingly, the Court finds that further

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amendment would be futile, as it appears that Plaintiff has stated all the factual allegations that he can

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plead in good faith. See Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court

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may not deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130

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(9th. Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446-1449 (9th Cir. 1987).

Plaintiff was previously notified of the applicable legal standards and the

Therefore, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to put a hold on this case, filed on

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September 21, 2018 (ECF No. 42), is denied.

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Further, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

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This action proceed on Plaintiff’s third amended complaint against Defendant Munoz

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and Defendant Alvarez for cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and

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for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment; and

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2.

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All other claims and Defendants be dismissed for the failure to state a cognizable claim

for relief.

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These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

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assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within sixty (60) days after

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being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the

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Court.

The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

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Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

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result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014)

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(citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:

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September 25, 2018
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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