Triffon v. Placer Lenders Services et al

Filing 8

ORDER DISMISSING CASE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction signed by District Judge Anthony W. Ishii on 5/21/2015. CASE CLOSED.(Lundstrom, T)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

9
10

12

1:15-cv-00761-AWI-GSA

TED TRIFFON,

11

Plaintiff,
v.

13
14
15

PLACER LENDER SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants.

16

INTRODUCTION

17
18

(Doc. 1)

Plaintiff Ted Triffon (“Plaintiff”), appearing pro se and proceeding in forma pauperis,

19

filed the complaint in this action on May 19, 2015. Doc. 1. The Court has screened the

20

complaint for legal sufficiency pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the reasons discussed

21

below, the complaint is dismissed and the case closed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

22
23

DISCUSSION
A. Screening Standard

24
25
26

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must conduct an initial review of a
complaint to determine whether it “state[s] a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous

27

or malicious,” or “seek[s] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”

28

If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, it must be dismissed. Id.
1

1

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

2

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required,

3

but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

4
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
5
6

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)).

7

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim that is

8

plausible on its face.‟” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). More

9

specifically, the plaintiff must present sufficient factual allegations as to each claim against each

10

defendant. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.

11

2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting Iqbal’s plausibility standard.

12
13
14

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. While well-pleaded factual allegations are
accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.

15

Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal

16

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that

17

pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). Accordingly, pro se

18
19

plaintiffs are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Id.
B. Analysis and Order

20
21

The instant complaint alleges that this action is brought in this Court on the basis of

22

diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Doc. 1 at 2. However, the facts alleged in

23

the complaint indicate that diversity jurisdiction does not exist.

24

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

25

Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “They possess only that power authorized by Constitution or a

26

statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “It is to

27
be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction and the burden of establishing the
28
2

1

contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also

2

Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006). “Subject matter

3
4

jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship requires that no defendant have the same
citizenship as any plaintiff.” Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a Better Env't, 236 F.3d 495, 499

5
6

(9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam), abrogated on other grounds by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77,

7

130 S.Ct. 1181 (2010); also see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “A plaintiff suing in federal court must

8

show in his pleading, affirmatively and distinctly, the existence of whatever is essential to federal

9

jurisdiction, and, if he does not do so, the court ... on discovering the [defect], must dismiss the

10
11

case, unless the defect be corrected by amendment.” Id. (quoting Smith v. McCullough, 270 U.S.
456, 459, 46 S.Ct. 338, 70 L.Ed. 682 (1926)).

12
Here, Plaintiff resides in California and he is citizen of California. Two of the defendants

13
14

are corporations incorporated in California while the other defendants also appear to be citizens

15

of California.1 Therefore, complete diversity between the parties does not exist and federal

16

subject matter jurisdiction cannot be established. Furthermore, the complaint does not allege any

17

federal claim. Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed in its entirety and the case closed for lack

18

of subject matter jurisdiction.

19
20
21
22

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 21, 2015
SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

23
24
25
26
27
28

1

The defendants include Capital Finance Corporation, which is listed as an active California incorporated entity on
the California Secretary of State‟s website with the entity number C1958428 (see http://kepler.sos.ca.gov, last viewed
on May 21, 2015); Placer Foreclosure, Inc., which is also listed as an active California incorporated entity on the
California Secretary of State‟s website with the entity number C1670115 (see http://kepler.sos.ca.gov, last viewed on
May 21, 2015); Placer Lender Services, an entity based in Auburn, California (Placer County); Placer Trustee
Services, an entity based in Auburn, California (Placer County); and two individuals, Robert J. and Wynne M.
Boynton, based in South Lake Tahoe, California. See Docs. 1 at 1, 1-1 at 2.

3