York v. Beard et al

Filing 44

ORDER Denying Plaintiff's Motions for Attorney's Fees and Costs re 40 , 41 , 43 , signed by Chief Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill on 12/15/16. (Gonzalez, R)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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REGINALD RAY YORK,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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1:14-cv-01234-LJO-GSA-PC
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS
(ECF Nos. 40, 41, 43.)

JEFFREY BEARD, et al.,
Defendants.

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I.

BACKGROUND

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Reginald Ray York (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with this civil

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rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act

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(“ADA”)). On June 8, 2016, this case was dismissed, with prejudice, for Plaintiff’s lack of

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standing. (ECF No. 35.)

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On August 16, 2016, November 3, 2016, and December 9, 2016, Plaintiff filed motions

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for attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs to be paid by Defendants, pursuant to Federal Rule of

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Civil Procedure 54(d) and the ADA. (ECF Nos. 40, 41, 43.)

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II.

AWARD OF FEES AND COSTS

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A.

Legal Standards

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) and Eastern District of California’s Local Rule

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292(f) (“Local Rule 292”) govern the taxation of costs, and other attorney’s fees that are

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awarded to the prevailing party in a civil matter. See Jones v. Cnty of Sacramento, No. CIV S1

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09-1025 DAD, 2011 WL 3584330, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011). This rule creates a

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presumption in favor of awarding costs to the prevailing party, which can only be overcome

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when the Court exercises its discretion to disallow costs for specific reasons, which may

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include punishing misconduct by the prevailing party or nonpunitive but compelling equitable

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justifications. Ass’n of Mexican–Am. Educators v. Cal., 231 F.3d 572, 591–93 (9th Cir. 2000).

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Local Rule 292 mirrors the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and states that a

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variety of fees incurred during litigation of the case, such as Clerk’s fees and Docket fees, are

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taxable as costs.

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Under 42 U.S.C. § 12205, the court “may allow the prevailing party [in ADA cases],

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other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and

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costs, and the United States shall be liable for the foregoing the same as a private individual.”

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B.

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Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney’s fees and non-taxable expenses and costs to be

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paid by Defendants. Plaintiff requests $400.00 for the cost of filing fees, $200.00 for the cost

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of legal supplies, copywork, and postage, and $8,000.00 in attorney’s fees.

Discussion

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The issue here is whether Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this case. To be entitled to

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the award Plaintiff seeks under Rule 504(d), Local Rule 292, or 42 U.S.C. § 12205, Plaintiff

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must be the “prevailing party” in the case. The general principle for an award of costs and

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attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party is well-settled. A “prevailing party” or “successful party”

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is a party that has been afforded some relief by the court. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc.

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v. West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001); Klamath Siskiyou

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Wildlands Center v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management, 589 F.3d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 2009).

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The term “prevailing party” does not include “a party that has failed to secure a judgment on

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the merits or a court-ordered consent decree, but has nonetheless achieved the desired result

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because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct.”

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Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600.

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Plaintiff’s claim in this case arose out of Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”) officials’

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alleged blanket exclusion of mobility-impaired inmates from eligibility to request one of the
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prison’s available deactivated cells, an exclusion allegedly based on their inability to access

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upper tier housing because of their disability. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief such that he

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could request single-cell housing on the first tier just as non-disabled inmates were able to do

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on the second tier. However, Defendants submitted that the cells on the top tier that were

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deactivated into single cells in 2012 no longer exist at KVSP. The prison population grew

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since 2012 to beyond maximum capacity; therefore, any deactivated cells were converted back

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to double cells. (ECF No. 31-2, Defs.’ Mot. Recons., Ex. B, Hancock Decl. ¶ 3.) Based on

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these facts the Court found that no legal remedy existed that would redress Plaintiff’s injury,

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and the case was dismissed for Plaintiff’s lack of standing.

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Thus, Plaintiff was not awarded any relief by the Court. His claim for injunctive relief

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was denied by the Court as moot, because the program under which Plaintiff claims he suffered

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discrimination was eliminated by Defendants. Even if Plaintiff received the desired result in

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this case because of Defendants’ conduct, he is not the “prevailing party” in this case.

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Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs, and his motion must

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be denied.

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III.

CONCLUSION

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Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motions for an

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award of attorney’s fees and costs, filed on August 16, 2016, November 3, 2016, and December

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9, 2016 are DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

/s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill _____

December 15, 2016

UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

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