Bank of New York Mellon v. Vega

Filing 4

ORDER Directing the Clerk to Assign a United States District Judge to the Action; FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS Remanding the 1 Matter to Kern County Superior Court for Lack of Jurisdiction, and Terminating Defendant's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis as Moot signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 06/16/2015. Referred to Judge O'Neill; Objections to F&R due by 7/6/2015. New Case Number: 1:15-cv-896 LJO-JLT. (Flores, E)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11
12

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, AS
TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATE
HOLDERS OF THE CWABS, INC., ASSETBACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-11,

13

Plaintiff,

14
15

v.
ARTURO VEGA,

16

Defendants.

17
18

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: 1:15-cv-00896 - --- - JLT
ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO ASSIGN
A UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE TO THE
ACTION
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
REMANDING THE MATTER TO KERN
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION, AND TERMINATING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO PROCEED IN
FORMA PAUPERIS AS MOOT

Arturo Vega seeks removal of an unlawful detainer action filed in Kern County Superior Court.

19
20

(Doc. 1). Because an action for unlawful detainer arises under California law, the Court lacks subject

21

matter jurisdiction over the complaint. Therefore, the Court recommends the action be REMANDED

22

to Kern County Superior Court, and Defendant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 3) be

23

terminated as MOOT.

24

I.

On March 16, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Arturo Vega for unlawful detainer in

25
26

Factual and Procedural History

Kern County Superior Court, Case No. L-1504-CL-7494.1 The defendant failed to file an answer or

27
28

1

The Court may take notice of facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir.

1

1

otherwise respond to the complaint. (See Doc. 1 at 2.) Therefore, Plaintiff requested the entry of

2

default which was granted, and a writ of possession for the property was issued on April 16, 2015.
On April 22, 2015, Vega filed an ex parte application for an order staying execution of the writ

3
4

and seeking to set aside the entry of judgment. Vega testified at a hearing, after which the court

5

denied his application and ordered the levying officer to proceed on the execution of the writ of

6

possession. On June 12, 2015, Vega filed a Notice of Removal and a motion to proceed in forma

7

pauperis, thereby attempting to initiate the action in this Court. (Docs. 1-3.)

8

II.

Removal Jurisdiction

9

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant has the right to remove a matter to federal court

10

where the district court would have original jurisdiction. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 286,

11

392 (1987). Specifically,

12
13

Except otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a
State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction,
may be removed by the defendant or defendants, to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.

14
15

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). District courts have “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the

16

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. at § 1331.

17

A party seeking removal must file a notice of removal of a civil action within thirty days of

18

receipt of a copy of the initial pleading. Id. at § 1446(b). Removal statutes are to be strictly construed,

19

and any doubts are to be resolved in favor of state court jurisdiction and remand. See Gaus v. Miles,

20

980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The party seeking removal bears the burden of proving its

21

propriety. Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996); Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443

22

F.3d 676, 683-85 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Calif. ex. rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 2274 F.3d 831, 838

23

(“the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction falls to the party invoking the statute”). If there is any

24

doubt as to the right of removal, “federal jurisdiction must be rejected.” Duncan, 76 F.3d at 1485.

25

The district court has “a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over [a] removed action

26
27
28

1993). The accuracy of Court records cannot reasonably be questioned, and judicial notice may be taken of court records.
Mullis v. United States Bank. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987); Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626,
635 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236m 1239
(4th Cir. 1989). Therefore, judicial notice is taken of the docket and the complaint filed in Case No. L-1504-CL-7494.

2

1

sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.” United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell &

2

Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Kelton Arms Condo. Homeowners Ass’n v.

3

Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting a distinction between procedural

4

and jurisdictional defects and holding that a “district court must remand if it lacks jurisdiction”). Thus,

5

the Sixth Circuit explained a court “can, in fact must, dismiss a case when it determines that it lacks

6

subject matter jurisdiction, whether or not a party has a filed a motion.” Page v. City of Southfield, 45

7

F.3d 128, 133 (6th Cir. 1995).

8

III.

9

Discussion and Analysis
A.

The Court lacks jurisdiction over the complaint

10

The determination of subject matter jurisdiction “is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint

11

rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the

12

face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. Therefore, the

13

complaint must establish “either that [1] federal law creates the cause of action or that [2] the

14

plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.”

15

Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Leasehold & Easement, 524 F.3d

16

1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S.

17

1, 27-28 (1983)).

18

Significantly, unlawful detainer is the only cause of action identified by Plaintiff in the

19

complaint. (See Doc. 1 at 6-10.) An unlawful detainer action does not arise under federal law, but

20

arises instead under state law. See Fannie Mae v. Suarez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82300, at *6 (E.D.

21

Cal. July 27, 2011) (“Unlawful detainer actions are strictly within the province of state court”);

22

Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co v. Leonardo, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83854, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1,

23

2011) (“the complaint only asserts a claim for unlawful detainer, a cause of action that is purely a

24

matter of state law”). Thus, the complaint does not invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction.

25

Vega seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction because he claims Plaintiff violated his due process

26

rights by not serving him with the summons and complaint. However, federal jurisdiction cannot be

27

invoking a defense which sounds in federal law. See Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63

28

(1987) (explaining that a defense “does not appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint and,
3

1

therefore, does not authorize removal to federal court”); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Const. Laborers

2

Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983); see Cal. Equity Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Jiminez, 2013

3

WL 1748051, at *1 (N.D. Cal. April 23, 2013) (explaining that “a defendant cannot create federal

4

subject matter jurisdiction by adding claims or raising defenses” and remanding an unlawful detainer

5

action to the state court). Moreover, it appears the state court rejected this defense by denying Vega’s

6

application to set aside the entry of default.

7

B.

8

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a party may not seek appellate review in federal court of a

9
10

Relief may not be granted under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

decision or judgment made by a state court. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923);
D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The Ninth Circuit explained,
Typically, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from exercising subjectmatter jurisdiction over a proceeding in which a party losing in state court seeks what in
substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district
court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the losers
federal rights.

11
12
13
14

Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

15

Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a district court from

16

appellate review of “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court

17

judgments rendered before the district court proceeding commenced . . .”). Accordingly, the district

18

court lacks jurisdiction over “claims . . . ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s decision such

19

that the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling.” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334

20

F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483, 485)).
Here, judgment was entered against Vega by the state court. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine

21
22

“prohibits a federal district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto

23

appeal from a state court judgment.” Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir.

24

2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Consequently, the Court lacks jurisdiction over

25

this matter.

26

IV.

27
28

Order
The Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this action for unlawful detainer. See

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject
4

1

matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded”); see also Kelton Arms Condo. Homeowners Ass’n, 346

2

F.3d at 1192-93 (“district court must remand if it lacks jurisdiction”).
Good cause appearing, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to assign a United States District

3
4

Judge to this action.

5

V.

Findings and Recommendations

6

Because the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the action for unlawful

7

detainer, the matter must be remanded. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment

8

it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded”); see also

9

Kelton Arms Condo. Homeowners Ass’n, 346 F.3d at 1192-93 (“district court must remand if it lacks

10

jurisdiction”). Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED:

11

1.

The matter be REMANDED to the Superior Court of Kern County; and

12

2.

Defendant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 3) be terminated as MOOT; and

13

3.

The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to close this matter, because this Order terminates
the action in its entirety.

14
15

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

16

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local

17

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 14 days

18

after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written objections

19

with the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

20

Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

21

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

22

1991); Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 834 (9th Cir. 2014).

23
24
25
26

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

June 16, 2015

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

27
28
5