Riley v. Lamb et al

Filing 5

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Dismissing the Matter Without Prejudice, signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 1/22/2016. Referred to Judge Dale A. Drozd. Objections to F&R due within 14 days. (Hall, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CAMERON RILEY,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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JUDGE BRIAN LAMB, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:16-cv-0059 - DAD - JLT
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO PROCEED
IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING THE
MATTER WITHOUT PREJUDICE

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Plaintiff Cameron Riley filed a “Writ of Mandamus” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361, asserting

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the Court should “compel an officer of the United States to perform his duty.” (Doc. 1) Because

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Plaintiff is unable to state claim upon which relief may be granted by this Court, it is recommended

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that Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis be DENIED and the matter be DISMISSED

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without prejudice.

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I.

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Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
As a general rule, all parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a United States

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District Court must pay a filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the Court may authorize the

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commencement of an action “without prepayment of fees and costs of security therefor, by a person

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who submits an affidavit that . . . the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.” 28

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U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, an action may proceed despite a failure to prepay the filing fee only if

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leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) is granted by the Court. See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d
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1178, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999).
The Ninth Circuit has held “permission to proceed in forma pauperis is itself a matter of

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privilege and not a right; denial of an informa pauperis status does not violate the applicant’s right to

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due process.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Weller v. Dickson, 314

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F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1963)). In addition, the Court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion to

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proceed IFP. O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1990); Weller, 314 F.2d at 600-01. In

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making a determination, the court “must be careful to avoid construing the statute so narrowly that a

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litigant is presented with a Hobson’s choice between eschewing a potentially meritorious claim or

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foregoing life’s plain necessities.” Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F.Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984).

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Here, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP be denied because, as

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discussed below, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915(e)(2).

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II.

Screening Requirement

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When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the Court is required to review the complaint, and

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shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue, or the

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action or appeal is “frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . .

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seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2). A

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claim is frivolous “when the facts alleged arise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,

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whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez,

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504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992).

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III.

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Pleading Standards
General rules for pleading complaints are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A

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pleading stating a claim for relief must include a statement affirming the court’s jurisdiction, “a short

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and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief

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sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

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The Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, and pro se pleadings are held to “less stringent

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standards” than pleadings by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521-21 (1972).

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A complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the plaintiff’s claim in a plain and
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succinct manner. Jones v. Cmty Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Further, a

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plaintiff must identify the grounds upon which the complaint stands. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534

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U.S. 506, 512 (2002). The Supreme Court noted,
Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers
labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further
factual enhancement.

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

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Conclusory and vague allegations do not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d

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266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The Court clarified further,
[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” [Citation]. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. [Citation]. The plausibility
standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. [Citation]. Where a complaint pleads
facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). When factual allegations are well-pled, a court should

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assume their truth and determine whether the facts would make the plaintiff entitled to relief; legal

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conclusions in the pleading are not entitled to the same assumption of truth. Id.
The Court has a duty to dismiss a case at any time it determines an action fails to state a claim,

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“notwithstanding any filing fee that may have been paid.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915e(2). Accordingly, a court

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“may act on its own initiative to note the inadequacy of a complaint and dismiss it for failure to state a

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claim.” See Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal

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Practice and Procedure, § 1357 at 593 (1963)). However, leave to amend a complaint may be granted

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to the extent deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by an amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

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1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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IV.

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Discussion and Analysis
Plaintiff asserts Judge Brian Lamb and Pamela Foster, Executive Office of the Inyo County

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Court, have made errors related to Case No. SICVDV 14-57536. (See generally Doc. 1) Plaintiff

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contends the court lacked jurisdiction over his case, and Judge Lamb erroneously determined the state
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court had jurisdiction. (Id. at 17-18) Further, Plaintiff contends Judge Lamb failed to give him due

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process by giving him “less than 5 minutes to refute the claims” presented against him. According to

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Plaintiff, Judge Lamb changed a domestic violence temporary restraining order “to a permanent 3

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year” restraining order “without a proper hearing or trial” (Id. at 18) Plaintiff contends he attempted

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to serve a document entitled “Writ of error; Challenge of Jurisdiction; Demand for Immediate

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Dismissal/Vacate of Void Judgment” upon Judge Lamb but was unable to do so. (Id. at 7-8) Ms.

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Foster, the Clerk indicated the document was “FILED” on October 25, 2015. (Id. at 16)

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Plaintiff requests that this Court vacate his criminal record, order the return of his property, and
restore his parental rights. (Doc. 1 at 12-13)

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A.

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361, the Court has “original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of

Writ of Mandamus

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mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a

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duty owed to the plaintiff.” The Ninth Circuit has determined Section 1361 does not provide an

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independent ground for jurisdiction or overrides other grounds for dismissal based upon jurisdictional

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defects. See Drake v. Obama, 664 F.3d 774, 785 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011)

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In this case, Plaintiff does not identify any officer or employee of the United States, or one of

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its agencies. Rather, the defendants appear to be individuals, including the judge, involved in

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decisions issued by the state court. Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledges that the defendants “are on the

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payroll of the State of California.” (Doc. 1 at 7) Accordingly, his request for a writ of mandamus fails.

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B.

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Plaintiff challenges the rulings of the state court related to his parental rights, a restraining

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

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order, and Judge Lamb’s determination that the state had jurisdiction over the matter. Importantly,

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however, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a party may not seek appellate review in federal court

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of a decision made by a state court. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court

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of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The Ninth Circuit explained,

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Typically, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from exercising subjectmatter jurisdiction over a proceeding in which a party losing in state court seeks what in
substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district
court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the losers’
federal rights.
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Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

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Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a district court from

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appellate review of “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court

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judgments rendered before the district court proceeding commenced . . .”). Accordingly, the district

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court lacks jurisdiction over “claims . . . ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s decision such

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that the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling.” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334

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F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483, 485)).
In this case, Plaintiff’s request that the Court “vacate” the family court order and child support

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debt owed clearly is a forbidden de facto appeal of the state court’s order directing Plaintiff to pay child

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support. Indeed, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal review of state court decisions regarding

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proceedings in family court. See, e.g., Moore v. County of Butte, 547 Fed. Appx. 826, 829 (9th Cir.

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2013) (finding a plaintiff’s claims challenging the outcome of her child custody proceedings were

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properly dismissed); Ignacio v. Judges of U.S. Court of Appeals, 453 F.3d 1160, 1165-66 (9th Cir.

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2006) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of the case “because the complaint is nothing more than

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another attack on the California superior court’s determination in [the plaintiff’s] domestic case”); see

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also Oliver v. Owens, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159259 at *8-9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2013) (finding the

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Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibited review of “multiple improprieties related to a restraining order”

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issued by the state) Accordingly, the Court is unable to grant Plaintiff the relief requested under the

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Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

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V.

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Findings and Recommendations
In light of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Plaintiff is unable to state a claim upon which relief

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may be granted by this Court. Consequently, leave to amend to amend would be futile. Lopez, 203

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F.3d at 1130 (dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper where it is obvious

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that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts alleged).

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Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED:

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Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) be DENIED;

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Plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandamus be DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO

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AMEND; and
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The matter be DISMISSED without prejudice;

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The remaining motion be terminated as moot; and

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The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to close the action.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned

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to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local Rules of

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Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within fourteen days after

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being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the

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Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

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Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

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waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

January 22, 2016

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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