Henshaw v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
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ORDER Regarding Plaintiff's Complaint, signed by Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto on 2/11/16: The case is REMANDED to the ALJ; The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant. (CASE CLOSED)(Hellings, J)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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TAMI LANEA HENSHAW,
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Case No. 1:14-cv-01788-SKO
Plaintiff,
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ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT
v.
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CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
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Defendant.
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____________________________________/
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INTRODUCTION
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Plaintiff Tami Lanea Henshaw ("Plaintiff") seeks judicial review of a final decision of the
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24 Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner" or "Defendant") denying her claim for
25 Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C.
26 §405(g). The matter is currently before the Court on the parties' briefs, which were submitted,
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27 without oral argument, to the Honorable Sheila K. Oberto, United States Magistrate Judge.
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The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge for all purposes. (Docs. 6, 7.)
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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Plaintiff was born in 1966, completed high school and vocational courses to become a
3 Medical Assistant and Therapeutic Health Technician, and worked as a medical assistant from
4 2004 to 2008 and as a home health aide for two months in 2010. (Administrative Record ("AR")
5 167.) She alleged disability beginning on July 16, 2008, due to chronic obstructive pulmonary
6 disease, arthritis, poor vision in her right eye, autoimmune symptoms, and depression. (AR 166,
7 195.)
8 A.
Relevant Medical Evidence
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Plaintiff underwent a hysterectomy in July 2008 and subsequently reported that she was
10 experiencing fatigue, but her pain was tolerable. (AR 341-43). In September 2008, Plaintiff
11 reported vision complications and indicated she was nervous and cried frequently; she was
12 prescribed Prozac. (AR 341-42.) Following her hysterectomy, Plaintiff began seeing a retinal
13 specialist for her blurry vision. (AR 434.) Upon examination, Tony Tsai, M.D., noted that
14 Plaintiff's visual acuity was 20/200, indicated she had pars planitis, 2 and administered a steroid
15 injection. (AR 516-17).
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On October 2008, Dr. Tsai noted Plaintiff's eye condition had improved and administered
17 another steroid injection. (AR 515.) In December 2008, Dr. Tsai noted floaters in Plaintiff's left
18 eye. (AR 425.)
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In December 2008, Plaintiff requested a prescription for Xanax due to anxiety. (AR 722.)
20 In March 2009, Plaintiff reported an inability to concentrate due to depression and indicated she
21 was still having problems with her eyes. (AR 335.) A doctor's note was written to excuse her
22 from jury service for one year. (AR 335.) Also in March 2009, Dr. Tsai noted Plaintiff's pars
23 planitis was controlled, but she was still experiencing pain and her vision was worsening.
24 (AR 420, 511.)
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Pars planitis refers to inflammation of the anterior chamber, the anterior vitreous, and/or the peripheral retina of the
eye. See https://rarediseases.info.nih.gov/gard/7339/pars-planitis/resources/1 (last visited 2/10/16).
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In April 2009, Plaintiff reported feelings of depression and was referred to a counselor.
2 (AR 333.)
Lexapro was prescribed in addition to Pristiq.
(AR 332-33.)
At a follow-up
3 examination, Plaintiff indicated she liked her counselor. (R 332.)
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In May 2009, Plaintiff's vision continued to worsen, and Dr. Tsai referred her to an
5 infectious disease specialist, David A. Olson, M.D. (AR 331.) Dr. Olson evaluated Plaintiff's eye
6 condition, hypothesized she may have an autoimmune disease, and ordered blood tests for a
7 rheumatoid factor, ANA,3 and Lyme serology. (AR 379.) Dr. Olson indicated if any of these tests
8 were positive, Plaintiff would return for a follow-up. (AR 379.)
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In June 2009, Plaintiff's health care provider indicated that returning to work would
10 improve Plaintiff's depression and felt Plaintiff's vision was improved enough that she could go
11 back to work. (AR 330.)
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In July 2009, Plaintiff saw Dr. Olson for treatment for a "persistent eruption" on her left
13 foot for which she received topical medication and was told to follow up in three weeks.
14 (AR 376.) In October 2009, Plaintiff saw Dr. Tsai for a dull ache in her eyes and reported floaters
15 and flashes. (AR 412.) Dr. Tsai prescribed Prednisone and observed a worsening cataract in
16 Plaintiff's right eye. (AR 412-13, 507.) Plaintiff underwent cataract extraction and surgical
17 implantation of an intraocular lens in her right eye. (AR 324, 526.) In September 2009, Plaintiff
18 began classes for health practitioners, and she began training as a physical therapist technician in
19 December 2009. (AR 325.)
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In February 2010, Plaintiff reported the vision in her right eye had improved after her
21 surgery, but shortly thereafter, her vision worsened. (AR 409-10.) In October 2010, Plaintiff
22 reported redness, swelling, and watering in her right eye and worsening vision in her left eye.
23 (AR 401-02.) Dr. Tsai observed that Plaintiff's par planitis was "quiet." (AR 402.)
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In October 2010, Plaintiff saw Dr. Olson for ongoing foot pain, and it was noted that
25 Plaintiff's asthma had worsened, and she used oxygen in addition to a nebulizer and inhaler.
26 (AR 359.) Plaintiff reported she was feeling well otherwise. (AR 359.)
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The antinuclear antibody ("ANA") test is used to evaluate a person for autoimmune disorders that may affect tissues
and organs throughout the body. See http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/ana-test/basics/definition/prc20014566 (last visited 2/10/16).
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In November 2010, Plaintiff reported increased fuzziness and "cob webs" in her right eye;
2 Dr. Tsai noted increased vitritis debris in her right eye, and administered an intraocular steroid
3 injection into her right eye. (AR 399-400.)
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In January 2011, Plaintiff reported headaches and pressure, and Dr. Tsai injected an
5 implant into Plaintiff's right eye. (AR 658-60.) In February 2011, Dr. Tsai indicated Plaintiff's
6 right eye vitritis was improved, but Plaintiff reported her vision was still blurry, and the floaters in
7 her left eye and her headaches had increased. (AR 653-54.)
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On March 4, 2011, Plaintiff was examined by Frank Chen, M.D., an internist, at the
9 request of the state agency. (AR 526-28.) Dr. Chen indicated there were no medical records
10 available for review. (AR 526.) Plaintiff's chief complaints were Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary
11 Disease ("OCPD"); chronic pain in her feet, hands, and shoulders; impaired vision in both eyes;
12 and pain and swelling of her left knee. (AR 526.) Dr. Chen noted a pulmonary function test
13 ("PFT") on the day of the examination showed moderate obstructive ventilatory defect and
14 moderate restrictive defect. (AR 528.) He indicated doubts whether she had fibromyalgia, and
15 that her knee was negative for pain on examination. (AR 528.) He opined Plaintiff remained able
16 to
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stand and walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday. She can sit for six hours in
an eight-hour day. It is not medically necessary for the claimant to use an assistive
device for short distances although she may use a can for long distances. She can
lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently. Oxygen therapy is
per her physician's prescription.
20 (AR 528.)
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On March 25, 2011, Plaintiff was again examined by Dr. Tsai and reported major
22 headaches, and while her right eye was beginning to clear, her left eye was blurry with a lot of
23 floaters. (AR 643, 646.) Dr. Tsai prescribed Prednisone drops and indicated steroid injections
24 might be necessary. (AR 643, 646.) In April 2011, Dr. Tsai indicated increased vitritis in
25 Plaintiff's left eye and administered an injection into that eye. (AR 605.)
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On May 26, 2011, Plaintiff underwent a psychological mental status evaluation with Carol
27 W. Fetterman, Ph.D. (AR 550-53.) Dr. Fetterman observed that Plaintiff presented in a friendly
28 manner, and made poor eye contact wearing dark glasses which she kept on. (AR 550.) Her gross
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1 motor function was normal, but she was not able to ambulate without assistance. (AR 550.) She
2 did not have difficulty handling objects, reading, or completing the history form. (AR 550.)
3 Plaintiff was able to visually go place to place in the examination office without bumping into
4 walls or holding onto furniture. (AR 550.) Dr. Fetterman diagnosed her with a depressive
5 disorder and provided the following functional assessment:
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This claimant's ability to understand, remember, and carry out job instructions was
assessed to be unimpaired as evidenced by her performance on the mental status
examination.
Her ability to maintain attention, concentration, persistence and pace was assessed
to be unimpaired based on performance on the mental status exam and observation
during the interview.
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The claimant's ability to relate and interact with supervisors, co-workers, and the
public was assessed to be unimpaired based on her current mood quality, attitude,
and willingness to follow instructions and cooperation during this contact period.
Her ability to adapt to day-to-day work activities, including attendance and safety,
was assessed to be mildly impaired based on her current mental status and
presentation.
15 (AR 552.) Based on the results of the mental status examination, Dr. Fetterman opined Plaintiff is
16 able to adequately perform one- to two-step simple repetitive tasks; she has a good ability to
17 accept instructions from supervisors and interact with co-workers and the public; she has a fair
18 ability to maintain regular attendance in the workplace as mental health symptoms may impact
19 attendance, complete a normal workday or workweek without interruptions from a psychiatric
20 condition as mental health symptoms may impact attendance, and handle normal work-related
21 stress from a competitive work environment. (AR 552-53.)
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On June 2, 2011, state agency physician Kay Cogbill, M.D., reviewed Plaintiff's medical
23 records and opined Plaintiff would be moderately limited in performing detailed tasks, carrying
24 out a normal workday and workweek and making realistic goals and plans. (AR 557.) She opined
25 Plaintiff retained the ability to perform semi-skilled work. (AR 556.)
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On June 27, 2011, Plaintiff followed up with Dr. Olson, complaining of shortness of
27 breath. (AR 601.) She indicated she had been using her nebulizer more often, and was trying to
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1 get disability because she was gradually losing her sight. (AR 601.) Dr. Olson referred Plaintiff
2 to a pulmonologist. (AR 601.)
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On August 9, 2011, Plaintiff asked Dr. Olson to complete a disability questionnaire
4 regarding Plaintiff's impairments. (AR 666.) Dr. Olson opined Plaintiff's impairments were
5 asthma and COPD, which precluded her from doing anything other than sedentary work. (AR
6 666.) He opined she would be able to sit for 1.5 hours, stand or walk for 20 minutes, and that she
7 was restricted from dust, fumes, temperature extremes, and had marked impairment of working
8 with machinery due to vision problems. (AR 666.)
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On August 26, 2011, Paul Crenshaw, licensed clinical social worker (LCSW), opined
10 Plaintiff was unable to deal with complex social interactions, she had poor concentration and an
11 impaired capacity for effective problems solving; she had a poor ability to maintain concentration
12 and attention for at least two-hour increments; and her short-term memory was impaired.
13 (AR 664.)
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On November 8, 2011, Plaintiff saw pulmonologist Drew H. Logue, M.D., and underwent
15 pulmonary function testing pre- and post-bronchodilator with lung volumes. His impression on
16 testing was as follows: "A profound bronchodilator response is noted with this study. The
17 diffusing capacity is in the normal range.
Findings are compatible with asthma with
18 bronchodilator response. A restrictive component may be present but is unlikely given the normal
19 diffusing capacity." (AR 803.) Plaintiff's FEV14 results showed 1.18 liters and 1.89 liters, post20 bronchodilator. (AR 803.)
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In December 2011, Plaintiff followed-up with Dr. Logue who indicated her pulmonary
22 function study "is compatible with severe obstructive lung disease with a near-normal diffusing
23 capacity." (AR 799.) He recommended a long-acting bronchodilator/inhaled steroid combination
24 and noted she was still on supplemental oxygen, although he was "not clear as to the ongoing
25 needs or benefits of supplemental oxygen." (AR 799.) He also noted she had undergone a sleep
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FEV1/FVC ratio is also called Tiffeneau-Pinelli index and is a calculated ration used in the diagnosis of lung
disease; it is the measure of air that can be forcefully exhaled in one second. See http://www.mayoclinic.org/testsprocedures/spirometry/basics/results/prc-20012673 (last visited 2/10/16).
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1 study which showed she did not have significant sleep-disordered breathing. He indicated she
2 would return in a few months for follow-up. (AR 799.)
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In February 2012, Plaintiff experienced a flare up of headaches, blurry vision, and light
4 sensitivity. (AR 949-50.) Dr. Tsai reported vitritis detritus in her right eye and inflammation in
5 both eyes. (AR 949-50.)
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On April 20, 2012, Dr. Tsai completed a questionnaire regarding Plaintiff's condition.
7 (AR 937-38.) He opined Plaintiff's fine vision was impaired and her visual acuity was reduced in
8 both eyes to 20/80; she required magnifiers for small print. (AR 937.) Dr. Tsai indicated she had
9 photosensitivity and difficulty under bright light conditions and opined Plaintiff should be
10 restricted from working around heights, dangerous equipment, or moving machinery. (AR 937.)
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On June 29, 2012, Dr. Olson completed another form indicating Plaintiff was unable to
12 work. (AR 940-41.) He indicated her primary impairment was of a respiratory nature, and she
13 required continuous oxygen. (AR 940.) He predicted she would only be able to sit for 30
14 minutes, and stand or walk for 10 minutes. (AR 940.) Mr. Crenshaw also submitted another
15 report regarding Plaintiff's mental symptoms. (AR 942.) He opined Plaintiff's depression and
16 anxiety impaired her ability to deal with social situations; her ability to maintain concentration and
17 attention was poor; she was anxious and fearful when dealing with the public; and her ability to
18 handle funds was poor due to short-term memory problems. (AR 942.)
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On September 18, 2012, Plaintiff was examined by Philip A. Edington, M.D., an
20 ophthalmologist. (AR 1114.) Upon examination, Dr. Edington noted Plaintiff' had pseudophakia5
21 in her right eye, an early cataract on her left eye, and chronic relapsing inflammation. (AR 1114.)
22 He opined her condition was likely to be "chronic and stationary." (AR 1114.)
23 B.
Lay Testimony
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Plaintiff submitted an adult function report in January 2010 reporting she experienced
25 constant pain in her knees and feet, and in her eyes when overused or exposed to bright lights.
26 (AR 182.) She used oxygen all night and during the day as necessary, and she used an inhaler and
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Pseudophakic is the most common type of intraocular lenses that are implanted in the eye for treatment of cataracts
or myopia. Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1568 (31st ed. 2007).
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1 took Alprazolam. (AR 183.) She reported fatigue since January 2008, which required her to take
2 two or more naps during the day, which lasted from 45 minutes to one hour. (AR 182.) On an
3 average day, she got her son ready for school, rested, did laundry three times a week, and cooked
4 with the help of her husband and son. (AR 184-86.) She was seated when she cooked or washed
5 the dishes, and her son took care of the pets and did the sweeping, mopping, vacuuming, and
6 cleaning the bathroom. (AR 185, 187.) She went to the mailbox once a day and grocery shopping
7 once a week, sometimes with oxygen, but required assistance if she could not get a motorized
8 chair. (AR 187.) She did not drive at night because of poor eyesight. (AR 183-89.)
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She estimated she could lift about 10 pounds, climb two to four steps, stand for 20 minutes,
10 and walk up to 50 feet at one time. (AR 189.) She had difficulty concentrating and she no longer
11 handled stress or changes in routine very well. (AR 189-90.)
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She submitted an additional disability report in August 2011 indicating her left-eye
13 problems had increased and her breathing and depression had worsened. (AR 195.)
14 C.
Administrative Hearing
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The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's application initially and again on reconsideration.
16 (AR 75-77, 82-87.) Consequently, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law
17 Judge ("ALJ"). (AR 88-92.) On July 26, 2012, an ALJ held a hearing in which Plaintiff,
18 represented by counsel, and vocational expert Kenneth Ferra testified. (AR 41-69.)
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1.
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Plaintiff appeared for the hearing with a sight-impaired cane she had for over a year.
Plaintiff's Hearing Testimony
21 (AR 44.) She wears glasses to protect her eyes from light as she is very light sensitive, which
22 causes "bad headaches." (AR 45.) She last worked as an in-home health care provider, but she
23 could not continue performing the work because she could not lift patients. (AR 47.) She was
24 also unable to drive a vehicle as she has no license upon her doctor's recommendation. (AR 47.)
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She has been having vision problems since 2008, and the problems have been worsening
26 since then. (AR 49.) She got a vision impaired cane in 2010, which was recommended by her eye
27 doctor. (AR 49.) Using her eyes for approximately two-and-a-half hours would result in blurred
28 vision, which would require a couple of hours of rest to recover. (AR 51.) The vision problems
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1 also caused tearing, pain, and headaches. (AR 51.) She was prescribed eye drops, but her vision
2 continues to worsen. (AR 52.) She continues to have headaches nearly every day, and the only
3 way she was able to work between 2008 and 2010 was with medication. (AR 53.)
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She has also used a breathing unit since 2010, which was prescribed by Dr. Wine.
5 (AR 53.) She has used a nebulizer since 2002 two to three times per day for about eight to ten
6 minutes each time, and she also has inhalers. (AR 54.) Dust and fumes aggravate her breathing
7 condition, and she is very sensitive to these things. She experiences shortness of breath "all the
8 time," and fatigue. (AR 55.) Extreme heat, changes in the weather, and pollen make her breathing
9 more difficult. She had gastric bypass surgery in the past, but she is not having any problems as a
10 result.
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She has a left-foot problem that results in swelling and sores on the foot, which cause
12 constant pain. (AR 56.) The longest she can be on her feet is 20 to 30 minutes. (AR 56.) She has
13 pain in her legs that make sitting for longer than 20 or 30 minutes difficult, which she believes is
14 related to her fibromyalgia. (AR 57.) The fibromyalgia also causes problems using her arms as
15 she experiences weakness when trying to carry things. To use her arms, she would need a 3016 minute rest after every 20 minutes because her shoulders bother her when she does reaching
17 activity. (AR 58.)
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She lives at home with her 13-year old son, but she does as little as possible. Her brother-
19 in-law does most of the sweeping, mopping, and vacuuming; he brings in the laundry so that
20 Plaintiff can fold it. (AR 58.) She does not watch television because she cannot see it. She has
21 had surgery for her eye problem; she had a cataract removed on the right eye, and two or three
22 Ozurdex pellets implanted. (AR 59.) Because of her eye problem, she can no longer cook, read,
23 or drive. (AR 59.)
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2.
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A Vocational Expert ("VE") offered testimony at the hearing. (AR 64-68.) The VE
Testimony of the VE
26 characterized Plaintiff's past work as a home attendant, which is classified under the Dictionary of
27 Occupational Titles ("DOT") as 354-377-014, medium, semi-skilled work with an SVP of 3. (AR
28 64.) She also performed past work as a medical assistant, DOT 079.362-010, which is classified
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1 as light, skilled work with an SVP of 6. Finally, she also performed work as a cashier, which is
2 characterized as light and unskilled work with an SVP of 2.
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The ALJ posed several hypotheticals for the VE to consider. The ALJ asked the VE to
4 assume a person of Plaintiff's age, education, and work experience who is limited to medium
5 work. This person is also limited to no more than frequently operating foot controls bilaterally,
6 may never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; may occasionally kneel; frequently perform bilateral
7 overhead reaching; may only perform jobs while using a handheld assistive device for uneven
8 terrain or prolonged ambulation; and must avoid moderate exposure to pulmonary irritants such as
9 fumes, odors, dust, gases and poorly ventilated areas but does not include pet dander; must also
10 avoid concentrated exposure to operational control of moving machinery and unprotected heights;
11 and is limited to occupations that do not require the reading of fine print.
The ALJ also
12 hypothesized this person would be limited to simple, routine and repetitive tasks and low stress
13 work defined as no more than occasional decision making or changes in the work setting, and no
14 more than occasional interaction with co-workers. (AR 64-65.) The VE testified that a person
15 with these limitations could perform Plaintiff's past work as an assembler and a cashier. (AR 65.)
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The ALJ posed a second hypothetical that was the same as the first, but the person would
17 be limited to light work. (AR 65.) The VE testified that such a person would be able to perform
18 Plaintiff's past work as an assembler and cashier. (AR 65.) The ALJ then asked if this same
19 person was limited to only sedentary work, whether this person could perform any of Plaintiff's
20 past work. (AR 65.) The VE testified that none of Plaintiff's past work could be performed by
21 such a person, but this person could perform work as an order clerk, DOT 209.567-014;
22 assembler, DOT 734.687-018; and nut sorter, DOT 521.687-086. (AR 65.)
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The ALJ then asked the VE to assume all the limitations posed in the first hypothetical, but
24 with the added limitation of being able to sit only 30 minutes, stand/ walk 10 minutes, and would
25 be off-task more than 10 percent of the time. (AR 66.) The VE testified there would be no work
26 that such an individual could perform. (AR 66.)
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Plaintiff's counsel also posed hypotheticals for the VE to consider. (AR 66.) Plaintiff's
28 counsel asked whether an order clerk position would involve the use of "fine" vision. (AR 66.)
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1 The VE testified reading fine print would be the same as using fine vision. (AR 67.) Plaintiff's
2 counsel asked whether the assembler job would require good vision, and the VE testified there
3 would certainly need to be "adequate vision" to see the products. (AR 67.) Plaintiff's counsel then
4 asked whether a nebulizer could be used at lunch, and whether the use of a breathing oxygen unit
5 would impede the ability to perform the work cited. (AR 67.) The VE testified that such a need
6 would impact all the jobs identified. (AR 67.) Plaintiff's counsel also asked, considering the first
7 hypothetical, if the person also had photosensitivity and difficulty under bright lights or sunlight,
8 and a problem with distant vision (further than 10 feet away), would that impact the jobs the
9 person could perform. (AR 67.) The VE testified that if the person were limited to wearing
10 sunglasses with her tasks, then this would not be an impediment to performing the work identified.
11 (AR 68.)
12 D.
The ALJ's Decision
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On November 21, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled since July
14 16, 2008, the date her disability ended. (AR 21-33.) The ALJ found that (1) Plaintiff had not
15 engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 16, 2008; (2) Plaintiff currently has the following
16 severe impairments: uveitis OD/OS, pars planitis, osteoarthritis, fibromyalgia, hypothyroidism,
17 asthma/COPD, anxiety, and depressive disorder, NOS; (3) Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
18 combination of impairments that met or equaled one of the impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Part
19 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) Plaintiff is unable to perform her past relevant work; and (5) there
20 is alternative work in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (AR 21-33.) Plaintiff
21 retained the following Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC"):
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. . . .[T]o perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1456(a) except she can
no more than frequently operate foot controls bilaterally. She can never climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She can occasionally kneel and frequently reach
overhead, bilaterally. She is limited to jobs that can be performed while using a
hand held assistive device for uneven terrain or prolonged ambulation. She must
avoid moderate exposure to pulmonary irritants, including fumes, odors, dusts,
gases and poorly ventilated areas but does not include pet dander. She must also
avoid concentrated exposure to operational control of moving machinery and
unprotected heights. She is further limited to occupations that do not require
reading of fine print. She is limited to simple, routine and repetitive tasks and low
stress work (low stress is defined as no more than occasional decision making or
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changes in the work setting) and she [is] limited to no more than occasional
interaction with co-workers.
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3 (AR 25.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled, as defined in the Social Security Act,
4 from July 16, 2008, through the date of decision. (AR 33.)
5 E.
The Appeals Council Decision
6
Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ's decision with the Appeals Council, which was denied
7 on September 10, 2014. (AR 1-7, 15-17.) Therefore, the ALJ's decision became the final decision
8 of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
9 F.
10
Plaintiff’s Current Appeal
On November 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed the current complaint before this Court seeking
11 review of the ALJ's decision. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in weighing the
12 medical evidence and improperly discredited Plaintiff's lay statements.
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14
SCOPE OF REVIEW
The ALJ's decision denying benefits "will be disturbed only if that decision is not
15 supported by substantial evidence or it is based upon legal error." Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599,
16 601 (9th Cir. 1999). In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the Court may not substitute its
17 judgment for that of the Commissioner. Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 1996).
18 Instead, the Court must determine whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards
19 and whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner's findings. See
20 Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007).
21
"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance." Ryan v.
22 Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). "Substantial evidence" means "such
23 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
24 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB,
25 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The Court "must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both
26 the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion, and
27 may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence." Lingenfelter v.
28 Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
12
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2
APPLICABLE LAW
An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if he is unable to
3 engage in any substantial, gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
4 mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to
5 last, for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),
6 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 23 (2003). The impairment or
7 impairments must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that are
8 demonstrable by medically accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and must be of
9 such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering
10 his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial, gainful work that
11 exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)-(3), 1382c(a)(3)(B), (D).
12
The regulations provide that the ALJ must undertake a specific five-step sequential
13 analysis in the process of evaluating a disability. In the First Step, the ALJ must determine
14 whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity.
20 C.F.R. §§
15 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If not, in the Second Step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant
16 has a severe impairment or a combination of impairments significantly limiting her from
17 performing basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If so, in the Third Step,
18 the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of
19 impairments that meets or equals the requirements of the Listing of Impairments ("Listing"), 20
20 C.F.R. 404, Subpart P, App. 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If not, in the Fourth Step,
21 the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has sufficient residual functional capacity despite
22 the impairment or various limitations to perform her past work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f),
23 416.920(f). If not, in Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant
24 can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§
25 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If a claimant is found to be disabled or not disabled at any step in the
26 sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99
27 (9th Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
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2 A.
3
4
DISCUSSION
The ALJ Failed to State Clear and Convincing Reasons to Support an Adverse
Credibility Determination
Plaintiff contends the ALJ's credibility analysis was limited only to one general statement
5 that offered no rationale or reasoning specific to the facts in the record, which is legally
6 insufficient to support an adverse credibility determination. The Commissioner argues the ALJ
7 noted that objective medical evidence did not support Plaintiff's alleged limitations, treatment
8 effectively controlled Plaintiff's conditions, and Plaintiff did not give full effort during pulmonary
9 function testing.
The Commissioner maintains these are all valid and legitimate reasons to
10 discredit Plaintiff's symptom testimony.
Plaintiff responds the reasons listed by Defendant
11 constitute post-hoc rationale drawn from the ALJ's summary of the medical evidence supporting
12 the RFC determination, which is not a credibility analysis as discussed in Brown-Hunter v. Colvin,
13 806 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 2015).
14
In evaluating the credibility of a claimant's testimony regarding subjective pain, an ALJ
15 must engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First,
16 the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an
17 underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms
18 alleged. Id. The claimant is not required to show that her impairment "could reasonably be
19 expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could
20 reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom." Id. (quoting Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at
21 1036). If the claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can
22 only reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of the symptoms if he gives "specific, clear
23 and convincing reasons" for the rejection. Id. As the Ninth Circuit has explained:
24
25
26
27
28
The ALJ may consider many factors in weighing a claimant’s credibility, including
(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s reputation
for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other
testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or
inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of
treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily activities. If the ALJ’s finding is supported
by substantial evidence, the court may not engage in second-guessing.
14
1 Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bray v.
2 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 2009); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.
3 Other factors the ALJ may consider include a claimant's work record and testimony from
4 physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which
5 he complains. Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997).
6
The clear and convincing standard is "not an easy requirement to meet," as it is "'the most
7 demanding required in Social Security cases.'" Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir.
8 2014) (quoting Moore v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)). General
9 findings are not sufficient to satisfy this standard; the ALJ "'must identify what testimony is not
10 credible and what evidence undermines the claimant's complaints.'" Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d
11 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995).
12
In Brown-Hunter, the claimant argued the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing
13 reasons for rejecting her symptom testimony. 806 F. 3d at 491. The district court, however,
14 identified inconsistences in the ALJ's summary of the medical record that it determined gave rise
15 to reasonable inferences about Plaintiff's credibility. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held the
16 ALJ had failed to identify the testimony she found not credible, and she did not link that testimony
17 to the particular parts of the record supporting the non-credibility determination. Id. at 493. The
18 Court reasoned that even if the district court's analysis was sound in identifying inconsistencies
19 with the medical record, the district court's reasoning could not overcome the ALJ's failure to offer
20 any reasoning in the first instance. The appellate court noted the district court had "pieced
21 together medical evidence identified by the ALJ that it found inconsistent with 'an allegation of
22 excess pain,' and stated therefore that the ALJ 'identified several inconsistencies between [Brown23 Hunter's] testimony and the record,' and 'gave clear and convincing reasons to support [her]
24 determinations that [Brown-Hunter's] impairments were less serious than she has alleged.'" Id. at
25 491. The appellate court reversed the district court's decision, and remanded the case to the
26 agency.
27
The ALJ's decision in this case suffers the same flaw as in Brown-Hunter. Although the
28 ALJ found Plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity, persistent and limiting effect of her
15
1 symptoms not credible to the extent they were inconsistent with the RFC, this finding is followed
2 only by a summary of the medical evidence.6 (AR 26-31.) The ALJ noted Plaintiff asserted an
3 onset date in July 2008 but also observed there were generally normal examination reports in
4 November 2009 and April 2010, and Plaintiff reported she was fine on medication in June and
5 September 2010. (AR 26.) The ALJ also noted Plaintiff did not put in full effort on the
6 spirometrics testing in March 2011, and that the treatment report indicated Plaintiff's effort and
7 cooperation were only marginally adequate for testing purposes.
(AR 27.)
The ALJ then
8 summarized the treatment Plaintiff received for uveitis OD/OS and pars planitis in her eyes, but
9 noted Plaintiff did not have difficulty handling objects in May 2011 and did not appear to have
10 visual difficulty with routine functioning. (AR 27.) It was also noted her eye pain was being
11 treated by NSAIDs. (AR 7.)
12
The ALJ discussed Plaintiff's asthma treatment and noted there were no respiratory
13 symptoms after discontinuing the oxygen during the consultative examination in March 2011.
14 (AR 27.) The ALJ summarized the treatment Plaintiff underwent due to chronic pain in her feet,
15 hands, and shoulders but noted Plaintiff was able to ambulate normally without a cane in March
16 2011, and there was good range of motion in all her joints. (AR 27.) The ALJ also discussed
17 Plaintiff's treatment for possible fibromyalgia, hypothyroidism, and depressive disorder. (AR 2718 31.)
19
None of the ALJ's discussion of this evidence specifically related to Plaintiff's credibility
20 or identified the grounds Defendant asserted in her brief as support for the ALJ's adverse
21 credibility finding. Defendant was only able to offer grounds in her brief that were extrapolated
22 from the ALJ's recitation of the medical evidence, not grounds stated by the ALJ as supporting an
23 adverse credibility determination. The ALJ's credibility determination was merely a conclusion
24 with no supporting reasons or bases cited. As the Brown-Hunter court elucidated, the district
25 court may not draw inferences from the ALJ's summary of the medical evidence to infer a basis
26 for the adverse credibility determination where none is stated. Although some of the reasons
27
28
6
At the first step of the credibility analysis, the ALJ found Plaintiff's conditions could reasonably cause the alleged
symptoms. (AR 26.) No malingering was noted.
16
1 Defendant notes, such as evidence that Plaintiff's medication effectively controlled her eye pain or
2 that she had normal examination results long after the date of her alleged disability onset date,
3 may be a basis to find Plaintiff less than fully credible, the ALJ must explain what statements were
4 not credible and link those statements to the evidence of successful treatment of her conditions
5 through medication. This Court is not empowered to make findings and draw conclusions where
6 the ALJ did not. In short, the ALJ's credibility determination is insufficient under Brown-Hunter,
7 806 F.3d at 494-95.
8 B.
The ALJ's Consideration of Dr. Tsai's Opinion Was Proper
9
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Tsai's opinion regarding Plaintiff's visual
10 impairments. Although Dr. Tsai had opined Plaintiff's vision was poor and that she was unable to
11 work, the only visual limitations included in the RFC were preclusion from reading fine print and
12 working around heights or operating moving machinery. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to
13 give specific and legitimate reasons for discrediting Dr. Tsai's opinions.
14
The ALJ rejected Dr. Tsai's opinion for the following reasons:
15
Dr. Tsai's conflicting opinions regarding the claimant being unable to do any work
(August 12, 2011) but being able to work the next spring with restrictions involving
heights, dangerous equipment or moving machinery (April 20, 2012) are given
reduced weight because his opinions are based upon the [Plaintiff's] subjective
complaints and the opinions are not consistent with the medical records.
16
17
18 (AR 29.)
19
1.
Inconsistencies in Dr. Tsai's Opinions
20
The ALJ found Dr. Tsai gave conflicting opinions. In August 2011, he opined Plaintiff
21 was not able to do any work (AR 615), but in April 2012 he concluded Plaintiff was able to work
22 with certain restrictions without any clinical bases stated to account for the change in her abilities
23 (AR 937). Plaintiff contends these opinions are not conflicting, and the 2011 opinion is simply
24 more detailed than the 2012 opinion. Plaintiff maintains there is no evidence Plaintiff's visual
25 condition improved between August 2011 and April 2012. Defendant asserts that Dr. Tsai's 2011
26 opinion that Plaintiff was unable to work and 2012 opinion that she was able to work, without any
27 evidence of improvement of Plaintiff's condition, highlights the inconsistency in Dr. Tsai's
28 opinions.
17
1
The ALJ reasonably concluded Dr. Tsai's August 2011 and April 2012 opinions about
2 Plaintiff's ability to work and the restrictions in her vision were inconsistent. The August 2011
3 opinion states Plaintiff was unable to work due to severely impaired vision, and notes that she had
4 very poor night vision, poor depth perception, and poor vision handling fine objects. (AR 615,
5 667.) In April 2012, Dr. Tsai opined Plaintiff's ability to work was merely restricted and she could
6 not work around heights, dangerous equipment, or moving machinery, and she was precluded
7 from reading fine print. (AR 937-38.) Dr. Tsai provides no basis for the change in his opinion,
8 and due to Plaintiff's contention that her eye sight continued to worsen during this time, the two
9 opinions appear inconsistent. This facial inconsistency is a legitimate reason to reject Dr. Tsai's
10 August 2011 opinion that Plaintiff was completely restricted from working due to her eye
11 condition. The limitations Dr. Tsai noted in his 2012 opinion—i.e., that her fine vision was
12 impaired and she should be restricted from working around heights, dangerous equipment, or
13 moving machinery—was incorporated into the RFC. (Compare AR 937 with AR 25.) Plaintiff
14 has not shown the ALJ erred in finding Dr. Tsai's opinions inconsistent and in disregarding Dr.
15 Tsai's 2011 opinion that Plaintiff's eye condition precluded her from work on this ground.
16
17
2.
The ALJ's Rejection of Dr. Tsai's Opinions as Predicated on Subjective
Testimony and Inconsistent with Medical Records is Harmless Error
18
The ALJ also gave Dr. Tsai's opinions reduced weight because they were "based upon the
19
subjective complaints and the opinions [were] not consistent with the medical records." (AR 29.)
20
Plaintiff contends the ALJ identified no evidence establishing Dr. Tsai's opinions were
21
based on Plaintiff's subjective complaints or were inconsistent with her medical records.
The
22
Commissioner maintains it is appropriate for the ALJ to reject an physician's testimony that is
23
found to rely on the claimant's subjective complaints where the claimant has been deemed
24
incredible. Further, the medical records are inconsistent with Dr. Tsai's opinions: Dr. Chen found
25
Plaintiff could move around the office without difficult (AR 527), and Dr. Tsai's treatment notes
26
often reported improvement in her condition.
27
28
18
1
Discrediting Dr. Tsai's opinions as based on Plaintiff's non-credible subjective complaints
2 and for lack of consistency with the medical evidence is legally insufficient. First, the ALJ
3 provided no specific examples of objective evidence that were inconsistent with Dr. Tsai's
4 opinions, but merely concluded it was not consistent with the medical records. Embrey v. Bowen,
5 849 F.2d 418, 412 (9th Cir. 1988) ("To say that medical opinions are not supported by sufficient
6 objective findings or are contrary to the preponderant conclusions mandated by the objective
7 findings does not achieve the level of specificity our prior cases have required, even when the
8 objective factors are listed seriatim."). Second, as discussed above, Plaintiff's credibility was not
9 properly considered by the ALJ; thus, Plaintiff's lack of credibility does not provide a sufficient
10 basis to reject Dr. Tsai's opinion.
11
Nonetheless, the ALJ stated a specific and legitimate reason to reject Dr. Tsai's opinions in
12 finding them inconsistent. Moreover, the restrictions noted in Dr. Tsai's April 2012 opinion were
13 included in the RFC. Therefore, any error in considering Plaintiff's subjective testimony or
14 inconsistency with the medical evidence in rejecting Dr. Tsai's opinion is harmless. Molina v.
15 Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (ALJ error is harmless where it does not alter the
16 ultimate non-disability determination).
17 C.
The ALJ's Consideration of Plaintiff's Lung Disease Was Legally Sufficient
18
The ALJ concluded the only impairment resulting from Plaintiff's lung disease was a
19 preclusion from moderate exposure to pulmonary irritants such as fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and
20 poorly ventilated areas.
(AR 25.)
Plaintiff argues a finding of such minimal limitation is
21 predicated on the erroneous rejection of Dr. Olson's opinions, as well as the silent, and thus
22 improper, rejection of Dr. Logue's diagnosis and PFT findings in November 2011 which establish
23 that Plaintiff's condition meets Listing 3.02.
24
1.
25
Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to consider findings made by Dr. Logue that show
The ALJ Did Not Err in Considering Listing 3.02
26 Plaintiff's obstructive lung disease meets Listing 3.02. Specifically, Listing 3.02, for pulmonary
27 disorders, requires a testing of the forced expiatory volume ("FEV1") at specific values
28 corresponding to a person's height. At 5'7, Listing 3.02 requires that Plaintiff demonstrate an
19
1 FEV1 equal to or less than 1.35 on testing. Plaintiff argues her FEV1 was 1.18 liters when tested
2 by Dr. Longue in November 2011, which qualifies under the Listing.
3
Defendant asserts the Listing requires that the FEV1 used for adjudication of claims is "the
4 larges of at least three satisfactory" results, which includes post-bronchodilator tests if given. As
5 Plaintiff's FEV1 improved to 1.89 liters with the use of a bronchodilator, she does not meet the
6 Listing. In reply, Plaintiff argues even the better test result did not show "good prognosis with
7 treatment," and she had not improved to the point where she could perform even sedentary work.
8
Whether or not Plaintiff's improved test score still did not result in a good prognosis of her
9 pulmonary condition is irrelevant to whether her testing strictly meets the requirements of the
10 Listing 3.02.
Under Listing 3.00(E), it describes the documentation necessary under the
11 pulmonary function testing and requires that the highest values of the FEV1 should be used to
12 assess the severity of the respiratory impairment. Plaintiff does not dispute that her FEV1 tested at
13 1.89 liters (AR 803), which is her highest value FEV1 test. Because her highest FEV1 score is
14 outside the parameters of the Listing, Plaintiff does not meet the requirements of Listing 3.02.
15 Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) ("For a claimant to show that his impairment matches
16 a listing, it must meet all of the specific medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some
17 of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify."). The ALJ specifically noted Plaintiff
18 did not meet the PFT requirements under Listing 3.02. (AR 24.) In sum, the ALJ did not err in
19 failing to find Plaintiff disabled under Listing 3.02.
20
2.
21
Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to incorporate or discuss Dr. Logue's diagnosis of "severe
Dr. Logue's Diagnosis was Properly Considered
22 obstructive lung disease." (See AR 799.) According to Plaintiff, because the diagnosis includes
23 the word "severe," it indicates significant functional limitations such as shortness of breath and
24 "common" exacerbations.
25
The diagnosis itself appears to have been adopted by the ALJ who found Plaintiff's
26 asthma/COPD was a severe condition. (AR 23.) A mere diagnosis, however, does not imply
27 significant functional limitation at Step Four of the sequential evaluation.
See Matthews v.
28 Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993). The use of the word "severe" in the diagnosis also does
20
1 not necessarily imply disabling functional limitation.
Dr. Logue noted Plaintiff's pulmonary
2 condition came with a "near-normal" diffusing capacity, she had a profound bronchodilator
3 response, and her CT showed very minimal emphysema findings and minimal scarring. (AR 799.)
4 Dr. Logue also noted Plaintiff remained on supplemental oxygen, but her ongoing need for the
5 oxygen and whether it provided any benefit was unclear. (AR 799.) He concluded only that
6 Plaintiff would follow up for re-evaluation in a few months. (AR 799.) Dr. Logue's findings
7 undercut Plaintiff's argument that Dr. Logue's diagnosis alone implies severe functional
8 limitations.
Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ improperly failed to account for Dr. Logue's
9 diagnosis is unpersuasive, and the Court perceives no error in this regard.
10
3.
11
The ALJ ascribed less weight to the opinions of Dr. Olson because of inconsistencies.
ALJ's Rejection of Dr. Olson's Opinions Was Proper
12 Plaintiff contends the inconsistencies noted by the ALJ between the two opinions Dr. Olson
13 rendered in 2011 and 2012 are not legitimate. Although the ALJ determined Dr. Olson reached
14 differing conclusions in the two opinions based on the same findings, Plaintiff argues the two
15 opinions were nearly a year apart and thus would not necessarily be identical. Further, any
16 contradictory findings in the opinions should have been resolved by following up with Dr. Olson
17 for clarification before the opinions were rejected. As to the ALJ's finding that Dr. Olson's
18 opinion about Plaintiff's ability to work is an issue reserved to the Commissioner, the ALJ was still
19 required to state reasons for rejecting the opinion. Plaintiff argues Dr. Olson's opinion that
20 Plaintiff could not perform the sitting, standing, and walking requirements of full-time work
21 should be credited and benefits should be paid.
22
The Commissioner argues the ALJ gave specific reasons for not giving Dr. Olson's
23 opinions weight beyond that Dr. Olson's opinion about Plaintiff's ability to work was an issue
24 reserved to the Commissioner. Defendant notes the ALJ cited inconsistencies between Dr. Olson's
25 opinion and the medical record, and noted that Dr. Olson's 2011 and 2012 opinions were
26 inconsistent with each other.
27
28
21
1
On August 9, 2011, Dr. Olson completed a questionnaire regarding Plaintiff's treatment.
2 (AR 614, 666-67.)7 He answered "no" to the question whether Plaintiff's medical problems
3 precluded her from performing full time work at any exertion level, but opined that her
4 impairments restricted her to sedentary work only. (AR 666.) He listed her primary impairments
5 as asthma/COPD, and noted she was on oxygen.
Dr. Olson listed the objective findings
6 supporting his opinion were wheezing, decreased breathing sounds, and a prolonged expiratory
7 phase. He opined Plaintiff would be able to sit for 1.5 hours in an 8-hour day, and could stand and
8 walk 20 minutes in an 8-hour day. He opined Plaintiff was totally precluded from work around
9 fumes; markedly impaired from work around dust, humidity, temperature extremes, and
10 machinery; and moderately impaired from work around noise, chemicals, and heights. (AR 666.)
11 He also noted Plaintiff relied on a nebulizer, which was necessary, and she had a PFT scheduled.
12 He indicated her vision was very poor and opined she had been disabled to this degree since May
13 2010. (AR 614.)
14
On June 29, 2012, Dr. Olson completed another questionnaire about Plaintiff's eye
15 condition. (AR 940-41.) He responded "yes" to a question asking whether Plaintiff's medical
16 problems precluded her from any full time work (AR 940); he listed Plaintiff's primary
17 impairment as severe respiratory condition and noted she was on "continuous oxygen." (AR 940.)
18 Dr. Olson listed objective findings as wheezing, decreased breath sounds, and "prolonged
19 expiratory phase." (AR 940.) He opined Plaintiff could only sit for 30 minutes during an 8-hour
20 day and could only stand and walk for 10 minutes in an eight-hour day; he found Plaintiff totally
21 restricted from fumes; markedly restricted from dust, humidity, temperature extremes, and
22 working around machinery; and he opined she was moderately restricted from work around noise,
23 chemicals, and heights. (AR 940.) He noted Plaintiff's nebulizer was medically necessary, and
24 that if she did not have the breathing machine there would be a daily need for emergency room
25 treatment. (AR 941.) In answer to whether Dr. Olson felt Plaintiff could effectively work
26 indoors, he answered, "No. Nearly blind also." (AR 941.) As an additional work limitation, Dr.
27
28
7
The pages of the questionnaire are separated in the record. The first two pages of the questionnaire are located at AR
667-68, and the third page appears at AR 614. Only the third page is dated. (AR 614.)
22
1 Olson noted Plaintiff is "legally blind" and indicated she had been disabled to this degree since
2 May 2010. (AR 941.)
3
The ALJ found these opinions inconsistent: in the 2011 opinion, Dr. Olson found Plaintiff
4 able to perform sedentary work, but in 2012, he found she could not perform any full-time work,
5 yet there were no additional findings to support the more restrictive 2012 opinion. Although Dr.
6 Olson noted Plaintiff's vision problems in the 2011 opinion, he indicated she was "legally blind" in
7 2012 but provided no findings to support the basis for his conclusion that her condition had
8 progressed from a vision problem to constituting legal blindness. In both opinions, Dr. Olson
9 indicated Plaintiff's disability to the degree opined in the questionnaire began in May 2010, but the
10 ALJ noted she was found less impaired in 2011 (able to perform sedentary work), so her level of
11 impairment noted in 2012 (unable to perform any work) could not have begun in 2010. Put
12 differently, his 2012 opinion that Plaintiff was restricted from all work beginning May 2010 is
13 inconsistent with his opinion in 2011 that Plaintiff could perform sedentary work. Substantial
14 evidence supports the ALJ's finding the two opinions are inconsistent. See Young v. Heckler, 803
15 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (treating doctor's conclusory opinion that claimant was
16 disabled was properly rejected by ALJ when it was internally inconsistent and not consistent with
17 the doctor's medical reports).
18
The ALJ also found the two opinions were not credible because they reached different
19 conclusions based on the same clinical findings. Plaintiff contends the opinions are subject to the
20 logical inference that the PFT results in November 2011 showed disabling obstructive lung
21 disease, and this was the reason for Dr. Olson's more restrictive 2012 opinion. This, however, is
22 not reflected in Dr. Olson's report. He was given an opportunity to list the objective findings upon
23 which his opinion was based and declined to list the November 2011 PFT results. Plaintiff also
24 notes that in 2011, Dr. Olson opined Plaintiff could perform full-time sedentary work, but could
25 only sit for 1.5 hours in an 8-hour day and could only stand for 30 minutes in an 8-hour day.
26 Plaintiff argues this internal inconsistency required the ALJ to re-contact Dr. Olson to provide a
27 clarifying explanation rather than rejecting the opinion wholesale.
28
23
1
Plaintiff's supposition as to why Dr. Olson's 2012 report was more restrictive than his 2011
2 report is only a theory as to why the two reports based on the same clinical findings provided
3 differing conclusions regarding whether Plaintiff could work and does not provide a basis—even
4 if a reasonable assumption—to find error in the ALJ's decision. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d
5 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
6 interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld.").
7
Turning to Plaintiff's contention that Dr. Olson's 2011 opinion was internally inconsistent
8 requiring further development of the record by ALJ, an ALJ has a duty to develop the record only
9 when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation
10 of the evidence.
See, e.g., Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001).
11 Nonetheless, where there is sufficient evidence in the record to make a determination, the ALJ is
12 not required to re-contact physicians who submit poorly crafted, unsupported, or inadequate
13 reports and opinions unless it renders the medical evidence, taken as a whole, ambiguous or
14 inadequate to allow for proper evaluation. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir.
15 2005) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(e), 416.912(e)). Dr. Olson's 2011 questionnaire is internally
16 inconsistent with regard to his opinion that Plaintiff was able to work full-time but could only sit,
17 stand, or walk for a total of 2 hours out of an 8-hour day. This inconsistency bears directly on the
18 credibility and weight of Dr. Olson's opinion. One poorly supported and crafted opinion that a
19 claimant is disabled does not render the medical evidence of record ambiguous or inadequate for
20 proper evaluation such that re-contacting Dr. Olson was necessary.
21
Moreover, while the ALJ declined to give deference to Dr. Olson's opinion that Plaintiff
22 was unable to work as a finding reserved to the Commissioner, the inconsistencies noted by the
23 ALJ in Dr. Olson's report provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial
24 evidence to reject the opinion that Plaintiff was precluded from work and the particular extent of
25 her opined limitations. See Young v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)
26 (treating doctor's conclusory opinion that claimant was disabled was properly rejected by ALJ
27 when it was internally inconsistent and not consistent with doctor's medical reports); Thomas v.
28 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (ALJ need not accept opinion of any physician that is
24
1 inadequately supported by clinical findings). In sum, the ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. Olson's
2 opinions.
3
4.
4
Plaintiff makes a very brief argument that Dr. Chen opined Plaintiff "was limited by her
Dr. Chen's Opinion was Properly Considered
5 need to use oxygen, which was all the time. . . The ALJ did not incorporate this limitation into his
6 RFC finding, which is error." (Doc. 19, 24:18-22.) Dr. Chen noted Plaintiff was diagnosed with
7 COPD and had been using oxygen since May 2010. (AR 526.) He also observed Plaintiff came to
8 the examination with her own oxygen, but there were no respiratory symptoms after
9 discontinuation of the oxygen during the examination. (AR 527.) Dr. Chen did not include any
10 limitation due to oxygen in the functional assessment, and it does not appear he felt Plaintiff was
11 limited by her need to use oxygen. He noted only that she had oxygen therapy per her physician's
12 prescription. (AR 528.) And, although Dr. Olson indicated Plaintiff needed oxygen "all the time,"
13 this opinion was not credited by the ALJ. More importantly, when Plaintiff underwent PFT
14 testing with Dr. Logue in November 2011, he noted that even though Plaintiff remained on
15 supplemental oxygen, Dr. Logue was "not clear as to the ongoing needs or benefits of
16 supplemental oxygen." (AR 799.) There is no indication Dr. Chen actually opined Plaintiff
17 needed to use her oxygen continually, and the only physician opinion noting this requirement was
18 discredited. In sum, Dr. Chen's opinion was properly considered, and the ALJ did not err in
19 failing to include a limitation in the RFC for necessary reliance on oxygen.
20 D.
The ALJ's Consideration of Plaintiff's Mental Condition
21
Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to include Dr. Fetterman's opinion regarding Plaintiff's
22 ability to maintain attendance and handle work-related stress and LCSW Crenshaw's opinion that
23 Plaintiff had significant deficits in a number of areas of her mental functioning.
24
1.
25
Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to give specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr.
Dr. Fetterman's Opinion
26 Fetterman's opinion that Plaintiff was impaired in her ability to handle work-related stress.
27 Although the ALJ included a limitation to "low-stress" work in the RFC, he defined that as "no
28 more than occasional decision making or changes in the work setting." (AR 25.) According to
25
1 Plaintiff, her inability to handle stress was predicated on more than decision making or changes in
2 the work setting, and thus the limitation in the RFC does not adequately encompass Dr.
3 Fetterman's opinion it this regard. Plaintiff also argues Dr. Fetterman opined Plaintiff's ability to
4 complete a normal workweek and handle work-related stress was only "fair," which is not "good"
5 or "adequate." The ALJ did not address these "fair" abilities or incorporate them meaningfully
6 into the RFC.
7
The Commissioner contends the ALJ's RFC analysis incorporated Dr. Fetterman's opinion
8 by limiting Plaintiff to low-stress work that involved only occasional decision making and
9 occasional changes, which encapsulates Plaintiff's fair ability to handle work-related stress.
10 Although Plaintiff argues that "fair" means less than "adequate" and precludes work activity, Dr.
11 Fetterman defined adequate to mean "there are no noted impairments at this time." Thus, "fair"
12 does not necessarily preclude work activity, even assuming it represents less ability than that
13 which is "adequate."
14
The ALJ credited Dr. Fetterman's opinion that Plaintiff was impaired in her ability to
15 handle work-related stress, complete a normal workweek, and maintain regular attendance at work
16 due to her mental symptoms. (AR 552-53.) Similarly, non-examining physician Dr. Cogbill
17 opined Plaintiff had moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace, as well as social
18 functioning, which the ALJ credited. (AR 29, 557.) Interpreting and synthesizing both these
19 opinions, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was "limited to simple, routine and repetitive tasks and low
20 stress work (low stress being defined as no more than occasional decision making or changes in
21 the work setting) and she [is] limited to no more than occasional interaction with co-workers."
22 (AR 25.) A limitation to jobs that require no more than occasional decision making or changes is
23 a reasonable limitation encompassing the fair abilities Dr. Fetterman's opinion noted. The ALJ is
24 not required to adopt the exact wording of a physician, but may translate mental limitations into
25 concrete restrictions. Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining
26 how an ALJ may translate mental limitations into concrete restrictions where the ALJ's assessment
27 is "consistent with restrictions identified in the medical testimony"). That Plaintiff's abilities were
28 only "fair" does not imply she was precluded or severely limited in the areas of stress or in her
26
1 ability to maintain attendance, particularly as Dr. Cogbill opined Plaintiff was only moderately
2 limited in the ability to complete a normal workweek due to psychological symptoms. (See AR
3 557.)
4
It is unclear what limitation Plaintiff believes the ALJ should have included in the RFC to
5 address her fair ability to handle stress, attend work, and complete a normal workweek. It is
6 reasonable to expect that jobs that are lower stress do not change often in setting, and are simple,
7 routine, and repetitive, and are more likely to be the type of work a person could perform even
8 when experiencing some psychological symptoms because the work does not require
9 concentration and attention to numerous and changing variables. In other words, work in a high10 stress environment involving many details and variables and requiring ongoing decision-making
11 may be more difficult to attempt when a person experiences psychological symptoms and thus
12 increasing absences. A low stress, simple job would reasonably address attendance, completion,
13 and pace limitations.
14
Plaintiff also contends that even though LCSW Crenshaw opined Plaintiff's ability to
15 function in several areas was "fair" or "poor," the ALJ gave no reasons for rejecting those
16 limitations.
LCSW Crenshaw opined Plaintiff had an impaired ability to deal with social
17 interactions, poor concentration and memory which impaired her problem solving skills, fair
18 ability to understand, remember, and carry out 1-2 step job instructions, poor ability to maintain
19 attention and concentration for at least two-hour increments, and a poor ability to withstand the
20 stress and pressure of a full-time job. (AR 942.) This opinion was generally credited and given
21 "appropriate" weight by the ALJ. (AR 31.)
22
The ALJ's RFC indicates this opinion was incorporated with that of Drs. Fetterman and
23 Cogbill's and included in the RFC. A poor ability to maintain attendance at full-time work and
24 deal with work stress is reasonably accommodated by a simple, routine, repetitive job that is also
25 low-stress—i.e., no more than occasional decision making or changes in the work setting. As
26 discussed above in the context of Dr. Fetterman's opinion that Plaintiff had a fair ability to deal
27 with work-related stress, a simple and repetitive job would reasonably accommodate someone
28 who occasionally suffered psychological symptoms because such work does not include complex
27
1 variables, changing expectations, or require difficult decision-making. Moreover, the ALJ limited
2 Plaintiff to jobs with few interactions with co-workers, which would also generally involve lower
3 stress. The ALJ's formulation of the RFC in view of LCSW Crenshaw is also bolstered by the
4 opinions of Drs. Cogbill and Fetterman who opined Plaintiff's limitations in the area of dealing
5 with work stress and maintaining work attendance were generally only moderate, and she retained
6 "fair" abilities in these areas. (AR 557 (Cogbill opines Plaintiff has moderate limitation to
7 completing full workweek due to symptoms; AR 552-53 (Fetterman opines Plaintiff has "fair"
8 ability to complete normal workday or workweek without interruptions from psychiatric condition
9 and fair ability to deal with routine work stress).)
10
Although LCSW Crenshaw opined Plaintiff had poor concentration and memory, simple
11 and repetitive work would also reasonably encompass this limitation, particularly since LCSW
12 Crenshaw opined Plaintiff had a fair ability to remember and carry out 1-2 step job instructions.
13 The ALJ's RFC reflects consideration of LSCW Crenshaw's opinion about Plaintiff's limitations,
14 particularly as it is generally congruous with Dr. Fetterman's and Dr. Cogbill's opinions of
15 Plaintiff's limitations and abilities. The ALJ's RFC is a reasonable and rational harmonization of
16 these opinions and does not appear to be a rejection of LCSW Crenshaw's opinion.
17 E.
Remand Is Appropriate
18
The ALJ's credibility analysis is deficient under Brown-Hunter, and Plaintiff contends her
19 testimony should be credited as true, and benefits should be awarded. Usually, "[i]f additional
20 proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative proceeding, a social security case
21 should be remanded." Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981). Courts are
22 empowered to affirm, modify, or reverse a decision by the Commissioner "with or without
23 remanding the cause for rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Courts generally exercise this power
24 when it is clear from the record that a claimant is entitled to benefits. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1019.
25 "[W]here there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a proper disability
26 determination can be made, and where it is clear from the administrative record that the ALJ
27 would be required to award benefits if the claimant's excess pain testimony were credited, we will
28 not remand solely to allow the ALJ to make specific findings regarding that testimony. Rather, we
28
1 will . . . take that testimony to be established as true." Id. (quoting Varney v. Sec'y of Health &
2 Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1988).
3
Similar to Burrell, the Commissioner points to evidence in the record not discussed by the
4 ALJ that suggests Plaintiff may not be credible. 775 F.3d at 1141-42. Plaintiff's alleged date of
5 onset in July 2008 conflicts with medical evidence showing she had normal examinations in
6 November 2009 and was generally doing well in April 2010, June 2010, and September 2010.
7 (AR 328, 365, 371.) There is also evidence suggesting Plaintiff's treatment adequately controlled
8 her conditions, and she appeared not to give full effort during pulmonary function testing. These
9 factors are credibility considerations the ALJ may take into account.
Remand for further
10 proceedings to allow the ALJ to do so is the appropriate remedy. Id.
11
CONCLUSION
12
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ's decision is not supported by
13 substantial evidence and is, therefore, REVERSED and the case REMANDED to the ALJ for
14 further proceedings consistent with this order. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter
15 judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of
16 Social Security.
17
18
IT IS SO ORDERED.
19 Dated:
February 11, 2016
/s/ Sheila K. Oberto
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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