Harris v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 20

Order GRANTING counsel's 16 Motion for Attorney Fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 5/13/2019. (Rosales, O.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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LAVONNE A. HARRIS,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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NANCY A. BERRYHILL1,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

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Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:15-cv-01429- JLT
ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)
(Doc. 16)

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James Sung Pi, counsel for Plaintiff Lavonne Harris, seeks an award of attorney fees pursuant to

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42 U.S.C. § 406(b) following a favorable decision by an administrative law judge. (Doc. 16) Neither

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Plaintiff nor the Commissioner of Social Security have opposed the motion. For the following reasons,

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the motion for attorney fees is GRANTED.

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I.

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Relevant Background
Plaintiff entered into a contingent fee agreement with the Law Offices of Harry J. Binder and

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Charles Binder on August 31, 2015. (Doc. 18-1 at 2) Plaintiff agreed that if the matter was remanded

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by the United States District Court for review or further administrative proceedings and past due

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benefits were awarded, counsel was entitled to seek additional fees under Section 406, which would

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“not exceed 25% of the back due benefits due.” (Id.) In addition, the parties agreed the fee request

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Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court substitutes Nancy A. Berryhill for her
predecessor, Carolyn W. Colvin, as the defendant.

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would “be approved the U.S. District Court pursuant to §406(b) of the Social Security Act.” (Id.)

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Further, Plaintiff agreed to “transfer and assign [her] rights and interests in any and all Equal Access to

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Justice Act …fees.” (Id.)
On September 21, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint for review of the administrative decision

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denying her application for Social Security benefits. (Doc. 1) The Court found the ALJ failed to

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identify legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physicians. (Doc. 12

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at 12-14) Therefore, the Court remanded the matter for further administrative proceedings pursuant to

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sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Id. at 14-15) Following the entry of judgment in favor of

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Plaintiff on March 3, 2017 (Doc. 13), the Court awarded $4,836.21 in attorney fees pursuant to the

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Equal Access to Justice Act. (Doc. 14 at 1; Doc. 15 at 1)
Following the remand, an ALJ issued a “fully favorable decision” awarding Plaintiff benefits,

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finding she was disabled as of December 22, 2011. (Doc. 18-1 at 15) On August 6, 2018, the

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Commissioner concluded Plaintiff was entitled to monthly disability benefits from Social Security

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beginning in January 2012. (Doc. 18-1 at 17-18) Accordingly, Plaintiff was entitled to past due benefits

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totaling $54,816.15. (Id. at 17)

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Mr. Pi filed the motion now before the Court on April 22, 2019. (Doc. 16) Plaintiff was served

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with the motion and informed of her right to file a response, indicating whether she agreed to disagreed

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with the requested fees. (Doc. 19 at 1) To date, no opposition has been filed.

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II.

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Attorney Fees under § 406(b)
An attorney may seek an award of fees for representation of a Social Security claimant who is

awarded benefits:

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Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under [42 USC § 401, et
seq] who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine
and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in
excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is
entitled by reason of such judgment. . . .

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42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A); see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 794 (2002) (Section 406(b)

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controls fees awarded for representation of Social Security claimants). A contingency fee agreement

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is unenforceable if it provides for fees exceeding the statutory amount. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807

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(“Congress has provided one boundary line: Agreements are unenforceable to the extent that they

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provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of the past-due benefits.”).

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III.

Discussion and Analysis
District courts “have been deferential to the terms of contingency fee contracts § 406(b) cases.”

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Hern v. Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003). However, the Court must review

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contingent-fee arrangements “as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in

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particular cases.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. In doing so, the Court should consider “the character of

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the representation and the results the representative achieved.” Id. at 808. In addition, the Court should

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consider whether the attorney performed in a substandard manner or engaged in dilatory conduct or

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excessive delays, and whether the fees are “excessively large in relation to the benefits received.”

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Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
Plaintiff entered into the contingent fee agreement in which she agreed to pay up to twenty-five

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percent of any awarded past-due benefits. The Law Offices of Charles E. Binder and Harry J. Binder,

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LLP, accepted the risk of loss in the representation and expended a total of 25.1 hours while

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representing Plaintiff before the District Court. (Doc. 17 at 8; Doc. 18-1 at 4) Due to counsel’s work

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to remand the action to an administrative law judge, Plaintiff ultimately received an award of benefits

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for disability. For this, Mr. Pi requests a fee of $13,704.03. (Doc. 17 at 1) Because $4,836.21 was paid

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under the EAJA, the net cost to Plaintiff is $8,867.82. (See id. at 5) Finally, though served with the

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motion and informed of the right to oppose the fee request (Doc. 19 at 1), Plaintiff did not and thereby

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indicated her belief that the fee request is reasonable.
Significantly, there is no indication Mr. Pi performed in a substandard manner or engaged in

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severe dilatory conduct to the extent that a reduction in fees is warranted. To the contrary, Plaintiff was

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able to secure a fully favorable decision following the remand for further proceedings, including an

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award of past-due benefits beginning in January 2012. Accordingly, the Court finds the fees sought by

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Mr. Pi are reasonable in light the results achieved in this action, and the amount does not exceed

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twenty-five percent maximum permitted under 42 U.S.C. §406(b).

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IV.

Conclusion and Order

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Based upon the foregoing, the Court ORDERS:

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1.

Counsel’s motion for attorney fees pursuant to 24 U.S.C. §406(b) in the amount of
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$13,704.03 is GRANTED;

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2.

The Commissioner shall pay the amount directly to Counsel, James Sung Pi; and

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Counsel SHALL refund $4,836.21 to Plaintiff Lavonne A. Harris.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

May 13, 2019

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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