Quarles v. Coalinga Municipality et al

Filing 13

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, With Prejudice, for Failure to State a Cognizable Claim for Relief signed by Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone on 6/22/2016. CASE CLOSED. (Jessen, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ARVIN RAY QUARLES,

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Plaintiff,
v.
COALINGA MUNICIPALITY, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Case No. 1:15-cv-01212-SAB (PC)
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR
RELIEF
[ECF No. 12]

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Plaintiff Alvin Ray Quarles is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this

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civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Individuals detained pursuant to California Welfare

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and Institutions Code § 6600 et seq. are civil detainees and are not prisoners within the meaning of the

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Prison Litigation Reform Act. Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000). Pursuant to 28

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U.S.C. § 636(c), Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge on

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September 8, 2015. Local Rule 302.

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Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed April 11, 2016. (ECF
No. 12.)

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I.

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SCREENING REQUIREMENT

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The in forma pauperis statue provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof,

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that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that … the
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action or appeal … fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §

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1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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II.

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COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff arrived at the Coalinga State Hospital on January 15, 2014. Plaintiff contends while

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in the custody of the hospital, he was unable to secure his personal property. Plaintiff arrived at a new

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dorm on December 10, 2014, and each dorm consists of up to four people and each resident has no

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way to lock his dorm. However, patients can allegedly secure their lockers in their dorms. Psych

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technician, Nicole Rodriguez gave Plaintiff his locker combination, and Plaintiff tried unsuccessfully

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to open the locker. Ms. Rodriguez also tried several times unsuccessfully to open the locker without

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success. Ms. Rodriguez then told Plaintiff she would order maintenance to install a new lock

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combination. Neither Ms. Rodriguez nor any other staff member informed Plaintiff he could secure

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his property in the office or lock his dorm. Plaintiff’s new television, media player, hard drive, small

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radio, headphones, disks, cosmetics, food, and his legal paper work were all left unattended.
On December 17, 2014, Plaintiff went to breakfast at 6:40 a.m., and then to the gym between

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7:00 and 8:00 a.m. Plaintiff returned to his dorm area around 8:15 a.m. and discovered that his media

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player and hard drive were on the floor. The USB and HDMI wires were disconnected from his

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television, and the television casing was broken. Plaintiff’s television, media player and hard drive

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were damaged as a result of the incident.
Plaintiff reported the incident to Linda Moon and Rebekah Reeves who indicated the room was

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not searched and Plaintiff was free to file a police report. When police arrived for an interview,

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Plaintiff was asked why he did not secure his property in his locker, and Plaintiff explained that the

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lock did not work. Plaintiff requested that police dust for fingerprints on the television to positively

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identify the culprit. However, police responded that fingerprints were not taken unless it was a serious

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crime.

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Coalinga State Hospital policy requires that staff make safety and security checks in the dorms
while patients at the dining hall.

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On December 19, 2014, maintenance went to Plaintiff’s dorm to repair the lock. After the

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replacement, Plaintiff asked Jesse Garcia to document in the log book that maintenance repaired his

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lock and combination.

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Plaintiff sought monetary costs for the damage to his property from the State Board of Control.

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Plaintiff filed a police report but was never provided a copy of the report.

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On June 24, 2015, Plaintiff was moved to a new unit with less supervision. When Plaintiff

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asked the officer for his locker combination, he informed Plaintiff the computer was down.
Plaintiff contends that the Coalinga State Hospital has a policy to never provide new padlocks
and/or new locker numbers to protect the patient’s personal property.
Plaintiff contends there is a disputed material fact as to the unconstitutional and discriminatory

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hospital policy which subjects Plaintiff and all Sexually Violent Predator patients to have no way to

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protect hospital approved personal property whenever a patient is required to move. Executive

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Director, Audrey King, discriminates against Plaintiff by failing to secure Plaintiff’s personal property

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under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). In addition, King fails to gain certification of

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compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

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III.

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DISCUSSION

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A.

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

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“[C]ivil detainees retain greater liberty protections than individuals detained under criminal

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process, and pre-adjudication detainees retain greater liberty protections than convicted ones. . . .”

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Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Treatment is presumptively

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punitive when a civil detainee is confined in conditions identical to, similar to, or more restrictive than

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his criminal counterparts, and when a pre-adjudication civil detainee is detained under conditions more

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restrictive than a post-adjudication civil detainee would face. Id. at 932-33.

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A determination whether Plaintiff’s rights were violated requires “balancing of his liberty

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interests against the relevant state interests.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321. Plaintiff is “entitled to

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more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of

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confinement are designed to punish,” but the Constitution requires only that courts ensure that
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professional judgment was exercised. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22. A “decision, if made by a

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professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision by the

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professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or

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standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a

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judgment.” Id. at 322-23; compare Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1243-44 (9th

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Cir. 2010) (rejecting the Youngberg standard and applying the deliberate indifference standard to a

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pretrial detainee’s right to medical care, and noting that pretrial detainees, who are confined to ensure

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presence at trial, are not similarly situated to those civilly committed). The professional judgment

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standard is an objective standard and it equates “to that required in ordinary tort cases for a finding of

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conscious indifference amounting to gross negligence.” Ammons v. Washington Dep’t of Soc. &

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Health Servs., 648 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2011).

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The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution

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protects Plaintiff from being deprived of property without due process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell,

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418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), and Plaintiff has a protected interest in his personal property, Hansen v.

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May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). Authorized, intentional deprivations of property are

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actionable under the Due Process Clause, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13 (1984);

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Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985), but the Due Process Clause is violated only when

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the agency “prescribes and enforces forfeitures of property without underlying statutory authority and

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competent procedural protections,” Nevada Dept. of Corrections v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th

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Cir. 2011) (citing Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2013)) (internal quotations omitted).

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The Due Process Clause is not violated by the random, unauthorized deprivation of property so

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long as the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. at 533;

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Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994).

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In the instant case, Plaintiff’s claim is premised on the fact that a policy exists that officials fail

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to provide Plaintiff a working lock for his personal property and his property was subsequently

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damaged by vandalism. Plaintiff’s allegations, at most, give rise to an unauthorized deprivation of

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property which is not cognizable by way of a section 1983 complaint. Plaintiff has an adequate post-

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deprivation remedy under California law and therefore, he may not pursue a due process claim arising
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out of the unlawful confiscation of his personal property. Barnett, 31 F.3d at 816-17 (citing Cal. Gov’t

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Code §§ 810-895).

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B.

Americans with Disabilities Act

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Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of

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such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,

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or activities of a public entity, or be subject to discrimination by such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

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Title II applies to the services, programs, and activities provided for inmates by jails and prisons.

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Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208-213 (1998); Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., 609

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F.3d 1011, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2010); Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1214-15 (9th Cir.

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2008). “To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is a

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qualified individual with a disability; (2) [he] was excluded from participation in or otherwise

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discriminated against with regard to a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; and (3) such

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exclusion or discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039,

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1052 (9th Cir. 2002); accord Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1021; McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259,

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1265 (9th Cir. 2004).

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As to this claim Plaintiff alleges “un-promulgation of every bylaws for twenty years thus far is

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facially discriminatory against the mentally disabled individuals in violation 42 USC 12132…”

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Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the ADA. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint does not set forth

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any facts supporting a claim that he was excluded from or discriminated against with regard to

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services, programs, or activities at Coalinga State Hospital by reason of his disability. To the contrary,

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the incidents giving rise to this lawsuit appear relate solely to his claim that his property was the

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subject of vandalism and improper investigation which does not provide a basis upon which to impose

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liability under the ADA. Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1022 (citing Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th

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Cir. 1996)). Indeed, Plaintiff claims the hospital is “rife with uncontrollable predator vandalism and

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thievery” and through discovery Plaintiff can acquire all reports made related to vandalism and

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property theft. As a result, Plaintiff contends he is denied police services due to his disability. The

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Court also notes that individual capacity suits against individual prison employees in their personal

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capacities are precluded under the ADA. See, e.g., Heinke v. Cnty. of Tehama Sheriff’s Dept., No.
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CVI S-12-2433 LKK/KJN, 2013 WL 3992407, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2013); White v. Smyers, No.

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2:12-cv-2868 MCE AC P, 2012 WL 6518064, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2012); Mosier v. California

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Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. 1:11-CV-01034-MJS (PC), 2012 WL 2577524, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 3,

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2012); Roundtree v. Adams, No. 1:01-CV-06502 OWW LJO, 2005 WL 3284405, at *8 (E.D.Cal. Dec.

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1, 2005) (quoting Thomas v. Nakatani, 128 F.Supp.2d 684, 691 (D. Haw. 2000)).

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C.

Administrative Procedure Act

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Plaintiff claims that he is subjected to an underground regulation is insufficient to state a claim

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under § 1983. Plaintiff contends that Administrative Directive (AD) 818 which defines and lists five

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different categorizes of contraband, including items not allowed on hospital grounds, items not

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allowed inside security, items not allowed in individuals’ possession, supervised items, and controlled

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items. California law provides that no state agency may issue, utilize or enforce a rule that constitutes

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a “regulation” unless the rule has been adopted as a regulation under the Administrative Procedures

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Act. The California Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”) is charged with determining whether a

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given instruction or rule should be adopted pursuant to the APA and any regulation which violates the

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APA may be deemed an “underground regulation.” Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 11340.2 and 11340.5; Cole v.

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Sisto, No. 08CV2318 JCW, 2010 WL 2303257, *3 (E.D. Cal. 2010). While a determination of an

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“underground regulation” under state law may be persuasive, it is not binding on the courts. Id. at *4.

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First, there is no showing that AD 818 was used against Plaintiff as it defines unlawful

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contraband and Plaintiff concedes his television was not contraband and was not confiscated, but was

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rather the subject of an unauthorized act of vandalism. Second, even if the Court were to find that the

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policy alleged by Plaintiff was an “underground policy” promulgated in violation of the APA, Plaintiff

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would still be unable to state a due process claim for relief under § 1983. The Ninth Circuit Court of

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Appeals has held that a plaintiff cannot maintain a due process cause of action under § 1983 on the

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premise that the plaintiff was subjected to a rule that violated state law. Id. (citing see, e.g., Lone Star

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Security & Video, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 584 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 2009). An exception may exist

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where a plaintiff states that the violation of state law creates an “atypical and significant hardship” as

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compared to the normal “incidents of prison life.” Cole, 2010 WL 2303257, at *5.

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Here, Plaintiff contends Coalinga State Hospital has an underground policy with regard to

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securing personal property and investigation measures. Plaintiff fails to present facts which

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demonstrate an atypical hardship to invoke this Court’s authority under § 1983. Accordingly,

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Plaintiff’s claims relating to underground policies must be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable

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claim for relief.

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D.

State Law Violations

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Plaintiff alleges violations of state statutes and regulations, and he alleges Coalinga State

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Hospital’s policy regarding locker combinations for patients’ personal property was instituted in

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violation of the statutory authority. See Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283-86 (2002)

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(basing a claim on an implied private right of action requires a showing that the statute both contains

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explicit rights-creating terms and manifests an intent to create a private remedy); Allen v. Gold County

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Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (no private right of action for violation of criminal

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statutes); Davis v. Powell, 901 F.Supp.2d 1196, 1211 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (no implied private right of

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action for violation of Title 15 prison regulations); Cole v. Sisto, 2010 WL 2303257, at *4-5 (E.D.

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Cal. 2010) (citing Lone Star Sec. & Video, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 584 F.3d 1232, 1236-37 (9th

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Cir. 2009)) (being subjected to a rule that is invalid under state law does not give rise to a viable

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section 1983 claim). Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff may state a cognizable claim under state law,

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the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claims because there is no

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cognizable federal constitutional claim. The “plain language” of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) “makes clear

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that supplemental jurisdiction may only be invoked when the district court has the hook of original

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jurisdiction on which to hang it.” Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805

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(9th Cir. 2001).

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IV.

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ORDER

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The Court finds that Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to state any cognizable claims

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upon which relief may be granted under § 1983. Plaintiff was previously notified of the applicable

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legal standards and the first amended complaint is substantially similar to the original complaint, and

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Plaintiff simply re-states his claims of an improper policy at Coalinga State Hospital to protect his
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personal property from vandalism. Based upon the allegations in Plaintiff’s original and first

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amended, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff is unable to allege any additional facts that would

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support a claim for failure to protect Plaintiff in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and further

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amendment would be futile. See Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district

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court may deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.”)

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deficiencies at issue, the Court finds that further leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203

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F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th. Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446-1449 (9th Cir. 1987).

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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Based on the nature of the

This action is dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; and

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2. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:

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June 22, 2016
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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