Muhammad v. Komin et al

Filing 29

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS to Dismiss Claims Consistent With Magistrate Judge's Prior Order in Light of Williams Decision re 11 Amended Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint signed by Magistrate Judge Erica P. Grosjean on 12/29/2017. Referred to Judge Drozd. Objections to F&R due within fourteen (14) days. (Jessen, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MAURICE MUHAMMAD,

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Plaintiff,

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v.
KOMIN and MITCHELL,

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Defendants.

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Case No. 1:15-cv-01373-DAD-EPG
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
TO DISMISS CLAIMS CONSISTENT
WITH MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S PRIOR
ORDER IN LIGHT OF WILLIAMS
DECISION
(ECF Nos. 11 & 12)
OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS

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Maurice Muhammad (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

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pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff consented to

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magistrate judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 7). Defendants have not yet consented to magistrate

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judge jurisdiction or declined to consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction.

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The Court previously screened Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint before Defendants

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appeared. (ECF No. 12). The Court found that Plaintiff stated cognizable claims against

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Defendants Komin and Mitchell in their individual capacities for violation of the First

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Amendment free exercise clause, as well as against Defendants Komin and Mitchell in their
official capacities for violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”). (Id. at 9.) However, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to state a cognizable
claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. (Id. at 7.)

Prior to the Court

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dismissing claims and defendants, Plaintiff agreed to proceed only on the claims found
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cognizable by the Court. (ECF No. 15).
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As described below, in light of Ninth Circuit authority, this Court is recommending that
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the assigned district judge dismiss claims and defendants consistent with the order by the
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magistrate judge at the screening stage.
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I.

WILLIAMS v. KING

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On November 9, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held

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that a magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to dismiss a prisoner’s case for failure to state a

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claim at the screening stage where the Plaintiff had consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction

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and defendants had not yet been served. Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that “28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) requires the consent of all

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plaintiffs and defendants named in the complaint—irrespective of service of process—before

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jurisdiction may vest in a magistrate judge to hear and decide a civil case that a district court

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would otherwise hear.” Id. at 501.

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Here, the defendants were not served at the time the Court issued its order dismissing

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claims and defendants, and therefore had not appeared or consented to magistrate judge

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jurisdiction.

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defendants based solely on Plaintiff’s consent.

Accordingly, the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to dismiss claims and

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In light of the holding in Williams, this Court will recommend to the assigned district

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judge that he dismiss the claims and defendants previously dismissed by this Court, for the

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reasons provided in the Court’s screening order.

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II.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a).

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The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are

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legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

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that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

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' 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have

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been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or

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appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

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that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

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not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
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conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient

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factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.

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(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting

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this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts

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“are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d

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677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, a

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plaintiff’s legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal

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pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that

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pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal).

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SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

III.

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In October/November of 2014, Plaintiff, as the leader of Nation of Islam religious group

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met with Captain Komin and Lieutenant Mitchell to plan their Ramadan-Eid procession.

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Komin and Mitchell were made aware that the Nation of Islam has a Ramadan time that is

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different from Orthodox Muslim’s time. The Nation of Islam religion practices Ramadan in the

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month of December. They also understood that the Eid, fast breaking fast of Ramada, is at the

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tail end of Ramadan. Plaintiff presented Komin and Mitchell with the menu for said feast.

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For the first week of the Nation of Islam Ramadan, the Eid morning meals were not

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served. Near the end of their Ramadan, Plaintiff sent a 22 form to Mitchell but received no

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response.

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On or about January 10, 2015, Plaintiff met with Komin and Mitchell and they informed

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Plaintiff that they were not going to honor their “Eid” per directives of DCD. Plaintiff asked

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for a memo or something in writing, but Komin and Mitchell said they could not give one.

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They added that they had accommodated Ramadan/Eid for the Orthodox/Sunni Muslims in July

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and that was all they were going to do.
This deprivation violated/nullified Plaintiff’s Ramadan.

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IV.

ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS
A.

Section 1983 Legal Standards

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress....

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely

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provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor,

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490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see

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also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los

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Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir.

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2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).

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To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted

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under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the

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Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.

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2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing

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“under color of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the

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meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or

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omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

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complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th

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Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite

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causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others

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which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional

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harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of

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causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.”
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Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City

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of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).

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Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of

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their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant

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holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional

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violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir.

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1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941

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(1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability,

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Plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that the supervisory defendants

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either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the

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violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so

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deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights' and is ‘the moving force

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of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal

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citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

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supervisor may be liable for his “own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or

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control of his subordinates,” “his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which the

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complaint is made,” or “conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of

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others.” Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal citations,

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quotation marks, and alterations omitted).

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V.

For instance, a

RETALIATION
A. Legal Standards

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Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner for exercising his First Amendment rights

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may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); see

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also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d

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802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). A retaliation claim requires “five basic elements: (1) an assertion that

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a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s

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protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment

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rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v.
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Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted); accord Watson v. Carter,

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668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir.

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2009).
B. Application of Legal Standards to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

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Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a retaliation claim. Plaintiff has not alleged facts

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that, if true, would establish that Defendants Komin and Mitchell acted in retaliation for

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Plaintiff exercising his constitutional rights, nor that Plaintiff’s conduct was chilled as a result.

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VI.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s

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retaliation claim against Defendants Komin and Mitchell be dismissed from this action without

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prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim.

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If these recommendations are adopted in full, this action will proceed only against
Defendants Komin and Mitchell on Plaintiff’s First Amendment and RLUIPA claims.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

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assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

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(14) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file

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written objections with the court.

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Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be

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served and filed within seven (7) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on

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appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan,

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923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

December 29, 2017

/s/
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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