Toste, et al. v. Gottfried, et al.

Filing 22

ORDER GRANTING Plaintiffs' 9 Motion to Remand to State Court, signed by Magistrate Judge Sandra M. Snyder on 8/7/2015. Copy of remand order sent to Fresno County Superior Court. CASE CLOSED. (Marrujo, C)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CYNTHIA TOSTE, an individual;
MEA COLE, a minor, through her
Guardian Ad Litem, Jennifer TOSTE; and
JENNIFER TOSTE, an individual,

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION TO REMAND TO STATE COURT

Plaintiffs,

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Case No. 1:15-CV-00775-SMS

v.
(Doc. 9)
BLAZE MICHAEL GOTTFRIED,
an individual; GELCO CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation;
APRIA HEALTHCARE GROUP, INC., a
Delaware corporation dba APRIA
HEALTHCARE, LLC, a limited
liability corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive,
Defendants.

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This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Remand to State Court.” Doc. 9.

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No hearing was held as the Court found the matter suitable for submission on the papers. Local Rule
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230(g); Doc. 21. For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
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I. BACKGROUND
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On April 17, 2015, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants in the Fresno County Superior
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Court, alleging four state causes of action: (1) motor vehicle negligence against Defendants Blaze
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Michael Gottfried, Gelco Corporation (“Gelco”), Apria Healthcare Group, Inc. (“Apria”) and Does

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26-50; (2) negligence per se against Gottfried, Gelco, Apria and Does 26-50; (3) negligence against

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Gottfried, Gelco, Apria and Does 26-50; and (4) negligent hiring, retention, supervision and/or

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training against Apria and Does 26-50. Doc. 1, Ex. A.
In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that on August 28, 2014, Gottfried, then an employee of

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Apria, drove a freightliner owned by Gelco, in the city of Caruthers, California. 4-5. Around the

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same time and area, Jennifer Toste drove a minivan carrying Cynthia Toste and Mea Cole. Compl.

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6. A multi-vehicle collision occurred when Gottfried allegedly failed to stop and crashed into a

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vehicle. Compl. 5. The vehicle, in turn, collided with another vehicle which struck Plaintiffs’

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minivan. Consequently, Plaintiffs sustained injuries, physical and mental, which require continued

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treatment. Compl. 6-7.
On May 21, 2015, Gottfried, Gelco and Apria filed a timely notice of removal with this

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Court, alleging “[t]his is a civil action . . . which may be removed to this Court by Gelco [because] it

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arises under 49 U.S.C. § 30106.” 1 Doc. 1. Thereafter, Gelco filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

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dismiss. Doc. 3. In response, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Gelco without prejudice, Doc. 10, and

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on the same day moved to remand the case back to state court.

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II. DISCUSSION
District courts “have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,

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laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “The removal statute authorizes a

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defendant to remove to federal court ‘any civil action brought in a State court of which the district

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courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.’ Id. § 1441(a). Consequently, only [those]

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Section 30106 provides, in relevant part:
(a) In general. An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the
vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable
under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of
being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm
to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or
possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if-(1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or
business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and
(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the
owner (or an affiliate of the owner).
49 U.S.C. § 30106(a).
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state court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal

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court by the defendant. Absent diversity of citizenship,2 only cases within the district court's original

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federal question jurisdiction may be removed from state to federal court.” Ethridge v. Harbor House

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Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988) (quotations and citations omitted). “The burden of

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establishing jurisdiction falls on the party invoking the removal statute, which is strictly construed

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against removal.” Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festival Enterprises, Inc., 908 F.2d 477, 479 (9th Cir.

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1990) (quotations and citations omitted).
The dispositive issue here is whether Plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal of Gelco without

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prejudice warrants remanding the case back to state court. Recognizing that Gelco is no longer a

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party in this case, Defendants nonetheless contend that the dismissal without prejudice reflects a

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reservation to re-file claims against Gelco which would again require removal. To avoid wasting

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“time, judicial economy, and court resources,” Defendants therefore oppose remand. Defs.’ Opp’n

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3-4. Stated differently, Defendants aver that federal question jurisdiction exists because the need to

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interpret and apply a federal law, namely section 30106, may later arise again. But federal

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jurisdiction cannot be premised on speculation about what claims may be brought.
Even if Gelco was still a party in this case, the Court would be hard pressed to find federal

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jurisdiction under the circumstances. “The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is

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governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only

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when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. The

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rule makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive

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reliance on state law.” Id. at 1394. But “under the artful pleading rule a plaintiff may not defeat

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removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint. A state-created cause of

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action can be deemed to arise under federal law (1) where federal law completely preempts state

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law; (2) where the claim is necessarily federal in character; or (3) where the right to relief depends
on the resolution of a substantial, disputed federal question[.]” ARCO Envtl. Remediation, L.L.C. v.
Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Quality, 213 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations and internal
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Diversity jurisdiction is not present because Plaintiffs are California residents and Defendants are
either California residents or authorized to conduct business and have had headquarters located in
California. Compl. 2-3.
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citations omitted). Defendants contend federal question jurisdiction is supported by complete

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preemption and that Plaintiffs’ right to relief depends on the resolution of section 30106. Defs.’

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Opp’n 2-3.
As to complete preemption, Defendants provide no legal authority for the position that

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section 30106 completely supplants any state law claim. The two cases on which Defendants rely,

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Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983) and Schroeder v. Trans

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World Airlines, Inc., 702 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1983),3 concern the Employee Retirement Income

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Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)4 and the Railway Labor Act, respectively. Neither case addressed

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the preemptive effect of section 30106. Defendants provide no support for the self-serving statement

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that section 30106 “completely preempts the subject matter[.]” Defs.’ Opp’n 2.
As to whether Plaintiffs’ right to relief depends on a resolution of section 30106, the inquiry

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is whether that section “is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state claims.” ARCO

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Envtl. Remediation, L.L.C., 213 F.3d at 1116 (quotations and citations omitted). The answer: it is

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not. The three causes of action against Gelco—motor vehicle negligence, negligence per se and

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negligence—are grounded in state law and not predicated on section 30106. Plainly read, that

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section limits Gelco’s liability as owner of the freightliner if certain conditions are met. It may be a

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defense to Plaintiffs’ claims and “a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a

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federal defense[.]” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987).
Thus, even if Gelco had not been dismissed, Defendants fail to meet their burden of

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establishing federal jurisdiction. The Court would have been unconvinced that federal question

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Schroeder was overruled by Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2009).
“We also hold that to the extent Schroeder ruled that federal question jurisdiction always or
automatically exists whenever a removal petition contains additional facts evidencing [t]he
application of [the RLA] and the necessity of its interpretation, that holding is also effectively
overruled[.]” Id. at 1246.
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“Examples [of complete preemption] include Section 502 of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) and
the usury provisions of the National Bank Act.” Dennis v. Hart, 724 F.3d 1249, 1254 (9th Cir.
2013).
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jurisdiction exists.

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III. CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Remand to State Court” is hereby
GRANTED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

August 7, 2015

/s/ Sandra M. Snyder
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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