Broadcast Music, Inc. et al v. Pardon

Filing 19

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS recommending that Plaintiffs' 17 Motion for Default Judgment be partially granted. The matter is referred to Judge Mendez. Objections due within 14 days. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone on 3/4/2015. (Hernandez, M)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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BROADCAST MUSIC, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,

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Case No. 1:14-cv-01394-JAM-SAB
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT BE
PARTIALLY GRANTED

v.
AUDIE STEVEN PARDON,

ECF NO. 17
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Defendant.
OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN
(14) DAYS

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On January 21, 2015, Plaintiffs Broadcast Music, Inc., Universal-Songs of Polygram

19 International, Inc., Sony/ATV Songs LLC, and Lost Boys Music (all plaintiffs collectively
20 referred to as “Plaintiffs”) filed a motion for default judgment. (ECF No. 17.) The motion for
21 default judgment was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for Findings and
22 Recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72.
23 See Local Rule 302(c)(19).
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The hearing on the motion for default judgment took place on March 4, 2015. Karen S.

25 Frank appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs. No one appeared on behalf of Defendant Audie Steven
26 Pardon (“Defendant”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that Plaintiffs’
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1 motion for default judgment be partially granted.1
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I.

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BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed the complaint in this action on September 5, 2014.

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(ECF No. 1.)

5 Plaintiffs sued Defendant for copyright infringement. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs raised four claims
6 of copyright infringement arising from Defendant’s unauthorized public performance of four
7 musical compositions from the BMI Repertoire. (Compl. ¶ 11.) The four songs were “Jessie’s
8 Girl,” “Mammas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be Cowboys,” “Take On Me,” and “Total
9 Eclipse Of The Heart.” (Compl., at pp. 5-6.) Plaintiffs allege that these songs were publicly
10 played without authorization at Defendant’s business establishment, known as Audie’s
11 Olympic/Club Fred, located at 1426 North Van Ness Avenue, Fresno, California 93728.
12 (Compl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs allege that the infringement occurred on June 22, 2014. (Compl., at pp.
13 5-6.)
Plaintiffs sought and obtained entry of default against Defendant on October 7, 2014.

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15 (ECF Nos. 12, 14.) Defendant has not filed a responsive pleading or otherwise appeared in this
16 action. Plaintiff filed the present motion for default judgment on January 21, 2015. (ECF No.
17 17.)
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II.

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LEGAL STANDARDS PERTAINING TO DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Entry of default judgment is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b), which

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21 states, in pertinent part:
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(2)
By the Court. In all other cases, the party must apply to
the court for a default judgment. A default judgment may be
entered against a minor or incompetent person only if represented
by a general guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary who has
appeared. If the party against whom a default judgment is sought
has appeared personally or by a representative, that party or its
representative must be served with written notice of the application
at least 7 days before the hearing. The court may conduct hearings
or make referrals—preserving any federal statutory right to a jury

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The partial grant language results from the Court’s analysis regarding attorney’s fees being requested and the

28 Court’s reduction due to the analysis provided herein.

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trial—when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs to:
(A)
conduct an accounting;
(B)
determine the amount of damages;
(C)
establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or
(D)
investigate any other matter.

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Upon entry of default, the complaint’s factual allegations regarding liability are taken as
true. Geddes v. United Financial Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977); Microsoft Corp. v.
Nop, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1235 (E.D. Cal. 2008). However, the complaint’s factual allegations
relating to the amount of damages are not taken as true. Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560. Accordingly,
the amount of damages must be proven at an evidentiary hearing or through other means.
Microsoft Corp., 549 F. Supp. 2d at 1236. Per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c), “[a]
default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the
pleadings.”
Entry of default judgment is committed to the Court’s discretion. Eitel v. McCool, 782
F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit has set forth the following factors for the
court is to consider in exercising its discretion:

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(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of
plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint,
(4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a
dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due
to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

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Id. at 1471-72.

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III.
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DISCUSSION
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A.
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The Balance of the Eitel Factors Weigh in Favor of Default Judgment

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that default judgment is appropriate after
consideration of each of the Eitel factors.

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1.
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Prejudice to Plaintiffs if Default Judgment is Not Granted

If default judgment is not entered, Plaintiff is effectively denied a remedy for the
violations alleged in this action until such time as the defendants in this action decide to appear

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1 in the litigation, which may never occur. Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor weighs in
2 favor of default judgment.
The Merits of Plaintiffs’ Substantive Claims and Sufficiency of the Complaint

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2.

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The Court is to evaluate the merits of the substantive claims alleged in the complaint as

5 well as the sufficiency of the complaint itself. In doing so, the Court looks to the complaint to
6 determine if the allegations contained within are sufficient to state a claim for the relief sought.
7 Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978).
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Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges violations of the United States Copyright Act. Under 17

9 U.S.C. § 106, the owner of a copyright has the exclusive rights to perform the copyrighted work
10 publicly. Under 17 U.S.C. § 501, the owner of a copyright may institute an action against an
11 infringer of that copyright. “To establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement, a plaintiff
12 must demonstrate (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of
13 the work that are original.” Range Road Music, Inc. v. East Coast Foods, Inc., 668 F.3d 1148,
14 1153 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 462 F.3d
15 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).
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Here, Plaintiffs allege that they own valid copyrights for the songs “Jessie’s Girl,”

17 “Mammas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be Cowboys,” “Take On Me,” and “Total
18 Eclipse Of The Heart.” Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant infringed upon the copyright by
19 publicly performing these songs at Defendant’s business establishment on June 22, 2014.
20 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ complaint states sufficient allegations to support a
21 cognizable claim for copyright infringement. This factor weighs in favor of default judgment.
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3.

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Default judgment is disfavored where large amounts of money are involved or the award

The Sum of Money at Stake in the Action

24 would be unreasonable in light of the defendant’s actions. G & G Closed Circuit Events, LLC v.
25 Nguyen, No. 3:11-cv-06340-JW, 2012 WL 2339699, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2012). In this
26 case, Plaintiffs’ seek statutory damages totaling $20,000.00, which represents four $5,000.00
27 awards associated with four claims of copyright infringement. Plaintiffs also seek costs and
28 attorney’s fees in the amount of $4,755.00 under 17 U.S.C. § 505, which authorizes an award of

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1 reasonable attorney’s fees in copyright infringement actions.
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The Court finds that only a relatively small amount of money is involved in this action

3 and, therefore, this factor weighs in favor of default judgment.
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4.

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Due to the factual allegations in the complaint being taken as true upon Defendants’

The Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material Facts

6 default, there are no genuine of issues of material fact in dispute in this action. Accordingly, this
7 factor weighs in favor of granting default judgment.
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5.

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Defendants have failed to file a responsive pleading or oppose the motion for default

Whether the Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect

10 judgment. There is no evidence before the Court that this failure was due to excusable neglect.
11 Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of granting default judgment.
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6.

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The Strong Policy Underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Favoring
Decisions on the Merits

The policy favoring decisions on the merits always weighs against entering default

15 judgment. However, in this instance the factors favoring default judgment outweigh the policy
16 favoring a decision on the merits.
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B.

Relief Requested

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1.

Injunctive Relief

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Plaintiffs seek an injunction prohibiting Defendant from engaging any further activities

20 which would constitute copyright infringement. Such relief is expressly authorized by 17 U.S.C.
21 § 502. In copyright infringement actions, “[a]s a general rule, a permanent injunction will be
22 granted when liability has been established and there is a threat of continuing violations.” MAI
23 Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 520 (9th Cir. 1993).
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Plaintiffs submitted evidence that Defendant was advised of the copyright infringement

25 issue and was asked to purchase a license for the music performances, but received no response.
26 (Decl. of Brian Mullaney in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. for Def. J. ¶¶ 3-9.)

Plaintiffs contacted

27 Defendant numerous times via letters, e-mails, and telephone. (Id.) After these communications,
28 Plaintiffs sent an agent to visit Defendant’s business establishment to witness and record the

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1 instances of copyright infringement which occurred on June 22, 2014. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Based upon
2 this sequence of events, the Court finds that there is a threat of continuing violations and
3 injunctive relief is appropriate.
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2.

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Plaintiffs seek $20,000.00 in statutory damages for four instances of copyright

Statutory Damages

6 infringement. Under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c):
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(1) Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the
copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is
rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an
award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the
action, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is
liable individually, or for which any two or more infringers are
liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than $750 or more
than $30,000 as the court considers just. For the purposes of this
subsection, all the parts of a compilation or derivative work
constitute one work.

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Plaintiffs note that the license fees Defendant’s would have paid to legally perform the

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songs at issue would have been $4,208.75. Thus, the amounts requested in statutory damages are
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between three and four times the amount Defendant would have paid in license fees. The Court
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finds the requested statutory damages to be reasonable and appropriate.
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3.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Plaintiff seeks costs and attorneys’ fees in the amount of $4,755.00. Recovery of costs,
including attorneys’ fees, are authorized under 17 U.S.C. § 505. “[U]nder federal fee shifting
statutes the lodestar approach is the guiding light in determining a reasonable fee.” Antoninetti

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v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 643 F.3d 1165, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal punctuation and
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citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has explained the lodestar approach as follows:
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The lodestar/multiplier approach has two parts. First a court
determines the “lodestar” amount by multiplying the number of
hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly
rate. See D'Emanuele [v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 904 F.2d
1379, 1383 (9th Cir. 1990)]; Hensley [v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,]
461 (1983). The party seeking an award of fees must submit
evidence supporting the hours worked and the rates claimed. See
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. A district court should exclude from the
lodestar amount hours that are not reasonably expended because
they are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Id. at
434. Second, a court may adjust the lodestar upward or downward
using a “multiplier” based on factors not subsumed in the initial
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calculation of the lodestar. [footnote omitted] See Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 898-901 (1984) (reversing upward multiplier based
on factors subsumed in the lodestar determination); Hensley, 461
U.S. at 434 n. 9 (noting that courts may look at “results obtained”
and other factors but should consider that many of these factors are
subsumed in the lodestar calculation). The lodestar amount is
presumptively the reasonable fee amount, and thus a multiplier
may be used to adjust the lodestar amount upward or downward
only in “‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’ cases, supported by both ‘specific
evidence’ on the record and detailed findings by the lower courts”
that the lodestar amount is unreasonably low or unreasonably high.
See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean
Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986) (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 898901); Blum, 465 U.S. at 897; D'Emanuele, 904 F.2d at 1384, 1386;
Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 487 (9th
Cir. 1989).
Van Gerwin v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000). Under the
lodestar method, the court will first determine the appropriate hourly rate for the work
performed, and that amount is then multiplied by the number of hours properly expended in
performing the work. Antoninetti, 643 F.3d at 1176. The district court has the discretion to
make adjustments to the number of hours claimed or to the loadstar, but is required to provide a
clear but concise reason for the fee award. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir.
1992). The loadstar amount is to be determined based upon the prevailing market rate in the
relevant community. Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 (1984).
The evidence submitted by Plaintiffs show that attorney Karen S. Frank billed 3.2 hours
of time at a rate of $575 per hour, totaling $1,840.00. Attorney Jeremiah J. Burke billed 7.2
hours of time at a rate of $325.00 per hour, totaling $2,340.00. Plaintiffs also identified $575 in
costs, from the $400.00 filing fee and $175.00 in process server fees.
Plaintiffs have not submitted any evidence regarding the prevailing market rate for
attorneys within this district. The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ law firm is in San Francisco,
located outside this district. Therefore, the normal hourly rate charged by Plaintiffs’ attorneys
does not necessarily reflect the prevailing market rate within this district. In a prior case in this
district involving Plaintiffs and the same attorneys, the Court awarded attorneys’ fees at a rate of
$275 per hour for Ms. Frank and $175 per hour for Mr. Burke due to the absence of evidence in
the record justifying a different amount. See Broadcast Music Inc. v. Antigua Cantina & Grill,

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1 LLC, No. 2:12-cv-1196 KJM DAD, 2013 WL 2244641, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2013).
2 Accordingly, the Court will recommend that the same rates be applied in this case. The Court
3 recommends that Plaintiff be awarded $2,140.00 in attorneys’ fees and $575 in costs.
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IV.

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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

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Based upon the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

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Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment be PARTIALLY GRANTED;

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2.

Plaintiffs be awarded $20,000.00 in statutory damages;

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3.

Plaintiffs be awarded $2,140.00 in attorneys’ fees;

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4.

Plaintiffs be awarded $575.00 in costs; and

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An injunction issue enjoining Defendant, his agents, servants, employees, and all

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persons acting under their permission and authority from infringing, in any

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manner, the copyrighted musical compositions licensed by BMI.
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this

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15 action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 304. Within fourteen
16 (14) days of service of this recommendation, any party may file written objections to these
17 findings and recommendations with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document
18 should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The
19 district judge will review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations pursuant to 28
20 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified
21 time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th
22 Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.

25 Dated:

March 4, 2015
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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