Jones v. Fresno County Jail

Filing 11

ORDER DISMISSING Action (Strike) with Prejudice for Failure to State a Claim; DISMISSAL COUNTS AS A STRIKE Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(g); Clerk to TERMINATE all Pending Motions and CLOSE CASE signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 4/13/2016. CASE CLOSED. (Sant Agata, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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LATONIA JONES,

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Plaintiff,
v.
FRESNO COUNTY JAIL,

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Defendant.

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CASE No. 1:16-cv-00132-MJS (PC)
ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITH
PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
CLAIM
(ECF No. 10)
DISMISSAL COUNTS AS A STRIKE
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
CLERK TO TERMINATE ALL PENDING
MOTIONS AND CLOSE CASE

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Plaintiff is a County Jail inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this

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civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1 & 4.) She has

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consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 5.) No other parties have appeared

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in the action.

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Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim, and she was given

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leave to amend. (ECF No. 6.) Her first amended complaint is before the Court for

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screening.

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I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has

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raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which

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relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

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such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion

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thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court

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determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may

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be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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II.

PLEADING STANDARD

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Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights,

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privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

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Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

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Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for

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vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94

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(1989).

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To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements:

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(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and

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(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state

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law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d

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1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

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the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations

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are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

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662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

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Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
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that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere

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possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are

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accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

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III.

PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

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Plaintiff is an inmate serving a four year term at the Fresno County Jail. She

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names as defendants (1) the Fresno County Jail Administration Staff, (2) the Sheriff’s

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Department, and (3) Sheriff Mims.

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Aside from the inclusion of additional defendants, Plaintiff’s allegations are

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repeated verbatim from her first amended complaint and may be summarized essentially

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as follows.

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There is mildew, black mold, and rust in the shower and living area of the jail.

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According to Plaintiff, the jail is 100 years old and has been condemned three times. The

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Sheriff’s Department knows that the conditions in the jail are unsafe and unhealthy but

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continues to house inmates there. As a result of the living conditions, Plaintiff has black

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and red spots all over her body. Medical staff has been unable to identify the spots and

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has referred Plaintiff to a specialist. Plaintiff must undergo breathing treatments three to

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six times per month. She uses an inhaler twice a day and has high blood pressure.

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Plaintiff alleges that these conditions violate her Eighth Amendment right to be

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free from cruel and unusual punishment. She seeks “medical help,” money damages,

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and to be moved to a different jail facility.

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IV.

ANALYSIS

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The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment protects

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prisoners from inhumane conditions of confinement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

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832 (1994); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

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395 n.10 (1989). Under the Eighth Amendment, a conditions of confinement claim has

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both an objective and a subjective component. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “First, the

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deprivation alleged must be . . . sufficiently serious,” and must “result in the denial of the

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minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. “[E]xtreme deprivations are required
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to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. Second, the

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prison official must have acted with “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk of

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serious harm to the inmate. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “Mere negligence is not sufficient

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to establish liability.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). Rather, a

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plaintiff must set forth facts to show that a defendant knew of, but disregarded, an

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excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. That is, “the official

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must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

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risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.

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In order to proceed against the Jail or the Sheriff’s Department on allegations of

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cruel and unusual punishment, Plaintiff must allege that “a deliberate policy, custom, or

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practice . . . was the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation . . . suffered.”

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Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007); City of Canton, Ohio,

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v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). Under this route, the plaintiff must satisfy traditional

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§ 1983 requirements and show that “the municipality acted with ‘the state of mind

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required to prove the underlying violation.’” Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175,

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1187 (2002) (quoting Board of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 404

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(1994)). Here, that standard is deliberate indifference. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

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825, 834 (1994).

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Alternatively, municipal liability may be imposed where the local government unit’s

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omission led to the constitutional violation by its employee. Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1186.

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Under this route to municipal liability, the “plaintiff must show that the municipality’s

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deliberate indifference led to its omission and that the omission caused the employee to

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commit the constitutional violation.” Id. This kind of deliberate indifference is found when

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the need to remedy the omission is so obvious, and the failure to act so likely to result in

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the violation of rights, that the municipality reasonably can be said to have been

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deliberately indifferent when it failed to act. Id. at 1195.

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Plaintiff’s allegation that she is housed in an area with unsanitary conditions that

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have affected her health is a sufficiently serious deprivation to state a conditions of
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confinement claim. The Ninth Circuit has determined that “subjection of a prisoner to lack

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of sanitation that is severe or prolonged can constitute an infliction of pain within the

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meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Anderson v. Cnty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314 (9th

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Cir. 1995) (holding an inmate must demonstrate that the sanitary limitations imposed on

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him or her were more than temporary), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 75 F.3d 448

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(9th Cir.1995).

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However, Plaintiff fails to allege deliberate indifference. Although Plaintiff now

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names Sheriff Mims and unspecified Jail “Administration Staff” as defendants, she does

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not allege any facts regarding these defendants. She therefore has not pled that any

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particular person knew of, but disregarded, a substantial risk to her health or safety

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caused by the unsanitary conditions. And, Plaintiff’s claims against the Fresno County

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Jail and Fresno County Sheriff’s Department fail for the reasons stated in the Court’s

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prior screening order. Plaintiff appears to allege that the Jail and/or Sheriff’s Department

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has a policy of housing female inmates at a particular institution. However, she has not

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alleged facts to show that municipal policy makers know that this policy will expose

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inmates to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation

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that the Sheriff’s Department knows that the conditions are unsafe and unhealthy is

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insufficient, as is Plaintiff’s allegation that the jail at one time was condemned.

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Plaintiff twice has been advised of these legal standards and of the deficiencies in

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her complaints but has failed to cure them. Further leave to amend would be futile and

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will be denied.

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V.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

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Plaintiff’s second amended complaint fails to state a cognizable claim. She

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previously was advised of pleading deficiencies and afforded the opportunity to correct

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them. She failed to do so. Any further leave to amend reasonably appears futile and will

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be denied.

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Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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The action is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim;
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2.

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Dismissal counts as a strike pursuant to the “three strikes” provision set
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); and

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The Clerk of the Court shall terminate all pending motions and close the
case.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

April 13, 2016

/s/

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Michael J. Seng

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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