Guzman v. Gruma Corporation et al

Filing 38

ORDER signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr. on 4/2/2015 ORDERING that Plaintiff's 6 Motion to Remand is GRANTED. The Court Clerk shall REMAND this case to the Superior Court of California in the County of Fresno. Copy of remand order sent to other court. CASE CLOSED. (Zignago, K.)

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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 OSCAR GUZMAN, 8 Plaintiff, 9 10 11 No. 1:15-cv-00159-GEB-SKO v. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S REMAND MOTION GRUMA CORP., CHUCK DAWSON, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, 12 Defendants. 13 Plaintiff 14 28 U.S.C. moves § to this state jurisdiction basis for removal does not exist, since Plaintiff 17 alleges in his Complaint that both he and Defendant Chuck Dawson 18 are California residents. Defendants counter that Dawson is a 19 fraudulently joined defendant whose residency does not defeat 20 diversity jurisdiction. 21 “It Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). 24 “If 25 resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the 26 well-settled rules of the state, the joinder is fraudulent and 27 [that] 28 purposes of determining diversity.” United Computer Sys., Inc. v. defendant's to removal state presence in 1 a on cause the diversity joined 23 fails defeat fraudulently defendants plaintiff not diversity 22 a will that the court 16 commonplace that to under a contending case 15 is 1447(c), remand of lawsuit action is grounds.” against ignored a for 1 AT&T 2 citations 3 analyzed on the basis of the pleadings filed at the time of 4 removal 5 Surgical Corp. v. Nat‟l Ass‟n of Sec. Dealers, 159 F.3d 1209, 6 1213 (9th Cir. 1998). Corp., 298 F.3d omitted). without 756, This 761 (9th Cir. 2002) “[j]urisdiction[al reference to subsequent (quotes issue] must amendments.” and be Sparta 7 Under the involved analysis, “[a] remand motion must be 8 granted unless [the removant] demonstrates that [a plaintiff] 9 „would not be afforded leave [in state court] to amend [his] 10 complaint to cure purported deficenc[ies].” Hernandez v. Ignite 11 Rest. Grp., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1090 (E.D. Cal. 2013) 12 (citing Burris v. AT&T Wireless, Inc., 2006 WL 2038040, at *2 13 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 19, 2006). “[T]he removal statute is strictly 14 construed against removal jurisdiction.” Gov‟t of Marinduque v. 15 Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). Moreover, 16 “any doubt about the right of removal requires resolution in 17 favor of remand.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 18 1241, 1244, (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 19 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). 20 The parties take opposite positions on whether 21 Plaintiff could plead a harassment claim against Dawson under 22 California law. Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint harassment 23 claims against Dawson, under the California Fair Employment and 24 Housing Act (“FEHA”), based on Plaintiff‟s disability and age. 25 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges: 26 27 28 [After] former owner[] Roberto Gonzalez Barrera [died], the company dynamic changed. Thereafter, an effort was made to hire younger[]lower-paid employees to replace or phase out senior employees. In early 2014, 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Defendant realigned three sales districts in the Central Valley of California. As part of the realignment, Plaintiff assumed responsibilities for the district previously presided over by former employee, John Escalante. At Plaintiff‟s 2013 year-end review, conducted in February 2014, Plaintiff received high marks. Despite the favorable review, Mr. Dawson sent Plaintiff a textmessage picture of John Escalante sticking his middle finger up. Because Plaintiff viewed the picture as offensive, with a negative subtext about his continued employment, Plaintiff complained to Mr. Dawson that the message was unwelcome. In response, Mr. Dawson conducted a second performance review for the 2013 year. This time, and unlike the first review for the same 2013 year, in the second review, Plaintiff received extremely negative marks. (Notice of Removal Ex. A, Compl. (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 6-7, ECF No. 1-1.) Thereafter, Dawson “put Plaintiff on a performance plan.” (Id. ¶ 7.) Subsequently, Plaintiff took medical leave due to “the onset of depression and anxiety,” and he informed Dawson “that he had been diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder . . . [and] that his condition impacted his ability to sleep and work.” (Id. ¶ 8.) Dawson then “shunned Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges Dawson‟s conduct was “so severe and pervasive that a reasonable person in Plaintiff‟s circumstances would have found the work environment to be hostile or abusive,” and that he suffered from a “changed work[] environment.” (Id. ¶¶ 44, 48.) Plaintiff alleges he “was wrongfully terminated—two months before his sixtieth birthday.” Defendants (Id. ¶ 9.) argue it is obvious under well-settled California law that Plaintiff cannot allege an age or disability harassment claim against Dawson. Specifically, Defendants argue 28 3 1 Plaintiff‟s “allegations of harassment are based almost entirely 2 on 3 against 4 normal 5 avoided.” 6 23.) 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 personnel-management a supervisor part of an decisions[,]” because such employment which are non-actionable actions are considered relationship that cannot “a be (Opp‟n to Mot. to Remand 15:1-5, 15:22-28, ECF No. To establish a claim for harassment [under the FEHA], a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) []he is a member of a protected group; (2) []he was subjected to harassment because []he belonged to this group; and (3) the alleged harassment was so severe that it created a hostile work environment. The plaintiff must show a concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine or a generalized nature. Unlike discrimination claims, harassment consists of actions outside the scope of job duties which are not of a type necessary to business and personnel management. For example, commonly necessary personnel management actions such as hiring and firing, job or project assignments, promotion or demotion, and performance evaluations, do not come within the meaning of harassment. Lawler v. Montblanc North America, LLC, 704 F.3d 1235, 1244 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations, ellipses, and quotations omitted). Harassment “consists of actions outside the scope of job duties which are not of a type necessary to business and personnel management.” Lawler, 704 F.3d at 1244. However, “some official employment actions done in furtherance of a supervisor‟s managerial role can also have a secondary effect of communicating a hostile message.” Roby v. McKesson Corp., 47 Cal. 4th 686, 709 (2009) (holding that official employment actions may constitute the evidentiary basis of harassment claims if the actions are used as a means of conveying an offensive message). Defendants have not shown it is obvious under well4 1 settled California law that Plaintiff would not be granted leave 2 to 3 Dawson. Therefore, Defendants have not established that Dawson is 4 fraudulently 5 granted. amend any deficiencies joined, and in his harassment Plaintiff‟s remand claims motion against will be 6 Plaintiff also requests, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), 7 attorney‟s fees incurred as a result of the removal. However, 8 “[a]bsent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney‟s fees 9 under § 1447(c) only reasonable where basis the for removing . . . party removal.” lacked an Martin v. 10 objectively 11 Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). Plaintiff has 12 not shown that Defendants lacked an objectively reasonable basis 13 for the removal. Therefore, Plaintiff‟s request for attorney‟s 14 fees is denied. 15 Plaintiff‟s remand motion is granted, and the Court 16 Clerk shall remand this case to the Superior Court of California 17 in the County of Fresno. 18 Dated: April 2, 2015 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5

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