Bradford v. Marchak

Filing 256

ORDER DENYING Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to Add Due Process Claims 35 , signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 3/29/2018: Defendant Grewal's answer to the second amended complaint is due within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this order. (Hellings, J)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RAYMOND ALFORD BRADFORD,

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Plaintiff,

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v.
M. MARCHAK, et al.,

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Defendants.

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I.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-01689-LJO-BAM (PC)
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT TO ADD DUE
PROCESS CLAIMS
[ECF No. 35]

Introduction
Plaintiff Raymond Alford Bradford is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

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in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case proceeds on Plaintiff’s second

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amended complaint against Defendants Marchak, Grewal, Depovic, and Clausell for the unnecessary

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and wanton infliction of pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 21.)

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Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint to add due

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process claims. (ECF No. 35.) Plaintiff also lodged a proposed third amended complaint. (ECF No.

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36.) Defendant Grewal filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion, (ECF No. 38), which Plaintiff moved

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to strike, (ECF No. 41). That motion to strike was denied by a separate order, but the Court will

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consider Plaintiff’s arguments in reply to Defendant Grewal’s opposition. Defendants Marchak,

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Depovic, and Clausell also filed a joint opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. (ECF No. 42.) The motion is

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deemed submitted. Local Rule 230(l).

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II.

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Discussion
Plaintiff asserts in his motion that he seeks to amend his complaint to add a due process claim,

as set forth in his proposed third amended complaint. With regard to due process, Plaintiff alleges in

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the proposed third amended complaint that he was denied a fair hearing because Defendants lied to an

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unnamed Administrative Law Judge in a hearing for renewal of a Keyhea order.

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Defendants oppose the motion, argue that these allegations are identical to allegations that

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Plaintiff previously pleaded. They further argue that the Court has previously held such a claim cannot

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be brought in this action, and has repeatedly dismissed the claim without leave to amend. Therefore,

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his proposed amendment is both futile and barred by the law of the case. Defendant Grewal also seeks

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an extension of time to answer the second amended complaint due to the pendency of Plaintiff’s

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motion for leave to amend.

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In reply, Plaintiff asserts that the District Judge gave no legal reason for his prior rulings, and

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that the Defendants’ oppositions lack merit. Plaintiff also opposes Defendant Grewal’s request for an

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extension of time to answer the second amended complaint.

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Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of

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course within 21 days after serving it or, if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is

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required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule

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12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). “In all other cases, a party may amend

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its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should

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freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

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Courts “need not grant leave to amend where the amendment: (1) prejudices the opposing

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party; (2) is sought in bad faith; (3) produces an undue delay in the litigation; or (4) is futile.”

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AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006). The “court’s

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discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where the court has already given the plaintiff

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an opportunity to amend his complaint,” Fidelity Financial Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San

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Francisco, 792 F.2d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986).

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Here, Plaintiff was twice previously granted leave to amend, and therefore may amend only

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with the Court’s leave. In screening Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, the Court ruled that he “may

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be able to state a due process claim, but not against the Defendants named in this action. Therefore, he

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was provided the relevant standards, and his due process claim was dismissed with leave to amend.

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(ECF No. 19.) In screening Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, the Court ruled that to the extent his

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claim was premised on Defendants’ false testimony at the Keyhea proceedings, Defendants were

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absolutely immune from such claims, and therefore he could not bring such claims. (ECF No. 22, at 2-

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3.) The Court further found that with respect to any assertions that a petition for involuntary

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commitment was used against him in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, he had failed to

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allege facts showing that the proceeds were terminated in his favor, which is required to state such a

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claim. (Id. at 3.) Therefore, his claims were dismissed without further leave to amend, and this action

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was ordered to proceed only on his Eighth Amendment claim. (Id.)

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Plaintiff’s proposed third amended complaint and attempt to add a due process claim is

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therefore futile, as he is re-pleading allegations which the Court previously found insufficient to state a

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claim. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, legal standards and reasoning were provided to him, and

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despite an opportunity to amend, he was found to be unable to state a due process claim. Even if the

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Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s motion as a motion for reconsideration, he has not shown any error

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in the prior ruling or presented any other grounds for reconsideration. See Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc.

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v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A motion for reconsideration

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should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with

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newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the

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controlling law.”) (quoting 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999)). For

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these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend shall be denied.
Further, the Court finds that Defendant Grewal provided sufficient good cause for the

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requested extension of time to answer the second amended complaint, as it would have been a waste of

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resources to require a response to the second amended complaint if the third amended complaint had

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been permitted. Accordingly, as the Court has now ruled on Plaintiff’s motion, Defendant Grewal’s

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answer will be due within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order.

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III.

Conclusion

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For the reasons explained above, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that:

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1.

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend complaint to add due process claims (ECF No.

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35), is denied; and

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2.

Defendant Grewal’s answer to the second amended complaint is due within fourteen

(14) days of the date of service of this order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

March 29, 2018

/s/ Barbara

A. McAuliffe

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE