Cochran v. Aguirre, et al.

Filing 99

ORDER denying 93 Motion for Reconsideration signed by District Judge Anthony W. Ishii on 6/8/2017. (Lundstrom, T)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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BILLY COY COCHRAN,

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Plaintiff,
v.
E. AGUIRRE,
Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:15-cv-01092-AWI-SAB (PC)
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE MAGISTRATE
JUDGE’S MARCH 14, 2017, ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE
COMPLAINT
[ECF No. 93]

Plaintiff Billy Coy Cochran is appearing pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1983. Plaintiff consented to the United States Magistrate judge jurisdiction; however, Defendant has

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not consented or declined. Therefore, this action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to pursuant

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to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

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Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s

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March 14, 2017, order denying Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint, filed March 30, 2017.

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Defendant filed an opposition on April 20, 2017. Plaintiff did not file a reply, and the motion is

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therefore deemed submitted for review without oral argument. Local Rule 230(l).

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I.

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DISCUSSION

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If a party objects to a non-dispositive pretrial ruing by a magistrate judge, the district court will

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review or reconsider the ruling under the “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard. 28 U.S.C. §
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626(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); Grimes v. City of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 240-41 (9th Cir.

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1991). A magistrate judge’s factual findings or discretionary decisions are “clearly erroneous” when

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the district court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.

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Security Farms v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 124 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th Cir. 1997); McAdam v.

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State Nat’l Ins. Co., 15 F.Supp.3d 1009, 1013 (S.D. Cal. 2014); Avalos v. Foster Poultry Farms, 798

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F.Supp.2d 1156, 1160 (E.D. Cal. 2011). This standard is significantly deferential. Avalos, 798

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F.Supp.2d at 1160. The district court “may not simply substitute its judgment for that of the deciding

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court.” Grimes, 951 F.2d at 241; Avalos, 798 F.Supp.2d at 1160. The “contrary to law” standard,

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however, allows independent review of purely legal determinations by the magistrate judge. See

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Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1992); Avalos, 798 F.Supp.2d at 1160; Jadwin

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v. County of Kern, 767F.Supp.2d 1069, 1110-11 (E.D. Cal. 2011). “An order is contrary to law when

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it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” Avalos, 798

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F.Supp.2d at 1160; Jadwin, 767 F.Supp.2d at 1011.

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As stated by the magistrate judge, Plaintiff’s original complaint was filed on July 15, 2015. On

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August 14, 2015, the complaint was dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff filed an amended

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complaint on September 10, 2015. On November 25, 2015, the amended complaint was dismissed

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with leave to amend. Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on January 4, 2016, against

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Defendant Aguirre only. On January 7, 2016, the Court found Plaintiff’s second amended complaint

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stated a cognizable claim against Defendant E. Aguirre for failure to protect, due process violation

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relating to the deprivation of his personal property, equal protection violation, and state law

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negligence. On May 10, 2016, Defendant filed an answer to the complaint. On May 11, 2016, the

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Court issued the discovery and scheduling order, setting a November 11, 2016, deadline to amend the

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pleadings. In his motion to amend, Plaintiff requested to add unspecified defendants, listed as “and

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others.” (ECF No. 83, Mot. at 1-2.) Plaintiff submitted a 92 page proposed third amended complaint,

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and listed fifty-six (56) defendants to add, and asserting new factual allegations along with submission

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of several additional exhibits, and a total of 245 claims.

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Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may amend the party=s

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pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. Otherwise, a
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party may amend only by leave of the court or by written consent of the adverse party, and leave shall

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be freely given when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).

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Rule 15(a) is very liberal and leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so requires.’”

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AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysis West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 15(a)). However, courts “need not grant leave to amend where the amendment: (1) prejudices

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the opposing party; (2) is sought in bad faith; (3) produces an undue delay in the litigation; or (4) is

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futile.” AmerisourceBergen Corp., 465 F.3d at 951. Relevant to the futility factor, a plaintiff may not

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bring unrelated claims against unrelated parties in a single action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), 20(a)(2);

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Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir.

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2007).

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Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the magistrate judge erred in determining that amendment

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would prejudice Defendant and cause undue delay. The magistrate judge correctly found that the most

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important factor, prejudice to Defendant, weighted against granting leave to amend. Defendant would

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be prejudiced in this instance because granting Plaintiff leave to amend at this juncture would

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necessitate reopening the discovery period and the period to file an exhaustion motion for summary

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judgment. See Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Putting the

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defendants through the time and expense of continued litigation on a new theory, with the possibility

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of additional discovery, would be manifestly unfair and unduly prejudicial.”); Acri v. International

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Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d 1393, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming the

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denial of leave to amend and holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding

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that allowing amendment would prejudice the defendant because of the necessity for reopening

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discovery); see also Bassani v. Sutton, 430 Fed. App’x 596, 597 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that “the

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district court’s ultimate conclusions – that there would be undue delay and prejudice to the defendants

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if [the plaintiff] were allowed to amend his complaint two years into litigation and after the close of

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discovery – were not an abuse of discretion”). Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration simply disagrees

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with the magistrate judge’s order and Plaintiff fails to overcome the finding of prejudice to Defendant.

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As stated by the magistrate judge, Defendant would be prejudiced as he has already filed an answer

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and the scheduling has been issued. (ECF No. 91.) Additionally, the deadline for Plaintiff to amend
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the pleadings expired on November 11, 2016. (Id.) Furthermore, Plaintiff was previously granted

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leave to amend and filed a second amended complaint against Defendant Aguirre only. By way of

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amendment, Plaintiff is seeking to add 56 defendants and 245 claims regarding events that took place

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over five years ago, and Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate diligence in seeking to amend the

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complaint as he has had several opportunities to do so, yet failed to timely do so. (Id.)

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Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s March
14, 2017, order denying his motion to amend the complaint is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: June 8, 2017

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SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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