Hammond v. Jewell et al

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM and ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 10/7/2015 GRANTING 16 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff has twenty days from the date this Order is signed to file an amended complaint, if he can do so consistent with this Order. (Kirksey Smith, K)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 PATRICK HAMMOND III, Plaintiff, 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 CIV. NO. 1:15-00391 WBS SKO MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS v. SALLY JEWELL, Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior; INTERIOR BOARD OF INDIAN APPEALS, U.S. Department of the Interior; AMY DUTSCHKE, Regional Director, Pacific Regional Office, Bureau of Indian Affairs; TROY BURDICK, Superintendent, Central California Agency, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Defendants. 23 24 25 ----oo0oo---Plaintiff alleges he was ousted from the leadership of 26 the Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians Tribe in violation 27 of tribal law and brought this suit against numerous federal 28 defendants seeking reinstatement to the Tribal Council. 1 1 Presently before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss for 2 lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of 3 Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim 4 pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 5 I. Factual and Procedural Background 6 Plaintiff was elected to the Tribal Council of the 7 Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians Tribe in December 2008. 8 (Compl. ¶ 10.) 9 Tribal Council for alleged violations of the tribal Ethics After initially suspending plaintiff from the 10 Ordinance, the Tribal Council permanently removed him on June 17, 11 2011 after a hearing. 12 (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) Following the December 3, 2011 election, three factions 13 were embroiled in a power struggle over tribal leadership, 14 resulting in legal disputes in the Tribal Court and even 15 violence. 16 the factions and it does not appear that their leadership 17 disputes were related to plaintiff’s removal from the Tribal 18 Council. 19 factions submitted contracts under the Indian Self-Determination 20 and Education Assistance Act (“ISDEAA”) to the Bureau of Indian 21 Affairs (“BIA”). 22 2014 BIA Decision”) (Docket No. 16-2).) 23 (Id. ¶¶ 19-23.) Plaintiff was not a member of any of Asserting conflicting claims of leadership, all three (See id. ¶ 23; Defs.’ Ex. B. at 1 (“Feb. 11, The BIA Superintendent returned the contract requests 24 from all three factions and concluded it would recognize the 25 results of the disputed December 1, 2012 election. 26 2014 BIA Decision at 6.) 27 Superintendent’s decision and the BIA Regional Director affirmed 28 the decision to return all three contract requests, but vacated (Feb. 11, All three factions appealed the 2 1 the decision to recognize the results of the disputed election 2 because the BIA did not have “the authority to determine which of 3 the opposing factions[’] interpretation of the Tribe’s law is 4 correct.” 5 “recognition of a government is essential for the purpose of 6 contracting under the ISDEAA and that the BIA “will conduct 7 business, on an interim basis, with the last uncontested Tribal 8 Council elected December 2010.” 9 not identify plaintiff as a member of that Tribal Council because (Id.) The Regional Director determined that (Id.) The Regional Director did 10 “[t]he record reflects that Nokomis Hernandez was appointed by 11 the Tribal Council to replace Patrick Hammond, III.” 12 n.3.) 13 (Id. at 3 Two factions and plaintiff appealed that decision to 14 the BIA Office of Hearings and Appeals and a two-judge panel 15 concluded that exigent circumstances justified making the 16 Regional Director’s decision to recognize the 2010 Tribal Council 17 “for government-to-government purposes” effective immediately. 18 (Defs.’ Ex. C at 5 (“Feb. 9, 2015 BIA Decision”) (Docket No. 16- 19 3).) 20 acceptance of his subsequent removal from the Council and 21 replacement,” the panel did not address the merits of that 22 dispute in its February 9, 2015 decision. 23 Although plaintiff had appealed “the Regional Director’s (Id. at 5 n.2.) Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit, alleging he was 24 “unethically and unconstitutionally removed from his position on 25 the Tribal Council.” 26 attempted to seek help from defendants in resolving his allegedly 27 wrongful removal, but defendants “failed to exercise their 28 inherent authority to correct this manifest injustice and error.” (Compl. ¶ 15.) 3 He further alleges that he 1 (Id. ¶ 17.) 2 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a denial of procedural due process; (2) 3 the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 1302; and (3) 4 the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706 et seq. 5 He asks the court to vacate the February 11, 2014 and February 9, 6 2015 BIA decisions, declare that his removal by the Tribal 7 Council was invalid and void, and declare that he is a member of 8 the Tribal Council. 9 dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction Plaintiff asserts claims for violations of (1) 42 (Id. at 8-9.) Defendants now move to 10 pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or, alternatively, for failure to state 11 a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12 12(b)(6). 13 II. Discussion 14 Rule 12(b)(1) authorizes a court to dismiss an action 15 over which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 16 challenges the court’s jurisdiction, the party invoking its 17 jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction 18 exists. 19 376 (1994); Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 20 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Hertz 21 Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010). 22 When a party Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must 23 accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all 24 reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. 25 Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by 26 Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 27 319, 322 (1972). 28 must plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is See Scheuer v. To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff 4 1 plausible on its face.” 2 544, 570 (2007). 3 for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 4 unlawfully,” and where a plaintiff pleads facts that are “merely 5 consistent with a defendant’s liability,” it “stops short of the 6 line between possibility and plausibility.” 7 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 8 A. 9 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. This “plausibility standard,” however, “asks Ashcroft v. Iqbal, Section 1983 and ICRA Claims “Internal matters of a tribe are generally reserved for 10 resolution by the tribe itself, through a policy of Indian self- 11 determination and self-government as mandated by the Indian Civil 12 Rights Act.” 13 1171, 1185 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (O’Neill, J.). 14 generally lacks jurisdiction to resolve matters of internal 15 tribal governance.1 16 11, 2014 decision, “the determination of tribal leadership is 17 quintessentially an intra-tribal matter raising issues of tribal 18 sovereignty.” 19 v. Acting Sacramento Area Dir., 29 I.B.I.A. 122, 123, 1996 WL 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. Kennedy, 687 F. Supp. 2d Id. A district court thus As the BIA recognized in its February (Feb. 11, 2014 BIA Decision at 6 (quoting Hamilton 1 There is an exception where a tribe’s own governing documents vest federal agencies with ultimate authority over certain decisions. Alto v. Black, 738 F.3d 1111, 1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that the BIA had authority to decide a membership dispute where the tribe’s own constitution required the BIA to approve the deletion of individual’s names from membership). The Constitution of the Picayune Reservation does not vest the BIA with the authority to review internal tribal leadership disputes. (See Defs.’ Ex. A (Constitution of the Picayune Reservation); see also Feb. 11, 2014 BIA Decision at 6 (“There is no provision in the Tribe’s Constitution or federal law that provides the BIA with authority to determine which of the opposing factions[’] interpretation of the Tribe’s law is correct . . . .”).) 5 1 165057, at *2 (Mar. 12, 1996))); see also In re Sac & Fox Tribe 2 of Miss. in Iowa/Meskwaki Casino Litig., 340 F.3d 749, 763-64 3 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the district court lacked 4 jurisdiction to resolve an internal tribal election dispute); see 5 Timbisha, 687 F. Supp. at 1185 (considering elections to be among 6 the internal affairs of the tribe that do not come within the 7 purview of review by federal courts). 8 9 Here, plaintiff’s § 1983 and ICRA claims are based on the allegation that his removal from the Tribal Council violated 10 tribal law, and his prayer for relief asks the court to order 11 that he be reinstated on the Tribal Council. 12 seeks “a form of relief that the federal courts cannot provide, 13 namely, resolution of [an] internal tribal leadership dispute,” 14 the court lacks jurisdiction over his claims. 15 Tribe, 340 F.3d at 763; see also Timbisha, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 16 1185 (holding that the plaintiff’s claims were non-justiciable in 17 federal court because they would require the court to resolve the 18 parties’ election dispute, an issue central to tribal self- 19 determination and self-government). 20 grant defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 and ICRA 21 claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 22 Because plaintiff In re Sac & Fox Accordingly, the court must B. APA Claim 23 Plaintiff’s ICRA claim also fails because “ICRA does not operate against the federal government.” Cal. Valley Miwok Tribe v. Salazar, 967 F. Supp. 2d 84, 93 (D.D.C. 2013); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-- . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law . . . .” (emphasis added). 2 24 25 26 27 28 6 1 The APA permits a reviewing court to review a “final 2 agency action,” 5 U.S.C. § 704, and “hold unlawful and set aside 3 actions, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, 4 capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 5 accordance with law.” 6 for § 1331 purposes is whether the BIA violated the APA; that it 7 is claimed to have done so in a case involving application of 8 tribal law does not matter, any more than it would matter to 9 § 1331 jurisdiction over an APA case involving an issue of state 10 law.” 11 Id. § 706(2)(A). “The federal question Alto v. Black, 738 F.3d 1111, 1124 (9th Cir. 2013). Under the APA, “[a] person suffering a legal wrong 12 because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by 13 agency action within the meaning of a particular statute, is 14 entitled to judicial review thereof.” 15 added). 16 is no right to sue for a violation of the APA in the absence of a 17 ‘relevant statute’ whose violation ‘forms the legal basis for 18 [the] complaint.’” 19 of Immigration Review, 959 F.2d 742, 753 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 20 Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990)). 21 5 U.S.C. § 702 (emphasis “Section 702 does not create substantive rights. There El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Exec. Office “Absent a statute with substantive standards, judicial 22 review is precluded because there is no ‘law to apply [and] “no 23 meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise 24 of discretion.”’” 25 Interior, No. 2:14-CV-00951-SU, 2015 WL 1538501, at *11 (D. Or. 26 Apr. 7, 2015) (quoting Or. Nat’l Res. Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 27 792, 798 (9th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original)); see also Pub. 28 Lands for the People, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 733 F. Supp. Eason Land Co., LLC v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of 7 1 2d 1172, 1180 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“A claim that an agency acted 2 arbitrarily and capriciously for purposes of the APA cannot 3 ‘stand free of any other law.’ 4 mechanism for enforcing obligations arising under other 5 authority.” (quoting Or. Nat’l Res. Council, 92 F.3d at 798)). 6 Instead, the APA provides a Here, plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege what 7 statute provides the substantive standards to review the BIA’s 8 decision and appears to allege only a deficient, free-standing 9 claim that the BIA’s decision was “arbitrary and capricious” in 10 violation of the APA. 11 To the extent plaintiff relies on the Due Process 12 Clause as the “standard against which to judge the agency’s 13 exercise of discretion,” Or. Nat’l Res. Council, 92 F.3d at 798, 14 this claim must fail. 15 under the Fifth Amendment, [the plaintiff] must first establish a 16 constitutionally protected interest. 17 more than a unilateral expectation of it; instead, she must have 18 a legitimate claim of entitlement.” 19 F.3d 653, 660 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Bd. of Regents of State 20 Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972)). 21 interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. 22 Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by 23 existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 24 source such as state law-—rules or understandings that secure 25 certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those 26 benefits.” 27 28 “To assert a procedural due process claim [The plaintiff] must have Stanley v. Gonzales, 476 “Property Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. Here, the system of tribal leadership and plaintiff’s ability and right to serve on the Tribal Council stem exclusively 8 1 from the Constitution of the Picayune Reservation. 2 Ex. A at arts. VII, X (Constitution of the Picayune 3 Reservation).) 4 federal or state statute or right gave him a legitimate claim of 5 entitlement to his continued service on the Tribal Council. 6 Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie, 812 F.2d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 7 1986) (holding that even though a federal statute gives “Indians 8 . . . a preference for appointment to vacancies in the 9 administration of services or functions affecting Indians,” such (See Defs.’ Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege that any 10 as the BIA, the statute “did not create proprietary rights to 11 Cf. their jobs”). 12 Even assuming the BIA decisions could be challenged 13 under the APA, plaintiff does not challenge the limited decision 14 the BIA reached in this case. 15 for carrying on government relations with the Tribe, is obligated 16 to recognize and deal with some tribal governing body in the 17 interim before resolution of [] election dispute[s].” 18 v. Grassrope, 708 F.2d 335, 339 (8th Cir. 1983). 19 decisions challenged in this case, the BIA acted within its 20 limited authority to recognize tribal leadership on an interim 21 basis for the limited purpose of government-to-government 22 dealings. 23 the election disputes and expressly refrained from interfering 24 with the tribe’s sovereignty in that respect. 25 BIA Decision at 6 (recognizing that it “does not have the 26 authority to determine the Tribe’s permanent leadership”); Feb. 27 9, 2015 BIA Decision at 5.) 28 “The BIA, in its responsibility Goodface In the As the BIA explained, it lacked the ability to resolve (See Feb. 11, 2014 Plaintiff does not challenge the BIA’s decision 9 1 regarding whom to deal with in the interim for “government-to- 2 government” purposes while the Tribe resolves its leadership 3 disputes. 4 to address the merits of his allegedly unlawful removal from the 5 Tribal Council in violation of tribal law. 6 (“Review of the subject decision and subsequent determination to 7 make that decision effective is sought insofar as said decision 8 states that 1) the Tribal Council’s removal of plaintiff from the 9 Tribal Council on or about June 17, 2011, is valid action; 2) Instead, plaintiff seeks review of the BIA’s refusal (See Compl. ¶ 2 10 plaintiff is not a member of the Tribal Council pursuant to the 11 election held on December 5, 2010, and; 3) plaintiff is not a 12 member of the last undisputed Tribal council.”).) 13 In Goodface, tribe factions similarly disputed a tribal 14 election and the BIA refused to recognize either faction and 15 indicated it would “deal with both councils on a de facto basis.” 16 708 F.2d at 337. 17 arbitrarily and capriciously by effectively creating a hiatus in 18 tribal government” and was “obligated to recognize and deal with 19 some tribal governing body in the interim before resolution of 20 the election dispute.” 21 however, that the district court “should not have addressed the 22 merits of the election dispute” in reviewing the BIA’s action and 23 “overstepped the boundaries of its jurisdiction in interpreting 24 the tribal constitution and bylaws and addressing the merits of 25 the election dispute.” 26 The Eighth Circuit held that the BIA “acted Id. at 338-39. It further explained, Id. at 339. Even if this court somehow interprets plaintiff’s 27 allegations as attacking the BIA’s decision that plaintiff was 28 not a member of the Tribal Council that it recognized for interim 10 1 government-to-government relations and that the decision is 2 subject to attack under the APA, the court could not assess 3 plaintiff’s claims without “interpreting the tribal constitution 4 and bylaws and addressing the merits” of plaintiff’s removal by 5 the Tribal Council. 6 jurisdiction to engage in this inquiry.3 7 C. 8 Similar to the BIA, the court lacks Id. Conclusion In Lewis v. Norton, the Ninth Circuit observed that 9 “[t]he plaintiffs of course did not sue the tribe directly, but 10 filed this action against the federal agencies responsible for 11 the regulation of tribal affairs, including gaming. 12 because they recognized that tribal immunity would create, at the 13 least, a serious obstacle.” 14 The Ninth Circuit explained that the plaintiffs’ “efforts to do 15 an end run around tribal immunity must also fail” because 16 “tribes, not the federal government, retain authority to 17 determine tribal membership.” 18 the federal government in an attempt to avoid tribal immunity 19 with respect to intra-tribal affairs. 20 plaintiff from his leadership position and plaintiff’s avenue to 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 They did so 424 F.3d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 2005). Id. A plaintiff cannot simply sue The Tribal Council removed Nor do the other cases plaintiff cites aid his position. In Salazar, a tribal faction challenged only the BIA’s determination of the faction it would recognize for governmentto-government relations and the district court did not identify the controlling standard for review under the APA. See 967 F. Supp. 2d at 89. Payton v. U.S. Department of Agriculture involved a farmer’s challenge under the APA of a Department of Agriculture decision and thus tribal sovereignty and immunity were not implicated. 337 F.3d 1163, 1165, 1168 (10th Cir. 2003). The BIA decision reviewed in Bernard v. U.S. Department of Interior, dealt with the BIA’s own alleged misconduct and similarly did not involve tribal sovereignty or immunity. 674 F.3d 904, 906-07 (8th Cir. 2012). 11 1 challenge that action remains with the Tribe. 2 Accordingly, because the court lacks jurisdiction to 3 hear plaintiff’s § 1983 and ICRA claims and plaintiff fails to 4 allege a cognizable claim under the APA over which the court 5 could exercise jurisdiction, the court must grant defendants’ 6 motion to dismiss. 7 plaintiff’s claims are subject to dismissal, the court need not 8 address defendants’ alternative argument that plaintiff lacks 9 Article III standing. 10 11 Because the court finds that all of IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to dismiss be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 12 Plaintiff has twenty days from the date this Order is 13 signed to file an amended complaint, if he can do so consistent 14 with this Order. 15 Dated: October 7, 2015 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12

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