Williams v. CDCR Department Corrections and Rehabilitations et al
Filing
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ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 4/15/2015. Second Amended Complaint due within thirty (30) days. (Attachments: # 1 Amended Complaint Form). (Jessen, A)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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VINCE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
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ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
v.
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Case No. 1:14-cv-01912-JLT (PC)
(Doc. 1)
CDCR, et al.,
RESPONSE DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS
Defendants.
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I.
Background
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Plaintiff, Vince Williams, is a prisoner in the custody of the California Department of
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Corrections and Rehabilitation. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on March 2, 2015
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which is before the Court for screening (Doc. 17).
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A.
Screening Requirement
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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
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Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
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frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary
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relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
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Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
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immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp.
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Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of
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substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred
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elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).
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To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a
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right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged
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violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487
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U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).
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B.
Summary of Plaintiff=s Complaint
Plaintiff complains of acts that occurred while he was an inmate at Pleasant Valley State
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Prison. Plaintiff names twenty-two Defendants and seeks monetary relief. It appears that Plaintiff
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is complaining about how the endemic Valley Fever occurrence was handled during the time that
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he was housed at PVSP. Plaintiff does not delineate any specific claims or identify any of his
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rights under the United States Constitution that he feels were violated. Plaintiff's allegations are
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very general and do not state any cognizable claims.
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Plaintiff may be able to amend to correct the deficiencies in his pleading and is being
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given the pleading requirements and what are the most likely applicable legal standards to apply
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to any claims he hopes to state and leave to file a second amended complaint.
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C.
Pleading Requirements
1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)
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"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited
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exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534
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U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain
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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a).
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"Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and
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the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.
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Detailed factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
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cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
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U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
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Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is
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plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual
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allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S.
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Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557.
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While Aplaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ,@ Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft,
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580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally
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and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).
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However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze
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v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may
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not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit
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Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266,
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268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. Wal-
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Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
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omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and
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“facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the
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plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
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If he chooses to file a second amended complaint, Plaintiff should endeavor to make it as
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concise as possible. He should merely state which of his constitutional rights he feels were
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violated by each Defendant and its factual basis.
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2. Linkage Requirement
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The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:
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Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to
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be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of
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any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . .
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shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
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other proper proceeding for redress.
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42 U.S.C. ' 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between
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the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See
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Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
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(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that A[a] person >subjects= another to the deprivation of a
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constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates
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in another=s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that
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causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th
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Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named
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defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff=s
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federal rights.
Plaintiff but fails to link any of the named Defendants to his factual allegations. Plaintiff
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must clarify which Defendant(s) he feels are responsible for each violation of his constitutional
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rights and their factual basis as his Complaint must put each Defendant on notice of Plaintiff=s
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claims against him or her. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004).
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D.
Claims for Relief
1. Eighth Amendment
a. Conditions of Confinement
AThe Eighth Amendment=s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects
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prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment, but also from inhumane conditions of
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confinement.@ Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). A[W]hile conditions
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of confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they >must not involve the wanton
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and unnecessary infliction of pain.=@ Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
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AWhat is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
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Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .@ Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).
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A[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-of-
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confinement claim.@ Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, A[b]ecause
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routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
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society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life=s necessities are
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sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.@ Id. (quotations and
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citations omitted).
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Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of confinement, prison
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officials may be held liable only if they acted with Adeliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
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serious harm.@ Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). The deliberate indifference
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standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in
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objective terms, Asufficiently serious . . . .@ Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing
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Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must Aknow[] of and
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disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .@ Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, a
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prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of
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confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and disregards that risk
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by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. Prison officials may avoid
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liability by presenting evidence that they lacked knowledge of the risk, or by presenting evidence
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of a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, response to the risk. Id. at 844-45. Mere negligence on the
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part of the prison official is not sufficient to establish liability, but rather, the official=s conduct
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must have been wanton. Id. at 835; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128.
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b. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
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Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to [a
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prisoner's] serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). "A medical need
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is serious if failure to treat it will result in ' "significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton
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infliction of pain." ' " Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (2014) (quoting Jett v. Penner,
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439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th
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Cir.1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th
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Cir.1997) (en banc))
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To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care in prison, a plaintiff must
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first Ashow a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner=s condition
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could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second,
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the plaintiff must show the defendants= response to the need was deliberately indifferent.@
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Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091,
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1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted)).
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The existence of a condition or injury that a reasonable doctor would find important and
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worthy of comment or treatment, the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an
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individual=s daily activities, and the existence of chronic or substantial pain are indications of a
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serious medical need. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing McGuckin v.
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Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc.
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v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)) (quotation marks omitted); Doty v.
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County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994). If Plaintiff has contracted disseminated
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Valley Fever, it would be accepted as serious medical need for screening purposes.
Deliberate indifference is Aa state of mind more blameworthy than negligence@ and
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Arequires >more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner=s interests or safety.=@ Farmer v.
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Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319). ADeliberate indifference
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is a high legal standard.@ Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.2004). AUnder this
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standard, the prison official must not only >be aware of the facts from which the inference could
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be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,= but that person >must also draw the
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inference.=@ Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). A>If a prison official should have been
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aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter
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how severe the risk.=@ Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188
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(9th Cir. 2002)).
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In medical cases, this requires showing: (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a
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prisoner=s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference. Wilhelm, 680
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F.3d at 1122 (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). More generally, deliberate indifference Amay
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appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it
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may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.@ Id. (internal
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quotation marks omitted). Under Jett, A[a] prisoner need not show his harm was substantial.@ Id.;
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see also McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (A[A] finding that the defendant=s activities resulted in
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>substantial= harm to the prisoner is not necessary.@).
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2. Supervisory Liability
Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their
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employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a
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supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be
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specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld,
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589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief
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under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that
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would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the alleged
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deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or
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promulgated or "implemented a policy so deficient that the policy 'itself is a repudiation of
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constitutional rights' and is 'the moving force of the constitutional violation.'" Hansen v. Black,
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885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045
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(9th Cir. 1989). Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for
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the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. "In
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a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action - where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants - the
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term 'supervisory liability' is a misnomer." Id. Knowledge and acquiescence of a subordinate's
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misconduct is insufficient to establish liability; each government official is only liable for his or
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her own misconduct. Id.
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A>[B]are assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a Aformulaic recitation of the
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elements@ of a constitutional discrimination claim,= for the purposes of ruling on a motion to
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dismiss [and thus also for screening purposes], are not entitled to an assumption of truth.@ Moss,
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572 F.3d at 969 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). ASuch
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allegations are not to be discounted because they are >unrealistic or nonsensical,= but rather
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because they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion B even if that conclusion is cast in the
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form of a factual allegation.@ Id. Thus, any allegations that a Defendant is somehow liable
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because a subordinate violated Plaintiff's rights is not cognizable.
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3. Damages
Critically lacking from Plaintiff's pleading is any allegation that he sustained a
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compensable injury, i.e. that he actually contracted Valley Fever.
A[T]he basic purpose of a ' 1983 damages award should be to compensate persons for
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injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.@ Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254
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(1978). For this reason, no compensatory damages may be awarded in a ' 1983 suit absent proof
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of actual injury. Id., at 264; accord, Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299,
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307 (1986). However, Athe denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal
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damages without proof of actual injury.@ Carey, 435 U.S. at 266. Nominal damage awards for
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the Aabsolute@ right to procedural due process Arecognizes the importance to organized society
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that [this] righ[t] be scrupulously observed@ while Aremain[ing] true to the principle that
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substantial damages should be awarded only to compensate actual injury.@ Id. Thus, a court is
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obligated to award nominal damages when a plaintiff establishes the violation of his right to
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procedural due process but cannot prove actual injury. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112
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(1992).
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If Plaintiff did not contract Valley Fever, he cannot receive compensatory damages in a
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suit under section 1983. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978). Further, where a prisoner
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challenges conditions of confinement and seeks injunctive relief, transfer to another prison
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renders the request for injunctive relief moot absent some evidence of an expectation of being
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transferred back. See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402-03 (1975); Johnson v. Moore, 948
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F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053,
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n.5 (9th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, Plaintiff=s transfer, such that he is now housed at California
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Medical Facility in Vacaville, CA rather than PVSP, rendered any claims for injunctive relief
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moot.
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II.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is dismissed, with
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leave to file a second amended complaint within thirty days. If Plaintiff needs an extension of
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time to comply with this order, Plaintiff shall file a motion seeking an extension of time no later
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than thirty days from the date of service of this order.
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Plaintiff must demonstrate in any second amended complaint how the conditions
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complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v.
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Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The second amended complaint must allege in specific
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terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless
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there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed
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deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.
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1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
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Plaintiff's second amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Such a short
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and plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
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upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) quoting Conley v.
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Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be
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[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. 127, 555
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(2007) (citations omitted).
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Plaintiff is further advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original, Lacey v.
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Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29,
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2012) (en banc), and must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded
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pleading," Local Rule 220.
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The Court provides Plaintiff with opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies identified
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by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff
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may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his second amended
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complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no "buckshot" complaints).
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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
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1.
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;
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2.
The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;
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3.
Within 30 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file a second
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amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order;
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and
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4.
If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure
to obey a court order and for failure to state a claim.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
April 15, 2015
/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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