Singh et al v. Bunch et al

Filing 27

ORDER signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr. on 1/6/2016 ORDERING defendants' 15 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs have fourteen days to file an amended complaint. (Zignago, K.)

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2
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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7
8

PRAVEEN SINGH, an individual;
and JOYTESHNA KARAN, an
individual,

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10
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12
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15
16

No. 1:15-cv-00646-GEB-BAM

Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS

v.
KIRK BUNCH, an individual;
FRANK NAVARRO, an individual;
JOHN EVERS, an individual;
DAVID HARRIS; BIRGIT
FLADAGER; COUNTY OF
STANISLAUS, a government
entity; ADAM CHRISTIANSON;
STANISLAUS COUNTY SHERIFF
DEPARTMENT, a government
entity; and DOES 1–100,
inclusive,

17

Defendants.

18
19

Defendants Birgit Fladager, County of Stanislaus (the

20

“County”), Stanislaus County Sheriff Department (the “Sheriff’s

21

Department”), Adam Christianson (“Sheriff Christianson”), David

22

Harris,

23

dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6)

24

of certain federal and state claims Plaintiffs Praveen Singh and

25

Joyteshna

26

Complaint.

(Defs.’

27

Defendants

Harris

and

Kirk

Karan

Bunch

(collectively,

(collectively,
Mot.
and

to

Bunch

“Defendants”)

“Plaintiffs”)

Dismiss
also

28
1

allege

(“Mot.”),

move

for

a

ECF
more

in
No.

seek

their
15.)

definite

1

statement under Rule 12(e) of any claim against them that is not

2

dismissed without leave to amend. (Mot. 14:19–21.)

3

I.

4
5

The

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

following

factual

allegations

in

the

Complaint

concern the motions.

6

Since 2003, Plaintiff Singh “has been the subject of an

7

erroneous and malicious investigation related to the homicide of

8

Korey Kauffman.” (Compl. ¶ 15, ECF No. 1.) “It appears the . . .

9

investigation . . .

10

is

politically

motivated,

or . . .

a[]

personal vendetta by Defendants.” (Compl. ¶ 18.)

11

District

Defendant

Investigator Defendant Bunch led the investigation. (Compl. ¶¶ 3,

14

9, 16.) Further, officers “from the Turlock, Modesto, and Ceres

15

Police

16

Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Department were involved in a joint

17

task force investigating the crime.” (Compl. ¶ 20.)
“At
came

to

some

point

believe

Department

during

this

[Plaintiff]

and

of

District

Deputy

13

[the]

Harris,

Chief

District

Departments,

Defendant

Fladager,

12

18

Attorney

Attorney

Corrections,

investigation,

the

Defendant

Bunch

20

murder.” (Compl. ¶ 20.) “Investigators[1] have engaged in an all-

21

out bully campaign against [Plaintiff] Singh and the ‘Indian’

22

community . . . .”

23

business and residence of” another individual, who Investigators

24

thought had information about the homicide. (Compl. ¶ 19 n.2.)

25

Plaintiff Karan has “been investigated, harmed, and bullied by

¶ 19.)

was

and

19

(Compl.

Singh

Attorney

involved

Investigators

in

“searched

the

the

26
27
1

28

Plaintiffs refer to Defendants Bunch, Frank Navarro, and John Evers as
“Investigators.” (Compl. ¶ 12.)

2

1

the District Attorney’s office, [Defendant] Bunch, and

2

unidentified] Defendants.” (Compl. ¶ 19 (emphasis removed).)

[other

3

Before September 6, 2013, “a confidential witness hired

4

by [Defendant] Bunch” called Plaintiff Singh and “attempted to

5

induce

6

“Although [Plaintiff] Singh had [no involvement with the murder

7

and therefore no information] to offer [to] the investigation,

8

he . . . cooperated with Investigators.” (Compl. ¶ 21.)

[him]

9

to

‘talk’

about

the

murder.”

(Compl.

¶ 21.)

On October 2, 2013, Plaintiff Singh sat for a polygraph

10

examination.

11

their attack on” Plaintiff Singh’s friends and family. (Compl.

12

¶ 23.) Defendant Bunch follows a pattern where “he would threaten

13

the friends and family of [Plaintiff] Singh, [and] accus[e] . . .

14

[Plaintiff]

15

run[ning]

16

(emphasis removed).) “On numerous occasions, [Plaintiff] Singh’s

17

friends were threatened by Investigators to ‘get away from Singh’

18

because ‘he is a murderer’ and ‘a pimp.’” (Compl. ¶ 24.)

19

(Compl.

Singh
some

“On

¶ 22.)

‘[of

sort

or

Thereafter,

being]

of

a

a

“Investigators

murderer’

prostitution

about

and . . .

ring.”

September 13,

began

[of]

(Compl.

2013,

¶ 23

Plaintiff

20

[Karan] . . . voluntarily went to the District Attorney’s office

21

to ‘talk’ about the investigation.” (Compl. ¶ 25.) “At this time,

22

[Plaintiffs] Singh and Karan were the parents of one child, and

23

[Plaintiff]

24

child . . . .”

25

cooperating

26

truthfully, Investigators threatened [her] with an investigation

27

for

28

wanted[,]’”

real

Karan

was

[five-months]

(Compl.

with

estate

¶ 26.)

“Although

Investigators,

fraud

meaning

if

pregnant

she

“information
3

[Plaintiff]

answering

didn’t

with

‘give

their

them

incriminating

a

second

Karan

was

questions

what

they

[Plaintiff]

1

Singh.” (Compl. ¶ 25.) Defendant Bunch told Plaintiff Karan, “If

2

you don’t stay away [from Singh], I will come and take your kids

3

away and put them in foster care,” (Compl. ¶ 26 (alteration in

4

original) (emphasis removed)), and, “I will investigate you and

5

take your children away.” (Compl. ¶ 26 (emphasis removed).)

6

Plaintiff
he

Singh

was

October 29,

investigation.” (Compl. ¶ 27.) While in jail, Plaintiff Singh was

9

housed with members of the Northern Ryders gang. (Compl. ¶ 28.)

11

[Plaintiff] Singh with these gang members by listening in on

12

conversations.” (Compl. ¶ 28.) His “bail bond was posted at about

13

10:00 PM the same day, but [he] was[ not] released until 4:00

14

AM.” (Compl. ¶ 28.)
or

about

November 11,

2013,

to

murder

During

On

“attempted

the

10

15

Bunch

regarding

2013,

8

Defendant

not

on

“although

time,

it

arrested

7

this

learned

was

‘set

Plaintiff

up’

“Singh

16

voluntarily called [Defendant] Bunch and asked him ‘What do you

17

want from me?’” (Compl. ¶ 29 (emphasis removed).)

18

Plaintiff

Singh

was

again

arrested

on

November 27,

19

2013; the arrest was unrelated to the homicide. (Compl. ¶ 30.)

20

“[A]fter his arrest, Investigators sought and placed [Plaintiff]

21

Singh under a [section] 1275 hold.”2 (Compl. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff

22

Singh was again housed with Northern Ryders gang members. (Compl.

23

¶ 36.) “A gang member told [Plaintiff] Singh that [Defendant]

24

Bunch told them that Singh was a ‘snitch’ . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 37.)

25

“Because of this accusation by [Defendant] Bunch, several members

26

threatened

[Plaintiff]

Singh

with

his

life.”

(Compl.

¶ 37.)

27
2

28

Plaintiffs presumably refer to California Penal Code section 1275, which
concerns bail issues.

4

1

Plaintiff “Singh immediately yelled for a guard[,]” and was moved

2

to a laundry facility. (Compl. ¶ 38.)

3

On

December 2,

2013,

Plaintiff

“Karan

delivered

her

4

child.” (Compl. ¶ 41.) “The birth had complications due to the

5

stress

6

being in jail . . ., together with the threats by [Defendant]

7

Bunch.” (Compl. ¶ 41.)

suffered

8
9

by

[Plaintiff]

Karan,

from

[Plaintiff]

Singh

On February 27, 2014, Plaintiff Singh was arrested “for
violation

of

Welfare
Before

Institutions
arrest,

§ 14107(b)(4)(a).”

(Compl.

11

unidentified person the keys to Plaintiff Karan’s real estate

12

brokerage,

13

“search[ed]

14

ended up seizing the majority of [its] files, computers, and

15

printers.” (Compl. ¶ 44.) Thereafter, Plaintiff “Singh was taken

16

to the Investigators[’] office . . ., where [Plaintiff] Singh was

17

asked questions about the murder investigation.” (Compl. ¶ 44.)

Royal

his

Code

10

18

¶ 43.)

and

Royalty.

[Royal

Plaintiff

(Compl.

Realty’s] . . .

Singh

¶ 43.)

files[

and]

gave

an

Investigators
computers,

and

“On or about April 2, 2014, Investigators went to the

19

office

of

Stewart

20

Realty . . . .”

21

“Singh

22

Stewart Title ‘on notice’ [of the homicide investigation] with

23

the goal that it would harm [Plaintiff] Singh financially if

24

Investigators could convince Stewart Title to drop Royal Realty

25

[and

26

Defendants’

27

business with” Plaintiffs. (Compl. ¶ 49.)

stood

Title,

(Compl.

to

Plaintiffs]

benefit

as

actions,

a

¶ 47.)
from

title

Investigators
a

customers.”
“Stewart

company

pending

(Compl.

Title

28
5

did

used

by

learned

transaction,

¶ 47.)
in

fact

Royal

Plaintiff
and

Because
stop

put

of

doing

1

Plaintiffs also allege the County, Defendant Fladager,

2

and Defendant Harris have policies that include: (1) failing to

3

train on “constitutional limits on the use of force and abuse of

4

power”; (2) failing to punish unconstitutional use of force; (3)

5

tolerating

6

investigate

7

statements;

8

activity; and (7) failing to supervise those involved in the

9

investigation. (Compl. ¶¶ 51, 52.) Plaintiffs also allege the

unconstitutional
citizen
(6)

of

complaints;

permitting

Defendant

use

Fladager,

force;

(5)

outrageous

failing

tolerating
tactics

collusive

and

11

tolerated, ratified, and acquiesced to the conduct about which

12

each Plaintiff complains. (Id.)

14

“To

survive

a

Harris

tortuous

County,

II.

Defendant

to

10

13

and

(4)

encouraged,

LEGAL STANDARD
motion

to

dismiss,

a

complaint

must

15

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

16

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

17

Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir.

18

2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). “A claim

19

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

20

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

21

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

22

at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556

23

(2007)).

24

claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires

25

the . . . court to draw on its judicial experience and common

26

sense.” Id. at 679.

“Determining

whether

a

complaint

states

Caviness v.

a

plausible

27

“For purposes of a motion to dismiss, we accept all

28

well-pleaded allegations of material fact as true and construe
6

1

them

2

Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 783 (9th

3

Cir. 2012).

in

4

the

light

most

favorable

to

the

nonmoving

party.”

8

[Further,] the court need not accept as true
conclusory allegations, nor make unwarranted
deductions or unreasonable inferences. But so
long as the plaintiff alleges facts to
support a theory that is not facially
implausible, the court’s skepticism is best
reserved for later stages of the proceedings
when the plaintiff’s case can be [evaluated]
on evidentiary grounds.

9

In re Gilead Sciences Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir.

5
6
7

10

2008) (citations omitted).

11
12

III.
A.

DISCUSSION

All Defendants

13

1.

14

Each

Standing
Defendant

argues

that

Plaintiff

Karan

lacks

15

standing to allege the following claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:

16

unlawful detention, deliberate indifference, unlawful search and

17

seizure, and racial discrimination, including denial of equal

18

protection of law; contending “[t]here are no allegations of any

19

constitutional

20

caused by a particular defendant.” (Mot. 8:26–27, 9:4–5.)

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

injury

involving

a

legally

protected

interest

To have standing, a plaintiff must plausibly allege
three standing elements:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an
“injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical. Second,
there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of—the
injury has to be fairly . . . trace[able] to
the challenged action of the defendant, and
not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent
action of some third party not before the
7

1

court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed
to merely speculative, that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision.

2
3

Lujan

v.

Defenders

of

4

(alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks

5

omitted).

6

governmental actor is discriminating on the basis of race, the

7

resulting

8

persons

9

challenged discriminatory conduct.” United States v. Hays, 515

10

U.S. 737, 743–44 (1995) (citations and internal quotation marks

11

omitted).

Further,

injury
who

in

the

accords

are

a

Karan

504

equal

basis

personally

Plaintiff

12

Wildlife,

555,

protection

for

denied

has

U.S.

standing

only

assert

“if

to

treatment

to

(1992)

context,

standing
equal

560–61

those

by

a

a

the

racial

13

discrimination claim under § 1983, based on her assertion that

14

she was personally denied equal treatment by Defendants’ alleged

15

conduct

during

16

alleges

a

17

Specifically, she alleges she sustained emotional stress with the

18

manifestation of a physical injury—birth complications—caused in

19

part by District Attorney Investigator Defendant Bunch when he

20

threatened to investigate her for real estate fraud and take away

21

her children. (Compl. ¶¶ 26, 41, 82.) She further alleges she has

22

“suffered

23

live[s] in fear of [her] life[; and that she has] been directly

24

harmed . . . by Investigators who have intentionally interfered

25

with [her] business, and destroyed [her] reputation among the

26

community,

27

3

28

the

concrete

emotional

including

homicide
and

investigation.3

actual

distress,

their

injury

stress,

close

Plaintiff

caused

anguish,

church

by

Karan

Defendants.

anxiety,

community.”

(Compl.

Plaintiff Singh, rather than Plaintiff Karan, asserts unlawful
detention, deliberate indifference, and unlawful search and seizure claims
under § 1983.

8

and

1

¶¶ 50, 82.) See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 96

2

(1983) (holding plaintiff “presumably” had “standing to claim

3

damages

4

perhaps

5

Defendants’ dismissal motion is denied as to Plaintiff Karan’s

6

racial discrimination claim.

against

7

the

against

2.

individual

the

Racial

officers

City”).

Therefore,

Discrimination

8

Fourteenth

9

[who

and

portion

this

him]

of

Violation

Equal

of

Protection

the

Claim

10

Amendment’s

in

choked

Clause

Defendants seek dismissal of each Plaintiff’s racial

11

discrimination

12

Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, arguing it is not

13

a viable claim.4 Specifically, Defendants contend, inter alia,

14

this

15

Plaintiffs

16

Plaintiffs’ race, national origin, religion, or any other legally

17

protected

18

contend Plaintiffs “fail[] to plead . . . facts reflecting . . .

19

disparate treatment.” (Mot. 11:24.)

claim

claim,

fails

to

attribute

which

they

allege
to

characteristic.”

jointly

“that

any

Defendants

(Mot.

of

were

11:18–21.)

allege

the
taken

under

actions

the

that

because

Defendants

of

further

20

Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, they were subjected to

21

“racially motivated arrests, searches, and seizures.” (See Compl.

22

¶ 82.) They further allege “race was a motivating factor in the

23

decision

24

Plaintiff [Singh], and [that these actions were] undertaken with

25

the purpose of depriving Plaintiffs of the equal protection and

26

benefits of the law.” (Compl. ¶ 83.)

to

use

excessive

force[

and]

maliciously

prosecute

27
4

28

Plaintiffs also allege a racial discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 that is not challenged in the motions. (See Compl. 18:11–14.)

9

1

“To state a claim for violation of the Equal Protection

2

Clause, a plaintiff must [allege] that the defendant acted with

3

an intent or purpose to discriminate against [plaintiff] based

4

upon [plaintiff’s] membership in a protected class[,]” Serrano v.

5

Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted),

6

or “that [plaintiff] has been intentionally treated differently

7

from others similarly situated and that there is no rational

8

basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v.

9

Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Further, “a long line of Supreme

10

Court cases make clear that the Equal Protection Clause requires

11

proof of discriminatory intent or motive.” Navarro v. Block, 72

12

F.3d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omiited).

13

Plaintiffs plead facts from which it can be inferred

14

that they are of Indian origin. (See Compl. ¶ 19.) See Reedy v.

15

Precyse Solutions LLC, No. 1:12-CV-02061-AWI, 2013 WL 1563254, at

16

*6

17

origin, Plaintiff is a member of a protected class.”).

(E.D.

18

Cal.

Apr. 12,

Plaintiffs’
that

2013)

(“As

conclusory

Defendants

person

assertions

21

protected class. Their allegation that “the motivation behind

22

this

23

motivated, or . . . [a] personal vendetta by Defendants,” (Compl.

24

§ 18), contradicts a plausible inference that Defendants acted

25

with

26

investigation.

Further,

27

Bunch

believe

28

murder,” (Compl. ¶ 20), contradicts a plausible inference that

discriminatory

came

to

intent

investigations

or

Plaintiffs’
[Plaintiff]

10

motive

was

purpose

is

during

allegation
Singh

or

plausibly

discriminate against Plaintiffs based upon their membership in a

any

intent

to

20

related

an

fail

Indian

allege

and

with

of . . .

19

investigation

acted

a

to

politically

the

that

homicide

“Defendant

involved

in

the

1

Defendant

2

Plaintiffs

3

differently

4

investigation.

5
6

Bunch’s

plausibly
from

motive

alleged

other

was

they

discriminatory.

were

similarly

Nor

intentionally

situated

have

treated

people

under

Therefore, this portion of each Defendant’s dismissal
motion is granted.

7

3.

8

Each

9

actual

RICO Conspiracy Claim
Defendant

seeks

dismissal

of

each

Plaintiff’s

conspiracy claim alleged under RICO, arguing, inter alia, the

10

“broad

11

are not sufficient under Rule 8 to . . . put [each Defendant] on

12

notice[] as to what alleged acts of racketeering Plaintiffs claim

13

are at issue.” (Mot. 13:1–3.)

14

Plaintiffs

15

allegation[s] . . .

have

against

not

the

individual[

responded

Defendant]s

to

these

dismissal

[the

RICO

conspiracy

arguments.

16

“To

establish

a

violation

of

17

statute], Plaintiffs must allege either an agreement that is a

18

substantive violation of RICO or that the defendants agreed to

19

commit,

20

offenses.” Howard v. Am. Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 751 (9th Cir.

21

2000) (citation omitted). To plausibly allege the substantive

22

elements of RICO, under § 1962(c), plaintiff must allege: “(1)

23

conduct

24

racketeering activity.” Rezner v. Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereinsbank

25

AG, 630 F.3d 866, 873 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal

26

quotation marks omitted).

or

(2)

27
28

participated

of

an

in,

enterprise

a

violation

(3)

through

of

a

two

predicate

pattern

(4)

of

Plaintiffs’ conclusory assertions are insufficient to
plausibly

allege

a

violation

of
11

the

RICO

conspiracy

statute,

1

since

2

elements of a RICO claim or violation of two predicate offenses.

Plaintiffs

3
4

fail

to

plausibly

allege

the

substantive

Therefore, each Plaintiff’s RICO conspiracy claim is
dismissed against all Defendants.

5

4.

Negligent Interference with Contract Claim

6

Defendants Fladager, Bunch, and Harris seek dismissal

7

of

8

arguing Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege this claim. (Mot.

9

5:12–14, 10:22–24.) However, “[i]n California there is no [claim]

10

for negligent interference with contractual relations.” Davis v.

11

Nadrich, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1, 9 (2009). Therefore, this claim is

12

dismissed since Plaintiffs have not shown it is viable under

13

California law.

14

Plaintiffs’

B.

negligent

interference

with

contract

claim,

Defendant Fladager

15

1.

16

Defendant Fladager seeks dismissal of Plaintiff Singh’s

17

unlawful detention, deliberate indifference, and unlawful search

18

and

19

Defendant

20

District Attorney, arguing the claims “are precluded [by] the

21

Eleventh

22

“Plaintiff[ Singh’s] claims against Defendant . . . Fladager in

23

her official capacity are based solely on [Defendant] Fladager’s

24

role as a policymaker and her training and supervision of her

25

employees. Defendant[ Fladager] submit[s] that Pitts[ v. County

26

of Kern, 17 Cal. 4th 340 (1998)] and Ninth Circuit precedent

27

following

28

against [Defendant] Fladager are barred pursuant to the Eleventh

seizure

Official Capacity § 1983 Claims

claims

Fladager

under
in

Amendment.”

Pitts

her

§ 1983
official

(Mot.

establishes

that

capacity

3:5–7.)

that

12

are

She

Plaintiff[

alleged
as

the

further

Singh’s]

against
County’s

argues:

claims

1

Amendment.”

2

asks the Court to allow discovery before dismissal on Eleventh

3

Amendment immunity grounds. (Opp’n 1:24–28, 2:1–12.)

4

(Mot.

5:1–5

(citations

omitted)).

Plaintiff

Singh

Plaintiff Singh alleges Defendant Fladager directed the

5

homicide

6

[I]nvestigators[,]”

7

concerning “the constitutional limitations on the use of force

8

and abuse of power,” and is responsible for a constitutionally-

9

deficient policy concerning the use of force. (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 16,

10

investigation,

“trained

failed

to

and

conduct

supervised
sufficient

the

training

51–52.)

11

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for damages against

12

state officials acting in their official capacity, in the absence

13

of the state’s consent to suit. Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816,

14

824–25 (9th Cir. 2007). This bar applies to a district attorney

15

when

16

county.” Pitts, 17 Cal. 4th at 345. “If the District Attorney was

17

a

18

plaintiff] complains, [s]he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment

19

immunity (to the extent that [s]he is sued in h[er] official

20

capacity) . . . .” Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1182 (9th

21

Cir. 2004), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 547 U.S. 410

22

(2006).

23

“the

state

district

officer

when

Plaintiff
to

attorney

[s]he

represents

engaged

Singh’s
state

in

the

the

conclusory

of

which

allegations

[a

are

25

notwithstanding whether she represented the state or the County.

26

Therefore,

27

claims, alleged against her in her official capacity, is granted.

28
13

motion

to

Defendant

the

insufficient

Fladager’s

against

acts

not

24

Defendant

claims

state,

dismiss

Fladager

the

§ 1983

1

2.

2

Defendant Fladager also seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’

3

state claims, arguing Plaintiffs fail “to state any facts that

4

reflect [she] had any direct and personal participation in the

5

events giving rise to Plaintiffs’ [state] claims,” and that she

6

“is immune from any state claims arising out of any alleged

7

actions taken by other Defendants in this case” under California

8

Government Code section 820.8. (Mot. 5:12–16, 6:3–4.)

9

State Claims

Plaintiffs do not oppose this portion of the motion.

10

Section

14

claim, or any facts plausibly exposing her to liability for the

15

alleged acts of her subordinates. See Milton v. Nelson, 527 F.2d

16

1158,

17

personal involvement is not alleged may not be held responsible

18

for

19

Therefore,

20

state claims is granted.

22

C.

acts

of

their

Defendant

caused

(“[S]upervisory

subordinates

Fladager’s

under

motion

to

by

the

public

Defendant Fladager was personally involved in any alleged state

1975)

injury

“a

13

the

an

part:

omission of another person.” Plaintiffs have not alleged that

Cir.

for

pertinent

12

(9th

liable

in

employee

1159

not

states

11

21

is

820.8

personnel

California
dismiss

act

or

whose

law.”).

Plaintiffs’

County: § 1983 Claims
The

County

seeks

dismissal

of

Plaintiff

Singh’s

23

unlawful detention, deliberate indifference, and unlawful search

24

and seizure claims, arguing:

25
26
27
28

Plaintiffs base their claim against the
County by asserting Defendant Fladager is the
policymaker
for
the
County . . . .
Since . . . it is well established that
district attorneys of California in their
official capacities are arms of the State,
then
District
Attorney
Fladager
cannot
14

1

represent
the
County . . .
when
setting
policy
for
her
department,
and
when
establishing policy in training of her
employees in these areas. Thus, because
[Defendant] Fladager’s policy-making actions
are not attributable the County . . ., the
County is an improper party to this case.
Moreover, as there is no other policy related
allegations save that arise from Defendant
Fladager, the County should be dismissed.

2
3
4
5
6

(Mot. 7:4–12 (citation omitted).)

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Plaintiff
against

the

County

Singh’s
allege:

allegations
“[The]

germane

C[ounty]

is

to

his

sued

claim

for

the

challenged delegated final decisions of Defendant F[ladager] in
her official capacity as the District Attorney for the C[ounty],
and for . . . final delegated decision makers, with respect to
the . . .

challenged

deliberately

indifferent

policies,

decisions, widespread habits, customs, usages, and practices.”
(Compl. ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff Singh further alleges in pertinent part:
It is the longstanding, widespread, and
deliberately
indifferent
custom,
habit,
practice and/or policy of County, [Defendant]
Fladagar, and [Defendant] Harris to permit
Investigators
to
use
excessive
force,
outrageous tactics, and tortuous activity
against
individuals
when
such
use
is
unnecessary and unjustified, as well as
failing
to
supervise
and
to
train
investigators
in
the
appropriate
constitutional limits on the use of force and
techniques, knowing that these members of law
enforcement therefore pose a significant risk
of injury to the public.
(Compl. ¶ 52.)

25

“A municipality or other local government entity . . .

26

may be sued for constitutional torts committed by its officials

27

according to an official policy, practice, or custom.” Cortez v.

28

Cnty. of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing
15

1

Monell

2

(1978)). “To hold a local government liable for an official’s

3

conduct, a plaintiff must . . . [allege] that the official [whose

4

action is ascribed to the County] (1) had final policymaking

5

authority

6

particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue and (2)

7

was the policymaker for the local governing body for the purposes

8

of

9

marks omitted).

the

v.

N.Y.

Dep’t

concerning

particular

of

the

act.”

Soc.

action

Id.

Servs.,

436

alleged

(citation

U.S.

to

and

have

658,

690–91

caused

internal

the

quotation

10

Plaintiff Singh’s allegations do not plausibly allege

11

Defendant Fladager was a policymaker for the County. Further,

12

“the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, nor

13

make unwarranted deductions or unreasonable inferences.” In re

14

Gilead Sciences Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d at 1057. Therefore, the

15

County’s dismissal motion is also granted.

16
17

D.

Sheriff Christianson: Official Capacity § 1983 Claims
Sheriff

Christianson

moves

for

dismissal

of

the

18

official capacity claims against him, arguing he is an improper

19

party in the lawsuit because he “is sued in his official capacity

20

only.” (Mot. 6:19 n.1.) Plaintiff Singh does not oppose this

21

portion of the motion.

22

The Supreme Court has held that “an official-capacity

23

suit [seeking to recover damages] is, in all respects other than

24

name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v.

25

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Such a suit “is not a suit

26

against the official personally, for the real party in interest

27

is the entity.” Id.; Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1023 n.8 (9th

28

Cir. 2002) (“Section 1983 [damages] claims against government
16

1

officials in their official capacities are really suits against

2

the

3

damages awarded.”).

governmental

employer

because

the

employer

must

pay

any

4

Therefore, “[w]hen both a municipal officer and a local

5

government entity are named, and the officer is named only in an

6

official

7

redundant defendant.” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los

8

Angeles Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 799 (9th Cir. 2008).

9

Here, the Sheriff’s Department is a named defendant and Sheriff

10

Christianson is the Sheriff’s Department employee. (See Compl.

11

¶ 8 (alleging Sheriff Christianson is “the head of the Stanislaus

12

County Sheriff’s office”).) Therefore, Plaintiff Singh’s damages

13

claims against Sheriff Christianson in his official capacity are

14

therefore dismissed.

15

E.

capacity,

the

court

may

dismiss

the

officer

as

a

Sheriff’s Department: Section 1983 Claims

16

The Sheriff’s Department seeks dismissal of Plaintiff

17

Singh’s unlawful detention, deliberate indifference, and unlawful

18

search and seizure claims, contending, inter alia, it is not

19

subject to suit since a municipality department is not considered

20

a “person” subject to suit for constitutional violations under

21

§ 1983, and because it is an improperly named party. (Mot. 7:18–

22

26.) It further asserts: “It is axiomatic that the Stanislaus

23

County Sheriff’s Department is not a separate, distinct legal

24

entity apart from the C[ounty], but instead is just a department

25

within the County.” (Mot. 7:20–22.)

26
27

Plaintiff
Department’s

motion.

Singh

does

Plaintiff

28
17

not

oppose

the

Sheriff’s

Singh

alleges

the

“Sheriff’s

1

Department w[as] involved in a joint task force investigating the

2

crime.” (Compl. ¶ 20.)

3

The Sheriff’s Department cites Vance v. County of Santa

4

Clara,

5

proposition that “municipal departments are not persons under

6

[§] 1983[].”

7

“unequivocally held that when a California sheriff’s department

8

performs the function of conducting criminal investigations, it

9

is a county actor subject to suit under § 1983.” Jackson v.

10

Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 764 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).

11

However, Plaintiff Singh’s vague and conclusory allegation fail

12

to

13

performed subjecting it to liability. Therefore, this portion of

14

the dismissal motion is granted.

15

928

F.

(Mot.

plausibly

F.

16

Supp.

993,

996

7:19–20.)

allege

what

(N.D.

However,

function

Cal.

the

the

1996),

Ninth

for

Circuit

Sheriff’s

the

has

Department

Defendants Harris and Bunch: “Section 1983” claim
Defendants Harris and Bunch each seek dismissal of each

17

Plaintiff’s

18

identify a specific [c]onstitutional provision.” (Mot. 10:6.)

19

“§ 1983”

claim,

arguing

“Plaintiffs

do

not . . .

“[Section] 1983 is not itself a source of substantive

20

rights,

but

merely

provides

a

method

21

rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-

22

94 (1989) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In

23

their First Claim, Plaintiffs assert legal conclusions devoid of

24

factual matter, and they “fail to explain in their [O]pposition

25

[brief] how their First [Claim] differs from their [remaining

26

claims].” Fontana, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 1155. “It appears to this

27

Court that Plaintiffs have identically pled [multiple] claims for

28

relief: one for violation of their rights under [§] 1983 and the
18

for

vindicating

federal

1

[remaining

2

Fourth . . .

3

Plaintiff’s “§ 1983” claim “is duplicative and fails as a matter

4

of law,” id., this portion of the dismissal motion is granted.

5

G.

6

claims]
and

for

violations

Fourteenth

of

their

rights

Amendments.”

Id.

under

Since

the
each

Defendant Harris
1.

Remaining

§ 1983

Claims:

Unlawful

Detention,

7

“Deliberate Indifference,” and Unlawful Search and

8

Seizure Claims

9

Defendant Harris seeks dismissal of Plaintiff Singh’s

10

§ 1983

11

against

12

allege causation. (See Mot. 9:11–23.)

13

claims
him

alleged

are

“Vague

vague,

and

against

him,

conclusory,

conclusory

arguing
and

fail

allegations

the

allegations

to

sufficiently

of

official

14

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to

15

withstand a motion to dismiss.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.

16

of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further:

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

A person deprives another of a constitutional
right, within the meaning of section 1983, if
he does an affirmative act, participates in
another’s affirmative acts, or omits to
perform an act which he is legally required
to do that causes the deprivation of which [a
plaintiff
complains].
The
inquiry
into
causation
must
be
individualized
and
focus[ed] on the duties and responsibilities
of each individual defendant whose acts or
omissions are alleged to have caused a
constitutional deprivation.
Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (alteration in
original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff Singh alleges Defendant Harris trained and
supervised Investigators; co-led the homicide investigation; made
statements to Plaintiff Singh’s lawyer; and is responsible for a
19

1

constitutionally-deficient

2

Defendant

Fladager.

3

Plaintiff

Singh

4

committed by Defendant Harris that caused the referenced, alleged

5

constitutional

6

motion to dismiss Plaintiff Singh’s § 1983 claims alleged against

7

him is granted.

policy,

(Compl.

fails

to

along

¶¶ 4,

16,

plausibly

deprivations.

with
46,

51,

allege

Accordingly,

the

County

52.)

However,

affirmative

Defendant

and

acts

Harris’s

8

2.

State Claims

9

Defendant Harris also seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’

10

state

claims,

11

facts . . . support[ing] th[ose] . . . claims.” (Mot. 10:22–23.)

12

He

13

“precludes imposition of any liability against . . . [him] for

14

actions undertaken by others,” in which any state claim could be

15

based. (Mot. 11:2–3.)

further

arguing,

argues

“Plaintiffs . . .

California

Government

fail

to

Code

plead . . .

section

820.8

16

Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege facts supporting any

17

state claim against Defendant Harris and have not shown he is

18

liable

19

section 820.8’s rule precluding his liability based on “the act

20

or

21

Therefore, this portion of the dismissal motion is granted.

22
23

for

omission

H.

the

of

alleged

another

acts

of

another

person.”

Cal.

person,

Gov’t

in

Code

light

of

§ 820.8.

Defendant Bunch
1.

Remaining

§ 1983

Claims:

Unlawful

Detention,

24

“Deliberate Indifference,” and Unlawful Search and

25

Seizure Claims

26

Defendant Bunch seeks dismissal of Plaintiff Singh’s

27

§ 1983 claims, arguing, inter alia, the allegations against him

28
20

1

are vague, conclusory, and fail to sufficiently allege causation.

2

(Mot. 9:11–23.)

3

a.

Unlawful detention claim

4

Defendant Bunch seeks dismissal of Plaintiff Singh’s

5

unlawful detention claim, arguing Plaintiff Singh “fail[s] to

6

state any defendant actually arrested him or caused the arrest,”

7

(Mot.

8

[Plaintiff Singh] on any occasion,” (Mot. 9:26–27), and “fail[s]

9

to allege Defendant Bunch . . . had any role in [his] alleged

10:7–8),

in

“do[es]

10

delay

release

from

11

not

jail

identify

after

which

[Plaintiff

agency

Singh]

arrested

post[ed]

bail.” (Mot. 10:11–12.)

12

Plaintiff Singh alleges in the Complaint: “Defendants

13

deprived Plaintiff [Singh] of his property and liberty interests

14

when

15

cause[,]” (Compl. ¶ 70), and since he “was not timely released”

16

after he posted bail. (Compl. ¶ 71.)

he

was

17

unlawfully

arrested

and

jailed

without

probable

Plaintiff Singh’s “[v]ague and conclusory allegations

18

of

19

violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.”

20

Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. The Complaint lacks factual allegations

21

plausibly showing that Defendant Bunch participated in Plaintiff

22

Singh’s arrests, subsequent jailing, and alleged untimely release

23

from jail.

24
25
26

[Defendant

Bunch’s]

Therefore,

participation

Defendant

Bunch’s

in

[these

motion

to

alleged]

dismiss

Plaintiff Singh’s unlawful detention claim is granted.
b.

“Deliberate indifference” claim

27

Defendant Bunch seeks dismissal of Plaintiff Singh’s

28

deliberate indifference claim, in which conditions of Plaintiff
21

1

Singh’s jail confinement are challenged. Defendant Bunch argues,

2

“Plaintiff[] [Singh] appear[s] to claim his life was placed in

3

danger in . . . jail, . . . but fails to state any individual

4

defendant made any statements to place him in danger.” (Mot.

5

10:12–14.) Defendant Bunch also argues “Plaintiff Singh appears

6

to admit he complained [to a guard] about being in danger and was

7

moved”

8

without bases” for challenging this referenced jail confinement.

9

(Mot. 10:14–16.)

and

that

this

admission

“render[s]

the . . .

[c]laim

10

Plaintiff Singh alleges in his Complaint that while in

11

jail around Thanksgiving Day, “[a] gang member told [Plaintiff]

12

Singh that [Defendant] Bunch told them that [Plaintiff] Singh was

13

a ‘snitch’ . . . . [and that] [b]ecause of this accusation . . .

14

several

15

(Compl. ¶ 37.)

members

threatened

[Plaintiff]

Singh

with

his

life.”

16

Since Plaintiff Singh alleges in the Complaint that he

17

“was a pretrial detainee, his right to be free from violence at

18

the hands of other inmates arises from the Fourteenth Amendment

19

rather

20

Angeles,

21

different constitutional sources, the ‘deliberate indifference’

22

test

23

prisoners.” Id. (citation omitted). In Valandingham v. Bojorquez,

24

866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit held a

25

prisoner stated a claim under § 1983 where an inmate alleged that

26

on a particular date, “he was approached by fellow prisoners and

27

threatened with harm because [prison officials] had told other

28

inmates in the law library that [plaintiff] was a snitch.”

is

than
797

the

the
F.3d

Eighth

same

654,

for

Amendment.”
664

(9th

pretrial

22

Castro

Cir.

v.

2015).

detainees

and

Cnty.

of

“Despite

for

Los

those

convicted

1

Defendant Bunch has not shown that Plaintiff Singh’s

2

allegations

3

Therefore, this portion of Defendant Bunch’s motion is denied.

4

fail

c.

to

plausibly

state

the

challenged

claim.

Unlawful search and seizure claim

5

Defendant Bunch seeks dismissal of Plaintiff Singh’s

6

unlawful search and seizure claim, which is based on Defendant

7

Bunch’s conduct during the investigation, arguing Plaintiff Singh

8

does not plausibly allege a “claim under the Fourth or Fourteenth

9

Amendments as a matter of law.” (Mot. 10:16–19.) Plaintiff Singh

10

alleges, “Defendants arrested [him] without probable cause, and

11

seized his property without probable cause.” (Compl. ¶ 78.) He

12

further

13

Plaintiff

14

therein. (Compl. ¶ 44.)

15

alleges
Karan’s

in

pertinent

real

However,

the

estate

part:

Investigators

brokerage

Complaint

lacks

and

seized

factual

searched
property

allegations

16

plausibly showing that Defendant Bunch participated in Plaintiff

17

Singh’s arrests. Further, Plaintiff Singh fails to identify what

18

property he owned that Defendant Bunch allegedly seized; instead,

19

he alleges Investigators seized Plaintiff Karan’s property from

20

her real estate brokerage. (Compl. ¶ 43.) Therefore, this portion

21

of the dismissal motion is granted.

22
23

2.

State Claims: California Government Code Section
945.3

24

Defendant Bunch seeks dismissal of Plaintiff Singh’s

25

state claims alleged against him, arguing that under California

26

Government Code Section 945.3, “all state . . . claims arising

27

out of [Plaintiff Singh’s pending criminal matters] . . . may not

28

be pursued at this time.” (Mot. 13:25, 14:13–14.) Plaintiff Singh
23

1

opposes,

2

matters outside the criminal proceedings against [him].” (Opp’n

3

5:2–3.)

arguing

4

Defendant

Section

945.3

Bunch’s

states

conduct

in

“was

pertinent

related

part:

to

“No

5

person . . . charg[ed with] a criminal offense may bring a civil

6

action based upon conduct of the peace officer relating to the

7

offense for which the accused is charged . . . .” Here, Plaintiff

8

Singh alleges Defendant Bunch’s conduct related to the homicide

9

investigation, and Plaintiff Singh has not been charged with the

10

homicide.

(Compl.

¶¶ 15–16.)

11

Plaintiff Singh’s state claims against Defendant Bunch are not

12

barred by section 945.3.5

13

3.

14

Additionally,

In

light

of

these

allegations,

State Claims: Factual Sufficiency

state

Defendant

claims

alia,

16

fail to plead . . . facts . . . support[ing] their state . . .

17

claims against [Defendant] Bunch.” (Mot. 10:22–23.) He further

18

argues,

19

actions of which they complain but Plaintiffs do not identify any

20

specific

21

support the existence of any of the[ state] claims.” (Mot. 10:27–

22

28.)

actions

by . . .

that

that

inter

Plaintiffs’

plead

arguing

argues,

15

“Plaintiffs

fail,

Bunch

“Plaintiffs . . .

‘Investigators’

[Defendant]

undertook

Bunch . . .

that

the

would

23
24
25
26
27
28

5

Defendants request judicial notice of three Case Information sheets,
concerning criminal matters pending against Plaintiff Singh. (Req. Judicial
Notice, ECF No. 8-2; Mot. 14:9.) The Court takes notice of these sheets. See
U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d
244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding the court may take judicial notice of
proceedings in other courts); MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504
(9th Cir. 1986) (holding the court “may take judicial notice of matters of
public record outside the pleadings”). The Case Information sheets do not show
Plaintiff Singh has been charged with the homicide.

24

1

a.

2

Defamation claim

Defendant

Bunch

seeks

dismissal

of

each

Plaintiff’s

3

defamation claim alleged against him. Defamation “allegations are

4

insufficient

5

collectively rather than to individual defendants.” Arikat v. JP

6

Morgan Chase & Co., 430 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

7

“While the exact words or circumstances of the slander need not

8

be alleged to state a claim for defamation, the substance of the

9

defamatory statement must be alleged.” Silicon Knights, Inc. v.

10

Crystal Dynamics, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1303, 1314 (N.D. Cal. 1997)

11

(citation

omitted).

12

standards,

‘general

13

which

14

insufficient.” Jacobson v. Schwarzenegger, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1198,

15

1216 (C.D. Cal. 2004).

do

i[f] . . .

not

they

“Even

are

under

allegations

identify

the

of

ascribed

liberal
the

substance

to

federal

defamatory
of

defendants

what

pleading

statements’

was

said

are

16

Plaintiffs’ allegations ascribed to Defendant Bunch are

17

that he told family and friends Plaintiff Singh “is a murderer,”

18

“a pimp,” and “runs some sort of a prostitution ring”; Plaintiffs

19

also allege he told gang members Plaintiff Singh was a “snitch.”

20

(Compl. ¶¶ 23, 37.)

21

Defendant Bunch has not shown that Plaintiff Singh’s

22

allegations

23

therefore, this portion of Defendant Bunch’s motion is denied.

24

Plaintiff Karan, however, has only stated conclusory allegations

25

that

26

therefore, this portion of his motion is granted.

fail

are

to

insufficient

state

a

to

claim

27
28
25

allege

against

a

defamation

Defendant

claim;

Bunch,

and

1

b.

Tortious interference with contract

2

(intentional interference with contractual

3

relations) claim

4

Defendant Bunch seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim

5

for tortious interference with contract. Plaintiffs allege: (1)

6

they had a pending transaction in the “escrow stage” with Stewart

7

Title,

8

discovered that [Plaintiff] Singh stood to benefit from [the]

9

pending transaction,” (Compl. ¶ 47); (3) “[Plaintiff] Singh was

10

referred to as a ‘murderer’ to Stewart Title personnel,” (id.);

11

“Investigators did this . . . with the goal that it would harm

12

[Plaintiff] Singh financially,” (id.); (4) “Stewart Title did in

13

fact stop doing business with [Plaintiffs] because of the actions

14

of Defendants,” (Compl. ¶ 49); and (5) the property buyer dropped

15

out, escrow dropped out, and the property has decreased in value.

16

(Id.)

a

third

party,

(Compl.

¶¶ 47,

49);

(2)

“Investigators

17

The California Supreme Court has held:

18

23

The elements which a plaintiff must plead to
state the cause of action for intentional
interference with contractual relations are
(1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a
third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of
this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional
acts
designed
to
induce
a
breach
or
disruption of the contractual relationship;
(4) actual breach or disruption of the
contractual relationship; and (5) resulting
damage.

24

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 50 Cal. 3d 1118, 1126

25

(1990) (citations omitted).

19
20
21
22

26

Plaintiffs fail to allege a valid contract, as they

27

merely allege they had “a pending transaction” in the “escrow

28

stage” with a third party, Stewart Title. (Compl. ¶¶ 47, 49.)
26

1

Accordingly,

Plaintiffs

2

interference

with

3

Defendant Bunch’s motion is granted.

4

fail

to

contract,

c.

state

and

a

claim

therefore

this

for

tortious

portion

of

Tortious and negligent interference with

5

(prospective) economic advantage claims

6

Defendant Bunch seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ tortious

7

and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage

8

claims.

9

“Defendants . . .

Plaintiffs

allege

knew

of

in

the

Plaintiffs

Complaint,
ongoing

inter

alia:

business

and

10

business relationships with buyers, sellers, title and escrow

11

companies,

12

transactions, and knew of Plaintiffs other prospective business.”

13

(Compl. ¶¶ 128, 134.)

14

To

15

interference

16

must allege:

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

with

plead
with

which

a

Plaintiffs

claim

prospective

for

conducted

tortious,

economic

i.e.,

advantage,

real

estate

intentional,
a

plaintiff

(1) an economic relationship between the
plaintiff and some third party, with the
probability of future economic benefit to the
plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of
the relationship; (3) intentional acts on the
part of the defendant designed to disrupt the
relationship; (4) actual disruption of the
relationship; and (5) economic harm to the
plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of
the defendant.
Youst v. Longo, 43 Cal. 3d 64, 71 n.6 (1987).
Further, to plead the tort of negligent interference
with prospective economic advantage, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) an economic relationship existed between
the plaintiff and a third party which
contained
a
reasonably
probable
future
economic benefit or advantage to plaintiff;
(2) the defendant knew of the existence of
the relationship and was aware or should have
27

1

6

been aware that if it did not act with due
care its actions would interfere with this
relationship and cause plaintiff to lose in
whole or in part the probable future economic
benefit or advantage of the relationship; (3)
the defendant was negligent; and (4) such
negligence caused damage to plaintiff in that
the relationship was actually interfered with
or disrupted and plaintiff lost in whole or
in part the economic benefits or advantage
reasonably expected from the relationship.

7

N. Am. Chem. Co. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. App. 4th 764, 786

8

(1997).

2
3
4
5

9

Plaintiff’s

conclusory

allegations

do

not

allege

a

10

prospective, or future, economic relationship with Stewart Title

11

or other third parties. Further, as to the negligent form of the

12

tort, Plaintiffs fail to allege that Defendant Bunch owed them a

13

duty of care.

14
15

Therefore, Defendant Bunch’s motions to dismiss these
claims are granted.
d.

16

Intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim

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18
19
20

Defendant

Bunch

seeks

dismissal

of

Plaintiffs’

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
Plaintiffs

allege

rights,

and

harassment,

retaliation,

22

Plaintiffs . . .

23

(Compl. ¶ 140.) Plaintiffs further allege they “have suffered and

24

will continue to suffer mental distress and anguish, and loss of

25

consortium.” (Compl. ¶ 144.)

constitute

Specifically,

of

unlawful

21

26

deprivation

“[t]he

extreme

Plaintiffs

and

allege

conduct

outrageous

Defendant

towards
conduct.”

Bunch

told

27

Plaintiff Karan, “If you don’t stay away [from Plaintiff Singh],

28

I will come and take your kids away and put them in foster care.”
28

1

(Compl. ¶ 26 (alteration in original).) At the time, Plaintiffs

2

had

3

Plaintiffs further allege “[t]he birth had complications due to

4

the stress suffered by [Plaintiff] Karan, from [Plaintiff] Singh

5

being in jail . . ., together with the threats by [Defendant]

6

Bunch.” (Compl. ¶ 41.)

7

“A

one

child,

8

emotional

9

outrageous

and

cause

distress
conduct

Plaintiff

of

Karan

action

was

for

intentional

exists

when

by

defendant

the

five-months

there

pregnant.

infliction

is

(1)

with

the

extreme
intention

of
and
of

10

causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing,

11

emotional

12

extreme

13

causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous

14

conduct.

15

extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a

16

civilized community.” Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1051

17

(2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

18

distress;
emotional

A

(2)

the

distress;

defendant’s

plaintiff’s
and

conduct

(3)

is

suffering
actual

outrageous

severe

and

when

or

proximate

it

is

so

Defendant Bunch has provided no authority evincing that

19

Plaintiff

20

therefore, his motion is denied. Plaintiff Singh, however, has

21

only stated conclusory allegations that fail to state a plausible

22

claim against Defendant Bunch, and therefore Defendant Bunch’s

23

motion to dismiss Plaintiff Singh’s claim is granted.

24

Karan’s

e.

25
26

allegations

are

factually

insufficient;

Negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim

Defendant

Bunch

also

seeks

dismissal

of

Plaintiffs’

27

negligent infliction of emotional distress claim alleged against

28

him. “The law of negligent infliction of emotional distress in
29

1

California

2

‘theories’ of recovery: the ‘bystander’ theory and the ‘direct

3

victim’ theory.” Burgess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1064, 1071

4

(1992).

5

is

“To

typically

recover

analyzed . . .

damages

for

by

reference

emotional

to

distress,

two

absent

6

physical injury, in a ‘bystander case’ the plaintiff must be: (1)

7

Closely related to the injury victim; (2) Present at the scene of

8

the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then

9

aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) Suffer

10

emotional distress as a result, beyond that which would occur in

11

a disinterested witness.” Megargee ex rel. Lopez v. Wittman, No.

12

CVF 06-0684 AWILJO, 2006 WL 2988945, at *16 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17,

13

2006) (citing Martin By and Through Martin v. United States, 984

14

F.2d

15

alleged

16

distress.

1033,

17

1037

their

(9th

Cir.

1992)).

contemporaneous

Plaintiffs

presence

or

here

resulting

have

not

emotional

In direct victim cases, “a cause of action to recover

18

damages

19

lie . . . where a duty arising from a preexisting relationship is

20

negligently breached.” Burgess, 2 Cal. 4th at 1074; see also

21

Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal.

22

3d

23

distress

24

negligence . . . . The traditional elements of duty, breach of

25

duty, causation, and damages apply.” (alteration in original)

26

(internal citation omitted)). Plaintiffs do not allege a duty

27

arising from a preexisting relationship.

583,

for

negligently

588

(1989)

is

not

an

inflicted

(“[The]

emotional

negligent

independent

28
30

tort

causing
but

distress

of
the

will

emotional
tort

of

1
2

For

the

stated

reasons,

this

portion

of

Defendant

Bunch’s dismissal motion is granted.

3

I.

Motion for a More Definite Statement

4

Defendants Bunch and Harris move in the alternative

5

under Rule 12(e) for a more definite statement of the claims

6

against

7

allegations are relevant to each Defendant. (Mot. 14:19–28.) This

8

motion is denied since Plaintiffs’ allegations are not “so vague

9

or

10

them,

ambiguous

arguing

that

the

they

have

party

to

cannot

speculate

as

reasonably

to

which

prepare

a

response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

11

IV.

CONCLUSION

12

For the stated reasons, Defendants’ motion dismiss is

13

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiffs have fourteen days

14

from the date on which this Order is filed to file an amended

15

complaint addressing deficiencies in any dismissed claim.

16

Dated:

January 6, 2016

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24
25
26
27
28
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