Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Magnolia Health Corporation et al
Filing
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ORDER APPROVING CONSENT DECREE re 55 signed by District Judge Dale A. Drozd on 3/7/2017. CASE CLOSED. (Jessen, A)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
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No. 1:15-cv-01222-DAD-EPG
ORDER APPROVING CONSENT DECREE
v.
(Doc. Nos. 50-1, 55)
MAGNOLIA HEALTH CORPORATION
et al.,
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Defendants.
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This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s unopposed motion for approval of the parties’
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consent decree. A hearing on the motion was held on March 7, 2017. Attorneys Nakkisa
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Akhavan and Rumduol Vuong appeared on behalf of plaintiff U.S. Equal Employment
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Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and attorney Elizabeth Tyler appeared on behalf of the
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defendants.
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This action arises from alleged disability discrimination under the Americans with
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Disabilities Act (“ADA”). After investigating charges of discrimination and pursuant to its
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statutory authority, the EEOC commenced this action on August 5, 2015. (Doc. No. 1.)
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Specifically, the EEOC alleged that defendants failed to hire or discharged individuals who had
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actual, perceived, or record of disabilities; and denied reasonable accommodations for individuals
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with disabilities and subjected individuals to an unlawful qualification standard. The EEOC
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sought both monetary and injunctive relief. (Id.) After a series of settlement conferences before
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United States Magistrate Judge Erica P. Grosjean, the parties reached a settlement on monetary
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and injunctive terms. The EEOC now seeks approval of a proposed consent decree (see Doc. No.
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50-1) reflecting the parties’ agreement.
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“A consent decree is ‘essentially a settlement agreement subject to continued judicial
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policing.’” United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Williams v.
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Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 920 (6th Cir. 1983)). Thus, before approving a consent decree, a district
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court must independently determine that the proposed agreement is “fundamentally fair, adequate,
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and reasonable” and “conform[s] to applicable laws.” Id.; see also Arizona v. City of Tucson, 761
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F.3d 1005, 1010–14 (9th Cir. 2014). “[T]he district court must balance several factors, including
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but not limited to: strength of the plaintiffs’ case; risk, expense, complexity and possible duration
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of continued litigation; relief offered in settlement; extent of discovery already completed; stage
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of proceedings; experience and views of counsel; governmental participation; and reaction of the
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class members.” Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 890 F.2d 1438, 1445 (9th Cir. 1989)
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(citing Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City & County of San Francisco, 688 F.2d
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615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982)). Where a government agency is involved in the negotiation of the
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proposed consent decree, there is a presumption in favor of the decree’s enforceability, and courts
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should pay deference to the agency’s judgment. See S.E.C. v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th
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Cir. 1984).
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Here, the proposed consent decree provides monetary relief to claimants in a total sum of
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$325,000.00, to be allocated at the sole discretion of the EEOC. (Doc. No. 50-1 § VII.A.) The
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proposed consent decree also provides procedures for reinstatement of eligible and qualified
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claimants, as well as other victim-specific relief. (Id. § VII.B–C.) Moreover, the proposed
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consent decree sets forth a number of forward-looking injunctive measures. (See, e.g., id. § VIII
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(general injunctive relief).) For example, the parties agree that defendants will (1) retain a third-
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party equal employment opportunity monitor to ensure compliance with the decree and the ADA;
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(2) assign an internal ADA coordinator to review and process requests for accommodation,
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changes in the terms and conditions of employment, and complaints regarding disability
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discrimination and retaliation; (3) review and, if necessary, revise defendants’ policies and
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procedures regarding disability discrimination, reasonable accommodation, and retaliation; and
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(4) provide training on employer obligations and employee rights under the ADA. (See, e.g., id.
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§ IX (specific injunctive relief).)
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In light of the claims and defenses in this action, the court concludes that the proposed
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consent decree provides substantial relief among claimants and defendants’ employees, and that it
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is the product of a fair arms-length negotiation process. Accordingly, the court finds that the
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proposed consent decree is fundamentally fair, reasonable, and adequate, and that it is not illegal,
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a product of collusion, or against the public interest.
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For the reasons stated above,
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1. Plaintiff’s motion for approval of the parties’ proposed consent decree (Doc. No. 55)
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is granted;
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2. The parties’ proposed consent decree (Doc. No. 50-1) is approved;
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3. The court retains continuing jurisdiction over the consent decree in this action for the
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duration of the decree (see Doc. No. 50-1 § IV.B); and
4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
March 7, 2017
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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