Hayward Lee Mayhan v. Connie Gipson

Filing 20

ORDER DENYING 19 Petitioner's Motion for Stay of Proceedings signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 4/6/2015. (Jessen, A)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11
12
13
14
15

) Case No.: 1:14-cv-01691-AWI-JLT
)
) ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION
) FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS (Doc. 19)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

HAYWARD LEE MAYHAN,
Petitioner,
v.
CONNIE GIPSON, Warden,
Respondent.

16
17
18
19
20
21

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with a petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The instant petition was filed on October 23, 2014, in the Central District of California and

22

transferred to this Court on October 29, 2014. (Docs. 1; 3; 4). On November 5, 2014, the Court

23

ordered Respondent to file a response to the petition (Doc. 7), and on February 6, 2015, Respondent

24

filed the Answer. (Docs. 7; 17). On March 19, 2015, Petitioner filed the instant motion to stay

25

proceedings in order to allow him to exhaust his claims in state court. (Doc. 19).

26

DISCUSSION

27

Traditionally, a district court has had the discretion to stay a petition which it may validly

28

consider on the merits. Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 987-988 (9th Cir.
1

1

1998); Greenawalt v. Stewar7, 105 F.3d 1268, 1274 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1002 (1997).

2

However, the Ninth Circuit has held that Taylor in no way granted “district courts carte blanche to stay

3

even fully exhausted habeas petitions.” Taylor, 134 F.3d at 988 n. 11. Granting a stay is appropriate

4

where there is no intention on the part of the Petitioner to delay or harass and in order to avoid

5

piecemeal litigation. Id. In addition, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that it is proper for a district

6

court, in its discretion, to hold a petition containing only exhausted claims in abeyance in order to

7

permit the petitioner to return to state court to exhaust his state remedies. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d

8

1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004); Ford v. Hubbard, 305 F.3d 875, 882-883 (9th Cir. 2002); James v. Pliler,

9

269 F.3d 1124, 1126-1127 (9th Cir. 2002); Taylor, 134 F.3d 981.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, until recently, federal case law continued to require that the

10
11

Court dismiss “mixed” petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Rose v. Lundy,

12

455 U.S. 509 (1982). However, on March 30, 2005, the United States Supreme Court decided Rhines

13

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). Recognizing that “[a]s a result of the interplay between AEDPA’s 1-

14

year statute of limitations1 and Lundy’s dismissal requirement, petitioners who come to federal court

15

with ‘mixed’ petitions run the risk of forever losing their opportunity for any federal review of their

16

unexhausted claims,” the Supreme Court held that federal courts may now issue “stay and abey”

17

orders under appropriate circumstances to permit petitioners to exhaust unexhausted claims before

18

proceeding with their federal petitions. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 276-277. In so holding, the Supreme

19

Court noted that the procedure should be “available only in limited circumstances.” 544 U.S. at 277.

20

Specifically, the Court said it was appropriate only when (1) good cause exists for petitioner’s failure

21

to exhaust; (2) petitioner’s unexhausted claims are not “plainly meritless” and (3) there is no

22

indication that petitioner engaged in “abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay.” Id. at 277-278;

23

Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005). When a petitioner has met these requirements,

24

his interest in obtaining federal review of his claims outweighs the competing interests in finality and

25

speedy resolution of federal petitions. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278.

26
27

1

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1244(d).

28
2

Here, Petitioner has indicated that he wishes to exhaust his claims in state court. The motion

1
2

specifically refers to page one, line eight of the Answer in explaining why a stay is needed. (Doc. 19,

3

p. 1). The language Petitioner refers to reads as follows:
Petitioner must prove exhaustion. A claim purportedly presented on direct appeal is exhausted
solely as it was articulated to the California Court of Appeal, and in light of the evidence
presented to that court; but subject to the further conditions that precise claim was thereafter
timely made to the California Supreme Court in a Petition for Review. A claim purportedly
presented on state habeas is exhausted only as explicitly articulated in the pleadings before the
California Supreme Court, and limited to the appellate record and further competent evidence
presented to that court. Otherwise, the claims in the Petition are barred as unexhausted…and
on the merits may only be denied….”

4
5
6
7
8
9

(Doc. 17, p. 1).

10

First, the Court notes that this “boilerplate” language about exhaustion appears in virtually

11

every Answer filed by Respondent and does not appear to raise the specific affirmative defense of

12

exhaustion as to any particular claim in the instant petition. Rather, it appears to be nothing more than

13

a generalized statement of the obvious, i.e., that if Petitioner has not presented all of his claims to the

14

California Supreme Court, then those claims would be unexhausted. However, nowhere in the Answer

15

does Respondent allege that any of the instant claims are actually unexhausted or that they have never

16

been presented to the California Supreme Court. Second, the petition itself alleges that all claims in the

17

petition were presented by petition for review to the California Supreme Court. Nothing in the Answer

18

appears to challenge Petitioner’s conclusion regarding exhaustion.

19

In other words, it appears to the Court that Petitioner has misconstrued the Answer as

20

challenging the instant claims on exhaustion grounds whereas, in reality, the Answer merely states a

21

generalized legal principle regarding federal habeas law, i.e., that claims must be exhausted in state

22

court first. In the Court’s view, the Answer, and specifically the quoted language above, does not

23

expressly or impliedly challenge any of the petition’s claims as actually being unexhausted. At present,

24

Respondent has answered Petitioner’s claims, Petitioner has not filed a Traverse, and the matter is

25

ready for a decision on the merits. For those reasons, no stay is justified and the Court will deny

26

Petitioner’s request for such a stay.

27

///

28

///
3

1

ORDER

2

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion to stay the instant

3

proceedings on his habeas petition (Doc. 19), is DENIED.

4
5
6
7

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

April 6, 2015

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
4