Acosta v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 27

ORDER Granting Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 23 ), signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 7/17/2018. The Court ORDERS: (1) The motion for attorney fees pursuant to 24 U.S.C. §406(b) in the amount of $21,642.90, net of the previously awarded fee of $3,934.24 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), for a total award of $17,708.66 is GRANTED; (2) The Commissioner shall pay the amount directly to Counsel, Shellie Lott. (Valdez, E)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RICHARD NICHOLAS ACOSTA SR., 12 Plaintiff, v. 13 14 NANCY A. BERRYHILL,1 Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No.: 1:14-cv-01422-BAM ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 23) 16 17 Petitioner, Shellie Lott, counsel for Plaintiff Richard Nicholas Acosta Sr., seeks an award of 18 attorney fees in the amount of $21,642.90 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (Doc. 23) Defendant has 19 filed a statement of non-opposition to Plaintiff’s request. (Doc. 26). Having reviewed the motion and 20 its supporting documentation, as well as the case file, the motion and the requested attorney’s fees are 21 GRANTED. 22 I. Relevant Background 23 Plaintiff entered into a written contingent fee agreement with Ms. Lott on August 7, 2014, which 24 provided that “if Attorney prevails… Claimant agrees to pay Attorney a fee for Federal Court work equal 25 to 25% of the past-due benefits.” (Doc. 23-3 at 1). 26 27 28 1 Nancy A. Berryhill is now Acting Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court substitutes Nancy A. Berryhill for her predecessor, Carolyn W. Colvin, as the defendant. 1 1 On September 11, 2014, Plaintiff filed this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s 2 denial of benefits (Doc. 1). Subsequently, on July 23, 2015, based on the parties’ stipulation for a 3 voluntary remand, the Court remanded the action for further administrative proceedings pursuant to 4 sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 20). On remand, an Administrative Law Judge found Plaintiff 5 disabled which resulted in Period of Disability, Disability Insurance Benefits, and Supplemental Security 6 Income. (Doc. 23-1 at 1). On March 29, 2017, Plaintiff received a Notice of Award of $86,571.60 in past-due benefits. 7 Twenty-five percent of Plaintiff’s past due benefit total of $86,571.60 equals 8 (Doc. 23-2 at 2). 9 $21,642.90. The Court awarded a fee of $3,934.24 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) 10 pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. (Doc. 22). Accordingly, Plaintiff has requested net attorney’s fees 11 of $17,708.66. 12 II. An attorney may seek an award of fees for representation of a Social Security claimant who is 13 14 awarded benefits: Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under [42 USC § 401, et seq] who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment. . . . 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Attorney Fees under § 406(b) 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A); see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 794 (2002) (Section 406(b) controls fees awarded for representation of Social Security claimants). A contingency fee agreement is unenforceable if it provides for fees exceeding twenty-five percent of past-due benefits. Id. at 807. III. Discussion and Analysis District courts “have been deferential to the terms of contingency fee contracts § 406(b) cases.” Hern v. Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003). However, the Court must review contingent-fee arrangements “as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. In doing so, the Court should consider “the character of the representation and the results the representative achieved.” Id. at 808. In addition, the Court should consider whether the attorney performed in a substandard manner or engaged in dilatory conduct or excessive delays, and whether the fees are “excessively large in relation to the benefits received.” 2 1 Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 2 In this case, after carefully considering the fee agreement and the applicable law, the Court finds 3 Plaintiff’s counsel’s requested fees to be reasonable. In support of her motion for attorneys’ fees under 4 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), Plaintiff’s counsel attached the contingent fee agreement which provided for a 5 contingent fee of twenty-five percent of any awarded retroactive benefits. Plaintiff’s counsel accepted 6 the risk of loss in the representation and expended a total of 32.1 hours while representing Plaintiff 7 before the District Court. (Doc. 23-4 at 2). As a result of counsel’s work, the matter was remanded for 8 further proceedings before an Administrative Law Judge, who issued a fully favorable decision and 9 awarded Plaintiff benefits. Plaintiff’s counsel provided a copy of the notice of award and the motion 10 for attorney’s fees to Plaintiff. (Doc. 23-1 at 2). Although served with the motion, Plaintiff did not file 11 challenge the requested fees which attests to their reasonableness. Likewise, the Commissioner, in its 12 advisory capacity, also declined to dispute the propriety of the amount of the fees requested by Plaintiff’s 13 counsel. 14 Additionally, there is no indication Ms. Lott performed in a substandard manner or engaged in 15 severe dilatory conduct to the extent that a reduction in fees is warranted. To the contrary, Plaintiff was 16 able to secure a fully favorable decision and remand for further proceedings, including an award of past- 17 due benefits. Accordingly, the Court finds the fees sought by Ms. Lott are reasonable in light the results 18 achieved in this action, and the amount does not exceed twenty-five percent maximum permitted under 19 42 U.S.C. §406(b). 20 IV. Conclusion and Order 21 Based upon the foregoing, the Court ORDERS: 22 1. The motion for attorney fees pursuant to 24 U.S.C. §406(b) in the amount of $21,642.90, 23 net of the previously awarded fee of $3,934.24 under the Equal Access to Justice Act 24 (EAJA), for a total award of $17,708.66 is GRANTED; 25 26 27 28 2. The Commissioner shall pay the amount directly to Counsel, Shellie Lott. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: /s/ Barbara July 17, 2018 A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 3

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