Townsel v. Madera County Department of Corrections

Filing 4

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 02/22/2016. Amended Complaint due by 3/28/2016.(Flores, E)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DAVID TOWNSEL,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
(ECF No. 1)

MADERA COUNTY DEP’T OF CORR.,

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CASE NO. 1:15-cv-0903-MJS

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE
WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS

Defendant.

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Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action brought pursuant

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to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint is before the Court for screening.

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I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

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The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any

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portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if

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the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which

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relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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II.

PLEADING STANDARD

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

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the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations

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are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

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662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

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Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief

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that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere

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possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are

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accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

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III.

PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

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Plaintiff’s allegations can be summarized essentially as follows: While Plaintiff

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was housed at the Madera County Department of Corrections1, he could not receive and

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was unable to send mail from Friday, December 20, 2013, to Monday, December 23,

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2013. Plaintiff brings suit against Defendant Madera County Department of Corrections

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for infliction of emotional distress and for violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be

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free from cruel and unusual punishment.

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IV.

ANALYSIS

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To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the

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conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of

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state law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right.

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Wood v. Outlander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). Negligence is not sufficient to

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state a claim under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). In

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addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct

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of a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link between the injury and

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the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371–72, 377 (1976).
Eighth Amendment – Cruel and Unusual Punishment

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A.

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In order to state a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must

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“objectively show that he was deprived of something ‘sufficiently serious,’“ and “make a

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subjective showing that the deprivation occurred with deliberate indifference to the

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Plaintiff’s address on record indicates that he is no longer in custody.

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inmate's health or safety.” Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing

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Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). In order to satisfy the first prong of the

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test, the matters about which the plaintiff is complaining must rise to the level of either

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“the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain” or the deprivation of “the minimal civilized

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measure of life's necessities.” See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); see

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also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (Prison officials “must ensure that inmates receive

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adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and must take reasonable measures to

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guarantee the safety of the inmates.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual

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punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319

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(1986); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

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105-06 (1976). In order to prevail on a claim of cruel and unusual punishment, a prisoner

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must allege and prove that objectively he suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation and

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that subjectively prison officials acted with deliberate indifference in allowing or causing

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the deprivation to occur. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991).

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Here, Plaintiff’s claims simply do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

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violation. He alleges only that his incoming and outgoing mail was interfered with over

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one weekend. There is no suggestion that this temporary deprivation constituted any

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measureable deprivation, much less a serious one or that it was done with deliberate

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indifference. Lastly, Plaintiff fails to link the Defendant to any deprivation. Plaintiff thus

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fails to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.
First Amendment – Send and Receive Mail

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B.

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Though Plaintiff does not allege that his First Amendment rights were violated, the

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complaint can be construed as asserting such a violation. Generally, prisoners have “a

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First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th

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Cir. 1995) (per curiam). However, isolated incidents of mail interference or tampering will

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not support a claim under section 1983 for violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See

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Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427,

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431 (8th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990). See also

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Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1999) (temporary delay or isolated incident of

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delay in mail processing does not violate prisoner's First Amendment rights).

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In order to state a First Amendment claim of mail interference under Section

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1983, Plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the delayed mail amounted to more

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than an isolated incident. Plaintiff has not done that here. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not

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alleged harm. There are no allegations that the temporary interference with his mail

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either constituted an ongoing practice of unjustified censorship or caused him to miss

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court deadlines or in any way prejudiced him. Also, he must link the Defendant to his

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allegations of wrongdoing. He must allege specific facts showing how the Defendant

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actually and proximately caused the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. He has not done so.

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C.

Infliction of Emotional Distress

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The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: “(1) extreme and

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outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard

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of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or

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extreme emotional distress; (3) and actual and proximate causation of the emotional

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distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal.

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3d 579, 593 (1979). Conduct is outrageous if it is “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of

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that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Id. The distress inflicted must be “of such

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substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society

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should be expected to endure it.” Fletcher v. W. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376,

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397 (1970) (citation omitted).

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Plaintiff’s cursory allegations do not state a claim for intentional infliction of

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emotional distress. Again, he alleges only that his mail was temporarily interfered with on

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one occasion. This does not amount to “extreme and outrageous conduct,” and there is

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no allegation that Plaintiff was harmed, let alone harmed in such a way “that no

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reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure.” Accordingly, this

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claim must also be dismissed.

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V.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

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The Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v.

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Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff opts to amend, he must

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address the deficiencies noted in this Screening Order. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78.

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Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its

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face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

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Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it

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is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George, 507 F.3d at 607. Plaintiff should

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carefully read this Screening Order and focus his efforts on curing the deficiencies set

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forth above.

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Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended

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complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule,

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an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d

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55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no

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longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

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original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be

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sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First

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Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed

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under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P.

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8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a

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right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations

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omitted).

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Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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Within thirty (30) days from the service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a first

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amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this Screening

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Order;

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1. The Clerk of Court is directed to send Plaintiff a copy of his complaint filed on

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June 15, 2015, and a copy of the Pro Se Packet; and

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2. If Plaintiff fails to file a first amended complaint or otherwise respond to this

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Order, the Court will dismiss this action, with prejudice, for failure to comply

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with a court order and failure to prosecute.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

February 22, 2016

/s/

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Michael J. Seng

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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