Simpson v. Ahlin

Filing 6

SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING Action for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May be Granted, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 9/16/16. Thirty Day Deadline. (Attachments: # 1 1983 Amended Complaint Form, # 2 2254 Petition Form)(Marrujo, C)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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EARL SIMPSON,

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Plaintiff,

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v.
PAM AHLIN,

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Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:15-cv-01301-BAM (PC)
SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING ACTION FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH
RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED, WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND
(ECF No. 1)
THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Earl Simpson (“Plaintiff”) is a state civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma

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pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed August 20,

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2015, is currently before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 1.)

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I.

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Screening Requirement and Standard
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §

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1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or

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malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief

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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C. §

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1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

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entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but

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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

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do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s

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allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v.

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Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

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omitted).
Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally

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construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir.

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2010) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which

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requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is

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liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted);

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Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a

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defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of

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satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks

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omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

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II.

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Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff is currently housed at Coalinga State Hospital. Plaintiff names Pam Ahlin, the CEO of

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the Department of Hospitals, as the sole defendant. Plaintiff filed this action using this Court’s

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standardized complaint form for a §1983 action. Attached to the complaint is a document entitled

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“Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition.”

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Plaintiff alleges as follows: On October 10, 2005, he was involuntarily transferred to the State

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Hospital pursuant to Cal. Penal Code §§2962-2972 as a civilly committed person. Plaintiff’s

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allegations, in his document entitled “Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition,” are confusing.

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He claims there are fraud and “sienter” and estoppel at the Hospital. But as best the Court can

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determine, Plaintiff is claiming that he was supposed to be released on parole on October 10, 2005 but

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instead he was transferred to the state hospital for treatment. He alleges he is being held “into the
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custody of the hospitals for unnecessary treatment.” (Doc. 1, p.5 of 7.) He asks to be released. The

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remainder of the “Petition” asks for the Court to subpoena documents and records from the

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Department of State Hospitals.

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III.

Deficiencies of Complaint

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Habeas Corpus

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Plaintiff is informed that insofar as he is challenging the validity of his continued commitment,

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the exclusive method for asserting that challenge is by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

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Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Such claims may not be

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brought in a section 1983 action. Nor may Plaintiff seek to invalidate the fact or duration of his

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confinement indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of

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the State's custody. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81. A section 1983 action is barred, no matter the relief

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sought, if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its

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duration. Id. at 81–82; Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994) (unless and until favorable

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termination of the conviction or sentence, no cause of action under section 1983 exists); Huftile v.

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Miccio–Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying Heck to SVPA detainees with access

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to habeas relief). Thus, when a prisoner challenges the legality of his custody and the relief he seeks is

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a determination that he is entitled to an earlier or immediate release, such a challenge is not cognizable

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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the prisoner's sole federal remedy is a petition for a writ of habeas

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corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818,

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824 (9th Cir. 1997); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). If a

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§ 1983 complaint states claims which sound in habeas, the court should not convert the complaint into

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a habeas petition. See id.; Trimble, 49 F.3d at 586. Rather, such claims must be dismissed without

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prejudice and the complaint should proceed on any remaining cognizable § 1983 claims. See Heck,

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512 U.S. at 487; Trimble, 49 F.3d at 585.

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Plaintiff's claims, either directly or indirectly, challenge the validity of his confinement, a

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challenge which may be brought only in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, Plaintiff has

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failed to state any claims that are cognizable under section 1983. In an abundance of caution, and in

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the event the Court has misconstrued the relief Plaintiff is seeking, the Court will permit plaintiff leave
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to amend his complaint. If, however, Plaintiff in fact seeks to challenge the fact or duration of his

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confinement, he should file a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1

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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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To the extent that Plaintiff’s intent was to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus, Rule 4 of the

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Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires the Court to conduct a preliminary review of each petition for

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writ of habeas corpus. The Court must dismiss a petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition ...

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that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 2254 Cases; see also

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Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir.1990).
A petitioner seeking habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must name the state officer

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having custody of him as the respondent to the petition. Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254

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Cases; Ortiz–Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir.1996); Stanley v. California Supreme

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Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir.1994). Respondent Pam Ahlin, Executive Director of Coalinga State

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Hospital, appears to be appropriately named as the officer having custody of Plaintiff, who as a result

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of his civil commitment is confined to Coalinga State Hospital.
In addition, the petition must “be signed under penalty of perjury by the petitioner or by a

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person authorized to sign if for the petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2242.” Rule 2(c)(5) of the Rules

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Governing 2254 Cases.
Finally, the complaint does not include the allegations and information required to file a

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complete petition for habeas corpus. The Court will order the Clerk to provide Petitioner with a form

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to be completed to create a complete petition for writ of habeas corpus. Plaintiff is directed to fully

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complete that petition to include all grounds for relief and facts supporting each such ground. The

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Court will not refer to the prior complaint if any necessary claims or facts are omitted from the

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amended petition.

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Exhaustion of State Remedies

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A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

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petition for writ of habeas corpus must first exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).

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In a prior proceeding, Simpson v. King, CAED Case. 14-1679, reported in 2014 WL 7447780
Plaintiff was informed of the standards for a habeas petition.
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The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

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opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

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722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198,

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71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir.1988).
A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

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full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v.

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Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,

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276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.1996).

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IV.

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Conclusion and Order
Plaintiff's §1983 complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The

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complaint fails to set forth a factual basis supporting Plaintiff's apparent legal conclusion that his

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commitment was not warranted. Due to the lack of clarity regarding Plaintiff's current commitment

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status and relief he seeks, Plaintiff will be given leave to amend. If Plaintiff elects to amend his

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pleadings, as this order permits him to do, he must set forth his claim(s) completely, including the full

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factual basis supporting his legal conclusions.

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If he chooses to proceed under §1983, he must specifically show that habeas relief is not

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available to him and that success in this action would not necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his

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confinement or its duration.

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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claim.

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The Complaint shall be dismissed with leave to amend for failure to state a cognizable

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The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a copy of this order and forms for (1) a Petition

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under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody, and

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(2) a Complaint pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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3.

Within thirty (30) days of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file amended pleadings

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consisting of either a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a complaint pursuant to the

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Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff shall fully complete the form for the

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amended pleadings, including all claims and the facts supporting each claim. Plaintiff

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shall sign the amended pleadings under penalty of perjury.

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If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the

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Court will dismiss this action, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim and to

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obey a court order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

/s/ Barbara

September 16, 2016

A. McAuliffe

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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