Reyes v. On Habeas Corpus

Filing 15

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS Recommending that the 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be Denied signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 12/20/2016. Referred to Judge Dale A. Drozd. Objections to F&R due by 1/23/2017. (Sant Agata, S)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RICARDO REYES,
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Petitioner,
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v.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00013-DAD-MJS
FINDINGS
AND
RECOMMENDATION
REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS

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SCOTT FRAUENHEIM, Warden,
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Respondent.
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Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

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corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent, Scott Frauenhiem, Warden of Pleasant
Valley State Prison, Corcoran, is hereby substituted as the proper named respondent
pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent is
represented by Maria Chan of the Office of the California Attorney General.
I.

Procedural Background
Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation following his September 26, 2007 conviction for robbery. (See Pet. at
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8, ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is currently serving his resulting sentence of fifteen (15) years
in prison. (Id.)

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On April 8, 2013, inmate Hernandez reported to correctional officers that he was in
a fight with Petitioner. (Answer, Ex. 1, ECF NO. 12-1 at 35-40.) In addition to
Hernandez’s statements that he fought with Petitioner, Hernandez had a cut to his lip,
and Petitioner had a cut to the knuckles of his right hand. (Id.) Each cut required four
sutures. (Id.) At the disciplinary proceeding on May 10, 2013, Petitioner was found guilty
of committing battery on an inmate with serious bodily injury, and assessed a 360 day
forfeiture of good conduct time. (Id. at 39.) Petitioner alleges that the disciplinary
decision was based on insufficient evidence as no correctional officers witnessed the
fight and his due process rights under the 6th and 14th amendments were violated by
the improper administration of his disciplinary proceeding. (Pet. at 1-7.)

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Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the Kern County Superior Court. The petition
was denied in a reasoned decision on June 8, 2014. (Answer, Ex. B, ECF No. 12-1 at
54-57.)

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On July 2, 2014, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal
for the Fifth District. The appellate court denied the petition in a summary decision on
July 18, 2014. (Answer, Exs. C-D.)

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Petitioner filed a habeas petition to the California Supreme Court September 19,
2014. The petition was summarily denied on November 25, 2014. (Answer, Ex. E, Pet.,
ECF No. 1 at 58.)

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Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on January 5, 2015.
Respondent filed an answer to the petition on March 9, 2015. (Answer, ECF No. 12.)
Petitioner did not file a traverse within thirty days of the service of the answer.
Accordingly, the matter stands ready for adjudication.
///
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II.

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Factual Background1
On April 8, 2013, Correctional Officer Robinson observed inmate Hernandez had a

cut lip. When asked, Hernandez told Robinson that he fought with Petitioner, and that

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Petitioner punched him after a verbal argument. Both Hernandez and Petitioner were

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provided medical assistance. Hernandez received sutures for an injury to his lip, and

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Petitioner received sutures to a cut to his knuckles.

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Petitioner was charged with violating Cal. Code Reg. § 3005(d)(1): “battery on an

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inmate with serious bodily injury” and provided a rules violation report on April 22, 2103.

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(Pet. at 36-40.)

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Petitioner appeared at the disciplinary hearing on May 10, 2013, and pled guilty to

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the offense. (Pet. at 36-40.) Petitioner stated that “He busted his lip open in self-defense,”

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and that “[he] only swung once.” (Id.) The hearing officer, Lieutenant M. J. Hetzel

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accepted the guilty plea, and assessed sanction of 360 days of credit forfeiture. (Id.)

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III.

Discussion

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A.

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Relief by way of a writ of habeas corpus extends to a prisoner under a judgment

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of a state court if the custody violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

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States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

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375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered a violation of his right to due process

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as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The disciplinary proceeding occurred in and

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Petitioner remains housed in correctional facilities in the Eastern District of California. 28

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U.S.C. § 2241(d); 2254(a). The Court concludes that it has jurisdiction over the action.

Jurisdiction

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B.

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On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

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Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus

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Legal Standard of Review

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The Kern County Superior Court’s summary of the facts in its June 18, 2014 opinion is presumed correct.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood,
114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of
the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.
Under AEDPA, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a prisoner in custody
under a judgment of a state court may be granted only for violations of the Constitution
or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 375 n.
7 (2000). Federal habeas corpus relief is available for any claim decided on the merits in
state court proceedings if the state court's adjudication of the claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
1.

Contrary to or an Unreasonable Application of Federal Law

A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that
contradicts governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases" or "confronts a set of facts
that are materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court case, yet reaches a different
result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06).
"AEDPA does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical
factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied. . . . The statue recognizes . . . that
even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner" Panetti v.
Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The

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"clearly established Federal law" requirement "does not demand more than a ‘principle'

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or ‘general standard.'" Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 839 (2009). For a state

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decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under §
2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court's prior decisions must provide a governing legal principle
(or principles) to the issue before the state court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71
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(2003).
A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of "federal law
only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 40910); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). In Harrington v. Richter, the Court
further stresses that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an
incorrect application of federal law." 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (citing Williams, 529 U.S.
at 410) (emphasis in original). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit
precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the
correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541
U.S. 653, 664 (2004)). Further, "[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts
have in reading outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Id.; Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct.
1855, 1864 (2010). "It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal
law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely
established by this Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122, 129 S. Ct. 1411,
1419 (2009) (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786).
2.

Review of State Decisions

"Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim,
later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim rest on the same
grounds." See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is referred to as the
"look through" presumption. Id. at 804; Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198
(9th Cir. 2006). Determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an
unreasonable legal or factual conclusion, "does not require that there be an opinion from
the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85.
"Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas
petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the
state court to deny relief." Id. ("This Court now holds and reconfirms that § 2254(d) does
not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been
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‘adjudicated on the merits.").
Richter instructs that whether the state court decision is reasoned and explained,
or merely a summary denial, the approach to evaluating unreasonableness under §
2254(d) is the same: "Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments
or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court's decision; then
it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments
or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Id. at 786.
Thus, "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion
was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75). AEDPA "preserves
authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could
disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents." Id. To put
it yet another way:
As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus relief from a federal
court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim
being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there
was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond
any possibility for fairminded disagreement.
Id. at 786-87. The Court then explains the rationale for this rule, i.e., "that state courts
are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions." Id. at
787. It follows from this consideration that § 2254(d) "complements the exhaustion
requirement and the doctrine of procedural bar to ensure that state proceedings are the
central process, not just a preliminary step for later federal habeas proceedings." Id.
(citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
3.

Prejudicial Impact of Constitutional Error

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether
the error had "a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's
verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551
U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (holding that the Brecht standard applies whether or not the
state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness). Some constitutional
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errors, however, do not require that the petitioner demonstrate prejudice. See Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659
(1984). Furthermore, where a habeas petition governed by AEDPA alleges ineffective
assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the
Strickland prejudice standard is applied and courts do not engage in a separate analysis
applying the Brecht standard. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918, n. 7 (2002); Musalin v.
Lamarque, 555 F.3d at 834.
IV.

Review of Petition
Petitioner raises two due process violations with regard to his disciplinary

proceeding and the following state court decisions. First, Petitioner asserts that there was
insufficient evidence of the violation because no correctional officers observed the fight.
(Pet. at 5-6.) Petitioner also asserts that correctional staff did not properly and adequately
investigate the incident. (Id.)
A.

State Court Decision

Petitioner presented his claims by way of petitions for writ of habeas corpus to the
California Courts. Petitioner is not entitled to relief because the state court's legal and
factual determinations in denying Petitioner's claims were not objectively unreasonable
or contrary to Supreme Court law. The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the
Kern County Superior Court and summarily denied in subsequent petitions by the
California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. B, ECF No.
12-1 at 54-57, Exs. D, Pet. at 58.)

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Because the Supreme Court opinion is summary in nature, this Court “looks

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through” that decision and presumes it adopted the reasoning of the last state court to

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have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n.3

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(1991) (establishing, on habeas review, “look through” presumption that higher court

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agrees with lower court’s reasoning where former affirms latter without discussion); see

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also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding federal courts
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look to last reasoned state court opinion in determining whether state court’s rejection of

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petitioner’s claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law under

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
The Superior Court described why Petitioner's due process rights were not denied
in a reasoned decision, stating:
Petitioner is serving a fifteen years sentence for burglary and
robbery from San Diego County, which is not the subject of the petition.
He protests the guilty finding for battery on an inmate causing serious
bodily injury prohibited by 15 Cal. Code Regs. Section 3005(d)(1) while an
inmate at California Correctional Institute in Tehachapi, California.
Petitioner contends that the violation should be reduced to fighting
or mutual combat. The discipline constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment since the discipline is so disproportionate to the offense. He
cites an adjacent inmate who received a less severe penalty under
identical facts.
Petitioner alleges that he struck inmate Hernandez in self-defense,
and the hearing officer failed to permit him to state his case. He alleges
that he plead not guilty instead of guilty as the decision states. The court
finds no merit in petitioner’s arguments, and finds the imposition of
discipline is supported by some evidence which is the prevailing
evidentiary standard in prison disciplinary hearings.
The court denies the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
On April 8, 2013, Officer Robinson observed Inmate Hernandez
with a cut lip. When he inquired, Hernandez stated that he and petitioner
got into a fight. Hernandez stated that petitioner threw the first punch after
a verbal argument.
Petitioner states that he did not want to speak with Hernandez and
directed him to return to his building. Things became more heated, and
Hernandez called petitioner a punk and punched petitioner in the back of
the head. Petitioner instantly reacted and punched Hernandez in the lip,
receiving a cut hand for his troubles.
Medical staff sutured petitioner’s hand and Hernandez’s lip. Both
wounds required four stiches. The Hearing Officer found that the petitioner
cut his hand due to a self-inflicted wound to Hernandez’s lip when striking
him.

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So long as there is some evidence to support the imposition of
discipline, the court will not disturb it. In re Powell (1988) 45 Cal.3d 894,
902, 904, In re Dikes, (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 825, 829-30, Superintendent
v. Hill (1985) 472 U.S. 445, 454-455. The rules violation report, the crime
incident reports, the investigative employee’s report and the medical
reports point to petitioner’s culpability, even if the Court were to accept

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petitioner plead not guilty. The documentation shows that that petitioner
plead guilty and admitted to punching Hernandez in the lip in self-defense.
Inmates have the right to call friendly and adverse witnesses at a
disciplinary proceeding. Wolff v. McDonald (1974) 518 U.S. 539, 566.
Petitioner waived the presence of Hernandez at the hearing.
Nevertheless, the hearing officer reviewed the written questions proposed
to Hernandez contained in the investigative employee’s report.
Many questions presented to Hernandez in writing were deemed
not relevant. For example, it is irrelevant that petitioner apologized to
Hernandez and wanted to continue to be best friends forever. The hearing
officer can exclude duplicative or irrelevant testimony. 15 Cal. Code Regs.
§ 3315(e)(1)(B). Hernandez’s versions of events was contained in the
rules violation report, the crime incident reports and the investigative
employee’s report.
There is no evidence that petitioner received any injuries to the
back of his head, and the injury to his hand resulted from throwing the
punch that struck Hernandez in the lip. As the second level’s decision
pointed out, petitioner could have retreated or held Hernandez until other
staff arrived. He exercised neither option. This negates his claim of selfdefense.
There is a rational basis for the relaxed evidentiary standard for
prison disciplinary hearings given the at times tumultuous environment of
prisons and the need to effectuate discipline expeditiously. Dikes at 830,
833. The loss of 360 days credits for battery with infliction of serious bodily
harm is authorized under 15 Cal. Code Regs., § 3323(b)(3). The Secretary
of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation is vested with the
statutory and regulatory power to discipline and classify inmates. In re
Cabrera (2012) 55 Cal.4th 683, 688, 690, In re Jenkins (2010) 50 Cal.4 th
1167, 1173. The Hearing Officer did not find credible petitioner’s claim of
self-defense and as an explanation accompanying his guilty plea. Thus,
the hearing officer complied with the regulations, and there are no credible
claims of violation of due process.
Prison disciplinary hearings are handled on a case-by-case basis,
and all that is required is the hearing officer apply the regulations and
make evidentiary findings based on the facts and their application to the
regulations. There are no eighth amendment implications or violations of
the equal protection clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
U.S. Constitution or Art. I. § 17 of the California Constitution.
On the basis of the foregoing, the petition for writ of habeas corpus
is accordingly denied because petitioner fails to satisfy his burden to show
a primia facie case for habeas corpus relief. Some evidence supports the
imposition of discipline, which is the prevailing evidentiary standard.
People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 737, In re Zepeda (2006) 141
Cal.App. 4th 1493m 1498, 1500.
(Answer, Ex. A, ECF No. 12-1 at 54-57.)
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B.

Procedural Due Process

The law concerning a prisoner's Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in good
conduct time is set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). While the United
States Constitution does not guarantee good conduct time, an inmate has a liberty
interest in good conduct time when a state statute provides such a right and delineates
that it is not to be taken away except for serious misconduct. Id. at 557. Inmates
involved in a disciplinary action are entitled to procedural protections under the Due
Process Clause, but not to the full array of rights afforded to criminal defendants. Wolff,
418 U.S. at 556 (1974).Thus, a prisoner's due process rights are moderated by the
"legitimate institutional needs" of a prison. Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th
Cir. 1989) (citing Superintendent, etc. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-455 (1984)).
When a prison disciplinary proceeding may result in the loss of good conduct
time, due process requires that the prisoner receive: (1) advance written notice of at
least 24 hours of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with
institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary
evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the fact-finder of the evidence
relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454; Wolff, 418 U.S.
at 563-567. In the facts and circumstances presented here, it appears that Petitioner
received all the process that was due. Petitioner does not dispute that he received prior
notice of the charges, the reasons for the charge, and an explanation of the decision.
Additionally, federal law allows witnesses to be appropriately excluded where their
testimony would have been cumulative or irrelevant to the disciplinary proceedings.
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566; Cal. Code Regs, tit. 15, §3315(e)(1). Petitioner was given the
opportunity to call witnesses. However he chose not to and instead plead guilty to the
offense. Further, Petitioner contends that correctional officers did not perform a complete
investigation. Petitioner was provided all the due process rights provided under Hill and
Wolff. To the extent that Petitioner contends that the investigation into his offense was
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incomplete, there is no federal authority to support such a claim.
The state courts did not unreasonably apply Wolff in reviewing the procedural
safeguards of the disciplinary proceedings and denying Petitioner’s claim.
C.

Substantive Due Process

Petitioner asserts that there was insufficient evidence as the correctional officers
did not observe the fight taking place. (See Pet.) As discussed above, Federal habeas
corpus relief is available only when the state court's decision results in a decision that
“contrary to” federal law or was based on “an unreasonable determination of the facts.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (citing Williams, 529
U.S. at 405-06). The evidentiary standard for review of a state prison disciplinary
decision’s adherence to due process merely requires "some evidence from which the
finding of the administrative tribunal could be deduced." Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S.
445 (1985).
A court must refrain from making its own assessment of the credibility of
witnesses or second guessing the fact finding determinations and decisions of the
disciplinary board. Id. at 455. Thus, the "some evidence" standard under Hill is
"minimally stringent," and the courts may not "set aside decisions of prison
administrators that have some basis in fact." Id. at 455-56. Further, the existing evidence
need not ''logically preclude'' any conclusion other than the one reached by the hearing
officer. Id. at 457.
An issue of fact is limited to ''basic primary, or historical facts: facts in the sense of
a recital of external events and credibility of their narrators." Thompson v. Keohane, 516
U.S. 99, 109-10 (1995) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). The state courts' adjudication
of petition did not turn on disputed factual findings; instead, the state court applied a
federal standard of review to undisputed facts in the record. (Answer, Ex. A at 54-57;

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Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-456 (application of the some-evidence standard to a prison
disciplinary decision does not involve re-weighing the evidence).)

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Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence of the assault, but does
not present any argument that would have negated the evidence of the assault
presented at the hearing. Though the evidence was not overwhelming, there was
evidence based on the location and type of injuries to Petitioner and Hernandez, and the
testimony of Hernandez.

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An alternative account of the incident need not be accepted as true or accurate by
the hearing officer, and does not undermine a finding that “some evidence” exists that
the battery had occurred. The some evidence standard is a low threshold, and will be
met even when evidence to the contrary is presented. As the evidence presented at the
hearing and relied upon by the hearing officer constitutes some evidence that Petitioner
committed battery, the disciplinary decision satisfies the some evidence standard.

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Accordingly, the state courts did not unreasonably apply Hill in reviewing the prison’s

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disciplinary proceedings and denying Petitioner’s claim. Moreover, in light of this Court’s

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deferential review under AEDPA, the Court rejects the invitation to reweigh, reassess,
and rebalance the evidence.

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The state court decision properly applied clearly established Supreme Court law
and the state court's factual determinations were not objectively unreasonable. Further,
the disciplinary decision was found to be supported by some evidence. The Court finds
no constitutional violation with regard to the finding of the disciplinary proceeding or
the state court interpretation of such proceeding at issue in this case. The Court
recommends that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied.
V.

Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for writ

of habeas corpus be DENIED.

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These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the assigned
United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636
(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District
Court, Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a
copy, Petitioner may file written objections with the Court. Such a document should
be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations. The
Court will then review the Magistrate Judge's ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636
(b)(1)(C). Petitioner is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time
may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772
F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:

December 20, 2016

/s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Michael J. Seng

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