Aleman v. North Kern State Prison, et al.
Filing
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FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS recommending to Dismiss Claims Consistent With Magistrate Judge's Prior Order in Light of Williams Decision re 1 Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint signed by Magistrate Judge Erica P. Grosjean on 12/29/2017. Referred to Judge O'Neill. Objections to F&R due within fourteen (14) days. (Jessen, A)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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HECTOR ALEMAN,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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C/O K. ACOSTA, et al.,
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Defendants.
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Case No. 1:15-cv-01293-LJO-EPG
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
TO DISMISS CLAIMS CONSISTENT
WITH MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S PRIOR
ORDER IN LIGHT OF WILLIAMS
DECISION
(ECF Nos. 1 & 13)
OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS
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Hector Aleman (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis
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in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff consented to magistrate
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judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 6-7). Defendants have not yet consented to magistrate judge
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jurisdiction or declined to consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction.
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The Court previously screened Plaintiff’s complaint before Defendants appeared. (ECF
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No. 13). The Court found that Plaintiff stated cognizable claims against Plaintiff’s complaint
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states a claim for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment as to Defendants
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Rentieria, Ledesma, Nuno, Fierros, Montalvo, Acosta, and Garcia. (Id. at 5-6.) However, the
Court also found that Plaintiff failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim against North Kern
State Prison (“NKSP”), and the warden of NKSP, S. Alfaro. (Id.) Additionally, the Court
found that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for a constitutional violation related to the prison
grievance process. (Id.) Plaintiff’s state law claims were dismissed without prejudice. (Id. at 6-
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7.)
Prior to the Court dismissing claims and defendants, Plaintiff agreed to proceed only on
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the claims found cognizable by the Court. (ECF No. 14).
As described below, in light of Ninth Circuit authority, this Court is recommending that
the assigned district judge dismiss claims and defendants consistent with the order by the
magistrate judge at the screening stage.
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I.
WILLIAMS v. KING
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On November 9, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
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that a magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to dismiss a prisoner’s case for failure to state a
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claim at the screening stage where the Plaintiff had consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction
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and defendants had not yet been served. Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2017).
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Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that “28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) requires the consent of all
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plaintiffs and defendants named in the complaint—irrespective of service of process—before
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jurisdiction may vest in a magistrate judge to hear and decide a civil case that a district court
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would otherwise hear.” Id. at 501.
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Here, the defendants were not served at the time the Court issued its order dismissing
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claims and defendants, and therefore had not appeared or consented to magistrate judge
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jurisdiction.
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defendants based solely on Plaintiff’s consent.
Accordingly, the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to dismiss claims and
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In light of the holding in Williams, this Court will recommend to the assigned district
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judge that he dismiss the claims and defendants previously dismissed by this Court, for the
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reasons provided in the Court’s screening order.
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II.
SCREENING REQUIREMENT
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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
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governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a).
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The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are
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legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
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that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
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' 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have
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been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or
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appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
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A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
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that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are
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not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
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conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient
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factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.
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(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting
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this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts
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“are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d
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677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, a
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plaintiff’s legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
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Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal
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pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
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pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal).
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III.
SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Plaintiff primarily alleges that he was beaten while in constraints, constituting a
violation of the Eighth Amendment’s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
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Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on August 31, 2014, he was housed at North Kern
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State Prison (NKSP). That day, he had an altercation with building floor officers, defendants
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Renteria and Ledesma. After the incident, Plaintiff was handcuffed with both hands behind his
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back. He was completely restrained and not a threat to the safety of the officers. After Plaintiff
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had been restrained, Defendants Benteria and Ledesma started punching and kicking Plaintiff’s
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entire body, including Plaintiff’s face and head.
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Fierros, Montalvo, Acosta and Garcia applied leg chains and joined in the assault on Plaintiff
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by taking turns punching and kicking him and using their expandable batons. They also
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slammed Plaintiff’s head into the door.
Responding officers, defendants Nuno,
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Plaintiff slipped in and out of consciousness for about an hour. Finally, Plaintiff was
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examined by a medical person and was told Plaintiff needed to go to the hospital immediately.
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Plaintiff suffered a broken rib. Plaintiff was then transferred to Wasco State Prison.
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Plaintiff also claims that Wasco State Prison attempted to invalidate Plaintiff’s appeals
by falsely claiming that Plaintiff missed his deadlines.
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IV.
ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS
A.
Section 1983 Legal Standards
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress....
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42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely
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provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor,
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490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see
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also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los
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Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir.
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2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).
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To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted
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under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the
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Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.
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2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing
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“under color of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the
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meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or
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omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which
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complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th
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Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite
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causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others
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which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional
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harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of
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causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.”
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Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City
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of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).
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Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of
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their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant
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holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional
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violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir.
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1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941
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(1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability,
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Plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that the supervisory defendants
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either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the
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violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so
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deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights' and is ‘the moving force
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of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal
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citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).
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supervisor may be liable for his “own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or
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control of his subordinates,” “his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which the
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complaint is made,” or “conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of
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others.” Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal citations,
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quotation marks, and alterations omitted).
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B.
For instance, a
Improper Section 1983 Defendants
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In his Complaint, Plaintiff lists NKSP Warden S. Alfaro as a Defendant. However,
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Plaintiff makes no specific allegation concerning this Defendant. Thus, the claim against S.
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Alfaro appears to be based upon his supervisory role at NKSP.
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To the extent Plaintiff names NKSP Warden S. Alfaro as a Defendant based upon a
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supervisory liability theory, he does not state a claim against him. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
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662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct
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of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”).
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Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff also attempted to name NKSP as a Defendant,
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this was improper under § 1983. NKSP is a state prison under the control of the California
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Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), a state agency of the state of
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California. State agencies are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, and are therefore
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not amenable to suit under that statute. Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004)
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(citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45
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(1989)).
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C.
Claims Concerning Grievance Process
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Prisoners have no stand-alone due process rights related to the administrative grievance
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process. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1988); see also Ramirez v. Galaza,
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334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no liberty interest entitling inmates to a
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specific grievance process). Because there is no right to any particular grievance process, it is
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impossible for due process to have been violated by ignoring or failing to properly process
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grievances.
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Prisoners have a First Amendment right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518
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U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing the right
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in the context of prison grievance procedures). This right includes petitioning the government
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through the prison grievance process. See id. The right of access to the courts, however, only
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requires that prisoners have the capability of bringing challenges to sentences or conditions of
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confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356–57.
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As a jurisdictional requirement flowing from the standing doctrine, the prisoner must
“Actual injury” is prejudice with respect to
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allege an actual injury. See id. at 349.
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contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a
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non-frivolous claim. See id.; see also Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007).
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Plaintiff fails to state a constitutional violation related to the prison grievance process.
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It may be that the prison’s wrongful denial of Plaintiff’s claims will allow him to proceed in
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this case despite not completing the prison grievance process. But as Plaintiff is filing his case
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in court now, Plaintiff cannot show injury from the failure to properly process his grievance.
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V.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that
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1. The following claims and Defendants be dismissed from this action:
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a. Defendants North Kern State Prison and Warden S. Alfaro; and
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b. Plaintiff’s claim alleging a constitutional violation related to the prison
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grievance process.
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If these recommendations are adopted in full, this action will proceed only against
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Defendants Rentieria, Ledesma, Nuno, Fierros, Montalvo, Acosta, and Garcia for excessive
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force in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen
(14) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file
written objections with the court.
Such a document should be captioned “Objections to
Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be
served and filed within seven (7) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised
that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on
appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan,
923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated:
December 29, 2017
/s/
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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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