Costello v. Brown et al

Filing 36

ORDER signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 12/10/2015 ORDERING the Court GRANTS with prejudice Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 11 , 12 , 13 . CASE CLOSED (Reader, L)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SARAH COSTELLO,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., Governor
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of the State of California; WILL )
LIGHTBOURNE, Director of
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California Department of Social )
Services; RHONDA SJOSTROM, Human )
Resources Director of Tulare
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County Health and Human Services )
Agency, a political subdivision )
of the State of California;
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TULARE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT;
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ALICIA ZAYAS; EVANGELINE
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SIONGCO; KAREN WHITED; MANDI
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LEWIS; and DOES I through X,
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inclusive,
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Defendants.
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Case No. 1:15-CV-00252 JAM-SKO

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Defendants filed three separate but similar motions to dismiss

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plaintiff Sarah Costello’s (“Costello”) complaint.

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defendants Edmund G. Brown, Jr. and Will Lightbourne (collectively

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“State Defendants”) moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of

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Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Doc. #11).

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defendants Rhonda Sjostrom, Karen Whited, and Alicia Zayas
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First,

Second,

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(collectively “Individual Defendants”) moved to dismiss pursuant to

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FRCP 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Doc. #12).

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County Superior Court moved to dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6)

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(Doc. #13).

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motions to dismiss. 1

Finally, defendant Tulare

As discussed below, the Court grants all three of the

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I.

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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Between October 2012 and August 2013, several hearings were
held to determine whether Costello should maintain jurisdiction

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over her minor children, R.M. and J.C.

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petition to place R.M. and J.C. into the custody of the Juvenile

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Dependency Court was filed in Riverside County, California.

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¶ 15.

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Court for final determination of Costello’s parental rights.

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Compl. ¶ 16.

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hearing, held pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code

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(“WIC”) section 366.26, at which the Tulare County Superior Court

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permanently terminated Costello’s parental rights.

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The decision was affirmed on appeal by the Fifth Appellate District

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Court of Appeal.

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Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Exh. A.

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denied Costello’s petition for review on June 11, 2014. RJN, Exh.

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B.

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On October 12, 2012, a

Compl.

The case was then transferred to Tulare County Superior

The investigation culminated in an August 8, 2013

Compl. ¶18.

Sjostrom, Whited, and Zayas’s Request for
The California Supreme Court

Costello subsequently filed this complaint on February 18,

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2015 (Doc. #1).

Costello alleges four counts of “Violation of

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Civil Rights-Denial of Due Process” and one count of “Violation of

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These motions were determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled
for November 4, 2015.
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Civil Rights.”

In count one, Costello alleges that all defendants

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violated her constitutional right to not be separated from her

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children without due process.

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all defendants intruded upon her privacy in violation of her “due

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process, liberty and property interests.”

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two, Costello alleges that all defendants violated her procedural

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and substantive due process rights by unreasonably and arbitrarily

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applying WIC section 366 et seq., thereby violating 42 U.S.C.

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section 1983.

Compl. ¶ 31.

Compl. ¶ 27.

She also alleges that

Compl. ¶ 28.

In count

Costello repeats these allegations in

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count three, but broadens her claim to allege that WIC section 366,

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et seq. is facially unconstitutional.

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which is only against DOES I-VIII, repeats the allegations of

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counts one through three.

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alleges that “Tulare County Health and Human Services Agency and

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DOES IX through X” were deliberately indifferent to the training of

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its agents and officers and “fed a culture of misconduct.”

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¶ 39.

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and permanent injunctions to prevent termination of her parental

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rights and reunification services and to bar the implementation of

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adoption, and a declaration that the WIC is unconstitutional

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facially and as applied to Costello.

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Compl. ¶ 33.

Compl. ¶¶ 35-36.

Count four,

Finally, count five

Compl.

Costello requests general and special damages, preliminary

Compl. at 16-17.

All of the defendants filed timely motions to dismiss (Doc. ##

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11, 12, 13).

Costello did not oppose the motions. (See Doc. #35

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striking Costello’s untimely opposition.)

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II.

OPINION

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A.

Judicial Notice

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Individual Defendants seek judicial notice pursuant to
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Federal Rule of Evidence 201 of the following two documents:

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(1) the opinion in In re J.C. et al, Persons Coming Under the

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Juvenile Court Law, Tulare County Health and Human Services Agency

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v. S.C., F068011, Super. Ct. No. JJV066587A, B (RJN, Exh. A), and

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(2) the California Supreme Court Docket (Register for Actions) for

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In re J.C., Case No. S218026 (RJN, Exh. B).

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A court may take judicial notice of a fact that is not

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reasonably disputed if it “can be accurately and readily

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determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be

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questioned.”

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courts are allowed to consider “matters of public record.”

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Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Investments, 779 F.3d 1036,

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1042 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593

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F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010)).

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Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).

On a motion to dismiss,

The documents submitted by Individual Defendants are in the

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public record and are not subject to reasonable dispute.

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the Court takes judicial notice of both documents.

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B.

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As such,

Analysis
1.

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

State Defendants, Individual Defendants, and Tulare County

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Superior Court all argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the

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Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over Costello’s

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claims.

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Costello did not respond to this argument.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars lower federal courts from

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reviewing state court judgments.

Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263

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U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.

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462, 476 (1983).

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as her injury legal error . . . by the state and seeks as her

The doctrine applies when the plaintiff “asserts

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remedy relief from the state court judgment.”

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Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004).

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issues that are “inextricably intertwined” with a state court

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judgment.

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A “federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state-court

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judgment . . . [w]here federal relief can only be predicated upon a

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conviction that the state court was wrong.”

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Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987).

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federal district court must refuse to hear the de facto appeal of a

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state court judgment, as well as “any issue raised in the suit that

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is inextricably intertwined with an issue resolved by the state

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court.”

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doctrine applies even when a party raises constitutional challenges

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to the state court proceeding.

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805 F.2d 888, 891 (9th Cir. 1986); De Rosier v. Longaker, No. 2:11-

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CV-01617-MCE, 2012 WL 2160965, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 2012).

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Kougasian v. TMSL,

It also applies to

Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 778-79 (9th Cir. 2012).

Id. at 779 (quoting
As such, a

Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003).

The

Worldwide Church of God v. McNair,

Here, Costello is seeking a de facto appeal of the state court

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judgment terminating her parental rights.

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directly asks the Court to issue an injunction that would

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essentially overturn the decision by the Tulare County Superior

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Court to terminate her reunification services and parental rights

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and to implement adoption services.

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that the court denied her due process by holding the final WIC

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section 366.26 hearing without her present.

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Under the factors discussed by Kougasian, this claim for relief is

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clearly a de facto appeal of the state court’s decision.

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alleges a legal error by the state - the violation of her due

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process - and Costello is seeking relief from the state court
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In count one, Costello

Compl. ¶ 28.

Costello argues

Compl. ¶¶ 18, 28.

Costello

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judgment by requesting permanent injunctions overturning the state

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court’s decisions.

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Costello’s remaining counts are inextricably intertwined to

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her de facto appeal.

In counts two and three, Costello argues that

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the state court decisions were arbitrary and unreasonable because

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they relied upon unconstitutional California law.

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33.

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the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. section 1983.

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On each of these four counts, the Court could not afford federal

Compl. ¶¶ 31,

Costello seeks damages in counts four and five, arguing that
Compl. ¶¶ 36, 39.

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relief without ruling that “the state court was wrong.”

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Cooper,

704 F.3d at 779.

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As pointed out by Individual Defendants and State Defendants,

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several cases directly support the Court’s conclusion that Rooker-

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Feldman bars the Court from exercising jurisdiction over Costello’s

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complaint.

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the Ninth Circuit ruled that the federal district court could not

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exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim that a state court

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child custody proceeding violated his constitutional rights.

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court concluded that plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claim was

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barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it was a

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“forbidden de facto appeal of a state court decision.”

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In

In Sareen v. Sareen, 356 F. App'x 977 (9th Cir. 2009),

The

Id.

Thompson v. Santa Cruz Cnty. Human Servs. Dep't, No. 12-

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CV-03894-LHK, 2013 WL 1750960, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013)

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plaintiffs alleged that a Juvenile Court judge committed various

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procedural errors that denied them a fair trial. Plaintiffs also

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alleged that the county health services agency and the adopting

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parents engaged in misconduct in connection with the custody

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proceedings.

Id.

The Thompson court concluded that the Rooker6

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Feldman doctrine barred it from exercising jurisdiction over all of

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the claims.

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Court judge was a de facto appeal because plaintiffs were asserting

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that the judge committed legal errors and were seeking relief from

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the state court judgment.

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against the health agency and the adoptive parents were

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inextricably intertwined because “the issues raised and conduct

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alleged in these claims was considered” by the judge.

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It found that plaintiffs’ claim against the Juvenile

Id. at *5-6.

Moreover, the claims

Id. at *6.

Just as the plaintiffs did in Sareen and Thompson, Costello is

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attempting to have a federal district court review the final

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determinations of a state court.

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is a de facto appeal from a final state court judgment.

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remaining claims contained in the complaint are at minimum

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inextricably linked to the de facto appeal.

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Rooker-Feldman doctrine is clear: federal district courts must

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refuse to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.

Count one in Costello’s complaint
And the

In such cases, the

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III.

ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 10, 2015

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