Marin v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 8

ORDER Dismissing Complaint, With Leave to Amend, signed by Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone on 03/11/15. Amended Complaint Due Within Thirty Days. (Gonzalez, R)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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NIGEL MARIN,
Plaintiff,

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Case No. 1:15-cv-00220-SAB
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND

v.

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AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE IN THIRTY
(30) DAYS

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Defendant.

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On February 9, 2015, Plaintiff Nigel Marin (“Plaintiff”) filed the complaint in this action.

18 (ECF No. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to
19 state any cognizable claims and should be dismissed without leave to amend.
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I.

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SCREENING

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District courts may dismiss a claim sua sponte under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23 12(b)(6) if the Court gives notice of its intention to dismiss and afford plaintiffs an opportunity to
24 at least submit a written memorandum in opposition to such motion. Lee v. City of Los Angeles,
25 250 F.3d 668, 683 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991
26 (9th Cir. 1987); Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1981)). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint
27 must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
28 relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require

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1 ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully2 harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
3 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual
4 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting
5 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’
6 a defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
7 entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, although a court must
8 accept as true all factual allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s
9 legal conclusions as true.

Id.

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

10 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
11 555).
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II.

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PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

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Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of specific factual matter, but it appears that Plaintiff is

15 attempting to sue Defendant for disability discrimination in the employment context. Plaintiff
16 vaguely alleges that on or around “08/26/2013 Agency’s Management, while in the scope of
17 their employment, breached their standard of care, and with knowledge of substantial certainty
18 ordered Plaintiff to report to work which placed him in the Zone of Danger, after receiving a
19 Medical Certificate stating Plaintiff suffered from a serious health condition.” (Compl. ¶ 1.)
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Although it is unclear, it appears that Plaintiff was an employee of the Social Security

21 Administration, and the agency denied Plaintiff’s request for accommodation regarding his
22 disability. Plaintiff does not identify what, if any, disability Plaintiff suffers from, or provide any
23 details regarding the “Zone of Danger” and what sort of risk of danger it posed to Plaintiff.
24 Plaintiff does not identify what accommodations he requested. Plaintiff alleges that he “suffered
25 harm,” but fails to provide any details regarding any harm he suffered.
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Plaintiff also alleges that he filed a complaint with the EEOC, but the Social Security

27 Administration lied during the investigation. Plaintiff provides no details regarding how Social
28 Security lied or what they lied about. Plaintiff also makes vague allegations that Social Security

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1 did not act in good faith, but fails to provide any factual details. For example, Plaintiff alleges
2 that Social Security did not allow a “union rep” to be present during a meeting, but fails to
3 explain how that constitutes a lack of good faith or what provision of law requires Social
4 Security to allow the “union rep” to be present. Plaintiff alleges that he was “threatened” by an
5 “Al Ballon,” but provides no details regarding what was said. Plaintiff further alleges that Social
6 Security attempted to “assess AWOL charges, then to remove Plaintiff from his job.” (Compl. ¶
7 7.)
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III.

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DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s ADA Claim

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A.

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Liberally construed, it appears that Plaintiff attempts to state a claim under the Americans

12 with Disabilities Act for employment discrimination based upon his disability. “[T]o establish a
13 prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA [Plaintiff] must show that [he]: (1) is disabled;
14 (2) is qualified; and (3) suffered an adverse employment action because of [his] disability.”
15 Snead v. Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001).
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Plaintiff’s complaint consists entirely of vague labels and conclusions and does not

17 contain sufficient factual detail to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Plaintiff
18 merely recited elements of a disability discrimination claim without alleging facts which show
19 how those elements are met.
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Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to plausibly support

21 the conclusion that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Plaintiff alleges no facts
22 pertaining to his disability. The ADA defines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that
23 substantially limits one or more major life activities...” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Plaintiff alleges
24 no facts which show how this definition is met.
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Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to plausibly support

26 the conclusion that he “is qualified.” The ADA defines “qualified individual” as “an individual
27 who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
28 employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Plaintiff’s

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1 complaint fails to allege any facts identifying the essential functions of his job or whether he
2 could perform those functions with or without reasonable accommodation. Plaintiff does not
3 identify what reasonable accommodation would entail.
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Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to plausibly support

5 the conclusion that he “suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability.”
6 Plaintiff’s complaint is unclear, because it appears Plaintiff was terminated after Plaintiff did not
7 show up to work for three months. Plaintiff fails to allege any facts explaining how this three
8 month absence from work was related to his disability.
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Finally, Plaintiff alleges, in conclusory fashion, that Defendant failed to engage in the

10 interactive process in good faith.

“Once an employer becomes aware of the need for

11 accommodation, that employer has a mandatory obligation under the ADA to engage in an
12 interactive process with the employee to identify and implement appropriate reasonable
13 accommodations.” Humphrey v. Memorial Hospitals Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir.
14 2001) (citing Barnett v. U.S. Air, 228 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000)). “The interactive process
15 requires communication and good-faith exploration of possible accommodations between
16 employers and individual employees, and neither side can delay or obstruct the process.” Id.
17 (citations omitted). “Employers, who fail to engage in the interactive process in good faith, face
18 liability for the remedies imposed by the statute of a reasonable accommodation would have
19 been possible.” Id. (citation omitted).
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Aside from identifying a reasonable accommodation that would have been possible,

21 Plaintiff fails to allege facts which plausibly support the conclusion that Defendant “delay[ed] or
22 obstruct[ed]” the interactive process.

Plaintiff alleges that a union representative was not

23 allowed to be present at one meeting, but the Court is unaware of any law which suggests that
24 the presence of a union representative is required. Plaintiff alleges that he was ordered to go
25 back to work, but the mere fact that the interactive process did not produce an outcome
26 satisfactory to Plaintiff is not sufficient in and of itself to state a claim. Plaintiff vague alleges
27 that he was threatened by an “Al Ballon,” but fails to elaborate on that allegation. Plaintiff also
28 alleges that his medical information was not forwarded to a medical officer, but fails to

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1 demonstrate how that created delay or obstructed the interactive process.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any

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3 cognizable claims.
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B.

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“Generally, Rule 15 advises the court that ‘leave [to amend the complaint] shall be freely

Leave to Amend

6 given when justice so requires.’

This policy is ‘to be applied with extreme liberality.’”

7 Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Owens v.
8 Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001)). The factors the Court
9 should consider in deciding whether to grant leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith or
10 dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
11 previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
12 amendment, and futility of the amendment. Id. at 1052.
In accordance with the “extreme liberality” with which leave to amend should be granted,

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14 the Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint to cure the deficiencies
15 identified herein.
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IV.

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any

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19 cognizable claims.
Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with

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21 leave to amend. Plaintiff shall file his amended complaint, if any, within thirty (30) days from
22 the date of service of this order. Plaintiff is forewarned that failure to file a timely amended
23 complaint will result in a recommendation that this action be closed.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.

26 Dated:

March 11, 2015
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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