Youngblood v. Clark et al

Filing 15

ORDER DISREGARDING Plaintiff's 14 Notice of Appeal; SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING Amended Complaint WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 5/9/17. Amended Complaint Due Within Thirty Days. (Attachments: # 1 Amended Complaint Form) (Marrujo, C)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JESSE L. YOUNGBLOOD,

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Plaintiff,
v.
CLARK, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:15-cv-01746-DAD-BAM (PC)
ORDER DISREGARDING PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE
OF APPEAL
(ECF No. 14)
SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED
COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
(ECF No. 8)

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Plaintiff Jesse L. Youngblood (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner, proceeds pro se and in forma

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pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed his original complaint

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in this action on November 18, 2015, along with a motion for injunctive and other relief, including

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seeking a judgment in his favor. (ECF Nos. 1, 3.) Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on

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December 4, 2015. (ECF No. 8.)

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I.

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On November 3, 2016, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive and other relief

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because Plaintiff’s most-recent amended complaint had not yet been screened to determine if he stated

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any cognizable claim for relief and no defendant had made an appearance in this action. (ECF Nos.

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11, 13.) On November 22, 2016, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Notice of Appeal.” (ECF No. 14.)

Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal

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Although the “notice” refers to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 and several California Penal Code

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sections, it does not include any argument or requested form of relief, and the Court cannot ascertain

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whether Plaintiff is requesting reconsideration by this Court or seeking to appeal a particular ruling to

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the Ninth Circuit. The purported notice is insufficient to support either request.

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For these reasons, Plaintiff’s notice of appeal shall be disregarded. Plaintiff is not precluded

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from seeking reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 or requesting

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certification of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). However, any such request

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must be made in the form of a motion and, more importantly, set forth the basis for the motion, the

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order to be reconsidered or appealed, and the relief sought.

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II.

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Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on December 4, 2015, is currently before the Court

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Screening Requirement and Standard

for screening. (ECF No. 8.)

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §

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1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or

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malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief

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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C. §

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1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

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entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but

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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

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do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s

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allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v.

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Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

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omitted).

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To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient

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factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the
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misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v.

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United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant

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acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the

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plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572

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F.3d at 969.

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A. Plaintiff’s Allegations

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Plaintiff is currently housed at California State Prison, Corcoran (“CSP-Corcoran”), where the

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events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff names Dr. Clark, Dr. Jeffrey Wang, Dr.

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Wang and John and Jane Does as defendants. In summary, Plaintiff alleges that he sustained acute

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injuries to his back, neck and shoulder while being transferred to R. J. Donovan Prison on December

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23, 2010. After arriving at R. J. Donovan, Plaintiff submitted a CDCR 602 Form and a Medical Form

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for a reasonable accommodation seeking medication, a back brace and lower tier chrono from an

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unknown doctor (“John Doe 1”) at R. J. Donovan. The doctor ordered x-rays and prescribed Tylenol

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for pain management, but denied the chrono and back brace. A second unknown doctor (“John Doe

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2”) at R. J. Donovan prescribed Tylenol and denied the chrono and back brace. Plaintiff allegedly

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made other requests to a third unknown doctor (“Jane Doe 1”) at R. J. Donovan, who prescribed

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Tylenol, but no other treatment in 2011/2012, such as a chrono or back brace.

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Upon Plaintiff’s arrival at CSP-Corcoran, Plaintiff submitted several forms and exhausted all

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available levels for relief regarding his treatment plan to no avail in the period from 2012 through

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2015. At some point, Dr. Clark approved of Tylenol, but stated that his supervisor would not let him

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grant a chrono or a back brace from the incident in 2010. Dr. Wang also approved of Tylenol, but

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further stated that his supervisor would not let him provide Plaintiff with a chrono or back brace. Dr.

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Wang also reportedly told Plaintiff he could submit a CDCR 602/Medical Form or ADA (1824) Form

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or take it to court. Dr. Kim also approved of Tylenol, but denied Plaintiff a chrono or back brace as a

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“necessity in treatment plan/rehabilitation plan.” (ECF No. 8, p. 6.) Plaintiff also alleges that an

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unknown individual (“John Doe”) took x-rays and showed results.

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As relief, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, including a chrono and back brace, along with

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compensatory and punitive damages. Additionally, Plaintiff suggests that he sought relief in “all
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lower courts,” including Kings County Superior Court, California Court of Appeal, and the California

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Supreme Court, but was denied for being a vexatious litigant. (ECF No. 8, pp. 6-7.)

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B. Discussion

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Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 18 and

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pro se, he will be granted an opportunity to amend his complaint to cure these deficiencies to the

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extent he is able to do so in good faith. To assist Plaintiff, the Court provides the following pleading

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and legal standards that appear applicable to his claims.

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1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

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Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain

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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed

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factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).

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Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

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plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974).

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While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550

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U.S. at 556–557.

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Although Plaintiff’s complaint is short, it is not a plain statement of his claims showing that he

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is entitled to relief. Plaintiff fails to include factual allegations describing what happened, when it

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happened and who was involved. Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions that he was denied certain forms of

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treatment are not sufficient.

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2. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18, 20

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A party asserting a claim “may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it

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has against an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), 20(a)(2); Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952

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(7th Cir. 2011); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). “Thus multiple claims against a

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single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B

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against Defendant 2.”

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defendants in one action if “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the

George, 507 F.3d at 607.

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However, multiple parties may be joined as

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alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions

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or occurrences; and [ ] any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.”

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Therefore, claims against different parties may be joined together in one

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complaint only if the claims have similar factual backgrounds and have common issues of law or fact.

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Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350–51 (9th Cir.1997).

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Here, Plaintiff appears to bring claims against defendants at R. J. Donovan and against

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defendants at CSP-Corcoran. Although the claims relate to an injury to his back, they involve unique

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claims against doctors at R. J. Donovan shortly after his asserted injury versus claims against doctors

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at CSP-Corcoran regarding later treatment following his transfer from R. J. Donovan. If Plaintiff

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elects to amend his complaint, he must choose which defendants he would like to proceed against in

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this action. Plaintiff is advised that R. J. Donovan is not located in this judicial district.

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3. Doe Defendants

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Plaintiff has asserted claims against unknown defendants. “As a general rule, the use of ‘John

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Doe’ to identify a defendant is not favored.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir.1980).

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Plaintiff is advised that Doe defendants (i.e., unknown defendants) cannot be served by the United

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States Marshal until Plaintiff has identified them as actual individuals and amended his complaint to

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substitute names for the Does.

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4. Eighth Amendment – Deliberate Indifference

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“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate

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must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096

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(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291 (1976)). The two part

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test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by

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demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the

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‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to the need was

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deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

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Deliberate indifference is shown where the official is aware of a serious medical need and fails

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to adequately respond. Simmons v. Navajo County, Arizona, 609 F.3d 1011, 1018 (9th Cir. 2010).

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“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1019; Toguchi v. Chung, 391
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F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). The prison official must be aware of facts from which he could make

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an inference that “a substantial risk of serious harm exists” and he must make the inference. Farmer v.

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Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994). Negligence, inadvertence, or differences

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of medical opinion between the prisoner and health care providers, however, do not violate the Eighth

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Amendment. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d

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240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); Lyons v. Busi, 566 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1191-1192 (E.D. Cal. 2008).

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Here, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against any of the defendants regarding his

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medical treatment. At best, Plaintiff has alleged a disagreement between himself and his medical

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providers regarding the need to pursue one course of treatment over another. A difference of opinion

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does not amount to deliberate indifference, and Plaintiff has failed to establish that the course of

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treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances. Jackson, 90 F.3d at

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332; Sanchez, 891 F.2d at 242. Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to cure this deficiency to the

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extent he is able to do so in good faith.

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III.

Conclusion and Order

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Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 18 and

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20, and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. As Plaintiff is

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proceeding in pro se, the Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend his complaint to

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cure the identified deficiencies. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

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Plaintiff is cautioned that he may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated

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claims in his third amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no

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“buckshot” complaints).

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Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each

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named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights.

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff also must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is

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plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

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Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint.

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Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended complaint

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must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220.
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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1.

Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal filed on November 22, 2016, is DISREGARDED;

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The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

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Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed December 4, 2015 (ECF No. 8), is dismissed

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for failure to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 18, 20, and for failure to state a claim

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upon which relief can be granted;

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Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a

second amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal; and
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If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the

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Court will dismiss this action, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim and for failure to obey a

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court order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

/s/ Barbara

May 9, 2017

A. McAuliffe

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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